KEYLESS AUTHORISATION SYSTEM
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present subject matter relates generally to a keyless authorisation system.
BACKGROUND [0002] With the recent developments in digital technologies, many user devices capable of communicating and processing information has been developed, for example a Personal Computer, an electronic organizer, a smart device, and the like. Such user device does not remain in traditional areas but are converging with different sectors, such as automobiles. Many portable terminals have been developed that reads information from a tag and transmits information to or receives information from another portable terminal.
[0003] One of such portable terminals utilizes either an RFID, a Bluetooth, or a Near Field Communication (hereinafter referred as NFC) technology for bidirectionally transmitting data between terminal at a close distance within a few centimetres. An NFC make use of a short-range wireless communication to transfer information between an NFC device and an NFC tag. NFC is used for payment, for sending goods information and travel information for visitors, traffic, access control locks, and device-to-device communication in supermarkets and general stores, and the like.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0004] The details are described with reference to an embodiment implemented in a vehicle along with the accompanying figures. The same numbers are used throughout the drawings to reference similar features and components.
[0005] Figure 1 exemplarily illustrates a block diagram of a system for keyless authorisation of a vehicle.
[0006] Figure 2 exemplarily illustrates a flow chart for detecting a physical tampering and a data tampering of the NFC tag by means of the user device. [0007] Figure 3 exemplarily illustrates a flowchart for checking the legitimacy of the NFC tag by using the user device.
[0008] Figure 4 exemplarily illustrates a flowchart for unsuccessful authorization of the NFC tag. In the event of an unsuccessful attempt of authentication, the vehicle records the data and sends that data to the NFC tag.
PET An .ED DESCRIPTION
[0001] Now-a-days, an NFC system are used for a wide variety of applications to store and access a variety of data by means of a scanner or a tag via an interface. The tag can be accessed over a distance of a few centimetres. NFC is a subset of a RFID and ensures safe and simple data exchange between two devices. When an NFC tag comes in proximity of a portable terminal that includes an NFC reader, an application for reading data stored in said NFC tag is executed in the portable terminal.
[0002] Among many other sectors, automobiles also employ the NFC tag to perform various functions. NFC tags are used for exchange of data, accessing the vehicle by opening and closing the door without a key i.e. a keyless card entry, payment at tolls, and the like. In many situations, even when a user of the vehicle does not desire to access the vehicle, there are high probability that the NFC tag present in the proximity of the portable terminal having the application for the NFC tag recognition may automatically execute unnecessarily. Thus, an unintended NFC operation may be performed compromising the safety of the vehicle. Also, the vehicle has multiple data related to the user inside the NFC tag, which is prone to tampering putting risk to the data security. There is a need of a system which keeps the data safe and do not allow to transmit the data outside the vehicle, in case of tampering. Therefore, there is a need to have a safer system for the vehicle that can avoid above mentioned situation of misapplication of the NFC system.
[0003] Conventionally available NFC tags are used for storing a digital key for automobiles for a keyless card entry. These NFC tags have authentication method to identify the owner of the vehicle accessing it. But these NFC tags are prone to tampering. Tampering may include physical tampering, data tampering, and the like. There is no such system available which can identify these tampering in the NFC tags. For example- in case if the digital key is a copy of the original key, the NFC tag will not be able to identify this and will allow the person accessing the vehicle. Also, if the NFC tag has been damaged physically or any data of the NFC tag is tampered to access the vehicle, this fraud will not be recognised, putting the vehicle in danger situations leading to theft or data misappropriation. Therefore, there exists a need for a system having an NFC tag which can avoid the tampering of said NFC tag while maintaining the performance, safety, handling, and serviceability of the vehicle. So, there is a need to cater to the various requirements of the NFC tag system while overcoming all above problems as well as other problems of known art.
