This paper comes out of a panel honoring the work of Anne Donchin (1940-2014), which took place at the 2016 Congress of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (FAB) in Edinburgh. My general aim is to highlight the contributions Anne made to feminist bioethics, and to feminist reproductive ethics in particular. My more specific aim, however, is to have a kind of conversation with Anne, through her work, about whether reproductive justice could demand insurance coverage for in vitro (...) fertilization. I quote liberally from Anne’s work for this purpose, but also to shower the reader with her words, reminding those of us who knew her well what a wonderful colleague she was. (shrink)

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How should we understand the duties between those who share in parenting a child? Those who engage in shared parenting have duties to each other derived from the child's interests, but they also have additional duties to each other as sharers in parenting. The intentional account of duties between parents appears unable to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting, as it seems to permit a parent to relinquish unilaterally their duties of shared parenting. Drawing on the work of (...) Bratman, Alonso, and Scanlon, I develop a shared intention account of duties of shared parenting. Duties of shared parenting are constituted by the distinctive combination of the value of reliance in shared intentions, the importance of assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy is deciding one's goals, and the entitlement to choose with whom one shares the intimacy of parenting. On this view, duties of shared parenting are shown to be stringent, but not duties of strict performance. Thus, I argue that the intentional account of parental duties is able to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting. (shrink)

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The potential emergence of morally relevant digital minds capable of reproduction raises profound ethical and societal questions. This paper analyses the possible implications of allowing these entities to replicate and create new offspring. The reproductive processes of digital minds may differ significantly from biological reproduction, presenting unique scenarios such as asexual (mass-) production of identical copies as well as structured self-modification. Moreover, scenarios, such as unintended reproduction, surrogate reproduction, non-consensual reproduction as well as reproduction with undesired outcomes, are examined for (...) their ethical ramifications. Motivations, requirements and procedures for digital minds to reproduce as well as population control methods are introduced and categorised. This leads to deliberations of risks and challenges linked to the reproduction of digital minds, including resource depletion, digital overcrowding and the emergence of rogue digital entities. The paper concludes with a draft of prospective policy recommendations aimed at ensuring responsible governance of reproductive rights for digital minds, balancing their autonomy and self-determination with the potential societal impacts of unregulated digital reproduction. (shrink)

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