US8561177B1 - Systems and methods for detecting communication channels of bots - Google Patents

Abstract

Exemplary systems and methods for detecting a communication channel of a bot. In exemplary embodiments, presence of a communication channel between a first network device and a second network device is detected. Data from the communication channel is scanned and used to determine if a suspected bot communication exists. If a bot communication is detected, then a recovery process may be initiated.

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims benefit of provisional patent application No. 60/868,323, filed Dec. 1, 2006, entitled, “Detecting Command & Control Communication Channels of Botnets”, and is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/494,990, filed Jul. 28, 2006, entitled “Dynamic Signature Creation and Enforcement”, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/471,072, filed Jun. 19, 2006, entitled “Virtual Machine with Dynamic Data Flow Analysis”, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/409,355, filed Apr. 20, 2006, entitled “Heuristic Based Capture with Replay to Virtual Machine”, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/096,287, filed Mar. 31, 2005, entitled “System and Method of Detecting Computer Worms”, and is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/151,812, filed Jun. 13, 2005, entitled “System and Method of Containing Computer Worms,” and is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/152,286, filed Jun. 13, 2005, entitled “Computer Worm Defense System and Method”; U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/096,287 claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/559,198 filed on Apr. 1, 2004, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/151,812 claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/579,953 filed on Jun. 14, 2004, and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/152,286 claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/579,910 filed on Jun. 14, 2004, all of which are incorporated by reference herein.

This application is related to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/998,750, filed on Nov. 30, 2007, and entitled “Systems and Methods for Detecting Encrypted Bot Command & Control Channels.”

The above-referenced related patent application is incorporated by reference herein.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates generally to network security and more particularly to detecting command and control communication channels of a bot.

2. Background Art

Presently, malicious software (i.e., malware) can attack various devices via a network. For example, malware may include any program or file that is harmful to a computer user, such as bots, computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, or any programming that gathers information about a computer user or otherwise operates without permission. Various processes and devices have been employed to prevent the problems that malware can cause.

For example, computers often include antivirus scanning software that scans a particular client device for viruses. The scanning may be performed based on a schedule specified by a user associated with the particular computer, a system administrator, and so forth. Unfortunately, by the time a virus is detected by the scanning software, some damage on the particular computer may have already occurred.

Another option for preventing malware is a honey pot. A honey pot is a computer system on the Internet that is expressly set up to attract and “trap” an illicit user that attempts to penetrate another's computer system. The illicit user can include a hacker, a cracker, or a script kiddy, for example. The honey pot records the activities associated with the invasion of the computer system. Disadvantageously, as the honey pot is being invaded, so too are other users' computer systems on the same network. Thus, other users' computer systems may be harmed while the honey pot determines the nature of the malware invading the honey pot's own computer system.

In some instances, malware comprises a bot. A bot is a software robot configured to remotely control all or a portion of a digital device (e.g., a computer) without authorization by the digital device's user. Bot related activities include bot propagation and attacking other computers on a network. Bots commonly propagate by scanning nodes (e.g., computers or other digital devices) available on a network to search for a vulnerable target. When a vulnerable computer is scanned, the bot may install a copy of itself. Once installed, the new bot may continue to seek other computers on a network to infect.

A bot may also, without the authority of the infected computer user, establish a command and control communication channel to receive instructions. Bots may receive command and control communication from a centralized bot server or another infected computer (e.g., via a peer-to-peer (P2P) network established by a bot on the infected computer).

The bot may receive instructions to perform bot related activities. When a plurality of bots (i.e., a botnet) act together, the infected computers (i.e., zombies) can perform organized attacks against one or more computers on a network. In one example, bot infected computers may be directed to ping another computer on a network in a denial-of-service attack. In another example, upon receiving instructions, one or more bots may direct the infected computer to transmit spam across a network.

A bot may also receive instructions to transmit information regarding the infected host computer. In one example, the bot may be instructed to act as a keylogger and record keystrokes on the infected host computer. The bot may also be instructed to search for personal information and email addresses of other users contained in an email or contacts file. This information may be transmitted to one or more other infected computers or a user in command of the bot or botnet.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Systems and methods for detecting a command and control communication channel of a bot are provided. In exemplary embodiments, presence of a communication channel between a first network device and a second network device is detected.

Data from the communication channel is scanned and used to determine if a suspected bot communication exists. Several different methods may be utilized to detect a command and control (C&C) communication within the communication channel. In one embodiment, a fingerprint module may scan for a bot oriented command communications in an IRC channel. In one example, the fingerprint module scans for commands or messages that indicate that an IRC channel is being established. In an alternative embodiment, a port module may monitor for communications originating from a non-standard port. In a further embodiment, a virtual machine may be utilized to detect C&C communication channels either in a replay virtual machine environment or in a direct entry virtual machine environment. Accordingly, intercepted or replayed network data obtained from the communication channel is transmitted to the virtual machine, and the virtual machine response is then analyzed to determine if the virtual machine is infected. In some embodiments, an analysis environment may wait for an outbound domain name system (DNS) request, which may also identify the C&C channel. A pseudo-DNS server in the virtual machine can respond to the request with an IP address mapped to an internal-to-virtual machine-analysis pseudo-server. The outbound IRC or web request made to the supplied IP address may confirm the C&C channel.

If a bot communication is detected, then a recovery process may be initiated. In one embodiment, during the recovery process, the devices that are suspected as being infected may be flagged and/or proper users and administrators notified. For example, icons associated with nodes coupled to a network may be color coded based on their association with any infection propagation, command and control communication with a bot, and/or bot attack. In another embodiment, a router (i.e., switch) may be configured to direct all data from a bot server (e.g., from the source IP address of the bot server) to a controller. As a result, all the network data from the bot server, not only that which is transmitted to the network device, may be intercepted.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a diagram of a channel detection environment in which embodiments of the present invention may be practiced.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an exemplary bot detector implementing some embodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an exemplary controller implementing some embodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary analysis environment, in accordance with some embodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of an exemplary method for detecting a C&C channel of a bot.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the controller, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

Exemplary systems and methods for detection of a command and control communication channel of a bot are provided. The bot running on a compromised device may be part of a plurality of software robots (e.g., a botnet) which run autonomously on a collection of compromised devices under a common command and control (C&C) infrastructure. In one example, a bot on the compromised device may open an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel with another device to receive commands. This IRC channel may be referred to as a C&C communication channel.

In some embodiments, the communication channel detection system may comprise a dynamic honey pot. A dynamic honey pot can monitor network traffic to detect the presence of a C&C communication channel. If a C&C channel or a suspected C&C channel is detected, then the network data from the C&C communication channel may be intercepted. In exemplary embodiments, the network traffic does not need to be directly transmitted to the dynamic honey pot. Rather, the dynamic honey pot can detect possible bot infection attempts or command and control communication with an existing bot on other devices on the network. Upon detection, the dynamic honey pot can then intercept future network data.

