The article outlines the distributive demands of relational equality in the form of a dynamic corridor of legitimate distributive inequality. It does so by complementing the already widely accepted sufficientarian floor with a limitarian ceiling, leading, in a first step, to a "corridor" of limited distributive inequality as a necessary condition for relational equality. This corridor alone, however, only provides necessary distributive conditions for relational equality and still allows for degrees of distributive inequality that would risk undermining egalitarian relations. Thus, (...) in a second step, intra-corridor distributive inequalities must be regulated by two further constraints: a (context- dependent) ratio between the best- and worst-off, and a demand for equality of opportunity so that inequalities result from people’s responsible choices. This set of demands spells out the distributive conditions that are not only necessary, but sufficient to provide a sound distributive basis for relational equality. After presenting this view, the article defends it against several objections. (shrink)

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Structural Injustice has become a hugely important concept in the field of political theory with the work of Iris Marion Young central to debates on what it is, what motivates it and how it should be addressed. In this article, I focus on a particular thread in Young’s account of structural injustice which I argue is all too often overlooked - the untraceability of structural injustice. This is not only a constant theme in Young’s account of structural injustice, it is, (...) in fact, a defining feature. By ‘untraceable’, Young means that structural injustice is distinct from other sorts of injustices for which there is a traceable agent at fault – these sorts of faut-based injustices fall under what Young calls the ‘liability model of injustice’. For the purposes of exploring the concept of structural injustice, I follow the logic of the claim that structural injustice is untraceable to see where it takes us in conversation with Young’s critics. I conclude that Young’s account is not only defensible with some clarification and development but vital politically. That said, I also find Young’s account of political responsibility for structural injustice wanting and accordingly I propose a way of understanding what I see as a dynamic transition from structural to fault-based injustices which I argue Young’s more ‘static’ account fails to accommodate. This is important, I suggest, for thinking about the ways in which responsibility for different forms of injustice operate and change. _Contemporary Political Theory_ (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-023-00634-4. (shrink)

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The call to make artificial intelligence (AI) more democratic, or to “democratize AI,” is sometimes framed as a promising response for mitigating algorithmic injustice or making AI more aligned with social justice. However, the notion of “democratizing AI” is elusive, as the phrase has been associated with multiple meanings and practices, and the extent to which it may help mitigate algorithmic injustice is still underexplored. In this paper, based on a socio-technical understanding of algorithmic injustice, I examine three notable notions (...) of democratizing AI and their associated measures—democratizing AI use, democratizing AI development, and democratizing AI governance—regarding their respective prospects and limits in response to algorithmic injustice. My examinations reveal that while some versions of democratizing AI bear the prospect of mitigating the concern of algorithmic injustice, others are somewhat limited and might even function to perpetuate unjust power hierarchies. This analysis thus urges a more fine-grained discussion on how to democratize AI and suggests that closer scrutiny of the power dynamics embedded in the socio-technical structure can help guide such explorations. (shrink)

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Invalidation from healthcare practitioners is an experience shared by many patients, especially those marginalized or living with contested conditions (e.g., chronic pain, fibromyalgia, etc.). Invalidation can include not taking someone’s testimony seriously, imposing one’s thoughts, discrediting someone’s emotions, or not perceiving someone’s testimony as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. Epistemic injustices have been used as a theoretical framework to understand invalidation that occurs in the patient-healthcare (...) provider relationship. However, to date, the different recommendations to achieve epistemic justice have not been listed, analyzed, nor compared yet. This paper aims at better understanding the state of the literature and to critically review possible avenues to achieve epistemic justice in healthcare. A systematic and critical review of the existing literature on epistemic justice was conducted. The search in four databases identified 629 articles, from which 35 were included in the review. Strategies to promote epistemic justice that can be applied to healthcare are mapped in the literature and sorted in six different approaches to epistemic justice, including virtuous, structural, narrative, cognitive, and partnership approaches, as well as resistance strategies. These strategies are critically appraised. A patient partnership approach based on the Montreal Model, implemented at all levels of healthcare systems, seems promising to promote epistemic justice in healthcare. (shrink)

