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What is dignity? My starting point is that dignity is one of those philosophical primitives that admit of no informative analysis. Nonetheless, I suggest, dignity might yield to indirect illumination when we consider the kind of experience we have (or rather find it fitting to have) in its presence. This experience, I claim, is what is sometimes known asrecognition-respect. Through an examination of a neglected aspect of the phenomenology ofrecognition-respect, I argue that the possession (...) of inner consciousness is a precondition for the possession of dignity. The reason for this, I suggest, is that the ultimate privacy of the contents of our consciousness grounds a kind of inviolability characteristic of dignity. (shrink)

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Gervais & Fessler’s defense of a sentiment construct for contempt captures features distinguishing the phenomenon from basic emotions and highlights the fact that it comprises a coordinated syndrome of responses. However, their conceptualization of contempt as the absence ofrespect equivocates. Subsequently, a “dignity” culture that prescribesrespect does not thereby limit legitimate contempt in the manner the authors claim.

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Since the early modern period, the vast majority of philosophers who have written on contempt have understood it as a denial ofrespect. But there has been considerable disagreement about precisely what kind ofrespect we deny people when we contemn them. Contemporary philosophers who defend contempt as a morally appropriate attitude tend to understand it as a denial of what Stephen Darwall calls appraisalrespect, while early modern writers, who all believe that contemning others constitutes a (...) serious moral wrong, seem to understand it more as a denial ofrecognitionrespect. In this paper, I argue that neither of these understandings of contempt hits the mark and that we do better to conceptualize it as a denial ofrecognition in the sense articulated by Axel Honneth and by other critical theorists who have been influenced by his work. (shrink)

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This paper develops and defends a paradigm-based explanation ofrespect. Paradigm-based explanations propose to illuminate subject matter that are basically disunified, by identifying a form of them (“the paradigm”) that is then shown to be explanatorily basic to the subject as a whole. This explanatory strategy is well-suited to the subject ofrespect, which is widely agreed to encompass two distinct kinds, appraisalrespect andrecognitionrespect. Accordingly, the paper sets out to determine which of (...) these two kinds is paradigmatic and which, derivative. It begins by advancing a novel account of appraisalrespect (“perspectivalrespect”), which it also hypothesizes isrespect in its paradigmatic form. On this hypothesis, perspectivalrespect is paradigmatic in virtue of its apparent “point” or function, which is that it constitutively aims at understanding another person’s perspective on things. The paper then tests the viability of this hypothesis by showing how one central form ofrecognitionrespect (“respect for persons”) can reasonably be understood to derive fromrespect in its paradigmatic form, by showing how it is illuminated by the aim of interpersonal understanding. (shrink)

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Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems isrespect (in the sense ofrespect for persons or so-calledrecognition-respect). However, discussions ofrespect in analytic moral philosophy have tended (...) to focus almost entirely on its functional role, in particular the behaviors thatrespect disposes us to engage in (or refrain from). Here we wish to investigate the phenomenal character ofrespect, what it is like to feelrespect for persons. Since Kant is the reference point for modern discussions ofrespect, we try to reconstruct Kant’s account of the phenomenology ofrespect, but also endeavor to refine his account in light of our own phenomenological observations. (shrink)

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This paper argues that relations of mutualrecognition (love,respect, esteem, trust) contribute directly and non-reductively to our flourishing as relational selves. -/- Love is important for the quality of human life. Not only do everyday experiences and analyses of pop culture and world literature attest to this; scientific research does as well. How exactly does love contribute to well-being? This chapter discusses the suggestion that it not only matters for the experiential quality of life, or for successful (...) agency, but that it actualizes our nature as “relational selves” (Chen, Boucher & Kraus 2011). I defend a hybrid or pluralist theory, which sees humans not only as subjects of experiences, or agents, or valuers, but also as relational selves. Expanding from love to other interpersonal relations, thriving relations of mutualrecognition (love,respect, esteem, trust), contribute directly and non-reductively to our flourishing as relational selves. The paper will start by putting forward the proposal (Section 2), and then discussing it in relation to important alternatives. The focus is on alternatives which hold that love, and other forms of mutualrecognition, are important for well-being, but only indirectly. One kind of challenge against the constitutive role of relations to others for well-being comes from the traditional theories that accommodate relations in some indirect ways (Section 3). A second kind of challenge admits that perhaps love is central to well-being in a direct way, but do we have reason to believe that other forms of mutualrecognition are as well? (Section 4) Yet another kind of challenge is that love matters for the quality of lives in some other way than contributing to its prudential value: love is good, but is it good for us? (Section 5) A fourth kind of challenge concerns what we are, and the nature of “essentialism” involved in the approach stressing relational selfhood: cannot, say, motherhood contribute to one’s good life even if motherhood is contingent and not essential? (Section 6). In debates onrecognition the idea that mutualrecognition is also relevant for well-being has been put forward, for example in Axel Honneth’s (1992, ch.9 ) ”formal” theory of good life. Whatever else constitutes good life, relations ofrecognition form its backbone (cf. Ikäheimo 2014). Surprisingly little however is written about mutualrecognition and well-being in detail, orrecognition in comparison to traditional theories of well-being. This chapter aims to fill some of that void, and at the same time defend the view that well-being is one of the normative notions with which mutualrecognition has a constitutive relationship. (shrink)

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Rawls’s remarks on self-respect have been described as cryptic or ambiguous. The discussion on the meaning ofrespect and, specifically, Rawlsian self-respect has been considerably influenced by Darwall’s distinction betweenrecognitionrespect and appraisalrespect. Since Rawls identifies self-respect as an essential element of his theory of justice, clarifying the meaning of this concept is essential. This paper defends that Darwall’s dichotomic understanding ofrespect does not clarify Rawlsian conception of self-respect. (...) Rawls uses the term self-respect to refer both torecognition self-respect and appraisal self-respect. However, he presents a third kind of self-respect which could be termed “value-confidence”. This third kind of self-respect concerns one’s confidence in the value of the particular conception of the good one has chosen. This value-confidence cannot be identified withrecognition self-respect, since the latter has the fact of moral personality as its object, not the particular conception one happens to choose. (shrink)

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What does it mean to listen to someone respectfully, that is, insofar as they are duerecognitionrespect? This paper addresses that question and gives the following answer: it is to listen in such a way that you are open to being surprised. A specific interpretation of this openness to surprise is then defended.