In exemplary embodiments, network data from a communication network may be copied and analyzed. If a C&C channel or a suspected C&C channel is detected, related network data may be intercepted. The intercepted network data may continue to be analyzed. If the intercepted network data comprises a network attack, command and control communication, and/or an attempt to propagate the bot, an unauthorized activity signature configured to identify the activity and/or bot may be generated.

The bot compromises one or more compromised devices which may send spam and malware, such as viruses, worms, or Trojan horses, for example. A virus is an intrusive program that infects a computer file by inserting a copy of itself in the file. The copy is usually executed when the file is loaded into memory, allowing the virus to infect other files. A worm is a program that propagates itself across multiple computers, usually by creating copies of itself in each computer's memory. A worm may duplicate itself in a computer so many times that it causes the computer to crash. A Trojan horse is a destructive program disguised as a game, utility, or application. When run by a user or computer program, a Trojan horse can harm the computer system while appearing to do something useful.

Malware may also include adware and spyware. Adware is a program configured to direct advertisements to a computer or a particular user. In one example, adware identifies the computer and/or the user to various websites visited by a browser on the computer. The website may then use the adware to either generate pop-up advertisements or otherwise direct specific advertisements to the user's browser. Spyware is a program configured to collect information regarding the user, the computer, and/or a user's network habits. In an example, spyware may collect information regarding the names and types of websites that the user browses and then transmit the information to another computer. Adware and spyware are often added to the user's computer after the user browses to a website that hosts the adware and/or spyware. The user is often unaware that these programs have been added and are similarly unaware of the adware and/or spyware's function.

FIG. 1 is a diagram of achannel detection environment100 in which embodiments of the present invention may be practiced. Thechannel detection environment100 may comprise abot server105 in communication via acommunication network110 with anetwork device115. Additionally, atap120 may be coupled to thecommunication network110. Thetap120 may be further coupled to acontroller125. Optionally, a router (not shown) may be provided for re-routing data from thecommunication network110.

Thebot server105 and thenetwork device110 comprise digital devices. A digital device comprises any device with a processor. Some examples of digital devices include computers, servers, laptops, personal digital assistants, and cellular telephones. Thebot server105 is configured to transmit network data over thecommunication network110 to thenetwork device115, which is configured to receive the network data. In some embodiments, thebot server105 may establish a C&C communication channel with thenetwork device115 via thecommunication network110. The C&C communication channel may be utilized by thebot server105 to control a bot on the node or the node itself on thenetwork device115.

Thebot server105 may attempt to control thenetwork device115 by transmitting instructions or a bot to thenetwork device115. In one example, thebot server105 is a computer controlled by an illicit user to control one or more bots or one ormore network devices115 through the use of bots. In another example, thebot server105 is a network device similar to thenetwork device115; thebot server105 may be a part of a P2P communication network for transmitting instructions to a bot on another digital device. In this example, once infected, thenetwork device115 may be a part of a P2P communication network whereby thenetwork device115 may transmit instructions to another network device similar to abot server105.

Thetap120 may comprise a digital data tap configured to monitor network data and provide a copy of the network data to thecontroller125. In some embodiments, thetap120 comprises a span port. The network data comprises signals and data that are transmitted over thecommunication network110 including data flows from thebot server105 to thenetwork device115. As discussed herein, the network data may include command and control instructions transmitted from thebot server105. In one example, thetap120 copies the network data without an appreciable decline in performance of thebot server105, thenetwork device115, or thecommunication network110. Thetap120 may copy any portion of the network data. For example, thetap120 can receive and copy any number of data packets of the network data. In exemplary embodiments, thetap120 can monitor and copy data transmitted from multiple devices without appreciably affecting the performance of thecommunication network110 or the devices coupled to thecommunication network110. In various embodiments, thetap120 can sample the network data based on a sampling scheme.

Thetap120 can also capture metadata from the network data. The metadata can be associated with thebot server105 and/or thenetwork device115. In one example, the metadata may identify thebot server105 and/or thenetwork device110. In some embodiments, thebot server105 transmits metadata, which is captured by thetap120. In other embodiments, a heuristic module, described in more detail below, can detect thebot server105 and/or thenetwork device110 by analyzing data packets within the network data and generate the metadata.

Thecommunication network110 may comprise a public computer network such as the Internet, a private computer network such as a wireless telecommunication network, wide area network, local area network, or any other type of network enabled to provide communications between coupled devices.

AlthoughFIG. 1 depicts data transmitted from thebot server105 to thenetwork device115, either device can transmit and receive data from the other device. Similarly, although only onebot server105,communication network110,network device115,tap120, andcontroller125 are depicted inFIG. 1, there may be any number ofbot servers105,communication networks110,network devices115, taps120, andcontrollers125.

Thecontroller125 may comprise a processor and/or software configured to receive and analyze network data for the presence of network data sent via the C&C communication channel. In exemplary embodiments, thecontroller125 receives network data over thetap120. If thecontroller125 detects commands within network data that potentially establishes a C&C communication channel, thecontroller125 may intercept the associated network data. In one example, thecontroller125 may intercept network data from the same data flow as that which potentially established the C&C communication channel. In another example, thecontroller125 may intercept all network data from a node on the communication network that either received or sent the commands (e.g., thebot server105 and the network device115). When network data is intercepted, the network data is no longer received by the intended recipient but rather is received by thecontroller125. In some embodiments, the associated network data is intercepted when network data is flagged as suspicious.

In some embodiments, thecontroller125 can organize the network data into one or more data flows. Data flows can then be reconstructed based on the network data samples received from the tap. Thecontroller125 is further discussed in more detail in connection withFIG. 3.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of anexemplary bot detector200 implementing some embodiments of the present invention. In various embodiments, thebot detector200 may be coupled to or comprised within thecontroller125. In other embodiments, thebot detector200 is coupled to thecommunication network110. In various embodiments, thebot detector200 is software that is loaded on a digital device. For example, thebot detector200 may be provided to a user for installation onto their LAN or a network device (e.g., network device115).

Theexemplary bot detector200 may comprise aprotocol fingerprint module205, a protocolstate description module210, aport module215, asignature module220, and atracking module225. Alternative embodiments may comprise more, less, or functionally equivalent modules.

In various embodiments, the use of an IRC protocol is used for bot command and control. Therefore, detecting the existence or establishment of an IRC channel in the network may indicate a possible botnet C&C communication channel. In one embodiment, theprotocol fingerprint module205 is utilized to detect an IRC C&C channel. The exemplaryprotocol fingerprint module205 may comprise input/output related behavior that uniquely identifies a protocol implementation (e.g., version number, feature, vendor, etc.). In some embodiments, a network trace may map routes between thebot server105 and thenetwork device115.