[0004] An objective of the present subject matter is to provide a system which can prevent unauthorized or illegitimate NFC tag to be connected with the vehicle, and diagnose the NFC tag to find the tampering and the origin of fault to nullify the problem, without going to a service centre. The system aims to provide enhanced safety, serviceability, ease of handling, and the like to the user of the vehicle. The present subject is applicable to any system using NFC authentication, with required changes and without deviating from the scope of invention. In the present subject matter, a keyless authorisation system is disclosed for a controlled access system comprising: a system NFC reader provided on the controlled access system; an NFC (Near Field Communication) tag in possession of a user accessing the controlled access system; and a user device configured with a diagnostic means in possession of the user, the diagnostic means being configured to diagnose an authenticity of the NFC tag.
[0005] As per an aspect of the present subject matter, the NFC tag being communicatively coupled with the system NFC reader for requesting authorization of the controlled access system. The NFC tag being communicatively coupled with the user device for transferring information and receiving authentication. [0006] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the user device being provided with a user NFC reader communicating with the NFC tag. The user NFC reader being configured to activate the diagnostic means upon an authorization request generated by the NFC tag for accessing the controlled access system. [0007] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the system NFC reader being embedded in the controlled access system.
[0008] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the controlled access system being a vehicle, and the system NFC reader being embedded in one or more of a front panel, a rear panel, a side panels, under a seat of the vehicle.
[0009] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the diagnosis of authenticity of the NFC tag includes diagnosis of at least one of a physical tampering, data tampering, legitimacy data, and a number of unsuccessful attempts by the user device.
[00010] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the physical tampering data includes one or more of a tag physical damage, a packaging tampering, a wiring damage. The data tampering information includes one or more of a digital certificate associated with the tag, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) of the tag. The legitimacy data tampering information includes one or more of a tag ID, software version number, digital certificate number, digital key, user ID. The number of unsuccessful attempts by the user, details of the unsuccessful attempts by the NFC tag and sends details of the unsuccessful attempts, the details of the unsuccessful attempts include one of a location, time, number to a diagnosis application.
[00011] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the user device being one of a wearable device, a laptop, a smart device, a tablet.
[00012] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, a method for keyless authorisation of a controlled access system, the method comprising the steps of: establishing communication between an NFC tag and a system NFC reader to generate an authorization request for accessing a controlled access system; establishing communication between the NF C tag and a user NF C reader to activate a diagnostic means of a user device upon generation of the authorization for accessing the controlled access system; diagnosing using the diagnostic means, authenticity of the NFC tag by the user device.
[00013] As per another aspect of the present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of accepting by the system NFC reader, the request of authorization for accessing the controlled access system upon establishing the authenticity of the NFC tag by the user NFC reader. Rejecting, by the system NFC reader, the request of authorization for accessing the controlled access system upon not establishing the authenticity of the NFC tag by the user NFC reader.
[00014] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of diagnosing of authenticity of the NFC tag includes at least one of a physical tampering, data tampering, legitimacy data, and a number of unsuccessful attempts by the user device.
[00015] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprises the steps of communicating, the NFC tag with the user NFC reader of the user device; receiving, by the user NFC reader of the user device, inputs for the physical tampering related data; and processing and analysing, by the diagnostic means of the user device, the physical tampering related data to identify physical tampering. [00016] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of polling and receiving the physical tampering data from the NFC tag by the user device, the physical tampering data includes one or more of a tag physical damage, a packaging tampering, a wiring damage.
[00017] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprises the steps of communicating, the NFC tag with the user NFC reader of the user device; requesting by the user NFC reader of the user device, one or more digital certificate stored in the NFC tag; checking and verifying by the user NFC reader of the user device, one or more digital certificate stored in the NFC tag for no data tampering; requesting by the user NFC reader of the user device, one or more CRC of stored data into NFC tag, after verifying said digital certificate stored in the NFC tag; checking and verifying by the user NFC reader of the user device, one or more CRC of stored data into the NFC tag for no data tampering; and issuing, a tampering status to the NFC tag. [00018] As per an aspect of present subject matter, in an event of the digital certificate and the CRC status not verified, indicating data tampering.
[00019] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of polling and receiving data tampering information from the NFC tag by the user device, the data tampering information includes one or more of a digital certificate associated with the tag, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) of the tag.