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`Duerecognition is a vital human need', argues Charles Taylor. In this article I explore this oft-quoted claim from two complementary and equally appealing perspectives. The bottom—up approach is constructed around Axel Honneth's theory ofrecognition, and the top—down approach is exemplified by T. M. Scanlon's brief remarks about mutualrecognition. The former can be summed up in the slogan `wronging by misrecognizing', the latter in the slogan `misrecognizing by wronging'. Together they provide two complementary readings of (...) the claim that duerecognition is a vital human need: one starts from needs, shows how we have a multifarious need for adequaterecognition and builds up to a view about wronging; the other starts from wronging and discusses the kind of interest or need that we have of standing in relations where wronging is absent. (shrink)

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My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...) debate — each side of which, I argue, correctly points to issues that need to be jointly accommodated in the Kantian account of practical reason. The constructivist points to the essential efficacy of practical reason, while the realist claims that any genuinely cognitive exercise of practical reason owes allegiance to what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. I argue that a Kantian account ofrespect for persons (“recognitionrespect”) suggests how the two claims might be jointly accommodated. The result is an empirical moral realism that is itself neutral on the received Kantian metaethical debate. (shrink)

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In recent years the term ‘recognition’ has been used in ever more variegated theoretical contexts. This article contributes to the discussion of how the concept(s) expressed by this term in different debates should be explicated and understood. For the most part it takes the concept itself as its topic rather than making theoretical use of it. Drawing on important work by Ikäheimo and Laitinen and taking Honneth’s tripartite distinction ofrecognition into love,respect, and esteem as a (...) starting point it introduces the conceptual distinction between recognitive attitudes, recognitive relations, and recognitive acts, discusses Brandom’s attempt at explaining self-consciousness in terms of reflexiverecognition mediated by intersubjective recognitive relations and suggests some critical points on how Butler puts the concept ofrecognition to work in her conception of ethics. (shrink)

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We can distinguish two concepts ofrespect for persons: appraisalrespect , an attitude based on a positive appraisal of a person's moral character, andrecognitionrespect , the practice of treating persons with consideration based on the belief that they deserve such treatment. After engaging in an extended analysis of these concepts, I examine two "truisms" about them. We justifiably believe of some persons that they have good character and thus deserve our esteem . Frequently (...) it pays to be disrespectful; e.g., insulting those who insult us may put them in their place. By using empirical results from social and personality psychology and techniques from decision theory in addition to conceptual considerations, I argue that, surprisingly, the above two "truisms" are false. Extensive psychological evidence indicates that most persons are indeterminate---overall neither good nor bad nor intermediate---and that our information about specific persons almost never distinguishes those who are indeterminate from those who are not. The strategy of habitually avoiding disrespectful behavior maximizes long-term expected utility. In sum, we have good pragmatic reason to treat persons respectfully, but we have good epistemic reason to avoid esteeming or despising them. (shrink)

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In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory ofrecognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: (...) The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception ofrecognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereasrecognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love,respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles forrecognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory ofrecognition considers norms ofrecognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life. (shrink)

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The purpose of this chapter is to consider the question of whetherrespect for persons requires toleration of the expression of any extremist political or religious viewpoint within public discourse. The starting point of my discussion is Steven Heyman and Jonathan Quong’s interesting defences of a negative answer to this question. They argue thatrespect for persons requires that liberal democracies should not tolerate the public expression of extremist speech that can be regarded asrecognition-denying or (...) class='Hi'>respect-denying speech – that is, speech or other expressive conduct that expresses viewpoints that explicitly reject that all persons should be regarded and treated as free and equal persons or citizens. According to Heyman and Quong,recognition-denying speech falls outside the scope of the right to participate in public discourse (i.e. what it is a right to). In contrast to Heyman and Quong, one can argue that a strong case can be made for viewpoint neutrality on the basis of what can be called a libertarian or Nozickean status-based theory of rights. According to this theory, toleration in a liberal democracy requiresrespect for the status of persons as thinking agents, andrespect for thinking agents and their sovereignty over their own mind requires viewpoint neutrality – that is, a basic right to participate in public discourse as speakers and listeners free from state-imposed viewpoint-based restrictions. All persons should have a basic right to express, hear and consider any viewpoint within public discourse. This doctrine of viewpoint neutrality requires that citizens in liberal democracies ought to have a legal free speech right to do moral wrong – that is, a legal right to express and defend any viewpoint within public discourse, even if it is morally wrong to express, or expose others to, such views. (shrink)

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Although the international legal framework protects the rights of all persons to adopt or manifest any religion or belief of choice without discrimination, indigenous spirituality is generally dismissed, marginalised or deniedrespect andrecognition in many states. The dismissal and denial ofrecognition of indigenous spirituality has led to severe discrimination against many indigenous communities and human rights violations, including the dispossession and loss of sacred sites, the obstruction of spiritual practices and the violation of the right (...) to religious freedom. This article examines state policies and practices on therecognition and registration of indigenous religious groups and the implications for their exercise of religious freedom. It argues that while states’recognition of indigenous spirituality has grown in recent decades, indigenous beliefs remain among the most marginalised, disrespected, discriminated and unrecognised. Consequently, many indigenous groups cannot fully exercise their religious freedom. (shrink)

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According to a prominent narrative, the problem ofrecognition arises in the modern period in opposition to premodern notions of honor. This chapter invites us to reconsider this narrative by examining two views of honor in ancient Greek thought. I first show that Homeric honor includes contestable norms of reciprocalrespect and esteem for individual virtue. I then show how Plato appropriates the Homeric view in his ethical psychology yet articulates a competing view of the nature and value (...) of honor. By showing that ancient Greek honor is more continuous with theories ofrecognition than has been appreciated, this chapter offers fresh perspectives on a central strand of ancient Greek ethics and its relevance to social and political thought. (shrink)