In exemplary embodiments, network data is scanned to detect a bot oriented IRC command, such as .advscan and SCAN, to highlight IRC channels to apotential bot server105. Stateful protocol fingerprinting analysis by theprotocol fingerprint module205 may be performed to detect bot oriented commands in the IRC channels. For example, instead of simply scanning for .advscan in an input stream, theprotocol fingerprint module205 may first look for an IRC channel establishment (e.g., JOIN and JOIN confirm commands), and then scan for an .advscan message.

In some embodiments, theprotocol fingerprinting module205 may be extensible to other protocols via protocol feature description using protocol state descriptions provided by the protocolstate description module210 and regular expressions. A description of the IRC protocol is made possible using this technique. For example, if the protocolstate description module210 determines that the protocol being used is IRC, theprotocol fingerprint module205 may be configured by the protocolstate description module210 to detect IRC commands.

In various embodiments, thesignature module220 provides signatures which identify bot related behavior, knownbot servers105, suspected bot servers, mechanisms to block attacks, mechanisms to block bot propagation, and/or mechanisms that remove bots fromnetwork devices115. These signatures may be provided to theprotocol fingerprint module205 and/or thecontroller125 to take corrective action.

By correlating infection propagation with C&C communication activity, a higher degree of confidence can be ascribed to a suspected bot list. For example, if traffic is observed on a suspected IRC C&C channel and immediately thereafter there is discovery of infection propagation from the IRC server (e.g.,bot server105 or network device115) that provided the C&C communication, then all nodes that have communicated to the same IRC server are highly suspect. This broadens the visibility of infected systems from those that are observed actively propagating infections to systems that have not been observed actively propagating but have been in communication with a confirmedactive bot server105.

Furthermore, detection of a central C&C server allows authorities and system administrators to take the central C&C server offline and/or block communications with the central C&C server. Once the C&C server has been neutralized, the bots that may otherwise receive commands from the C&C server are no longer controlled and are, in some examples, unable to function.

However, because thebot server105 may be easily neutralized by shutting down the central C&C server, botnets controlled using a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communications protocol have been developed. Due to the distributed nature of P2P communication channel, it becomes much harder to shut down a P2P controlled botnet.

In various embodiments, detection of a P2P C&C channel may be performed by theport module215 detecting communications on a seldom used (non-standard) port. During base-lining, standard well-known ports are marked. For example, all well known ports and services in a network environment may be categorized as “standard.” A standard list may be compiled and stored by theport module215. In exemplary embodiments, the standard list may comprise all ports defined in Internet RFCs as well as ports and services used by standard versions of Windows and Linux.

In some embodiments, theport module215 may “learn” standard ports through observation of network data on acommunication network110. In one example, the software onmultiple network devices115 may transmit and receive network data on a variety of ports. The network data is received by thecontroller125 and theport module215 may update the standard list based on the ports of thenetwork devices115 that receive and transmit data over a predetermined period of time.

Any port not on the standard list may be considered a non-standard port. In some embodiments, theport module215 will mark a number of nodes communicating over a non-standard port over a predetermined period of time a P2P communications channel when the number of nodes is over some threshold (e.g., 3 or 4 nodes). In one example, theport module215 will mark a potential P2P communications channel when fournetwork devices115 communicate with each other over a non-standard port within 4 seconds.

These nodes do not need to be communicating on the same port, as long as the ports are seldom used non-standard ports. For example, theport module215 may detect P2P chains that use a different port for each leg of the chain. In some embodiments, the time difference between anomaly propagation in the chain may be assumed to be small (e.g., less than 10 seconds). This short time difference allows thetracking module225 to track various nodes without running into resource constraint issues. In one example, thetracking module225 identifiesnetwork devices115 that communicate withother network devices115 over the predetermined period of time. Theport module215 may identify thosenetwork devices115 communicating over non-standard ports. Once theport module215 detects anetwork device115 communicating over a non-standard port, theport module215 may check thetracking module225 to determine if anyother network device115 has been communicating over non-standard ports.

In other embodiments, thetracking module225, tracks the source and destination of at least some communications over thecommunication network110. If abot server105 or a potential bot server is detected, thetracking module225 can provide a list ofnetwork devices115 in communication with thebot server105 or the potential bot server. In one example, thetracking module225 can provide a list of nodes in communication with a suspectedbot server105 over a predetermined period of time.

While existence of a P2P channel is not conclusive evidence of a botnet, network operators may benefit from notification of P2P communications on their networks. If a P2P communication can be correlated to infection propagation via one or more nodes of the P2P chain, then all nodes of the P2P network may become highly suspect as members of a P2P controlled botnet.

In exemplary embodiments of the present invention, systems may be marked in order to identify infections. For example, any nodes that are not associated with any infection propagation may be placed in a yellow category. These nodes (e.g., network devices115) may be considered “nodes of interest.” Nodes in an IRC or P2P network where at least one of the nodes (e.g., in a chain of nodes) is observed propagating an infection may be placed in, for example, an orange category. Nodes that are observed to be actively propagating an infection may be placed in a red category. Any nodes that have not been categorized as yellow, orange, or red may be assigned to a green category. In various embodiments, icons associated with nodes may be colored and/or associated with a color category.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of anexemplary controller125 implementing embodiments of the present invention. Thecontroller125 may be any digital device or software that receives network data. Theexemplary controller125 may comprise bot detection components similar to thebot detector200 ofFIG. 2 including aprotocol fingerprint module305, a protocolstate description module310, and atracking module315. In this example, the functions of the tracking module225 (FIG. 2) and the port module215 (FIG. 2) are combined.

Thecontroller125 may further comprise aheuristic module320, ascheduler325, afingerprint module330, avirtual machine pool335, ananalysis environment340, asignature module345, and apolicy engine350. In some embodiments, thecontroller125 comprises a tap which is further coupled to thecommunication network110. In other embodiments, thecontroller125 is coupled to anexternal tap120 or may be directly coupled to thecommunication network110.

The exemplaryheuristic module320 may receive a copy of network data from thecommunication network110. Theheuristic module320 applies heuristics and/or probability analysis to determine if the network data may contain suspicious activity (such as bot related activity). In one example, theheuristic module320 flags network data as suspicious. The network data can then be buffered and organized into a data flow. The data flow is then provided to thescheduler325. In some embodiments, the network data is provided directly to thescheduler325 without buffering or organizing the data flow.

Theheuristic module320 can perform any heuristic and/or probability analysis. In some embodiments, once a C&C communication channel has been detected or suspected, analysis may be performed to confirm and/or verify the C&C channel. Once theprotocol fingerprint module305 identifies a potential C&C communication channel, network data from the channel is forwarded to thescheduler325.