[00020] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of requesting by user NFC reader of the user device for a legitimacy related data; receiving and verifying by said user device, legitimacy of the received legitimacy related data by the NFC tag; and issuing by the user device, a legitimacy status to the NFC tag.
[00021] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of polling and receiving legitimacy tampering data from the NFC tag by the user device, the legitimacy data tampering information includes one or more of a tag ID, software version number, digital certificate number, digital key, user ID.
[00022] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the method comprising the steps of storing by the NFC tag, details of the unsuccessful attempts by the NFC tag; forwarding by the NFC tag, details of the unsuccessful attempts data to the user device, the details of the unsuccessful attempts data includes one of a location, time, number to a diagnosis application; analysing by said user device, details of the unsuccessful attempts data to find out the cause of unsuccessful attempt; and providing, instructions by the user device to the NFC tag and instructing a course of action.
[00023] As per an aspect of present subject matter, the controlled access system being a vehicle. The embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to an embodiment in a two wheeled vehicle along with the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the present embodiments. The present subject matter is further described with reference to accompanying figures. It should be noted that the description and figures merely illustrate principles of the present subject matter. Various arrangements may be devised that, although not explicitly described or shown herein, encompass the principles of the present subject matter. Moreover, all statements herein reciting principles, aspects, and examples of the present subject matter, as well as specific examples thereof, are intended to encompass equivalents thereof.
[00024] Fig.l exemplarily illustrates a block diagram of a system for keyless authorisation 100. The keyless authorisation system 100 comprises of a controlled access system 101, a Near Field Communication (hereinafter called as NFC) tag 103, a system NFC reader 102, and a user device 104. The NFC tag 103 is in possession of a user of the controlled access system 101. The user device 104 is provided with a diagnostic means in possession with the user of the controlled access system 101. The diagnostic means being configured to diagnose an authenticity of the NFC tag 103. The NFC tag 103 is used as a smart card or can be used as some other means to get access of the controlled access system. Here, the system may include a vehicle, a device, and the like. In the present embodiment, the controlled access system is a vehicle. The NFC tag 103 works as a digital key for a user of the vehicle 101. The NFC tag 103 of the user gets paired with the system/vehicle NFC reader 102 (hereinafter referred as system NFC reader) of the vehicle whenever NFC tap is done by the user. The system NFC reader 102 process an authentication request generated by the tag 103 and after the tag 103 is authenticated for that particular user, then the system NFC reader 102 grants the access to the NFC tag 103 for using the vehicle 101. The system NFC reader 102 grants access to authorization process only if the NFC tag 103 has been allowed to do so from the user device 104. Before the start of authorization process, the user device 104 initiates a process of authentication to check for physical tampering and data tampering of the NFC tag 103. In case where no tampering of the tag 103 is found, then it marks the tag 103 as a legitimate tag and the tag can be used to get paired with the vehicle 101 for further authorization process.
[00025] In case where the tampering of the NFC tag 103 is detected by the user device 104, then it marks the tag 103 as an illegitimate tag and the tag is denied pairing with the vehicle 101 for further authorization process. In case of an unsuccessful attempt of accessing the vehicle 101, the related data for that particular attempt is stored on the NFC tag 103 by the vehicle 101. The stored related data in the NFC tag 103 is later transferred to and is analysed by the user device 104 at the time of diagnostics for any potential theft. The user device 104 may be a smart phone, a wearable device, a Personal computer, a laptop, a tablet, other smart device, and the like. In the present embodiment, the user device 104 is a smart device. The user device 104 is used to diagnose the NFC tag 103 for any one or more physical or data tampering. The user device 104 is provided with a user NFC reader 105 which communicates with the NFC tag 103. The user NFC reader 105 is configured to activate the diagnostic means upon an authorization request generated by the NFC tag 103 for accessing the controlled access system 101. The user device 104 includes an application which carries out the diagnostic process to find out the cause of the failed attempt and gives further suggestions to prevent any kind of potential theft. The user device 104 also diagnoses the tag 103 if the NFC based vehicle authorization is not working properly. The diagnosis is carried on by using the user device 104 as it is much simpler and easier to identify the problem from the user device 104 instead of the vehicle 101 itself as the vehicle has much more complex electronics to handle. The diagnosis using the user device 104 is a cost-effective means and do not requires any additional component. The user device 104 also checks for the legitimacy of the NFC tag 103 before the tag tries to get paired and starts the authorization process with the vehicle 101. This enhances the security level of the vehicle 101, making it safer.