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The sixth IPCC report states that a proper conception of climate justice that can address the complexity of the phenomenon of anthropogenic climate change as a whole requires considering not only one but rather three dimensions of justice today: redistributive, procedural, andrecognition dimensions. In this article, my focus is on exploring the latter dimension, drawing special attention to climate policies addressing cultural-identity issues. In the first section, I illustrate how climate policies can be connected to discriminatory practices against (...) minority cultures and their identities. To do so, I take the struggles of Black movements against environmental racism and the struggles of Indigenous peoples against a colonialist cultural heritage as case studies. In the second section, I look into the most advanced normative model to address the dimension ofrecognition, its advantages, and how it addresses the so-called ‘institutionalization of cultural patterns’ in climate policies: the Nancy Fraser model. Finally, in the third section, I investigate an aspect that remains open. It concerns the matter of how to use institutional authority to ‘deinstitutionalize’ non-ecological cultural patterns, while respecting pluralism and avoiding falling into the risks of institutional paternalism. (shrink)

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In this volume Axel Honneth deepens and develops his highly influential theory ofrecognition, showing how it enables us both to rethink the concept of justice and to offer a compelling account of the relationship between social reproduction and individual identity formation. Drawing on his reassessment of Hegel’s practical philosophy, Honneth argues that our conception of social justice should be redirected from a preoccupation with the principles of distributing goods to a focus on the measures for creating symmetrical relations (...) ofrecognition. This theoretical reorientation has far-reaching implications for the theory of justice, as it obliges this theory to engage directly with problems concerning the organization of work and with the ideologies that stabilize relations of domination. In the final part of this volume Honneth shows how the theory ofrecognition provides a fruitful and illuminating way of exploring the relation between social reproduction and identity formation. Rather than seeing groups as regressive social forms that threaten the autonomy of the individual, Honneth argues that the ‘I’ is dependent on forms of socialrecognition embodied in groups, since neither self-respect nor self-esteem can be maintained without the supportive experience of practising shared values in the group. This important new book by one of the leading social philosophers of our time will be of great interest to students and scholars in philosophy, sociology, politics and the humanities and social sciences generally. (shrink)

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n this article I address the idea thatrecognition is fundamentally ambivalent: not only can there be bad forms ofrecognition – misrecognition, nonrecognition, disrespect – but that even the good or adequate forms ofrecognition may in some ways be detrimental to the recipient or sustain societal domination (Ikäheimo, Lepold, Stahl 2021). One version of the challenge is that social movements do better by focusing on other concepts thanrecognition, for their progressive aims. I will (...) discuss the non-consequentialist nature of adequacy ofrecognition, value pluralism, the rewards of submissiveness, dialectical progression to adequaterecognition, and “ambivalence of being” as providing partial explanations for the ambivalence ofrecognition, while arguing that adequaterecognition is only contingently ambivalent. By discussing these challenges, I continue to articulate a conception of mutualrecognition and misrecognition that I have developed earlier (Laitinen 2002, 2003, 2010, 2012, Ikäheimo & Laitinen 2007). (shrink)

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It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds ofRespect” (1977), to distinguish between “appraisalrespect” and “recognitionrespect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarianrespect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric ofrespect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion (...) is fundamental and that the definition of an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion ofrespect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions ofrespect. (shrink)

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Conditions forrecognition of religion or belief (RoRB) continued to deteriorate around the world from June 2021 to June 2022. Authoritarian regimes bent on controlling religious activity maintained a foothold in Africa, Asia and parts of Central and South America. The liberties enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights are at serious threat by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine. While in Afghanistan, the Taliban's reclamation of power after twenty years of being kept at bay likely signals a (...) new generation of Afghan boys and girls who will not see their fundamental human rights upheld by the very institutions that are supposed to protect them.​ -/- The ReligiousRecognition Project considers the topic of how countries register religious groups and activities is one of the foremost issues in the modern world when it comes to respecting and protecting freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). The majority of countries and territories (58% or 137 out of 235 studied) either continue to make government registration mandatory for religious groups or provide no registration procedures at all. -/- An even greater majority of countries have established onerous registration procedures, the consequences of which, whether by intention or not, include the disenfranchisement of belief communities, the deregistration or denial of registered status for minority or "untraditional" religious groups, and the state's maintenance of control over the religious and philosophical lives of citizens. In essence, issues of registration remain a harbinger of worse violations of FoRB to come so if a focus is placed on dismantling these misusedrecognition and registration systems, it is possible that we could see a brighter future for FoRB conditions in countries worst effected by this issue. (shrink)

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We argue that the interaction of biased media coverage and widespread employment of therecognition heuristic can produce epistemic injustices. First, we explain therecognition heuristic as studied by Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues, highlighting how some of its components are largely external to, and outside the control of, the cognitive agent. We then connect therecognition heuristic with recent work on the hypotheses of embedded, extended, and scaffolded cognition, arguing that therecognition heuristic is best understood (...) as an instance of scaffolded cognition. In section three, we consider the double-edged sword of cognitive scaffolding. On the one hand, scaffolds can reduce the internal processing demands on cognitive agents while increasing their access to information. On the other hand, the use of scaffolding leaves cognitive agents increasingly vulnerable to forming false beliefs or failing to form beliefs at all about particular topics. Withrespect to therecognition heuristic, agents rely on third parties (such as the media) to report not just what’s true but also what’s important or valuable. This makes cognitive agents relying on these third parties vulnerable to two erroneous influences: 1) because they don’t recognize something, it isn’t important or valuable, and 2) because they do recognize something, it is important or valuable. Call the latter the Kardashian Inference and the former the Darfur Inference. In section four, we use Fricker’s (2007) concept of epistemic injustice to characterize the nature and harm of these false inferences, with special emphasis on the Darfur Inference. In section five, we use data-mining and an empirical study to show how Gigerenzer’s population estimation task is liable to produce Darfur Inferences. We conclude with some speculative remarks on more important Darfur Inferences, and how to avoid them by scaffolding better. One primary way to accomplish this it to shift the burden of embodying the virtue of epistemic justice from the hearer or consumer of media to the media themselves. (shrink)