In other embodiments, theheuristic module320 performs a dark internet protocol (IP) heuristic. A dark IP heuristic can flag network data coming from abot server105 that has not previously been identified by theheuristic module320. The dark IP heuristic can also flag network data going to an unassigned IP address. In an example, an attacker scans random IP addresses of a network to identify an active server or workstation. The dark IP heuristic can flag network data directed to an unassigned IP address.

Theheuristic module320 can also perform a dark port heuristic. A dark port heuristic can flag network data transmitted to an unassigned or unusual port address. Such network data transmitted to an unusual port can be indicative of a port scan by a worm, hacker, or bot. Further, theheuristic module320 can flag network data from thebot server105 ornetwork device115 that is significantly different than traditional data traffic transmitted by thebot server105 ornetwork device115. For example, theheuristic module320 can flag network data from thebot server105 such as a laptop that begins to transmit network data that is common to a server.

Theheuristic module320 can retain data packets belonging to a particular data flow previously copied by thetap120. In one example, theheuristic module320 receives data packets from thetap120 and stores the data packets within a buffer or other memory. Once theheuristic module320 receives a predetermined number of data packets from a particular data flow, theheuristic module320 performs the heuristics and/or probability analysis.

In some embodiments, theheuristic module320 performs heuristic and/or probability analysis on a set of data packets belonging to adata flow320 can then continue to receive new data packets belonging to the same data flow. Once a predetermined number of new data packets belonging to the same data flow are received, the heuristic and/or probability analysis can be performed upon the combination of buffered and new data packets to determine a likelihood of suspicious activity.

In some embodiments, an optional buffer receives the flagged network data from theheuristic module320. The buffer can buffer and organize the flagged network data into one or more data flows before providing the one or more data flows to thescheduler325. In various embodiments, the buffer can buffer network data and stall before providing the network data to thescheduler325. In one example, the buffer stalls the network data to allow other components of thecontroller125 time to complete functions or otherwise clear data congestion.

Thescheduler325 is a module that identifies thenetwork device115 to receive the copied network data and retrieves a virtual machine associated with thenetwork device115. A virtual machine may be software that is configured to mimic the performance of a device (e.g., the network device115). The virtual machine can be retrieved from thevirtual machine pool335.

In some embodiments, theheuristic module320 transmits the metadata identifying thenetwork device115 to receive the copied network data to thescheduler325. In other embodiments, thescheduler325 receives one or more data packets of the network data from theheuristic module320 and analyzes the one or more data packets to identify thenetwork device115. In yet other embodiments, the metadata can be received from thetap120.

Thescheduler325 can retrieve and configure the virtual machine to mimic pertinent performance characteristics of thenetwork device115. In one example, thescheduler325 configures characteristics of the virtual machine to mimic only those features of thenetwork device115 that are affected by the network data copied by thetap120. Thescheduler325 can determine the features of thenetwork device115 that are affected by the network data by receiving and analyzing the network data from thetap120. Such features of thenetwork device115 can include ports that are to receive the network data, select device drivers that are to respond to the network data and any other devices coupled to or contained within thenetwork device115 that can respond to the network data. In other embodiments, theheuristic module320 can determine the features of thenetwork device115 that are affected by the network data by receiving and analyzing the network data from thetap120. Theheuristic module320 can then transmit the features of the destination device to thescheduler325.

Theoptional fingerprint module330 is configured to determine the packet format of the network data to assist thescheduler325 in the retrieval and/or configuration of the virtual machine. In one example, thefingerprint module330 determines that the network data is based on a transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP). Thereafter, thescheduler325 will configure a virtual machine with the appropriate ports to receive TCP/IP packets. In another example, thefingerprint module330 can configure a virtual machine with appropriate ports to receive user datagram protocol/internet protocol (UDP/IP) packets. Thefingerprint module330 can determine any type of packet format of the network data.

In other embodiments, theoptional fingerprint module330 passively determines a software profile of the network data to assist thescheduler325 in the retrieval and/or configuration of the virtual machine. The software profile may comprise the operating system (e.g., Linux RH6.2) of thebot server105 that generated the network data. The determination can be based on analysis of the protocol information of the network data. In an example, thefingerprint module330 determines that the software profile of network data is Windows XP, SP1. Thefingerprint module330 can then configure a virtual machine with the appropriate ports and capabilities to receive the network data based on the software profile. In other examples, thefingerprint module330 passes the software profile of the network data to thescheduler325, and thescheduler325 either selects or configures the virtual machine based on the profile.

Thevirtual machine pool335 is configured to store virtual machines. Thevirtual machine pool335 may include any storage capable of storing virtual machines. In one example, thevirtual machine pool335 stores a single virtual machine that can be configured by thescheduler325 to mimic the performance of any network device, such as thenetwork device115 on thecommunication network110. Thevirtual machine pool335 can store any number of distinct virtual machines that can be configured to simulate the performance of any of thenetwork devices115.

Theanalysis environment340 is a module that simulates transmission of unencrypted or decrypted network data between thebot server105 and thenetwork device115 to identify the effects of malware or illegitimate computer users (e.g., a hacker, computer cracker, or other computer user) by analyzing the simulation of the effects of the network data upon thenetwork device115 that is carried out on the virtual machine. In exemplary embodiments, there may bemultiple analysis environments340 in order to simulate multiple network data.

In one example, theanalysis environment340 simulates transmission of the network data between thebot server105 and thenetwork device115 to analyze the effects of the network data upon thenetwork device115 to detect unauthorized activity. As theanalysis environment340 simulates the transmission of the network data, behavior of the virtual machine can be closely monitored for unauthorized activity. If the virtual machine crashes, performs illegal operations, or performs bot related activity, theanalysis environment340 can react. In some embodiments, theanalysis environment340 performs dynamic taint analysis to identify unauthorized activity.

Once unauthorized activity is detected, theanalysis environment340 can generate the unauthorized activity signature configured to identify network data containing unauthorized activity (e.g., malware attacks or bot related activity). Since the unauthorized activity signature does not necessarily require probabilistic analysis to detect unauthorized activity within network data, unauthorized activity detection based on the unauthorized activity signature may be very fast and save computing time.

In various embodiments, the unauthorized activity signature may provide code that may be used to eliminate or “patch” portions of network data containing an attack. Further, in some embodiments, the unauthorized activity signature may be used to identify and eliminate (i.e., delete) the malware causing the attack. The unauthorized activity signature may also be used to configure digital devices to eliminate vulnerabilities (e.g., correct system settings such as disabling active-x controls in a browser or updating an operating system.)

Theanalysis environment340 may store the unauthorized activity signature within thesignature module345. Theanalysis environment340 may also transmit or command the transmission of the unauthorized activity signature to one or moreother controllers125, bot detectors200 (e.g., to the signature module220),network devices115, switches, and/or servers. By automatically storing and transmitting the unauthorized activity signature, known malware, previously unidentified malware, and the activities of illicit computer users can be quickly controlled and reduced before a computer system is damaged or compromised. Theanalysis environment340 is further discussed with respect toFIG. 4.

