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US7907935B2 - Intelligent remote device - Google Patents

Intelligent remote device
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US7907935B2
US7907935B2US10/740,497US74049703AUS7907935B2US 7907935 B2US7907935 B2US 7907935B2US 74049703 AUS74049703 AUS 74049703AUS 7907935 B2US7907935 B2US 7907935B2
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security token
security
remote device
computer system
intelligent remote
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US20050136964A1 (en
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Eric F. Le Saint
Dominique Louis Joseph Fedronic
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ActivCard Ireland Ltd
Assa Abloy AB
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ActivCard Ireland Ltd
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Assigned to ACTIVCARD IRELAND, LIMITEDreassignmentACTIVCARD IRELAND, LIMITEDASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS).Assignors: FEDRONIC, DOMINIQUE LOUIS JOSEPH, LE SAINT, ERIC F.
Priority to US10/740,497priorityCriticalpatent/US7907935B2/en
Priority to EP14167129.7Aprioritypatent/EP2770693B1/en
Priority to ES04293088.3Tprioritypatent/ES2481396T3/en
Priority to EP04293088.3Aprioritypatent/EP1549018B1/en
Publication of US20050136964A1publicationCriticalpatent/US20050136964A1/en
Priority to US12/931,351prioritypatent/US8200195B2/en
Publication of US7907935B2publicationCriticalpatent/US7907935B2/en
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Priority to US13/472,752prioritypatent/US20130019100A1/en
Assigned to ACTIVCARD IRELAND, LIMITEDreassignmentACTIVCARD IRELAND, LIMITEDASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS).Assignors: ACTIVIDENTITY, INC.
Assigned to ACTIVIDENTITY, INC.reassignmentACTIVIDENTITY, INC.CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE NAMES PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 029444 FRAME 0562. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST.Assignors: ACTIVCARD IRELAND LIMITED
Assigned to ASSA ABLOY ABreassignmentASSA ABLOY ABASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS).Assignors: ACTIVIDENTITY, INC.
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Abstract

An intelligent remote device equipped with a security token operatively coupled thereto is processing communications with a security token enabled computer system over a wireless private network. The intelligent remote device is adapted to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the computer system. Multiple computer systems may be authenticated to using the intelligent remote device. Additionally, various secure communications connections mechanisms are described which are intended to augment existing security protocols available using wireless network equipment. Authentication of a user supplied critical security parameter is performed by the security token. The critical security parameter may be provided locally via the intelligent remote device or received from the wireless network and routed to the security token. Aural, visual or vibratory feedback may be provided to the user to signal a successful authentication transaction.

Description

FIELD OF INVENTION
The present invention relates generally to a data processing method, system and computer program product and more specifically to an intelligent remote device equipped with a security token which is used to emulate for authentication purposes, a local security token peripheral device connected to a host computer system.
BACKGROUND
The explosive growth in the use of portable intelligent devices and network appliances has created demand for security mechanisms to be deployed which takes advantage of the greater user flexibility offered by these device. An ideal use for these devices is to simplify access to one or more computer systems in which a user may be required to interact with. For example, in an enterprise computing environment, a typical user may have a computer system which is used at a primary work location and a laptop which is used while the user is traveling.
In many cases, different user credentials are required to access the computer system and the laptop as a defensive measure for preventing cascading security compromises. Furthermore, the practice of using static user names and passwords has fallen into disfavor as this type of user credentials are frequently compromised, temporarily forgotten and increases administrative expenses by requiring a “helpdesk” type arrangement to assist users whose user names and passwords have either been forgotten or compromised.
A more secure solution is to provide a portable security device such as a security token which minimizes the number of credentials a user is required to remember and provides a much more secure mechanism to authenticate the user to a computer system. However, equipping each computer system with a separate security token, reader and interface software can be expensive to deploy and maintain, thus presenting a formidable economic barrier to improving computer system security over the use of static user names and passwords.
One possible solution is to provide an alternate mechanism for authenticating to one or more computer systems which minimizes the number security tokens, readers and interface software required to be installed and maintained. An example of which is shown in European patent application EP 1061482 A1 to Cuong. The Cuong application discloses an intelligent portable device which allows a user to authenticate to a plurality of financial service providers using a single universal security token in the form of a smart card. The basic goal of this application is to reduce the number of smart cards required to be carried by the user.
Another solution is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,016,476 to Maes, et. al. The Maes patent discloses an intelligent portable device for use by a consumer for point of sales and other financial transactions using the same concept of a single universal security token in the form of a smart card. This patent addresses security mechanisms such as biometric authentication to prevent unauthorized access to the user's universal security token.
Both the Cuong application and the Maes, et al. patent are intended to be used over a public network in a client-server arrangement where the user is authenticating to a external organization rather than there own organization. No particular emphasis is placed on the security of the telecommunications link.
In yet another approach, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/880,795 to Audebert, et al., provides a solution which may be implemented over a public or private network using a client-server and/or a peer-to-peer authentication arrangement. This application addresses the limitations described above but does not address security issues related to wireless telecommunications links or alternate user login mechanisms associated with accessing the user's unattended computer system. This application is to a common assignee and is not admitted as prior art to the instant application.