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The cardinal role that notions ofrespect and self-respect play in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has already been abundantly examined in the literature. In contrast, it has hardly been noticed that these notions are also central to Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice.Respect and self-respect are not only central topics of his chapter “Recognition”, but constitute a central aim of a “complex egalitarian society” and of Walzer’s theory of justice. This paper substantiates this thesis (...) and elucidates Walzer’s criticism of Rawls that we need to distinguish between “self-respect” and “self-esteem”. (shrink)

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The cardinal role that notions ofrespect and self-respect play in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has already been abundantly examined in the literature. However, it has hardly been noticed that these notions are also central for Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice.Respect and self-respect are not only central topics of his chapter on “recognition”, but constitute a central aim of his whole theory of justice. This paper substantiates this thesis and elucidates Walzer’s criticism of (...) Rawls’s that we need to distinguish between “self-respect” and “self-esteem”. (shrink)

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This paper provides a theoretical discussion with point of departure in the case of Denmark of some of the theoretical issues concerning the relation liberal states may have to religion in general and religious minorities in particular. Liberal political philosophy has long taken for granted that liberal states have to be religiously neutral. The paper asks what a liberal state is withrespect to religion and religious minorities if it is not a strictly religiously neutral state with full separation (...) of church and state and of religion and politics. To illuminate this question, the paper investigates a particular case of an arguably reasonably liberal state, namely the Danish state, which is used as a particular illustration of the more general phenomenon of “moderately secular” states, and considers how one might understand its relations to religion. The paper then considers the applicability to this case of three theoretical concepts drawn from liberal political philosophy, namely neutrality, toleration andrecognition, while simultaneously using the case to suggest ways in which standard understandings of these concepts may be problematic and have to be refined. (shrink)

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According to Matthew Kramer’s aspirational perfectionism, the state is permitted to provide funding for the arts, sciences, and culture with the aim of securing the warranted self-respect of all citizens. This paper argues that although Kramer is right to think that the state has an important role to play in the economy ofrecognition, his conception of this role is mistaken. I argue, first, that Kramer’s exclusive focus on warrant for self-respect obscures the importance of social phenomena (...) such as stigma, marginalization, and discrimination. Second, I argue that Kramer is mistaken in his reliance on vicarious pride to explain how the various excellences of our fellow citizens provide us with warrant for self-respect. I conclude with a brief sketch an alternative account, according to which the self-respect of citizens of democratic societies is supported by their collective creation and maintenance of just political institutions. (shrink)

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According to a Kantian conception truthfulness is characterised as a requirement ofrespect for the agency of another. In lying we manipulate the other’s rational capacities to achieve ends we know or fear they may not share. This is paradigmatically a failure ofrespect. In this paper we argue that the importance of truthfulness also lies in significant part in the ways in which it supports our agential need to make sense of the world, other people, and ourselves. (...) Since sense-making is something we do together, and that we can support or undermine, it generates norms of interaction that constitute a further, distinct, mode ofrecognition andrespect for another’s agency. But the requirements of truthfulness and support for sense-making sometimes conflict. Through a series of cases, we analyze why and when a rigid insistence on truthfulness is disrespectful of the other and undermining of their agency. (shrink)

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This paper investigates how human interactions with AI-powered chatbots may offend human dignity. Current chatbots, driven by large language models (LLMs), mimic human linguistic behaviour but lack the moral and rational capacities essential for genuine interpersonalrespect. Human beings are prone to anthropomorphise chatbots—indeed, chatbots appear to be deliberately designed to elicit that response. As a result, human beings’ behaviour toward chatbots often resembles behaviours typical of interaction between moral agents. Drawing on a second-personal, relational account of dignity, we (...) argue that interacting with chatbots in this way is incompatible with the dignity of users. We show that, since second-personalrespect is premised on reciprocalrecognition of second-personal moral authority, behaving towards chatbots in ways that convey second-personalrespect is bound to misfire in morally problematic ways, given the lack of reciprocity. Consequently, such chatbot interactions amount to subtle but significant violations of self-respect—therespect we are dutybound to show for our own dignity. We illustrate this by discussing four actual chatbot use cases (information retrieval, customer service, advising, and companionship), and propound that the increasing societal pressure to engage in such interactions with chatbots poses a hitherto underappreciated threat to human dignity. (shrink)

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According to many of its proponents, shared decision making ("SDM") is the right way to interpret the clinician-patient relationship because it respects patient autonomy in decision-making contexts. In particular, medical ethicists have claimed that SDM respects a patient's relational autonomy understood as a capacity that depends upon, and can only be sustained by, interpersonal relationships as well as broader health care and social conditions. This paper challenges that claim. By considering two primary approaches to relational autonomy, this paper argues that (...) standard accounts of SDM actually undermine patient autonomy. It also provides an overview of the obligations generated by the principle ofrespect for relational autonomy that have not been captured in standard accounts of SDM and which are necessary to ensure consistency between clinical practice andrespect for patient autonomy. (shrink)

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This paper is an examination of the concept ofrecognition and its connection with identity andrespect. This is related to the question of how women are or are not adequately recognised or respected for their achievements in sport and whether eliminating sex segregation in sport is a solution. This will require an analysis of the concept of excellence in sport, as well as the relationship between fairness and inclusion in an activity that is fundamentally about bodily movement. (...) I argue that attempts to address the problem of women’srecognition in sport need to do so in ways that neither eliminate sport as a fairness regulated system for developing individual excellence in bodily movement nor that prevent women’s achievement of sporting excellence, with the regard that belongs to them. Doing this requires us to decide whether sport is about champions or about individual excellence. (shrink)