Thesignature module345 receives, authenticates, and stores unauthorized activity signatures. The unauthorized activity signatures may be generated by theanalysis environment340 or anothercontroller125. The unauthorized activity signatures may then be transmitted to thesignature module345 of one, ormore controllers125.

Thepolicy engine350 coupled to theheuristic module320 and is a module that can identify network data as suspicious based upon policies contained within thepolicy engine350. In one example, thenetwork device115 can be a computer designed to attract hackers and/or worms (e.g., a “honey pot”). Thepolicy engine350 can contain a policy to flag any network data directed to the “honey pot” as suspicious since the “honey pot” should not be receiving any legitimate network data. In another example, thepolicy engine350 can contain a policy to flag network data directed to anynetwork device115 that contains highly sensitive or “mission critical” information.

Thepolicy engine350 can also dynamically apply a rule to copy all network data related to network data already flagged by theheuristic module320. In one example, theheuristic module320 flags a single packet of network data as suspicious. Thepolicy engine350 then applies a rule to flag all data related to the single packet (e.g., associated data flows) as suspicious. In some embodiments, thepolicy engine350 flags network data related to suspicious network data until theanalysis environment340 determines that the network data flagged as suspicious is related to unauthorized activity.

Thepolicy engine350 may scan network data to detect unauthorized activity based upon an unauthorized activity signature. In some embodiments, thepolicy engine350 retrieves the unauthorized activity signature from thesignature module345. The network data is then scanned for unauthorized activity based on the unauthorized activity signature.

Thepolicy engine350 can scan both the header and body of a packet of network data. In some embodiments, thepolicy engine350 scans only the header of the packet for unauthorized activity based on the unauthorized activity signature. If unauthorized activity is found, then no further scanning may be performed. In other embodiments, thepolicy engine350 scans the packet contents for unauthorized activity.

Unauthorized activity may be found by scanning only the header of a packet, the contents of the packet, or both the header and the contents of the packet. As a result, unauthorized activity that might otherwise evade discovery can be detected. In one example, evidence of unauthorized activity may be located within the contents of the packet. By scanning only the contents of the packet, unauthorized activity may be detected.

If the packet contents or the packet header indicate that the network data contains unauthorized activity, then thepolicy engine350, theprotocol fingerprint module305, theheuristic module320, or thesignature module345 may take action. In one example, thepolicy engine350 may generate a rule or command an interceptor module (not shown) to intercept network data from the node that transmitted the network data and delete or bar the packet from thecommunication network110. Thepolicy engine350 and/or the interceptor module may also quarantine, delete, or bar other packets belonging to the same data flow as the unauthorized activity packet.

Based on a determination that the network data is suspicious, the interceptor module can re-route the associated network data to a virtual machine from thevirtual machine pool335. As discussed herein, theheuristic module320 can provide information that the network data is suspicious. The interceptor module can intercept all of the network data that is initially flagged by theheuristic module320. The interceptor module can also base the interception of data on the detection of a malware attack by theanalysis environment340 or a policy or signature by thepolicy engine350.

The interceptor module can provide the intercepted data to theheuristic module320 for analysis with a heuristic or to theanalysis environment340 to orchestrate the transmission of the intercepted data to detect a malware attack. If no malware attack is detected, the interceptor module can transmit some or all of the intercepted data to the intended recipient (e.g.,network device115.) If a malware attack is detected within the intercepted data, the unauthorized activity signature may be generated by thesignature module345 and transmitted to one ormore controllers125 or other digital devices.

The interceptor module can redirect network data from thebot server105 in any number of ways including, but not limited to, configuring a switch, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) manipulation, or DHCP services.

The interceptor module may send a request to a switch to redirect network data from anybot server105 to thecontroller125. The switch includes any device configured to receive and direct network data between one or more digital devices. Examples of a switch include, but is not limited to, a router, gateway, bridge, and, or server.

In some embodiments, executable code is loaded onto the switch. In one example, the executable code configures the switch to direct network data from anybot server105 to thecontroller125. In another example, the executable code allows the interceptor module to transmit a request to the switch to direct network data from thebot server105 to thecontroller125. In some embodiments, the interceptor module configures the router to intercept network data from thebot server105 for a predetermined time. The predetermined time may be set by the interceptor module, preloaded into the switch, or configured by a user.

The interceptor module may manipulate dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) services to intercept network data. As thebot server105 transmits network data that is flagged as suspicious or otherwise identified as containing a malware attack. The interceptor module may manipulate DHCP services to assign new IP addresses, associate thecontroller125 MAC address with the IP address of thenetwork device115, or otherwise redirect network data from thebot server105 to thecontroller125.

In various embodiments, the interceptor module can manipulate the DHCP server to configure thebot server105 with a gateway IP address which is the same as the controller's IP address to send all network data to thecontroller125. In other embodiments, the interceptor module may perform DHCP services for thecommunication network110 as a DHCP server.

In one example of ARP manipulation, theheuristic module320 or the interceptor module scans the copied network data flagged as suspicious to identify a source IP address and a target IP address. In this example, the source IP address is the IP address of thebot server105 and the target IP address is the IP address of thenetwork device115. In some embodiments, the interceptor module may send an ARP reply to thebot server105. The ARP reply is configured to identify the MAC address of thecontroller125 with the IP address of thenetwork device115. When thebot server105 receives the ARP reply, thebot server105 may begin to send network data intended for the destination device to thecontroller125.

In other embodiments, a policy within thepolicy engine350 may indicate which IP addresses arebot servers105. Whenever abot server105 sends network data for the first time to anetwork device115, thebot server105 may transmit an ARP request. The network data identifying the source IP address is copied by thetap120 and the policy within thepolicy engine350 can flag the source IP address as abot server105. Thereafter, the interceptor module may store the ARP request, and provide thecontroller125 MAC address in an ARP reply to the switch and/or thebot server105. Once the switch and/or thebot server105 receives thecontroller125 MAC address in the ARP reply, the IP address of the digital device (e.g., network device115) will be associated with thecontroller125 MAC address (e.g., in memory storage or cache). Network data intended for thenetwork device115 may then be transmit from thebot server105 to thecontroller125.

Thebot server105 may send the network data to any number of digital devices. Before the attack can proceed, thebot server105 may send a separate ARP request for the IP address of every other digital device the malware wishes to send data to. Thecontroller125 detects and responds to each ARP request by sending an ARP reply to each request with thecontroller125 MAC address. Thecontroller125 MAC address may be associated with the IP address of the other digital devices on a table within thebot server105, switch, and/or server (not depicted). The table may be within memory, storage, buffered, and/or cached. As a result, network data transmitted by thebot server105 tomultiple network devices115 may be intercepted by thecontroller125.

