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  1. What is it to Share Contraceptive Responsibility?Emmalon Davis -2017 -Topoi 36 (3):489-499.
    There are three stages at which procreative outcomes can be prevented or altered: (1) prior to conception (2) during pregnancy and (3) after birth. Daniel Engster (Soc Theory Pract 36(2):233–262, 2010) has ably argued that plans to prevent or alter procreative outcomes at stages (2) and (3)—through abortion and adoption—introduce financial, physical, and emotional hardships to which women are disproportionately vulnerable. In this paper, I argue that plans to prevent or alter undesirable procreative outcomes at stage (1)—through contraception use—similarly disadvantage (...) women. I suggest that accounts proposing moral responsibilities to delay or permanently avoid procreation are insufficiently attentive to the methods through which undesirable procreative outcomes might be prevented and how such methods unfairly burden women. In conclusion, I propose several ways that men and women might more equitably share contraceptive responsibility. (shrink)
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  • Bad moms, blameless dads: The portrayal of maternal and paternal age and preconception harm in U.S. newspapers.Lisa Campo-Engelstein,Laura Beth Santacrose,Zubin Master &Wendy M. Parker -2016 -AJOB Empirical Bioethics 7 (1):56-63.
  • The Responsibility Objection to Thomson Re-imagined: What If Men Were Held to a Parallel Standard?Vicki Toscano -2023 -International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 16 (2):26-45.
    This article focuses on a resonant debate initiated by the publication of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s groundbreaking article “On Defense of Abortion” in 1971. It is my contention that philosophers who argued against Thomson based on what has come to be called the “Responsibility Objection” did not fully examine the gender assumptions embedded in their logic. Rather than attempt to prove the flaw in the Responsibility Objection directly, I demonstrate it by applying the same logic used to discuss women’s responsibilities to (...) men to prove that it also supports forcing men to get a vasectomy. What I show is that the Responsibility Objection, when no longer clothed in a set of gendered assumptions, is not logically convincing. Further, given that the Responsibility Objection supports the logic the U.S. Supreme Court recently relied on in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women’s Health in overruling Roe vs. Wade, the examination of the flaws in this logic is timely and important. (shrink)
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