In the relevant art, it has been determined that certain of the earlier wireless security protocols could be compromised by a reasonably sophisticated attacker. For example, the wireless equivalent privacy (WEP) specified by the IEEE 802.11:1999 standard was intended to provide roughly the same level of confidentiality for wireless data that is available in a wired (Ethernet) LAN which is not protected by encryption. Later versions of the IEEE 802.11 standards have improved the level of security of wireless connections. However, total reliance on developing security protocols is not advisable. As such, additional security measures should be provided to ensure that authenticating information is not compromised or vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle,” “dictionary” or “replay” type attacks.
Lastly, a secure mechanism needs to be established which allows a user to authenticate to his or her computer system which does not require significant changes to existing user authentication mechanisms included in computer operating systems and does not reduce the overall level of security afforded by the existing authentication mechanisms.
Therefore, a secure authentication arrangement which allows an intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral in a peer-to-peer relationship over a private network without reduction in the overall level of security would be highly advantageous in current enterprise computing environments.
SUMMARY
This invention addresses the limitations described above and provides an intelligent remote device equipped with a security token which emulates a local security device peripheral in a peer-to-peer relationship over a private network without reduction in the overall level of security. The intelligent remote device includes a personal data assistant (PDA), a cellular telephone having private networking capabilities, a network appliance or a personal security device such as a secure PIN pad.
The term “security token” as described herein includes hardware based security devices such as cryptographic modules, smart cards, integrated circuit chip cards, portable data carriers (PDC), personal security devices (PSD), subscriber identification modules (SIM), wireless identification modules (WIM), USB token dongles, identification tokens, secure application modules (SAM), hardware security modules (HSM), secure multi-media token (SMMC), trusted platform computing alliance chips (TPCA) and like devices.
In various method embodiments of the invention, the invention comprises a method for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communications interface for a security token.
The method includes the establishment of a first communications connection between the intelligent remote device and a network gateway coupled to a network in common with a computer system. The network in common includes private wireless networking such as BlueTooth, HomeRF, and IEEE 802.11 a/b/g and its successors.
The communications connection utilizes existing security protocols established for the network interface devices and is essentially the connection handshake between the intelligent remote device and the network gateway. Examples of which include secure socket layer (SSL), transport layer security (TLS), private communications technology (PCT), internet protocol security (IPsec) or a secure messaging arrangement.
The secure messaging arrangement incorporates a shared symmetric key pair for cryptography purposes which is uniquely identified by a session identifier generated and assigned by the security token. Alternately, or in combination with the symmetric key cryptography, an APDU communications pipe may be established between the computer system and the security token. The APDU communications pipe allows exchanging of native security token APDU commands and responses which are encapsulated in standard networking protocols such as TCP/IP.
Once the communications connection is established, a critical security parameter (CSP) associated with a user is provided to the security token using the intelligent remote device as a communications interface. A critical security parameter as defined herein includes authentication data, passwords, PINs, secret and private cryptographic keys which are to be entered into or output from a cryptographic module and is intended to be synonymous with the definition of CSP included in FIPS PUB 140-2, “Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.”
The provided critical security parameter may be directly entered using a user interface included with the intelligent remote device or sent from a remote location via the communications connection. For example, a biometric scanner may be directly connected to the user's computer system or coupled to the network in common. In this arrangement, the generally greater computing power of the user's computer system may be used to process a biometric sample which subsequently matched by the security token.
The provided user's critical security parameter is then used to perform an authentication transaction, in which the user is authenticated to the computer system and the security token. A two factor authentication transaction may be incorporated as well where the security token is authenticated to the computer system by exchanging authenticating information during establishment of the communications connection. The two factor authentication process may be performed using dynamic one-time passwords, challenge/response or by digital certificate exchanges. Upon successful completion of the authentication transaction, the user is allowed access to at least one secure resource associated with the computer system.
To ensure security and to facilitate communications between the security token and the computer system through a network address translation (NAT) type firewall, the communications connection is initiated by sending an access request message from the intelligent remote device to the computer system. The access request message provides sufficient information to the network gateway for routing to the target computer system and includes a return network address in which the target computer system is to respond. Multiple logical connections may be established over the network with one or more computer systems to employ the intelligent remote device as a security peripheral device. The access request message further includes information which identifies the intelligent remote device and associated security token.
The computer system includes an alternate user authentication method which allows the user to remotely authenticate to the computer system over the communications connection. The term “method” as defined herein is used in its broadest context which includes a function, application, routine, remotely invocable method, subroutine or applet. The alternate user authentication method includes an agent which monitors incoming network traffic directed to the computer system for an access request message. The agent invokes the alternate user authentication method which is an adjunct or replacement of a main user authentication method.
Aural or visual feedback is provided to the user following successful authentication. This allows the user to determine which computer system among a plurality of computer systems has been authenticated. The aural or visual feedback may be provided on either or both the intelligent remote device and the authenticated computer system.
In another embodiment of the invention, a trusted path is established between the security token and the intelligent remote device. The trusted path allows the intelligent remote device to be used in high security operating environments such as FIPS security levels 3 and 4 which requires that critical security parameters be entered into or output from a cryptographic module in an encrypted form to prevent interception of the critical security parameters.