Once the network data is intercepted, the network data is re-routed to the virtual machine, as discussed herein. Because the network data is re-routed, the actual machine or thenetwork device115 for which the network data is intended may not receive the network data and is, as a result, unaffected. A plurality of the network data can be re-routed to more than one virtual machine at one time (e.g., in parallel.) Thus, if the network data intended for a plurality of thenetwork devices115 is flagged as suspicious, or as coming from the device that has previously been deemed suspicious (e.g., the bot server105), the interceptor module can select a plurality of virtual machines on which to test the suspicious network data.

Thepolicy engine350 may scan network data to detect unauthorized activity (e.g., including some bot related activity) based upon an unauthorized activity signature. In some embodiments, thepolicy engine350 retrieves the unauthorized activity signature from thesignature module345. The network data is then scanned for unauthorized activity based on the unauthorized activity signature. Thepolicy engine350 can also flag network data as suspicious based on policies, as discussed herein.

AlthoughFIG. 3 depicts various modules comprising thecontroller125, fewer or more modules can comprise thecontroller125 and still fall within the scope of various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of anexemplary analysis environment340, in accordance with some embodiments of the present invention. Theanalysis environment340 comprises areplayer405, avirtual switch410, and avirtual machine415. Thereplayer405 is a module that receives network data that has been flagged by theheuristic module320 and replays the network data in theanalysis environment340. In some embodiments, thereplayer405 mimics the behavior of theinfected bot server105 in transmitting the flagged network data. There can be any number ofreplayers405 simulating the transmission of network data between nodes on the communication network (e.g., thebot server105 and the network device115). In a further embodiment, thereplayer405 dynamically modifies session variables, as is appropriate, to emulate a “live” client or server of the protocol sequence being replayed. In one example, dynamic variables that may be dynamically substituted include dynamically assigned ports, transaction IDs, and any other variable that is dynamic to each protocol session. In other embodiments, the network data received from theheuristic module205 is transmitted to thevirtual machine415 without areplayer405.

Thevirtual switch410 is a module that is capable of forwarding packets of flagged network data to thevirtual machine415. Thevirtual switch410 simulatesnetwork device115. Thevirtual switch410 can route the data packets of the data flow to the correct ports of thevirtual machine415.

Thevirtual machine415 is a representation of thenetwork device115 that can be provided to theanalysis environment340 by thescheduler325. In one example, thescheduler325 retrieves avirtual machine415 from thevirtual machine pool335 and configures thevirtual machine415 to mimic thenetwork device115. The configuredvirtual machine415 is then provided to theanalysis environment340 where it can receive flagged network data from thevirtual switch410.

As theanalysis environment340 simulates the transmission of the network data, behavior of thevirtual machine415 can be closely monitored for unauthorized activity. If thevirtual machine415 crashes, performs illegal operations, performs abnormally, or allows access of data to an unauthorized computer user, theanalysis environment340 can react.

In exemplary embodiments, virtual machines may be used to detect C&C channels and botnet infected systems using the C&C channels. C&C channel detection may occur in a replay virtual machine environment or in a direct entry virtual machine environment. While replay virtual analysis of virtual machines may be leveraged to extract C&C channel information, this may not be possible for all infection protocols. For infections protocols that can be replayed to result in a full bot infection, this technique may yield positive results. For infection protocols that do not go proceed to completion due to an inability to effectively replay unknown worms protocols, for example, the replay environment may not result in a full infection of thevirtual machine415. This may result in a denial of C&C channel information extraction, which will only become evident post-infection. In those instances, theanalysis environment340 may flag the devices involved in the suspected C&C channel as possibly infected with a bot and continue to track the nodes that communicate with those devices that participate within the suspected C&C channel.

Passive replay virtual machine environments may be effective for C&C channel discovery, since a passive worm may introduce no new worm protocol. Instead, a passive worm may merely piggyback on an existing protocol. Therefore, the existing passive worm replay may be adequate to detect a full bot infection. Passive replay of, for example, web based exploits may be extended to result in full infection and extraction of C&C channel information. Direct entry virtual machine environments are effective in extracting C&C channel information, since there is no need to replay an unknown worm protocol.

In some embodiments, theanalysis environment340 performs dynamic taint analysis to identify unauthorized activity. For a malware attack to change the execution of an otherwise legitimate program, the malware attack may cause a value that is normally derived from a trusted source to be derived from the user's own input. Program values (e.g., jump addresses and format strings) are traditionally supplied by a trusted program and not from external untrusted inputs. Malware, however, may attempt to exploit the program by overwriting these values.

In one example of dynamic taint analysis, all input data from untrusted or otherwise unknown sources are flagged. Program execution of programs with flagged input data is then monitored to track how the flagged data propagates (i.e., what other data becomes tainted) and to check when the flagged data is used in dangerous ways. For example, use of tainted data as jump addresses or format strings often indicates an exploit of a vulnerability such as a buffer overrun or format string vulnerability.

In some embodiments, theanalysis environment340 monitors and analyzes the behavior of thevirtual machine415 in order to determine a specific type of malware or the presence of an illicit computer user. Theanalysis environment340 can also generate computer code configured to eliminate new viruses, worms, bots, or other malware. In various embodiments, theanalysis environment340 can generate computer code configured to identify data within the network data indicative of a malware attack, repair damage performed by malware, or the illicit computer user. By simulating the transmission of suspicious network data and analyzing the response of the virtual machine, theanalysis environment340 can identify known and previously unidentified malware and the activities of illicit computer users before a computer system is damaged or compromised.

Once the virtual machine is infected, via either replay or direct entry, the environment can wait for an outbound domain name system (DNS) request. The requested name in the DNS request is likely a C&C channel. A pseudo-DNS server in the virtual machine environment can respond to this request with an IP address mapped to an internal-to-virtual machine-analysis pseudo-server. If an outbound IRC or web request is made to the supplied IP address, then this confirms the existence of the C&C channel.

In some embodiments, all outbound DNS requires may be logged in a circular buffer (not shown). Once a C&C channel DNS name is identified, a search may be performed on all entries in the buffer for other source IP addresses that have requested the same DNS name. These source IP addresses are now highly suspect to be infected with the same bot or malware family that infected the virtual machine, even though these other IP addresses may not have been acknowledged as propagating an infection.

Once a C&C DNS name is discovered, the name may be communicated to all other devices as well as a cloud server. This allows other distributed devices to detect attempts to connect to the same C&C channel.

FIG. 5 is aflowchart500 of an exemplary method for detecting a C&C channel of a bot. Instep505, the system (e.g.,controller125 and/or bot detector200) determines if there is communication detected in thecommunication network110. The determination may be performed, in accordance with some embodiments, by thetap120, thebot detector200, and/or thecontroller125. If there is communication detected, then instep510, data within the communication may be scanned. In one embodiment, the data may be copied. For example, the network data from thenetwork device115 to thebot server105 may be copied by thetap120. The network data is then sent from thetap120 to thecontroller125 for analysis. In an alternative embodiment, the data may be scanned directly by, for example, thebot detector200.

