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Sarbanes–Oxley Section 406 requires a code of ethics for top financial and accounting officers in public companies. The objective of this research is to discover the impact of a financial code of ethics on firm behavior. We performed a longitudinal tracking of firm adoption of a financial code of ethics starting in 2005. We checked these companies’ codes again in 2011 to confirm their continued implementation. Financial restatements were used as a dependent variable to measure improved financial reporting after the (...) adoption of the financial codes. The results confirm that the adoption of a financial code of ethics improves the integrity of financial reporting. (shrink) | |
Both the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 include clawback provisions that require executives to pay back incentive compensation earned on financial statements that are restated in a subsequent period. Such provisions intend to reduce unethical reporting behavior by executives who otherwise might be more inclined to misstate financial statements to boost incentive-based compensation. However, such provisions could promote rather than deter unethical behavior. In particular, Pyzoha :2515–2536, 2015) finds that, under certain conditions, executives are less (...) willing to restate financial statements in the presence of a clawback policy. Similarly, auditors might also act unethically by being less likely to propose restatements in the presence of clawbacks to avoid upsetting management. To examine this possibility, this study reports the results of three experiments that examine the effect of clawback provisions on auditor judgment. Contrary to expectations, our three experiments, along with supplemental qualitative evidence consistently indicate that clawbacks do not affect auditors’ propensity to propose restatements. These results suggest that a decrease in the number of restatements in a clawback environment will not be due to auditors acting unethically to appease management. The effects of clawbacks on auditors’ risk assessments, however, are less conclusive. As such, we offer potential post hoc explanations to guide future research. (shrink) | |
Recent conceptualizations of auditors’ professional skepticism suggest the interplay between analytical and intuitive information processing. We conduct an in-depth empirical investigation to explore this relationship, drawing on 49 interviews with auditors from the Big Four audit firms in the UK. It reveals that auditors’ skepticism often emerges intuitively in response to interpersonal contexts, manifesting as feelings of discomfort. These intuitive responses guide subsequent, more deliberative processes of collecting and analyzing audit evidence. The research demonstrates that such intuitive feelings are integral (...) to auditors’ recognition of potential issues, thereby enhancing their cognitive evaluations. Additionally, the study explores how auditors’ skeptical judgments are continuously shaped by their social environments and the intuitions of other members of their audit teams. Ultimately, the findings affirm that the fusion of intuition and reasoning plays a crucial role in auditors’ practice of PS, with past practice experiences and social interactions enriching their intuitive assessments and contributing to developing their professional expertise. (shrink) | |
The audit profession’s technical and ethical standards require the application of professional skepticism throughout the financial statement audit process, as auditor skepticism is essential for detecting financial statement fraud and protecting the investing public. However, recent research suggests that audit supervisors often punish staff for exercising skepticism, presenting auditors with an ethical conflict between acting in their own self-interest and acting in a way that improves audit quality and protects the public. This research also suggests that supervisors who reward appropriate (...) skeptical behavior, regardless of the outcome, appear to develop staff that are more likely to detect and convey fraud red flags to their superiors. Building on this research, we use a case-based survey to identify the characteristics of audit supervisors (audit seniors and managers) who are more likely to reward appropriate skepticism, even if it ultimately does not identify a misstatement. We find that trait skepticism, especially suspending one’s judgment, positively drives the evaluations of professional skepticism in our setting. Also, we observe that when supervisors believe that their own audit partner will view the skepticism favorably, they “pay it forward” by rewarding their own staff who engage in skepticism. Our findings identify the characteristics that audit firms may want to develop and foster in auditors rising to supervisory levels. (shrink) | |
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