In various embodiments of the invention, the hardware portion of the invention includes an intelligent remote device equipped with a security token in processing communications with a computer system over a network. The network includes a wireless private network such as BlueTooth, HomeRF, IEEE 802.11 a/b/g and successors which incorporate a secure communications protocol comprising secure socket layer (SSL), transport layer security (TLS), private communications technology (PCT), internet protocol security (IPsec) or a secure messaging arrangement.
The intelligent remote device includes a personal data assistant (PDA), a cellular telephone having private networking capabilities, a network appliance or a personal security device such as a secure PIN pad.
The intelligent remote device is equipped with the necessary hardware, software and firmware to emulate a security token peripheral device which is locally connected to the computer system and includes the abilities to; operatively couple the security token to the intelligent remote device, send an access request message over the network to the computer system to invoke establishment of a secure communications connection between the security token and the computer system, provide cryptographic protection of data exchanged between the intelligent remote device and the computer system, receive a critical security parameter provided by the user either directly or received through the secure communications connection, exchange information over the network using an APDU communications pipe and provide aural or visual feedback to the user upon successful completion of a two-factor authentication transaction.
The security token is comprised of hardware based security devices such as cryptographic modules, smart cards, integrated circuit chip cards, portable data carriers (PDC), personal security devices (PSD), subscriber identification modules (SIM), wireless identification modules (WIM), USB token dongles, identification tokens, secure application modules (SAM), hardware security modules (HSM), secure multi-media token (SMMC), trusted platform computing alliance chips (TPCA) and like devices. The security token is provided with at least one operatively installed reference critical security parameter associated with the user and includes the abilities to; receive a critical security parameter associated with the user, perform an authentication transaction.
The computer system includes at least one workstation, server, desktop, laptop, personal computer, mini computer or mainframe computer which requires user authentication prior to allowing a user to access. The computer system portion of the invention is equipped with the necessary hardware, software and firmware to allow the user to remotely authenticate to the computer system over the network as if the user were local to the computer system and includes the abilities to; receive an access request sent over the network from the intelligent remote device, establish the communications connection between the computer system and the security token, execute an alternate user authentication method which allows the user to remotely authenticate to the computer system over the network using the two factor authentication transaction, exchange information over the network or communications connection using an APDU communications pipe and allow the user access to the computer system following successful completion of the two factor authentication transaction.
The intelligent remote device and security token enabled computer system include a set of application program interfaces embodied on a computer readable medium for execution by a processor which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to the security token enabled computer system. The application program interfaces comprise a first interface that exchanges information between a security token and the security token enabled computer system in a protocol native to the security token and a second interface that receives and routes a critical security parameter to the security token.
In one embodiment of the invention, the first set of application interface programs installed in the intelligent remote device provides protocol conversion into a protocol native to the security token. In another embodiment of the invention, the first set of application interface programs installed in the intelligent remote device extracts the information from communications packets already in a protocol native to said security token.
The programs and associated data may be stored on transportable digital recording media such as a CD ROM, floppy disk, data tape, DVD, or removable hard disk for installation on the computer system, intelligent remote device and/or security token as one or more transportable computer program products. The programs and associated data comprise executable instructions which are stored in a code format including byte code, compiled, interpreted, compliable or interpretable.
The computer program product embodied in the tangible form is readable by a plurality of processors in processing communications and includes executable instructions stored for causing one or more of the plurality of processors to; establish a secure communications connection between a security token and a security token enabled computer system via an intelligent remote device, authenticate at least the security token to said security token enabled computer system, provide a critical security parameter associated with a user to the security token and authenticate the critical security parameter by the security token.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
The features and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following detailed description when considered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Where possible, the same reference numerals and characters are used to denote like features, elements, components or portions of the invention. It is intended that changes and modifications can be made to the described embodiment without departing from the true scope and spirit of the subject invention as defined in the claims.
FIG.1—is a generalized block diagram of a security token enabled computer system and a functionally connected security token.
FIG.1A—is a generalized block diagram of a intelligent remote device.
FIG.1B-1—is a detailed block diagram of the functional modules incorporated into the security token enabled computer system.
FIG.1B-2—is a detailed block diagram of the functional modules incorporated into the intelligent remote device.
FIG.1C—is a detailed block diagram of an initiating process which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system.
FIG.1D—is a detailed block diagram of the intelligent remote device emulating a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system.
FIG.2A—is a detailed block diagram of one embodiment of a secure communications connection between the security token and the security token enabled computer system where a shared symmetric key pair are incorporated into the secure connection.
FIG.2B—is a detailed block diagram of another embodiment of a secure communications connection between the security token and the security token enabled computer system where two sets of symmetric key pairs are incorporated into the secure connection.
FIG.2C—is a detailed block diagram of another embodiment of a secure communications connection between the security token and the security token enabled computer system where an APDU communications pipe is incorporated into the secure connection.
FIG.2D—is a detailed block diagram of another embodiment of the invention where an additional security token enabled computer system and an authentication server are securely connected to the security token.
FIG.3—is a flow diagram illustrating the major steps associated with enabling an intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to a security token enabled computer system.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
This present invention provides an arrangement which allows an intelligent remote device to securely emulate a local security device peripheral connected to a security token enabled computer system via a network. The applications are envisioned to be programmed in a high level language such as Java™, C++, C, C# or Visual Basic™.