Instep515, a bot communication analysis is performed. As discussed herein, thebot detector200 or thecontroller125 may utilizes various modules (e.g.,protocol fingerprint module305,heuristic module320, and analysis environment340) to determine whether the copied network data contains a possible bot communication or may otherwise be potentially harmful to thenetwork device115 for which the copied network data may be intended. Subsequently, suspicious nodes can be flagged. If thecontroller125 orbot detector200 does not identify the copied network data as possibly containing a possible bot communication, the network data may be transmitted to the intended destination (e.g., network device115).

As described herein, several different methods may be utilized to detect a C&C communication within a channel on thecommunication network110. In one embodiment, afingerprint module205 or305 may scans for a bot oriented command in an IRC channel including IRC channel establishment commands or messages.

In an alternative embodiment, aport module215 may monitor the use of non-standard ports. During base-lining a list of standard ports is compiled. Communications not originating from a standard port may be considered non-standard or an anomaly. As such, associated nodes may be flagged (e.g., color coded) and tracked.

In a further embodiment, a virtual machine may be utilized to detect C&C communication channels. The C&C communication channel detection may occur in a replay virtual machine environment or in a direct entry virtual machine environment. Accordingly, a virtual machine is retrieved which is used to mimic thenetwork device115. Intercepted or replayed network data obtained from the communication channel is transmitted to the virtual machine. The virtual machine response is then analyzed to determine if the virtual machine is infected. In some embodiments, theanalysis environment340 may wait for an outbound domain name system (DNS) request, which likely identifies the C&C channel. A pseudo-DNS server in the virtual machine can respond to the request with an IP mapped to an internal-to-virtual machine-analysis pseudo-server. If the outbound IRC or web request is made to the supplied IP address, then this confirms a C&C channel.

If a suspected bot communication is detected instep520, then a recovery process may be performed instep525. In one embodiment, the associated devices may be flagged and/or proper users and administrators notified. For example, any nodes that are not associated with any infection propagation may be placed in a yellow category. Nodes in an IRC or P2P network where at least one of the nodes (e.g., in a chain of nodes) is observed propagating an infection may be placed in, for example, an orange category. Nodes that are observed to be actively propagating an infection may be placed in a red category. Any nodes that have not been categorized as yellow, orange, or red may be assigned to a green category.

In another embodiment, a router (i.e., switch) may be configured to direct all data received from the bot server105 (e.g., from the source IP address of the bot server105) to thecontroller125. As a result, all the network data from thebot server105, not only that which is transmitted to thenetwork device115, may be intercepted.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of thecontroller125, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. Thecontroller125 comprises aprocessor600, amemory system605, astorage system610, an I/O interface615, and acommunication network interface620 which are all coupled to asystem bus625. Theprocessor600 is configured to execute executable instructions. In some embodiments, theprocessor600 comprises circuitry or any one or more processors capable of processing the executable instructions.

Thememory system605 is any memory configured to store data. Some examples of thememory system605 include storage devices, such as RAM or ROM.

Thestorage system610 is any storage configured to retrieve and store data (e.g., a computer readable medium). Some examples of thestorage system610 are flash drives, hard drives, optical drives, and/or magnetic tape. Thestorage system610 can comprise a database or other data structure configured to hold and organize data (e.g., network data, copies of network data, buffered data.) In some embodiments, thecontroller125 includes memory in the form of RAM and storage in the form of flash data. Thememory system605 and/or thestorage system610 can comprise cache and buffers configured to retain network data or copies of network data.

The input/output (I/O)interface615 is any device that can receive input and provide output to a user. The I/O interface615 can be, but is not limited to, a keyboard, a mouse, a touchscreen, a keypad, a biosensor, or floppy disk drive.

Thecommunication network interface620 can be coupled to any user device via thelink630 throughlink635. Thecommunication network interface620 may support communication over a USB connection, a firewire connection, an Ethernet connection, a serial connection, a parallel connection, or an ATA connection. Thecommunication network interface620 may also support wireless communication (e.g., 802.11a/b/g/n or wireless USB). It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that thecommunication network interface620 can support many wired and wireless standards.

Although only two links (630 and635) are depicted inFIG. 6, there may be any number of links. In various embodiments, there may be onelink630 used by thetap120 to transparently copy network data from thecommunication network110. The other links may be used by thecontroller125 to intercept data from one ormore bot server105 in parallel. In one example, thecontroller125 comprises multiple IP addresses that may be broadcast from different links. Network data may be intercepted from differentinfected devices105 by different links.

The above-described modules can be comprised of instructions that are stored on storage media (e.g., computer readable media). The instructions can be retrieved and executed by a processor (e.g., the processor600). Some examples of instructions include software, program code, and firmware. Some examples of storage media comprise memory devices and integrated circuits. The instructions are operational when executed by the processor to direct the processor to operate in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. Those skilled in the art are familiar with instructions, processor(s), and storage media.

While various embodiments have been described above, it should be understood that they have been presented by way of example only, and not limitation. Thus, the breadth and scope of a preferred embodiment should not be limited by any of the above-described exemplary embodiments.

Claims (31)

What is claimed is:

1. A method for detecting a communication channel of a bot, comprising:

detecting presence of a suspected command and control communication channel between a first network device and a second network device, the suspected command and control communication channel having an increased probability of being used for bot communication;

identifying the communication channel of the bot, the communication channel of the bot being a command and control communication channel permitting remote control of all or a portion of the second network device without authorization by a user of the second network device, the identifying comprising:

scanning data flow within the detected suspected command and control communication channel for a bot communication;

determining a first of a plurality of protocols and corresponding ports associated with the data flow; and

determining if a suspected bot communication exists within the data flow by analyzing a response of a virtual machine to the data flow, the virtual machine being configurable with ports corresponding to any of the plurality of protocols including the first protocol associated with the data flow, the virtual machine configured with the corresponding ports associated with the data flow; and

if a suspected bot communication is detected indicating existence of the communication channel of the bot, performing a recovery process.

2. The method ofclaim 1 wherein detecting presence of the suspected command and control communication channel occurs via a packet level analysis.

3. The method ofclaim 1 wherein detecting presence of the suspected command and control communication channel occurs via a virtual machine level analysis.

4. The method ofclaim 1 wherein determining if a suspected bot communication exists comprises detecting if any peer-to-peer (P2P) anomaly communication chains are present.

5. The method ofclaim 4 wherein the detecting if any peer-to-peer (P2P) anomaly communication chains are present comprises determining if any chain of nodes communicating to non-standard ports exceeds a predetermined threshold.

6. The method ofclaim 1 where determining if a suspected bot communication exists comprises identifying and scanning at least one network device.