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The traditional role of justice is to arbitrate where the good will of people is not enough, if even present, to settle a dispute between the concerned parties. It is a procedural approach that assumes a fractured relationship between those involved.Recognition, at first glance, would not seem to mirror these aspects of justice. Yetrecognition is very much a subject of justice these days. The aim of this paper is to question the applicability of justice to the (...) practice ofrecognition. The methodological orientation of this paper is a Kantian-style critique of the institution of justice, highlighting the limits of its reach and the dangers of overextension. The critique unfolds in the following three steps: 1) There is an immediate appeal to justice as a practice ofrecognition through its commitment to universality. This allure is shown to be deceptive in providing no prescription for the actual practice of this universality. 2) The interventionist character of justice is designed to address divided relationships. Ifrecognition is only given expression through this channel, then we can only assume division as our starting ground. 3) The outcome of justice inrespect torecognition is identification. This identification is left vulnerable to misrecognition itself, creating a cycle of injustice that demandsrecognition from anew. It seems to be well accepted thatrecognition is essential to justice, but less clear how to do justice torecognition. This paper is an effort in clarification. (shrink)

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For more than two decades, police in the United States have used facialrecognition to surveil civilians. Local police departments deploy facialrecognition technology to identify protestors’ faces while federal law enforcement agencies quietly amass driver’s license and social media photos to build databases containing billions of faces. Yet, despite the widespread use of facialrecognition in law enforcement, there are neither federal laws governing the deployment of this technology nor regulations settings standards withrespect to (...) its development. To make matters worse, the Fourth Amendment—intended to limit police power and enacted to protect against unreasonable searches—has struggled to rein in new surveillance technologies since its inception. -/- This Article examines the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to Carpenter v. United States and suggests that the Court is reinterpreting the amendment for the digital age. Still, the too-slow expansion of privacy protections raises challenging questions about racial bias, the legitimacy of police power, and ethical issues in artificial intelligence design. This Article proposes the development of an algorithmic auditing and accountability market that not only sets standards for AI development and limitations on governmental use of facialrecognition but encourages collaboration between public interest technologists and regulators. Beyond the necessary changes to the technological and legal landscape, the current system of policing must also be reevaluated if hard-won civil liberties are to endure. (shrink)

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In this paper I argue that equalrespect-based accounts of the normative basis of tolerance are self-defeating, insofar as they are unable to specify the limits of tolerance in a way that is consistent with their own commitment to the equal treatment of all conceptions of the good. I show how this argument is a variant of the long-standing ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection to Kantian-inspired, freedom-based accounts of the justification of systems of norms. I criticize Thomas Scanlon’s defence of (...) ‘pure tolerance’, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s work on the relationship between tolerance, equalrespect andrecognition, and Arthur Ripstein’s recent response to the ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection. The upshot of my argument is that, while valuing tolerance for its own sake may be an appealing ideal, it is not a feasible way of grounding a system of norms. I close with a thumbnail sketch of two alternative, instrumental (i.e. non-Kantian) approaches to the normative foundations of tolerance. (shrink)

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Plato's _Republic_ divided subsequent study of justice in two, as a virtue of people and of institutions. Here, the start of a reunification is attempted. Justice is first understood personally as the virtuous mean between arrogance and servility, where just people properlyrespect themselves and others. Because justice requires that like cases be treated alike and self-respect is a special instance ofrespect generally, justice requires a single standard for self and others. In understanding justice in terms (...) ofrespect, structural analogies become apparent between “recognition” and “appraisal”respect, on the one hand, and Rawls' two principles of justice on the other. The present view is then compared to “social egalitarian” theories of justice and the essay concludes with a discussion of how mercy is related to justice and an explanation of why just people always look for reasons to mitigate blame and punishment but never to aggravate them. (shrink)

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This study attempts to understand whether there were changes over time in Hegel’s opinions on the idea ofrecognition, which were the basis of Axel Honneth’s theory ofrecognition, and how later philosophers writing onrecognition and intersubjectivity have comprehended Hegel’s intellectual heritage, together with their criticism of peculiar aspects of Hegel’s point of view. In this regard, in order to be able to understand Honneth’s theory ofrecognition, it is necessary to inquire into the relation (...) between Honneth’s and Hegel’s theories in a philosophical context. The current inquiry is both related to the aspects of how Honneth was affected by Hegel, and is also particularly focused on Hegel’s Jena period. The point of emphasis in this study is whether or not Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity andrecognition after his Jena period. Therefore, the discussion focuses on Hegel’s Jena period and the aspects which distinguished this period from others. This study also critically examines the views respecting the abandonment of therecognition on the Phenomenology of Spirit and intersubjectivity after the Jena period, and suggests thatrecognition and intersubjectivity still retain their dominance on this work known also as Jena Phenomenology, dated as the end of the Jena period. -/- Keywords: Honneth, Hegel,Recognition, Intersubjectivity -/- Türkçe Özet Bu çalışma, Axel Honneth’in tanınma kuramına temel teşkil eden Hegel'in tanınma ve öznelerarasılık üzerine görüşlerinin zaman içinde değişip değişmediğini; tanınma üzerine yazan sonraki kuşak düşünürlerin Hegel’in düşünsel mirasını nasıl algıladıklarını ve görüşlerini hangi açılardan eleştirdiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Honneth’in tanınma kuramını anlayabilmek için onun Hegel ile düşünsel bağlamda ilişkisinin sorgulanması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mevcut sorgulama, Honneth’in Hegel’den ne bağlamda ve ne şekilde etkilendiğiyle ilgili olmakla birlikte özellikle Hegel’in Jena dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, Hegel’in Jena dönemi sonrası felsefesinde öznelerarasılık ve tanınma kuramlarını terk edip etmediği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple ilk önce Hegel’in Jena dönemi ile bu dönemi farklı kılan yönler ele alınmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Jena dönemi sonrasında, Tinin Fenomenolojisi’nde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın terk edildiğine dair görüşlerin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiği; Hegel’in felsefesinde Jena döneminin bitişine tarihlenen ve Jena Fenomenolojisi olarak da bilinen bu eserde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın halen gücünü koruduğu savunulmaktadır. -/- Anahtar Kelimeler: Honneth, Hegel, Tanınma, Öznelerarasılık. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT In recent years, debates on same-sex marriage and therecognition of transwomen as women have been raging. These debates often seem to revolve around the meaning of, respectively, the word ‘marriage’ and ‘woman’. That such debates should take place might be puzzling. It seems that if debates on gay and transgender rights revolve around the meaning of these words, then those in favor of same-sex marriage and of therecognition of transwomen as women have no room left (...) to maneuver. However, prima facie, the pro – and anti-, in both cases, have genuine disagreements over the meaning of these words: though the analyses of revisionary theorists are revisionary, they are analyses. Sally Haslanger and other philosophers in her wake have appealed to an anti-descriptivist externalist view of meaning to provide the conceptual foundations of this practice of revisionary theorizing: revisionary analyses bring to light what, unbeknownst to us, these words mean. In this paper, I argue that a descriptivist externalist view should be preferred instead. My argument rests on the thesis that what is contested in these debates is the meaning of the words ‘marriage’ and ‘women’ as used in the law. (shrink)