Referring toFIG. 1, a functional block diagram of the security token enabled computer system is shown which includes a central processor5, amain memory10, adisplay20 electrically coupled to adisplay interface15, asecondary memory subsystem25 electrically coupled to ahard disk drive30, aremovable storage drive35 electrically coupled to aremovable storage unit40 and an auxiliaryremovable storage interface45 electrically coupled to an auxiliaryremovable storage unit50.
Acommunications interface55 subsystem is coupled to anetwork65 via anetwork interface60. Asecurity token75 is operatively coupled to thecommunications interface55 via a securitytoken interface70. User input devices including a mouse and akeyboard85 are operatively coupled to thecommunications interface55 via auser interface80. Lastly, an optional biometric scanner is operatively coupled to thecommunications interface55 via abiometric scanner interface90.
The central processor5,main memory10,display interface15secondary memory subsystem25 andcommunications interface system55 are electrically coupled to acommunications infrastructure100. Thehost computer system105 includes an operating system having an extensible, modifiable or replaceable logon security application, a security token application programming interface, one or more security token aware applications, one or more proprietary extensions to the logon security application, a communications agent capable of sensing an incoming access request and invoking an alternate logon method, cryptography software capable of performing symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic functions, secure messaging software and all necessary device interface and driver software.
Thesecurity token75 includes a wireless, optical and/or electrical connection means compatible with the securitytoken interface70, a processor, a cryptography co-processor, volatile and non-volatile memory electrically coupled to the processor and co-processor, a runtime operating environment, cryptography extensions available to the operating system and capable of performing symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic functions compatible with the computer system's cryptography software, a security executive application, one or more CSP protected applications including two factor authentications are functionally coupled to the security executive application and a public key infrastructure (PKI) key pair functionally coupled to the security executive application.
Thesecurity token75 further includes the necessary authentication applications and cryptographic extensions to successfully perform the two factor authentication transaction with the security token enabled computer system. The non-volatile memory has operatively stored therein one or more reference CSPs which are verified by the security executive application to authenticate a user to the security token. Thesecurity token75 is embodied in a removable form factor, although other form factors will work as well.
Thenetwork65 includes a wireless private network such as BlueTooth, HomeRF, IEEE 802.11 a/b/g and its successors which incorporate a secure communications protocol comprising secure socket layer (SSL), transport layer security (TLS), private communications technology protocol (PCT), internet protocol security (IPsec) or a secure messaging arrangement. Thenetwork65 further includes a network gateway which allows ad hoc connection to the intelligent remote device.
Referring toFIG. 1A, a functional block diagram of an intelligentremote device110 is shown. The intelligentremote device110 essentially incorporates the same modular components included in the security token enabled computer described above. The intelligent remote device includes a processor5′, amain memory10′, adisplay20′ electrically coupled to adisplay interface15′, asecondary memory subsystem25′ electrically coupled to an optionalhard disk drive30′, avirtual storage drive35′, and aremovable memory interface45′ electrically coupled to aremovable memory module50′.
Acommunications interface55′ subsystem is coupled to anetwork65 via anetwork interface60′, asecurity token75′ coupled to a securitytoken interface70′ and a user input arrangement including a stylus, pen, a touch sensitive display, a miniature mouse and/orkeyboard85′ coupled to auser device interface80′ and an optionalbiometric scanner95′ coupled to an optionalbiometric scanner interface90′. The processor5′,main memory10′,display interface15secondary memory subsystem25′ andcommunications interface system55′ are electrically coupled to acommunications infrastructure100
The intelligentremote device110 further includes an operating system having an extensible, modifiable or replaceable logon security application, one or more proprietary extensions to the logon security application, a security token application programming interface, for example PC/SC, one or more security token aware applications, a token emulator application capable of causing the intelligent remote device to transparently exchange security token commands and responses between the network computer system, cryptography software capable of performing symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic functions, secure messaging software and all necessary device interface and driver software. Thesecurity token75′ may be the same device normally used to access the security token enabledcomputer system105 or another security token containing the necessary information to successfully complete the two factor authentication transaction.
ReferringFIG. 1B-1, a functional layer diagram of the computer system is shown. The various layers shown are loosely based on the Open System Interconnection model (OSI). For simplicity, certain layers are not shown and should be assumed to be present and/or incorporated into adjacent layers. Theuppermost applications layer115 includes user and security token aware applications denoted asToken Apps175.
Themiddleware layer120 includes security token application programming interface applications denoted asToken API145 which allow the user and security token aware applications included in theapplications layer115 to communicate with the attachedsecurity token75. An example of the security token application programming interface is described in the PC/SC workgroup specifications available from the organization's website www.pcscworkgroup.com.
Theoperating system layer125 includes the software that controls the allocation and usage of hardware resources such as memory, central processing unit (CPU) time, disk space, and peripheral devices. Included in this layer are the logon security application(s)150 and addedextensions155 which allows for an alternate user authentication method. Auser input device85 is shown coupled to the addedextension Ext155.