[00026] In an embodiment, an RFID technology is used. But using NFC technology has several advantages over the RFID. The NFC works within the range of a few centimetres, whereas the RFID range extends to several metres. The NFC works only if the tag 103 is within the few centimetre range of the vehicle, making it safer. The strength of the system NFC reader 102 is flexible as compared to RFID, i.e. NFC can be operated over a wide range of temperature, making it suitable to be placed anywhere in the vehicle. The NFC automatic antenna tuning signifies that any detuning of an antenna of the NFC due to environmental effects do not affect the performance of the NFC. As the system NFC reader 102 is smart enough to re adjust by using one or more parallel capacitors (not shown), and other components to optimize the field strength and efficiency of the NFC. The NFC offers low-power consumption and also replaces the multiple interaction with just one tap and pair interaction. The whole process of pairing takes one or two seconds to be executed, hence the process is fast and takes very less time. By using the NFC tag 103, the user can lock or unlock the vehicle 101 and store the user profiles for settings such as seat positions, radio stations, AC temperatures, ride modes and the like. It also facilitates data sharing with the user’s smart device 104. The NFC is ideal where flexible access solutions are required such as vehicle sharing, vehicle rental, social sharing, fleet management, and the like.
[00027] In an embodiment, the NFC tag 103 is portable and can be used outside the vehicle 101. When a user turns off the vehicle 101, the vehicle 101 transmits status information related to the user device 104 and the user can use this information like the status of the locks, the position of the vehicle 101, the tank level and the like. The system NFC reader 102 can be disposed anywhere in the vehicle 101. The system NFC reader 102 can be placed in a front panel, a rear panel, a side panels, under a seat, handles, on a dashboard, and the like, where the NFC tag 103 being communicated to pair with the system NFC reader 102. The communication can be established either by tapping the NFC tag 103 or keeping the NFC tag 103 in the vicinity of the vehicle, and the like.
[00028] Fig.2 exemplarily illustrates a flow chart for detecting a physical tampering and a data tampering of the NFC tag 103 by means of the user device 104. The diagnosis of authenticity of the NFC tag for keyless authorisation includes diagnosis of at least one of a physical tampering, data tampering, legitimacy data, a number of unsuccessful attempts, and the like by the user device 104. The physical tampering data includes one or more of a tag physical damage, a packaging tampering of tag, a wiring damage of tag, and the like. The data tampering information includes one or more of a digital certificate associated with the tag, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) of the tag, and the like. The legitimacy data tampering information includes one or more of a tag ID, software version number, digital certificate number, digital key, user ID, and the like. The details of unsuccessful attempts include one of a failure codes (failure code shows the probable reason of failure), location of the vehicle 101, date and time, NFC tag ID, number of authorization attempt, and the like.
