The region of the world that has remained least democratised is the Muslim Middle East. Regimes in the region have come under increasing domestic and external pressure to democratise, but repeated attempts have either failed, or produced nothing more than different forms of procedural democracy. There is not one Muslim country in the area that can meet the essential requirements of a liberal democracy. When prompted to promote democratic reforms, a majority of leaderships have done so on a highly selective and exclusive basis, and within procedural frameworks that have not substantially affected their personal or family or elite powers. They have conveniently designed the reforms in such a way as to produce little more than systems that may be termed ‘democratic in form but authoritarian in content’; devoid of the necessary dynamism to secure even the gradual application of basic liberal principles against the open-ended, arbitrary needs of rulers. Thus, whether operating within a traditional or traditional-modernist or revolutionary-modernist mould, not many of them have succeeded in venturing beyond at best a kind of manipulable procedural democracy.
Most strikingly, they have fallen well short of creating a widely inclusive and competitive system. They have sought to exclude from the processes the groups that they have perceived as popularly threatening, and have refused to disperse power to the extent that could reduce their own indispensability to the operation of their politics. As a consequence, their reforms have frequently resulted in political polarization and violent conflict. One can draw on a number of countries’ experiences to illustrate this point, but none are more pertinent than those of Iran, Algeria and Egypt. This is not to claim that important civil society changes have not taken place in the Muslim constituent states, but to emphasise that these changes have been manipulated to be less conducive to democratisation and more supportive of authoritarianism or concealed authoritarianism.
The UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report 2002, which was largely reconfirmed by the agency’s subsequent reports and which is applicable to the whole of Muslim Middle East in various degrees, notes:
“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has barely reached the Arab states. This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development. While de jure acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal codes and government pronouncements, de facto implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately disregarded. In most cases, the governance pattern is characterized by a powerful executive branch that exerts significant control over all other branches of the state, being in some cases free from institutional checks and balances. Representative democracy is not always genuine and sometimes absent. Freedoms of expression and association are frequently curtailed. Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail.”[1]
This has also led to failure to ‘adapt to demands of the new economics and the new politics’, to address problems of gender disparities and inequalities, to promote liberal education, and to part with those outdated traditions and cultural practices that have proved to be unaccommodating of certain much-needed aspects of modernity. Further, there has been a ‘mismatch between aspirations and their fulfilment’, as well as ‘alienation and its offspring - apathy and discontent’. Given the lack of progress beyond a form of limited procedural democracy, such alienation has created serious legitimation problems for rulers and their governmental systems, with which the people have found it increasingly difficult to identify. It has also reflected a high level of distrust, not only between rulers and ruled, but also among the people themselves.
A variety of national and cross-national reasons can be cited to explain why most of the Muslim Middle Eastern countries have proved so inhospitable to anything more than procedural democratisation. At least five in the literature are worthy of particular attention.
The first is the degree of incompatibility that allegedly exists between Islam and competitive pluralist democracy. It is argued that Islam, with its central principle of Tawhid (Unity of God), from which other Islamic principles flow, including those concerning earthly governance - most importantly the principles of Shura (consultation) and Ijma (consensus) - essentially provides for little more than what Mawlana Mawdudi (1903-1979) has called ‘Theo-democracy’[2]; and is therefore a foundation for an authoritarian, not liberal, political culture. Consequently, what has historically evolved has been incremental acculturation of Muslim–dominated Middle Eastern societies to authoritarian thinking, values and practices, although with variations in their intensity and effectiveness from time to time and place to place. This phenomenon took a sharper upward turn following the closure of the gate of ijtihad (creative interpretation of Islam, based on independent human reasoning) in the thirteenth century. Having said this, there is also a counter-argument, advanced by such thinkers and activists as the former Iranian and Indonesian presidents, Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2002), that Islam is essentially compatible with democracy and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; all depends on how Islam is interpreted and applied. If one goes down a traditionalist path, as many Jihadi Islamists (or combative forces of political Islam) do, Islam can be cited to negate some of the liberal principles of democracy related to individualism and freedom of choice. On the other hand, this need not be the case if Islam is applied through an ijtihadi spectrum according to changing times and conditions.
The second factor, which in a way flows from the first, is that personalization, as against institutionalisation, of politics has, become deeply entrenched in the Muslim Middle East in particular, and in the Muslim world in general. Many date the origins of this back to the early leadership of Islam following the death of the Prophet and his Companions, and the patriarchal nature of Arab societies, pre-dating Islam. With rulership frequently falling into the hands of self-centered individuals, families, clans and elites, the need for institutionalisation of politics has grown more acute than ever.