For example, in Microsoft Windows®, a customizable or replaceable dynamically linked library (msgina.dll) is provided which allows inclusion of alternate authentication methods developed by third party vendors. A brief description of how one skilled in the art would customize or replace msgina.dll is presented in “The Essentials of Replacing the Microsoft® Graphical Identification and Authentication Dynamic Link Library,” by Ben Hutz and Jack Fink both of the Microsoft Corporation, published June 2001.
In Unix® and Linux® based operating systems, a separate security executive application, hardware and software drivers, and security policy libraries are installed which interfaces with a Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) and Common Display Environment (CDE). Analogously, the PAM and CDE allows for customization and replacement. An extensive library of supported applications including source codes and documentation is available from the Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment (MUSCLE) at www.linuxnet.com.
Thecommunications layer130 is essentially a consolidation of the network and transport layers and includes anagent160 andAPDU Interface software170, examples of which are provided above. The agent is used to monitor incoming network traffic for an access request message. Detection of an access request message by theagent160 invokes the alternate user authentication method.
Invocation of the alternate user authentication method by detection of an access request message by theagent160 causes theresource manager165 to toggle the security token device interface from the localtoken device interface70 to the remotetoken device interface180. The APDU Interface software provides protocol conversion between the various communications formats used by the computer system, network and security token. In an alternate embodiment of the invention, APDU protocol conversion is performed by a counterpart application installed in the intelligent remote device.
The data link layer denoted asDevice Drivers135 includes aresource manager165 which controls access to thesecurity token75 and is the application responsible for selecting either the localtoken device driver175 or remotetoken device driver180 based on established logon policies. The software device drivers may be based on the PC/SC (Personal Computer/Smart Card) promulgated by the Open Card(SM)industry consortium. Additional information is available from the consortium's website at www.opencard.org.
The final layer denoted asPhysical Devices140 includes the localtoken device interface70 which couples thesecurity token75 to thecomputer system105. Thephysical device layer140 further includes a software based remotetoken device driver180. This remotetoken device driver180 is included in thephysical device layer140 for simplifying the understanding of the invention only. In actuality, the remotetoken device driver180 is installed in theDevice Driver layer135. Lastly, anetwork interface device60 provides the physical connection between thecomputer system105 and thenetwork65.
Referring toFIG. 1B-2, a functional layer diagram of the intelligentremote device110 is shown. As described above, the various layers shown are loosely based on the Open System Interconnection model (OSI.) The intelligentremote device110 essentially incorporates the same functional layers included in the security token enabled computer described inFIG. 1B-1 and will not be repeated here. Atoken emulator182 is shown as amiddleware application120′ which allows the intelligentremote device110 to emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to the security token enabledcomputer system105 over awireless network65.
Thetoken emulator182 includes logical interfaces that facilitates the transparent exchange of information between thesecurity token75′ and the security token enabledcomputer system105 in a protocol native to thesecurity token75′ and receives and routes acritical security parameter85′ entered locally to the intelligentremote device110 or received from thewireless network65′ to thesecurity token75′. While shown as amiddleware application125′, it will be appreciated by one skilled in the art that thetoken emulator182 may also be provided as a subroutine, ActiveX control, function, remotely invocable method associated with theToken API145 oragent160 installed in the security token enabledcomputer system105, or a local browser applet.
The native protocol is generally in the format of an application protocol data unit (APDU) as specified in ISO 7816-4. As described herein, the token emulator facilitates the transparent exchange of APDU commands and responses between the security token enabledcomputer system105 and the intelligentremote device110. Various communications embodiments of the invention are provided which are described in the discussions included withFIGS. 2A-2D which follows.
Referring toFIG. 1C, a detailed block diagram illustrating the interaction of the intelligentremote device110 with thecomputer system105 is shown. Details related to security considerations for information exchanged over thenetwork65 is omitted in the instant discussion in order to simplify the explanation and understanding of this portion of the invention. Security considerations are included in the discussion forFIGS. 2A-2D which follows.
To initiate the process in one embodiment of the invention, a user in possession of the intelligentremote device110 selects a token awareremote authentication application175′. Theremote authentication application175′ causes thetoken emulation application182 to execute an alternate authentication method which implements a pre-established security policy or script associated with theextension EXT155′ to thelogon application150′. Invocation of thelogon application150′ causes theremote authentication application175′ to prompt the user to enter his or her critical security parameter (CSP)188. In a related embodiment of the invention, thetoken emulator application182 generates an accessrequest message AR190 which is sent over thenetwork65 to thecomputer system105.
The access request message includes information about the intelligent remote device such as a unique identifier, information about the operatively coupledsecurity token75′ such as a unique serial number, and information about the assigned network address. The access request message is used to transit a wireless access point in wireless network arrangements.
In a one embodiment of the invention, a user enters his or herCSP188 through auser input device85′ which is routed by thelogon application150′ via theresource manager165′ to theAPDU interface170′ for protocol conversion. TheCSP188 incorporated in APDU format is then routed through the securitytoken device interface70 and into thesecurity token75′. The security token performs an authentication transaction which authenticates the user to the security token. User authentication is performed by comparison of the enteredCSP188 to a reference CSP stored inside thesecurity token75′.
