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The philosophy of mind

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall (1962)

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  1. A defense of the knowledge argument.Brie Gertler -1999 -Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.
    This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to physical facts. Materialist reduction of the phenomenal is, thus, (...) untenable; materialists must adopt a more extreme, eliminativist view about the phenomenal. (shrink)
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  • II. The ontological status of mental images.Robert N. Audi -1978 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4):348-361.
    This paper explores the question whether an adequate account of the facts about imagination and mental imagery must construe mental images as objects. Much of the paper is a study of Alastair Hannay's defense of an affirmative answer in his wide?ranging study, Mental Images ? A Defence. The paper first sets out and evaluates Hannay's case. The second part develops an alternative account of mental images, including non?visual images, which Hannay does not treat in detail. The alternative account is analogous (...) to the adverbial theory of perception; and it is suggested how this account, without construing mental images as objects, might accommodate the data from which Hannay argues for their objecthood. (shrink)
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  • Images et réalités du behaviorisme.Jean Bélanger -1978 -Philosophiques 5 (1):3-110.
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  • Phenomenal properties and the identity theory.J.-B. Blumenfeld -1985 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):485-93.
  • Meaning, identification and other minds.J. W. Meiland -1964 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):360-374.
  • (1 other version)Agent and Spectator: The Double-Aspect Theory.G. N. A. Vesey -1968 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 1:139-159.
    One of the theories defined in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, published in 1901, is ‘The Double Aspect Theory’. It is ‘the theory of the relation of mind and body, which teaches that mental and bodily facts are parallel manifestations of a single underlying reality’. It ‘professes to overcome the onesidedness of materialism and idealism by regarding both series as only different aspects of the same reality, like the convex and the concave views of a curve; or, according to (...) another favourite metaphor, the bodily and the mental facts are really the same facts expressed in different language’. (shrink)
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