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G.A. Cohen’s value conservatism entails that we ought to preserve some existing sources of value in lieu of more valuable replacements, thereby repudiating maximizing consequentialism. Cohen motivates value conservatism through illustrative cases. The consequentialist, however, can explain many Cohen-style cases by taking extrinsic properties, such as historical significance, to be sources of final value. Nevertheless, it may be intuitive that there’s stronger reason to preserve than to promote certain sources of value, especially historically significant things. This motivates an argument that (...) the weights of our reasons to preserve such things are especially strong relative to the amounts of value they bear. The value conservative can then explain these intuitions in non-consequentialist terms. There may be reason to preserve historically significant things as a matter ofrecognitionrespect for a cultural and historical heritage, or because it is virtuous to cultivate the right kind of connection with such a heritage. (shrink)

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Immanuel Kant's description of humans' first encounter with each other depicts a peacefulrecognition of mutual worth. G.W.F. Hegel's by contrast depicts a struggle to the death. I argue in this paper that Hegel's description of conflict results in an ethical theory that better preserves the distinctness of the other. I consider Christine Korsgaard's description of first encounters as a third alternative but conclude that Hegel's approach better accounts for the specific commitments we make--as family members, works, and citizens (...) --in ethical life. (shrink)

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In this chapter we analyse the nature and ethical implications of parasocial relationships. While this type of relationship has received significant attention in other interdisciplinary fields such as celebrity studies and fan studies, philosophers have so far had very little to say about them. Parasocial relationships are usually defined as asymmetrical, in which a media-user closely relates to a media-personality as if they were a friend or family member, and where this connection is mostly unreciprocated. We focus on the most (...) typical form of this kind of relationship, between fans and celebrities. We argue that a parasocial relationship between fan and celebrity is a distinct kind of personal relationship, constituted by three basic structural asymmetries: attention, communication, and epistemic. These asymmetries give rise to a more substantial asymmetry concerning the way in which celebrities and fans have ‘directive’ or ‘interpretative’ influence over each other’s identity. This can lead to a failure ofrecognitionrespect, and generates ethical responsibilities for both fans and celebrities. We conclude by noting that the structural asymmetries we find in parasocial relationships are present in many other types of relationship, especially those in which one person holds a position of power. As such, it is valuable to pay attention to the way in which asymmetries point to forms of parasociality in these other relationships, and the extent to which they give rise to distinct ethical responsibilities. (shrink)

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Drawing inspiration om Joseph T. O’Connell’s work on socio‐cultural integration, this pa‐ per connects the notion of ‘deep equality’ with two broad lessons that can be taken om O’Connell’s approach that pertain to the study of religious diversity in contemporary life. The rst is therecognition of the amorphous nature of religious identity, and the second is the necessity to search for models of socio‐cultural integration in the face of di erence. These lessons are valuable in providing an alternative (...) discourse of diversity that moves away om problematisation to collaboration. Słowa kluczowe: ; ; ; ; ; ; ;;;. (shrink)

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Should the government censor dangerous anti-vaccination propoganda? Should it restrict the praise of terrorist groups, or speech intended to promote discriminatory attitudes? In other words, should the government curb the advocacy of dangerous ideas and actions (i.e. 'harmful advocacy'), or should the government take a more permissive approach? Strong free speech supporters argue that citizens should be free to engage in and to hear harmful advocacy, arguing that restrictions are deeply objectionable at best, and, at worst, wholly impermissible. To support (...) their position, strong free speech supporters have offered a wide range of arguments and ideas. One of the most interesting arguments revolves around the idea that restrictions on harmful advocacy are deeply insulting to citizens. The worry, broadly understood, is that this kind of censorship is demeaning, treats citizens as though they are stupid, or as though they are children. As such, even when censorship is effective in preventing harms to citizens, it nonetheless comes at the significant political cost of failing to properlyrespect the citizenry at large. By contrast, so the thought goes, an alternative political scheme that prohibits censorship, or permits it only in exceptional cases, does a better job of respecting citizens as independent, rational, morally responsible agents. This alternative political system may, sometimes, be less effective at preventing speech harms. But it is a political system where citizens can stand tall and hold their heads high. In this paper, I consider and reject three versions of the worry that censorship is insulting. §1 explores the idea that censorship is insulting qua involving a negative appraisal of the citizens being interfered with. The key idea here is that censorship involves a lack of what Stephen Darwall terms ‘appraisalrespect’, insofar as the government is suggesting that citizens cannot be trusted to manage their own beliefs and intentions. Drawing on the work of Thomas Nagel, §2 explores the idea that censorship diminishes the political status of citizens. Finally, §3 explores the suggestion that censorship is incompatible with a full appreciation of the thinking nature of citizens, and thus involves a lack of what Darwall would term ‘recognitionrespect’. The paper argues that censorship is not necessarily premised upon an insulting view of the citizenry. On the contrary, it argues that the best kind of censorship stems from a rich appreciation of the diverse range of capabilities, needs, vulnerabilities, and responsibilities of citizens, as well as the need for co-operation between citizens if societal flourishing is going to be achieved on a large scale. Granted, such a vision places an emphasis on the imperfections and liabilities of citizens – at least when compared to the rather solitary, highly intellectual creature one sometimes finds in the philosophical literature. Still, such a vision of citizens as imperfect falls well short of being genuinely insulting. To err is human. And there’s nothing insulting about being treated like a human. (shrink)