The third factor cited is the lack of sufficient critical education to enable the public to grasp easily the significance of democratic values and practices, with responsibility and cross-cultural understanding and commitment. The culture of authoritarianism, and ensuing political exclusivism, divisiveness and distrust that it has generated, have substantially thwarted the growth of freedom of critical thinking and expression, and therefore the degree of intellectual diversity and free discourse which are so vital for the innovative, pluralist development of societies.
The fourth factor concerns the lack of consensus over the form and functions of government, a problem which has historically dogged most of the countries in the Muslim Middle East. Few of these countries have so far succeeded in fostering, as against imposing, a viable national approach to, and agreement on, what constitutes good and acceptable government. Although the Islamic regime in Iran put this issue to the people in a referendum in 1979, the fact that it was done without the provision of any alternative greatly reduced its significance.
The fifth factor is related to the effects of European colonial domination and then the USA’s globalist penetration and interventions in the Middle East. In general, European colonization did little to promote the cause of good government and principles of human rights and responsibilities. British colonial rule proved more rewarding in terms of the judicial and institutional legacy that it left behind in the Indian subcontinent than in the Middle Eastern region. A survey of the colonial subjugation of Middle Eastern lands clearly indicates that the colonial powers, whether British, French, or Italian, paid far less attention to the task of nation-building and institutionalisation of politics in their colonies than the British perhaps did in the subcontinent. The history of European colonialism generally displays an attitude of divide and rule, and exploitation and a sense of cultural superiority. In most cases, the colonial powers deliberately thwarted the need for good governance in order to facilitate maintenance of their domination. When French and British colonial rule of the Muslim Middle East finally folded up, with the partial exception of Egypt little had been achieved in terms of political institutions and practices that could promote democracy. The postcolonial governments were confronted with the difficult task of starting state-building from scratch, and leading their citizens from the colonial political culture to a new one.
In their transition, they have also had to contend with another development: US globalist behaviour in the context of the Cold War and its aftermath. During the Cold War, the US approach was overarching; it made few bones about what type of leader, government or sub-national force the USA dealt with, as long as it was prepared to support the USA’s top foreign policy goal of containing Soviet communism. In the process, it made little or no effort to tie its penetration of many key Muslim Middle Eastern states to promotion of good governance and democracy. On the contrary, in several cases, it put dictatorship before democracy to achieve its globalist objectives. It was even prepared to court Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq in the 1980s in order to compensate for the loss of the Shah’s autocratic rule in Iran. Rarely did the USA seriously link its friendship or alliance with regional Muslim states to the need for democratisation, and rarely has it worked with democratic forces to enhance the conditions for democracy in the region. Its policy approach to the Muslim Middle East has continued to suffer from a serious tension between its desire to safeguard the state of Israel and to be the dominant power in the region, and what is required to help the region democratise.
The lack of progress beyond some form of procedural democracy in the Muslim Middle Eastern states, and of course for that matter many other countries around the world, underscores a vital point: the necessary conditions either for cutting through or for leap-frogging authoritarianism are still out of reach in most of them. Historical experience suggests that the way forward is perhaps not to strive for immediate transformation in pursuit of liberal democratisation of political systems, which would require profound changes in the power structures, with profound effects on the fortunes of the very leaderships which are expected to bring about these changes. The objective might better be to prepare the conditions in the given countries first of all for pro-democratic civil society changes and good governance. Such changes do not need to be fully in conformity with liberal democratic models that underpin the operation of politics and societies in old democracies. Methods and mechanisms would have to be founded on those ideals and practices that are conducive to the development of transitional conditions from procedural to substantive democracy on the one hand, and have sufficient relevance to the cultural and identity settings of the changing society on the other.
It is possible to achieve liberty - in terms of lessening the state’s grip over society - without first instituting a Western-type liberal democracy. However, the achievement of liberty could well open the way for not only procedural democracy, but well beyond it. Yet this cannot be achieved as long as many countries function in an international system where the most powerful assume a veto power over the weak or weaker. The character of substantive democracy, therefore, is partly determined by its systemic context. The development and transformation of democratic systems therefore requires at least in part a change of attitude and consensus on the part of those states that have a determining say in the shaping of the international order.
[1] See United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2002 (Amman: UNDP, 2002): 20.
[2] A major Islamist thinker and founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. For more on Mawdudi, see Roy Jackson, Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State (London: Routledge, 2008).