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Structural injustice exists when the influence of social structure exposes some groups of people to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned power to others. It has been argued that the responsibility for addressing structural injustices should be shared among those participating in the social structure and can only be discharged through collective action; however, the proper form of collective action does not happen easily. To address structural injustice effectively, we need to gain clarity on the practical challenges that are involved and (...) explore possible means of implementing shared responsibility. This chapter thus aims to contribute to the study of addressing structural injustice in the following two ways. First, building on previous studies, I categorize three forms of practical challenges that have been encountered by existing proposals for discharging shared responsibility for structural injustice. Second, I offer an alternative proposal, which I will refer to as the deliberative mini-public proposal, and argue that it has the potential to mobilize structural change and better overcome the identified practical challenges. (shrink)

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Reflecting on the rapid growth of epistemic injustice scholarship, this article proposes an ‘active alignment account’ for relating epistemic and social justice. The account contains both critical and constructive elements. The critical aim of the article is to argue that debates about epistemic and social justice are commonly misaligned. A focus on epistemic injustice can distort social justice agendas and epistemic recognition can be actively turned against the material interests of epistemically recognized actors. The constructive aim of the article is (...) to show that epistemic justice nonetheless remains central to many social justice agendas. Recognizing both distortions and centrality leads to the demand of ‘active alignment’ according to which epistemic justice needs to be proactively connected with material conditions of social justice. (shrink)

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In this paper, we discuss epistemic and ethical concerns brought about by machine learning (ML) systems implemented in medicine. We begin by fleshing out the logic underlying a common approach in the specialized literature (which we call the informativeness account). We maintain that the informativeness account limits its analysis to the impact of epistemological issues on ethical concerns without assessing the bearings that ethical features have on the epistemological evaluation of ML systems. We argue that according to this methodological approach, (...) epistemological issues are instrumental to and autonomous of ethical considerations. This means that the informativeness account considers epistemological evaluation uninfluenced and unregulated by an ethical counterpart. Using an example that does not square well into the informativeness account, we argue for ethical assessments that have a substantial influence on the epistemological assessment of ML and that such influence should not be understood as merely informative but rather regulatory. Drawing on the case analyzed, we claim that within the theoretical framework of the informativeness approach, forms of epistemic injustice—especially epistemic objectification—remain unaddressed. Our analysis should motivate further research investigating the regulatory role that ethical elements play in the epistemology of ML. (shrink)

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Tout être humain sera exposé un jour à un certain degré de souffrance. Une tranche de la population, les personnes vivant l’itinérance, sera cependant beaucoup plus susceptible de côtoyer la mort, la maladie et les deuils. En effet, au Québec, elles sont quatre fois plus à risque de développer un cancer et leur espérance de vie se situe entre 42 et 52 ans. Devant la mortalité et la morbidité élevées rencontrées dans la population itinérante est soulevée cette question : est-ce (...) que ces individus ont un accès équitable aux ressources en soins palliatifs? L’arrivée de la Loi 2 en 2015 a permis d’encadrer les soins de fin de vie au Québec. Au coeur de cette loi se trouve le droit des malades en fin de vie d’avoir accès à des soins palliatifs pour prévenir et apaiser leurs souffrances. Or, plusieurs enjeux viennent influencer l’accessibilité aux soins palliatifs pour la population itinérante, notamment des facteurs individuels tels que la maladie mentale et la dépendance aux substances, compliquant la recherche de soins. La méfiance des individus ayant vécu de multiples expériences traumatiques ajoute une barrière supplémentaire. De plus, trop occupées à survivre, ces personnes naviguent difficilement dans le système de santé. Des facteurs structuraux, tels l’absence de logements abordables ou les répercussions d’un système en silos moins adapté aux situations sociales complexes contribuent au manque d’accessibilité. Les préjugés sont très répandus, participant à l’exclusion symbolique et institutionnelle de cette population. L’objectif de cet article sera donc d’approfondir notre compréhension des enjeux d’accès aux soins palliatifs pour la population en situation d’itinérance au Québec. (shrink)

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