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Kant scholars have paid relatively little attention to his raciology. They assume that his racism, as personal prejudice, can be disentangled from his core philosophy. They also assume that racism contradicts his moral theory. In this book, philosopher Huaping Lu-Adler challenges both assumptions. She shows how Kant's raciology--divided into racialism and racism--is integral to his philosophical system. She also rejects the individualistic approach to Kant and racism. Instead, she uses the notion of racism as ideological formation to demonstrate how Kant, (...) from his social location both as a prominent scholar and as a lifelong educator, participated in the formation of modern racist ideology. As a scholar, Kant developed a ground-breaking scientific theory of race from the standpoint of a philosophical investigator of nature or Naturforscher. As an educator, he transmitted denigrating depictions of the racialized others and imbued those descriptions with normative relevance. In both roles, he left behind, as one of his legacies, a worldview that excluded non-whites from such goods as recognitionalrespect and candidacy for cultural and moral achievements. Scholars who research and teach Kant's philosophy therefore have an unshakable burden to take part in the ongoing antiracist struggles, through their teaching practices as well as their scholarship. And they must do so with a pragmatic attention to nonideal social realities and a deliberate orientation toward substantial racial justice, equality, and inclusion. Lu-Adler pushes the discourse about Kant and racism well beyond the old debates about whether he was racist or whether his racism contaminates his philosophy. By foregrounding the lasting legacies of Kant's raciology, her work calls for a profound reorientation of Kant scholarship. (shrink)

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Contemporaryrecognition theory has developed powerful tools for understanding a variety of social problems through the lens of misrecognition. It has, however, paid somewhat less attention to how to conceive of appropriate responses to misrecognition, usually making the tacit assumption that the proper societal response is adequate or proper affirmativerecognition. In this paper I argue that, although affirmativerecognition is one potential response to misrecognition, it is not the only such response. In particular, I would like (...) to make the case for derecognition in some cases: derecognition, in particular, through the systematic deinstitutionalization or uncoupling of various reinforcing components of social institutions, components whose tight combination in one social institution has led to the misrecognition in the first place. I make the case through the example of recent United States debates over marriage, especially but not only withrespect to gay marriage. I argue that the proper response to the misrecognition of sexual minorities embodied in exclusively heterosexual marriage codes is not affirmativerecognition of lesbian and gay marriages, but rather the systematic derecognition of legal marriage as currently understood. I also argue that the systematic misrecognition of women that occurs under the contemporary institution of marriage would likewise best be addressed through legal uncoupling of heterogeneous social components embodied in the contemporary social institution of marriage. (shrink)

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Many cultural commentators and philosophers are highly critical of the pursuit of fame. We argue that pursuing fame does not always deserve this negative appraisal, and can in some circumstances be virtuous. We begin our argument by outlining three positive functions that fame can serve, providing role models, spokespersons, and hermeneutic resources. These functions are particularly valuable for those from marginalized groups, providing empowering ways to respond to and subvert social discrimination. marginalized groups, providing empowering ways to respond to and (...) subvert social discrimination. Next, we explain the ways in which certain groups are under-represented in the public eye, resulting in a lack ofrecognition andrespect. We argue that this under-representation ought to be mitigated. The pursuit of fame is valuable insofar as it acts a corrective to the injustice that arises because of the marginalization of certain groups from the public eye and celebrity culture. We then discuss four problems with the idea that the pursuit of fame and celebrity by members of marginalized groups may function to combat social injustice. First, celebrities from marginalized groups who are viewed as role models, spokespersons or hermeneutic resources, are especially likely to find themselves subject to judgmental and moralistic criticism from the public. Second, the pursuit of fame from members of marginalized groups runs significant risks of elite capture. Third, they are also likely to be subjected to demeaning forms of representation. Fourth, and more generally, the role of being famous can be severely psychologically damaging, causing significant personal burdens for those who pursue fame and ultimately achieve celebrity status. Taking these points together shows that while the pursuit of fame may be useful in mitigating certain forms of social injustice, there are also important reasons to worry about how effective a tool it is, and the costs that arise for those who pursue fame and become celebrities. We conclude our argument in by noting how the domain of fame and intersectionality influences the extent to which the pursuit of fame is valuable and burdensome. -/- . (shrink)

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I begin my comment on Westphal’s study by exploring briefly his refutation of “the arbitrariness thesis,” and then focusing on the “conditio humanae,” i.e. the conditions of life as freedom realized in common life. As I understand it, coordination and cooperation among persons are required because employing freedom in the presence of others presupposes an act ofrecognition that acknowledges a priori the necessity of universalrespect. The right to use and possess things within the institution of property (...) is an illustrative example of this necessity. Justice requires possession not in the form of some equal distribution but as a normative requirement that “everyone shall have property.” One must have property in order to enter the world of inter-subjectivity and become a person. This has important implications for determining how poverty is related to the validity of laws, which depends on the joint legislative will of all persons. (shrink)

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Many philosophers conceive of freedom as non-interference. Such conceptions unify two core commitments. First, they associate freedom with non-constraint. And second, they take seriously a distinction between the interpersonal and the non-personal. As a result, they focus our attention exclusively on constraints attributable to other people’s choices – that is, on interference. I argue that these commitments manifest two distinct concerns: first, for a wide range of options; and second, for other people’srespect. However, construing freedom as non-interference unifies (...) these concerns in a way that does justice to neither. In particular, it focuses our attention on phenomena that are at best tangential, and at worst hostile, to our interest inrespect. If we wish to preserve the distinctive significance of the interpersonal, we would be better served by a conception of freedom that focuses immediately on what I call "the social conditions ofrespect.". (shrink)