In another embodiment of the invention, theCSP188 may be entered from the security token enabledcomputer system105 or a remote location and securely sent over the wireless connection to thesecurity token75′ via the intelligentremote device110. This alternate embodiment of the invention is particularly suited for biometric authentication which generally requires greater processing power than may be available from the intelligent remote device.
On thecomputer system105, receipt of the accessrequest message AR190 is detected by theagent160 which causes invocation of the alternate user authentication method. As previously described, invocation of the alternate user authentication method by detection of an access request message by theagent160 causes theresource manager165 to toggle the security token device drivers from the localtoken interface device70 to the remotetoken device driver180. Thetoken API145 is concurrently invoked by theextension EXT155 which causes the authentication transaction to be initiated. Control of the counterpart applications installed on the security token enabledcomputer system105 and the intelligent remote device may be performed using remote method invocation, subroutines and callable methods. One skilled in the art will appreciate that many alternate mechanisms are available in the relative art to accomplish invocation and control of the counterpart applications and modules.
Referring toFIG. 1D, a second part of the authentication transaction is performed under the control of thetoken API145. The second part of the authentication transaction utilizes a pre-established security policy or script associated with thelogon application125. The security policy may include challenge/response, digital certificate exchange, dynamic passwords, etc. Authentication data is exchanged via theAPDU interface170 andresource manager165 using the remote securitytoken device interface180 andnetwork interface60 and exchanged over thenetwork65 with the intelligentremote device110. Authentication data received at thenetwork interface60′ of the intelligent remote device is routed by thetoken emulator182 via theresource manager165′ andAPDU interface170′ through the securitytoken device interface70′ and into thesecurity token75′.
Referring toFIG. 2A, a secure messaging arrangement is shown where a symmetric key pair Ksys′[ID]205′, Ksys[ID]205 having a unique session identifier assigned by thesecurity token75′ is used to provide end-to-end cryptographic protection of information exchanged between thesecurity token ST75′ via the intelligentremote device IRD110 and thecomputer system CS105 over thenetwork65. Thenetwork65 includes anetwork gateway NG225 which provides an ad hocsecure connection230 between the network gateway and the intelligentremote device ERD110. The symmetric key pair Ksys′[ID]205′, Ksys[ID]205 are incorporated into a symmetric cryptography arrangement which is described in commonly assigned co-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 10/424,783, first filed on Apr. 29, 2003 entitled “Universal Secure Messaging For Cryptographic Modules,” and is herein incorporated by reference.
Referring toFIG. 2B, an alternate secure messaging arrangement is shown where two sets of symmetric key pairs Ksys′[ID]205′, Ksys[ID]205, Ksys′[Idx]210′, Ksys[Idx]210, each set of key pairs having a unique session identifier assigned by thesecurity token75′ are used to provide end-to-end cryptographic protection of information exchanged between thesecurity token ST75′ via the intelligentremote device IRD110 and thecomputer system CS105 over thenetwork65. The first symmetric key pair set Ksys′[ID]205′, Ksys[ID]205 is used to provide a trusted path between thesecurity token75′ and the intelligentremote device IRD110. The trusted path allows the intelligentremote device110 to be used in high security operating environments such as FIPS security levels 3 and 4 which requires that critical security parameters be entered into or output from a cryptographic module in an encrypted form to prevent interception of critical security parameters.
The second key pair set Ksys′[Idx]210′, Ksys[Idx]210 provides the secure communications connection between the intelligentremote device IRD110 and thecomputer system105. Other aspects of this second secure communications embodiment are likewise described in the co-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 10/424,783.
Referring toFIG. 2C, another secure communications embodiment is shown where an APDU pipe is established between the intelligentremote device IRD110 and thecomputer system CS105. In this embodiment of the invention, apipe server240 application is installed on thecomputer system CS105. Thepipe server application240 is used to encapsulate APDU commands into communications packets, generally TCP/IP, for transmission over thenetwork65 to the intelligent remote device. The APDU's may be encrypted before or after encapsulation in a network communications packet. Thepipe server application240 is also used to separate incoming APDU responses from the network communications packets, convert the resulting APDU responses into a protocol readable by other applications installed on thecomputer system CS110.
The intelligentremote device IRD110 includes apipe client application245 which is used to separate incoming APDU commands from the network communications packets and route the resulting APDU commands to thesecurity token75′. Alternately, thepipe client application245 packages APDU responses generated by thesecurity token75′ into the network communications packets for transmission over thenetwork65 to the computer system.
The APDU pipe communications arrangement is described in commonly assigned co-pending U.S. application Ser. No. 09/844,246, first filed on Apr. 30, 2001 entitled “Method and System for Establishing a Remote Connection to a Personal Security Device,” and is herein incorporated by reference.
Referring toFIG. 2D, another embodiment of the invention is shown where a first secure communications connection is established between the security token and a firstcomputer system CS105 using a first symmetric key pair set Ksys′[ID]205′, Ksys[ID] and a second secure connection is established between the security token and a second computer system CS′105′ using a second symmetric key pair set Ksys′[Idx]210′, Ksys[Idx]210 over the network. This embodiment illustrates that multiple computer systems may be authenticated using the intelligentremote device IRD110. In addition, network access privileges may be obtained by sending an authenticatingmessage AM270 from the firstcomputer system CS105 to an authenticating server AS250 following successful completion the two factor authentication transaction.