[00029] The user device 104 first checks for the physical tempering by tapping the NFC tag 103 at step 201. The user device 104 requests for physical tampering related data from the NFC tag 103 at step 202. The NFC Tag 103 responds with a particular proprietary data related to the tag’s physical condition based on a predefined algorithm to the user device 104. The user device 104 receives and analyse these data inside a proprietary application of the user device 104 and identify any physical tempering on the NFC tag 103 and notify the tag 103 for the same at step 203. The NFC tag 103 is identified as physically tampered when either no response or a garbage response is received by the user device 104. Garbage response is an inconsistent response to a standard request made by the user device 104. No response is available, when either an antenna of the NFC tag 103 is defective or is tampered. Also, if an NFC passive chip is tampered, a no response is sent to the user device 104. Then the user device 104 requests for data tampering related data from the NFC tag 103 at step 204. The Tag 103 responds with a particular proprietary data related to the tag’s data integrity based on a predefined algorithm to the user device 104 at step 205. The user device 104 receives and analyses these data inside said proprietary application and identify any data tempering on the NFC tag 103 and notify the tag 103 for the same at step 206. The NFC tag 103 can be identified as data tampering when the digital certificates or the CRC of the data has been tampered. The user device 104 requests for CRC of the stored data from the NFC tag 103 at step 207, and receives the CRC of stored data at step 208. Every data stored on the NFC tag 103 generates one CRC and if there is any change in the CRC, then that is identified as data tampering at step 209. Also, any change in the digital certificate indicates data tampering, showing authenticity of the tag 103. If the tag 103 is not exposed with either the physical tempering or the data tempering, then the tag 103 is allowed to get paired with the vehicle 101 for further authorization process. But if the tag 103 is tampered, no authorization process is initiated, and the user device 104 sends the tag 103, the status of tampering and a next course of action to be taken, to secure the vehicle 101 at step
210
[00030] Fig.3 exemplarily illustrates a flowchart for checking the legitimacy of the NFC tag 103 by using the user device 104. The user device 104 requests for legitimacy related data from the NFC tag 103 at step 301. The Tag 103 responds with a particular proprietary data which includes but not limited to digital certificate of the tag, the digital signature of the user of the vehicle 101, and the like at step 302. The user device 104 analyses these data inside said proprietary application of the user device 104 and identify the tag’s legitimacy at step 303. A legitimacy status is issued by the user device 104 to the NFC tag 103 at step 304. If the tag 103 is approved from the user device 104 and declared legitimate, only then it allows the tag 103 to get paired with the vehicle 101 and initiate the authorization process. The process of finding the legitimacy of the NFC tag 103 is carried out after the tag 103 has been tested for physical and data tampering. The user device 104 is used to diagnose the legitimacy of the NFC tag 103 because it is easier to identify any fault or tampering from the user end rather than vehicle end. The vehicle 101 may have any other faults resulting in improper identification of the fault. Also, the vehicle 101 has complex electronic which makes it difficult to handle. In addition to this, finding fault using the user device is a cost effective and a simpler means.
[00031] Fig.4 exemplarily illustrates a flowchart for unsuccessful authorization of the NFC tag 103. In the event of an unsuccessful attempt of authentication at step 401 & 402, the vehicle 101 records the data and sends that data to the NFC tag 103 at step 403. Even an unsuccessful authorization attempt from the legitimate tag also gets stored onto the NFC tag 103. At the time of diagnostics, the stored data in the NFC tag 103 is transferred to the user device 104 at step 404. The user device 104 first checks for the physical and data tampering at step 405. Further, the user device 104 tries to match the results with the failure code provided by the system NFC reader 102 of the vehicle 101 at step 405. The user device 104 checks if there is any substantial mismatch between a last successful authorization event and a current failed authorization event at step 405. The user device 104 further checks if different NFC tag has been used during this failed attempt of authorization, and checks for the continuity of the authorization event count at step 405. For example: if the last authorization count was 100 and the current authorization count is 102, which implies that the vehicle 101 has been tried to get authorized by an unknown NFC tag, which can be a potential theft attempt. The data is processed to find out cause of the unsuccessful attempt of authorization and prevent vehicle 101 for any kind of potential theft at step 405. The user device 104 after an analysis, further transfers a set of instructions as a precautionary step to be taken by the NFC tag 103 in such future situations at step 406. This keyless vehicle authorization makes the vehicle 101 handling easier. Now, the user need not take his/her vehicle 101 to a service centre every time to find a problem and troubleshoot it. As now, the user can easily find the fault and troubleshoot it by using the user device 104. This system improves the security of the vehicle 101 and a potential system malfunction. Many other improvements and modifications may be incorporated herein without deviating from the scope of the invention.
List of Reference numerals
100: keyless authorisation system 101: Vehicle 102: system NFC reader of 100
103: NFC tag of 100 104: User device 105: user NFC reader of the 104