7. The method ofclaim 1 wherein determining if a suspected bot communication exists comprises identifying an internet relay chat (IRC) channel establishment command.

8. The method ofclaim 1 wherein determining if a suspected bot communication exists comprises simulating data flow between a replayer and a virtual machine and analyzing a response of the virtual machine.

9. The method ofclaim 1 wherein determining if a suspected bot communication exists comprises analyzing a response of a virtual machine.

10. The method ofclaim 1 wherein performing the recovery process comprises providing notification to at least one administrator.

11. The method ofclaim 1 wherein performing the recovery process comprises assigning color codes for review by an administrator.

12. The method ofclaim 1 wherein performing the recovery process comprises performing infection propagation analysis on nodes associated with the bot communication.

13. The method ofclaim 1 wherein performing the recovery process comprises determining an identity of the first network device.

14. The method ofclaim 1 wherein performing the recovery process comprises redirecting all communications from the first network device to a virtual machine.

15. A system for detecting communication channels of a bot, comprising:

a processor;

a tap configured to access data from a detected suspected command and control communication channel, the detected suspected command and control communication channel having an increased probability of being used for bot communication; and

a bot detector comprising instructions executable by the processor, the bot detector being configured to identify the communication channels of the bot each communication channel of the bot being a command and control communication channel permitting remote control of all or a portion of the second network device without authorization by a user of the second network device, the identifying comprising instructions to:

scan the data from the detected suspected command and control communication channel for bot communication;

determining a first of a plurality of protocols and corresponding ports associated with the data flow; and

determine if the data from the detected suspected command and control communication channel comprises a bot communication by analyzing a response of a virtual machine to the data flow, the virtual machine being configurable with ports corresponding to any of the plurality of protocols including the first protocol associated with the data flow, the virtual machine configured with the corresponding ports associated with the data flow.

16. The system ofclaim 15 further comprising a router.

17. The system ofclaim 15 further comprising an interceptor module.

18. The system ofclaim 15 wherein the bot detector comprises a protocol fingerprint module configured to determine if the data comprises a control and command message.

19. The system ofclaim 15 wherein the bot detector comprises a port module configured to determine if the data is being sent from a non-standard port.

20. The system ofclaim 15 wherein the bot detector comprises a heuristic module configured to determine using a virtual machine whether the data comprises a bot communication.

21. A non-transitory computer readable medium having embodied thereon instructions executable by a processor for performing a method operations for detecting communication channels of a bot, comprising:

detecting presence of a suspected command and control communication channel between a first network device and a second network device, the suspected command and control communication channel having an increased probability of being used for bot communication;

identifying the communication channel of the bot the communication channel of the bot being a command and control communication channel permitting remote control of all or a portion of the second network device without authorization by a user of the second network device, the identifying comprising:

scanning data flow within the detected suspected command and control communication channel for a bot communication;

determining a first of a plurality of protocols and corresponding ports associated with the data flow; and

determining if a suspected bot communication exists within the data flow by analyzing a response of a virtual machine to the data flow, the virtual machine being configurable with ports corresponding to any of the plurality of protocols including the first protocol associated with the data flow, the virtual machine configured with the corresponding ports associated with the data flow; and

if a suspected bot communication is detected indicating existence of the communication channel of the bot, performing a recovery process.

22. The method ofclaim 1 being conducted by a hardware processor within a controller.

23. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the first of the plurality of protocols includes transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP).

24. A method for detecting a communication channel of a bot, comprising:

detecting presence of a suspected command and control communication channel between a first network device and a second network device, the suspected command and control communication channel having an increased probability of being used for bot communication;

identifying the communication channel of the bot, the communication channel of the bot being a command and control communication channel permitting remote control of all or a portion of the second network device without authorization by a user of the second network device, the identifying comprising:

scanning data flow within the detected suspected command and control communication channel for a bot communication; and

determining if a suspected bot communication exists within the data flow; and

if a suspected bot communication is detected indicating existence of the communication channel of the bot, performing a recovery process, wherein performing a recovery process comprises determining suspicious nodes by identifying nodes that have participated in communications associated with the suspected command and control communication channel.

25. The method ofclaim 24, wherein the determining of the suspicious nodes by identifying nodes that have participated in communications associated with the suspected command and control communication channel further comprises identifying nodes that have participated in an internet relay chat (IRC) communication with a potential bot server.

26. The method ofclaim 24, wherein the determining of the suspicious nodes by identifying nodes that have participated in communications associated with the suspected command and control communication channel further comprises identifying nodes that have participated in a suspicious P2P network.

27. The method ofclaim 24, wherein the determining of the suspicious nodes by identifying nodes that have participated in communications associated with the suspected command and control communication channel further comprises identifying nodes that have made an outbound DNS request for a DNS name associated with a suspected command and control communication channel.

28. A method for detecting a communication channel of a bot, comprising:

detecting presence of a suspected command and control communication channel between a first network device and a second network device, the suspected command and control communication channel having an increased probability of being used for bot communication;

identifying the communication channel of the bot, the communication channel of the bot being a command and control communication channel permitting remote control of all or a portion of the second network device without authorization by a user of the second network device, the identifying comprising:

organizing network data within the detected suspected command and control communication channel into one or more data flows by utilizing protocol implementation information identified by a protocol fingerprint module;

scanning the one or more data flows within the detected suspected command and control communication channel for a bot communication; and

determining if a suspected bot communication exists within the data flow; and

if a suspected bot communication is detected indicating existence of the communication channel of the bot, performing a recovery process.

29. The method ofclaim 28, wherein the organizing of the network data within the detected suspected command and control communication channel into one or more data flows by utilizing protocol implementation information identified by a protocol fingerprint module further comprises organizing the network data into one or more internet relay chat (IRC) communication data flows.

30. The method ofclaim 28, wherein the organizing of the network data within the detected suspected command and control communication channel into one or more data flows by utilizing protocol implementation information identified by a protocol fingerprint module further comprises organizing the network data into one or more P2P communication data flows.

31. A method for detecting a communication channel of a bot, comprising:

detecting presence of a suspected command and control communication channel between a first network device and a second network device, the suspected command and control communication channel having an increased probability of being used for bot communication;

identifying the communication channel of the bot, the communication channel of the bot being a command and control communication channel permitting remote control of all or a portion of the second network device without authorization by a user of the second network device, the identifying comprising:

scanning data flow within the detected suspected command and control communication channel for a bot communication;

determining protocols and ports associated with the data flow; and

determining if a suspected bot communication exists within the data flow by analyzing a response of a virtual machine configured with the protocols and ports to receive and respond to the data flow;

if a suspected bot communication is detected

indicating existence of the communication channel of the bot; and

performing a recovery process, wherein performing a recovery process comprises determining suspicious nodes by identifying nodes that have participated in communications associated with the suspected command and control communication channel.

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