Additional embodiments of the invention allow the user to send his or her CSP in the form of a biometric sample to thesecurity token75′ via the secure communications connection. In this embodiment of the invention, abiometric scanner280 is provided on the second computer system CS′105′ which is securely connected to the security token over thenetwork65′. Thebiometric scanner280 may be associated with another computer system or directly connected to thenetwork65 as a network appliance.
In yet another embodiment of the invention, aural260 or visual255 feedback may be provided to the user following successful completion of the two factor authentication transaction. The aural260 or visual255 feedback may be provided at either or both thecomputer systems CS105, CS′105 and/or the intelligentremote device IRD110.
Lastly, a flow chart of the major steps involved in implementing this invention is shown inFIG. 3. The process is initiated300 by a user in possession of a security token equipped intelligent remote device. The intelligent remote device establishes an ad hoc communications connection with a security token enabledcomputer system305. The user executes a remote authentication application installed in the intelligent remote device which causes an access request message to be sent to thecomputer system310 if required to transit a network gateway or access point and invokes an alternate authentication method which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the computer system.
Concurrently or thereafter, the user is prompted by the remote authentication application to provide his or her critical security parameter (CSP)315. The critical security parameter may be entered from the intelligent remote device, security token enabled computer system or from another computer system in processing communications with the intelligent remote device. An authentication transaction is then performed in which the user is authenticated to the security token using the providedCSP320.
If the authentication transaction is unsuccessful325, processing ends340. If the authentication transaction is successful325, the user is allowed access at least onesecure resource335. Optionally, the user is provided withsensory feedback330 which informs the user of the successful authentication transaction. Also, in the embodiments of the invention which employs symmetric keys having unique session identifiers assigned by the security token, the symmetric keys may be established as temporary surrogates for authenticated CSPs. Processing of the remote authentication transaction ends following itssuccessful completion340.
The foregoing described embodiments of the invention are provided as illustrations and descriptions. They are not intended to limit the invention to precise form described. In particular, it is contemplated that functional implementation of the invention described herein may be implemented equivalently in hardware, software, firmware, and/or other available functional components or building blocks. No specific limitation is intended to a particular cryptographic module operating environment. Other variations and embodiments are possible in light of above teachings, and it is not intended that this Detailed Description limit the scope of invention, but rather by the Claims following herein.

Claims (52)

1. A method for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communication interface for a security token, comprising:
establishing a wireless communications connection between at least an intelligent remote device and a security token enabled computer system,
executing a remote authentication application installed in the intelligent remote device that triggers an access request to the security token enabled computer system which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system,
prompting a user to provide a critical security parameter,
sending the critical security parameter from the intelligent remote device to said security token operatively coupled to said intelligent remote device,
authenticating said critical security parameter by said security token so that the user is authenticated to the security token,
upon successful completion of the authentication transaction to the security token, allowing the user access to at least one secure resource associated with the security token enabled computer system, and
providing aural or visual feedback to said user following successful authenticating to at least said security token enabled computer system.
12. A system for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communications interface for a security token, comprising:
an intelligent remote device that:
communicates with at least a security token enabled computer system over at least a wireless communications connection,
operatively couples a security token to said intelligent remote device,
receives a critical security parameter provided by a user,
sends the critical security parameter to the security token, and
said intelligent remote device being equipped to trigger an access request to the security token enabled computer system and to emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to said security token enabled computer system,
said security token:
receives the critical security parameter associated with said user from the intelligent remote device, and
authenticates said critical security parameter; and
said security token enabled computer:
utilizes said intelligent remote device as said security token peripheral device, and
allows said user access to at least one secure resource following successful authentication of said critical security parameter, wherein said intelligent remote device or said security token enabled computer system provides aural or visual feedback to said user upon successful completion of said two-factor authentication transaction.
22. A method for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communication interface for a security token, comprising:
establishing a wireless communications connection between at least an intelligent remote device and a security token enabled computer system,
executing a remote authentication application installed in the intelligent remote device that triggers an access request to the security token enabled computer system which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system,
prompting a user to provide a critical security parameter,
sending the critical security parameter from the intelligent remote device to said security token operatively coupled to said intelligent remote device,
authenticating said critical security parameter by said security token so that the user is authenticated to the security token,
upon successful completion of the authentication transaction to the security token, allowing the user access to at least one secure resource associated with the security token enabled computer system, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the security token enabled computer system and is received at the intelligent remote device.
23. A method method for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communications interface for a security token, the intelligent remote device being equipped to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system, the method comprising:
establishing a secure communications connection between a security token and a security token enabled computer system via an intelligent remote device,
authenticating at least said security token to said security token enabled computer system,
executing a remote authentication application installed in the intelligent remote device that triggers an access request to the security token enabled computer system which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system,
prompting a user to provide a critical security parameter,
sending the critical security parameter from the intelligent remote device to said security token operatively coupled to said intelligent remote device,
authenticating said critical security parameter by said security token so that the user is authenticated to the security token, and
upon successful completion of the authentication transaction to the security token, allowing the user access to at least one secure resource associated with the security token enabled computer system, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the security token enabled computer system and is received at the intelligent remote device.