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It is a matter of fact that Europe is facing more and more crucial challenges regarding health and social care due to the demographic change and the current economic context. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has stressed this situation even further, thus highlighting the need for taking action. Active and Assisted Living technologies come as a viable approach to help facing these challenges, thanks to the high potential they have in enabling remote care and support. Broadly speaking, AAL can be referred (...) to as the use of innovative and advanced Information and Communication Technologies to create supportive, inclusive and empowering applications and environments that enable older, impaired or frail people to live independently and stay active longer in society. AAL capitalizes on the growing pervasiveness and effectiveness of sensing and computing facilities to supply the persons in need with smart assistance, by responding to their necessities of autonomy, independence, comfort, security and safety. The application scenarios addressed by AAL are complex, due to the inherent heterogeneity of the end-user population, their living arrangements, and their physical conditions or impairment. Despite aiming at diverse goals, AAL systems should share some common characteristics. They are designed to provide support in daily life in an invisible, unobtrusive and user-friendly manner. Moreover, they are conceived to be intelligent, to be able to learn and adapt to the requirements and requests of the assisted people, and to synchronise with their specific needs. Nevertheless, to ensure the uptake of AAL in society, potential users must be willing to use AAL applications and to integrate them in their daily environments and lives. In thisrespect, video- and audio-based AAL applications have several advantages, in terms of unobtrusiveness and information richness. Indeed, cameras and microphones are far less obtrusive withrespect to the hindrance other wearable sensors may cause to one’s activities. In addition, a single camera placed in a room can record most of the activities performed in the room, thus replacing many other non-visual sensors. Currently, video-based applications are effective in recognising and monitoring the activities, the movements, and the overall conditions of the assisted individuals as well as to assess their vital parameters. Similarly, audio sensors have the potential to become one of the most important modalities for interaction with AAL systems, as they can have a large range of sensing, do not require physical presence at a particular location and are physically intangible. Moreover, relevant information about individuals’ activities and health status can derive from processing audio signals. Nevertheless, as the other side of the coin, cameras and microphones are often perceived as the most intrusive technologies from the viewpoint of the privacy of the monitored individuals. This is due to the richness of the information these technologies convey and the intimate setting where they may be deployed. Solutions able to ensure privacy preservation by context and by design, as well as to ensure high legal and ethical standards are in high demand. After the review of the current state of play and the discussion in GoodBrother, we may claim that the first solutions in this direction are starting to appear in the literature. A multidisciplinary debate among experts and stakeholders is paving the way towards AAL ensuring ergonomics, usability, acceptance and privacy preservation. The DIANA, PAAL, and VisuAAL projects are examples of this fresh approach. This report provides the reader with a review of the most recent advances in audio- and video-based monitoring technologies for AAL. It has been drafted as a collective effort of WG3 to supply an introduction to AAL, its evolution over time and its main functional and technological underpinnings. In thisrespect, the report contributes to the field with the outline of a new generation of ethical-aware AAL technologies and a proposal for a novel comprehensive taxonomy of AAL systems and applications. Moreover, the report allows non-technical readers to gather an overview of the main components of an AAL system and how these function and interact with the end-users. The report illustrates the state of the art of the most successful AAL applications and functions based on audio and video data, namely lifelogging and self-monitoring, remote monitoring of vital signs, emotional staterecognition, food intake monitoring, activity and behaviourrecognition, activity and personal assistance, gesturerecognition, fall detection and prevention, mobility assessment and frailtyrecognition, and cognitive and motor rehabilitation. For these application scenarios, the report illustrates the state of play in terms of scientific advances, available products and research project. The open challenges are also highlighted. The report ends with an overview of the challenges, the hindrances and the opportunities posed by the uptake in real world settings of AAL technologies. In thisrespect, the report illustrates the current procedural and technological approaches to cope with acceptability, usability and trust in the AAL technology, by surveying strategies and approaches to co-design, to privacy preservation in video and audio data, to transparency and explainability in data processing, and to data transmission and communication. User acceptance and ethical considerations are also debated. Finally, the potentials coming from the silver economy are overviewed. (shrink)

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Mountains have gained globalrecognition for their sacredness and biodiversity. Over the years, scientists, researchers, local bodies and states have made efforts to protect and preserve the mountains. Perrigo, Hoorn and Antonelli call them the cradles of diversity, which need to be studied in order to understand nature and mountain biodiversity. (2019). The growing work on the mountains can be located in the awakening of earth consciousness in the world. Earth consciousness or what may also be called the universal (...)respect for nature and all of its forms is manifesting in different ways. The multidisciplinary approaches that build the idea of earth consciousness have added much weight to the end outcomes in the forms of frameworks for protection and preservation. One can see an influence of cultural, ethical, legal, philosophical, religious, and spiritual perspectives in the realization of a deep and meaningful relationship between humans with nature. (shrink)

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In this paper, I make a case for the view that we have special relationship duties (also known as “associative duties”) that are not identical to or derived from our non-associative impartial moral obligations. I call this view “moral partialism”. On the version of moral partialism I defend, only loving relationships can normatively ground special relationship duties. I propose that for two capable adults to have a loving relationship, they must have mutual non-trivial desires to promote each other’s interests or (...) flourishing and torespect each other’s core values. Along the way, I critically ascertain three alternative accounts of what normatively grounds special relationship duties and argue that my proposed view avoids the problems plaguing the alternatives. (shrink)

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In recent years, an array of critical emotion theorists have emerged who call for change withrespect to how emotion theory is done, how emotions are understood, and how we do emotion. In this chapter, I draw on the work that some of these authors have produced to analyze how emotional marginalization of trans and disabled identities is experienced, considering in particular how this emotional marginalization results from the long history of pathologization of trans and disabled people. The past (...) and current pathologization of trans and disabled people is produced through normative assumptions, values, and beliefs that uphold systems of normalcy, including assumptions, values, and beliefs about how we feel and express emotions. In order to examine these issues, I identify three different stages at which emotional marginalization may take place: emotion experience, emotional display, and emotionrecognition. In other words, emotional marginalization of trans and disabled people can occur at any of these stages. The central concern of my chapter is thus to show how emotional marginalization, at each of these stages, affects trans and disabled people. (shrink)

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