28. A system for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communications interface for a security token, comprising:
an intelligent remote device that:
communicates with at least a security token enabled computer system over at least a wireless communications connection,
operatively couples a security token to said intelligent remote device,
receives a critical security parameter provided by a user,
sends the critical security parameter to the security token, and
said intelligent remote device being equipped to trigger an access request to the security token enabled computer system and to emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to said security token enabled computer system,
said security token:
receives the critical security parameter associated with said user from the intelligent remote device, and
authenticates said critical security parameter; and
said security token enabled computer:
utilizes said intelligent remote device as said security token peripheral device, and
allows said user access to at least one secure resource following successful authentication of said critical security parameter, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the security token enabled computer system and is received at the intelligent remote device.
29. A system system for accessing a security token enabled computer system using an intelligent remote device as a communications interface for a security token, comprising:
an intelligent remote device in processing communications with at least a security token enabled computer system over a communications connection, said intelligent remote device including:
a device processor,
a device memory coupled to said device processor,
a security token interface coupled to said device processor, and
at least one remote device application operatively stored in at least a portion of said device memory, said at least one remote device application having logical instructions executable by said device processor to:
exchange information with said at least a secure token enabled computer system and said security token,
receive a critical security parameter provided by a user;
send the critical security parameter to the security token;
trigger an access request to the security token enabled computer system; and
emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to said security token enabled computer system;
said security token operatively coupled to said intelligent remote device via said security token interface, said security token including:
a token processor,
a token memory coupled to said token processor,
at least one token application operatively stored in at least another portion of said token memory, said at least one token application having logical instructions executable by said token processor to:
receive said critical security parameter provided by said user from the intelligent remote device, and
authenticate said received critical security parameter; and, said security token enabled computer system including:
a computer processor,
a computer memory coupled to said computer processor, and
at least one computer application operatively stored in at least a portion of said computer memory, said at least one computer application having logical instructions executable by said computer processor to:
exchange information with at least said intelligent remote device security token enabled computer system over said communications connection,
receive said critical security parameter provided by said user,
utilize said intelligent remote device as said locally connected security token peripheral device, and
allow access to at least one secure resource following a successful authentication of said critical security parameter, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the security token enabled computer system and is received at the intelligent remote device.
39. A set of application program interfaces embodied on a computer readable medium for execution by a processor included in an intelligent remote device and a security token enabled computer system which allows the intelligent remote device to trigger an access request to the security token enabled computer system and to emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to the security token enabled computer system, comprising:
a first interface that exchanges information between a security token and a remote security token enabled computer system in a protocol native to said security token; and,
a second interface, being an interface of the intelligent remote device, that receives and routes the critical security parameter to said security token, wherein the critical security parameter is authenticated with the security token, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the first interface and is received by the second interface.
44. A set of application program interfaces embodied on a computer readable medium for execution by a processor included in an intelligent remote device and a security token enabled computer system which allows the intelligent remote device to trigger an access request to the security token enabled computer system and to emulate a security token peripheral device locally connected to the security token enabled computer system, comprising:
a first interface that exchanges information between a security token and a remote security token enabled computer system in a protocol native to said security token; and,
a second interface, being an interface of the intelligent remote device, that receives and routes the critical security parameter to said security token, wherein the critical security parameter is authenticated with the security token, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the second interface.
49. A computer program product embodied in a tangible form readable by a plurality of processors in processing communications, wherein said computer program product includes executable instructions stored thereon for causing one or more of said plurality of processors to:
establish a secure communications connection between a security token and a security token enabled computer system via an intelligent remote device, wherein the intelligent remote device emulates a local security device peripheral connected to the security token computer system,
authenticate at least said security token to said security token enabled computer system,
execute a remote authentication application installed in the intelligent remote device that triggers an access request to the security token enabled computer system which allows the intelligent remote device to emulate a local security device peripheral connected to the security token enabled computer system,
prompt a user to provide a critical security parameter,
send the critical security parameter from the intelligent remote device to said security token operatively coupled to said intelligent remote device,
authenticate said critical security parameter by said security token so that the user is authenticated to the security token, and
upon successful completion of the authentication transaction to the security token, allow the user access to at least one secure resource associated with the security token enabled computer system, wherein the critical security parameter is entered by the user at the security token enabled computer system and is received at the intelligent remote device.
US10/740,4972003-12-222003-12-22Intelligent remote deviceActive2026-09-30US7907935B2 (en)

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US10/740,497US7907935B2 (en)2003-12-222003-12-22Intelligent remote device
EP14167129.7AEP2770693B1 (en)2003-12-222004-12-22Remote device for emulating a local security device
ES04293088.3TES2481396T3 (en)2003-12-222004-12-22 Remote device to emulate a local security device
EP04293088.3AEP1549018B1 (en)2003-12-222004-12-22Remote device for emulating a local security device
US12/931,351US8200195B2 (en)2003-12-222011-01-28Intelligent remote device
US13/472,752US20130019100A1 (en)2003-12-222012-05-16Intelligent remote device

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US13/472,752AbandonedUS20130019100A1 (en)2003-12-222012-05-16Intelligent remote device

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