US20220329627A1 - Tunneling for network deceptions - Google Patents

Abstract

Provided are systems, methods, and computer-program products for providing network deceptions using a network tunnel. In various implementations, a network device on a first network can be configured as a projection point. A projection point can be configured as one endpoint of a network tunnel. The other end of the network tunnel can terminate at a deception farm. The deception farm can host a second network, where the second network includes network devices configured as deception mechanisms. By assigning a deception mechanism a network address from the first network, the network address and the network tunnel enable the deception mechanism to appear as a node in the first network.

Description

CROSS REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
• This application is a continuation of U.S. Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 16/800,763, filed Feb. 25, 2020, which is a continuation of U.S. Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 15/983,418, filed May 18, 2018, now U.S. Pat. No. 10,983,418, which is a continuation of U.S. Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 15/498,300, filed Apr. 26, 2017, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,979,750, which claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/344,267, filed on Jun. 1, 2016; and U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/327,836, filed on Apr. 26, 2016. Each of the preceding applications is incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
BRIEF SUMMARY
• Provided are methods, including computer-implemented methods or methods implemented by a network device, devices including network devices, and computer-program products for providing network deceptions using tunneling. In various implementations, a network device can be configured as a projection point. A projection point can be configured as one endpoint of a network tunnel. The other end of the network tunnel can terminate at a deception center. The deception center can host network devices configured as deception mechanisms.
• In various implementations, the network device configured as a projection point can determine a network address. The network address can be determined from available network addresses in a first network, where the first network is the network to which the network device is connected. The network device can further configure a network tunnel to a second network. The second network can include one or more deception mechanisms; for example, the second network can be at a deception farm. The network device can further select a deception mechanism from among the one or more deception mechanisms. The network device can further assigning the network address to the selected deception mechanism. The network address and the network tunnel can enable the selected deception mechanism to be a node on the first network.
• In various implementations, the network device that is configured as a projection point can further determine a configuration of one or more other network devices on the first network. In these implementations, the selected deception mechanism can be selected using the configuration.
• In various implementations, the network device can further determine a configuration of one or more other network devices on the first network, and configure the selected deception mechanism using the configuration of the one or more other network devices.
• In various implementations, the network device can further select the second network from among a plurality of deception networks, where the plurality of deception networks host deception mechanisms.
• In various implementations, the network device can further receive network traffic from the first network, where the network traffic is addressed to the network address that is assigned to the selected deception mechanism. The network device can further transmit the network traffic over the network tunnel.
• In various implementations, the network device can further receive network traffic from the first network, where the network traffic requests information about the network address. The network device can then respond to the request, for example, using the network address.
• In various implementations, the network device can further hide the network device from the first network. Hiding the network device can include not responding to network traffic addressed to the network device.
• In various implementations, the network device can further determine to add an additional deception mechanism to the first network. The network device can then configure a different network tunnel to a third network, where the third includes one or more additional deception mechanisms. The network device can then select the additional deception mechanism from among the one or more additional deception mechanisms.
• In various implementations, the second network is associated with a deception farm, where a deception farm includes network devices configured as deception mechanisms. In various implementations, a deception mechanism is an emulated network device or a physical network device.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
• Illustrative embodiments are described in detail below with reference to the following figures:
• FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysis system, in which various implementations of a deception-based security system can be used;
• FIGS. 2A-2D provide examples of different installation configurations that can be used for different customer networks;
• FIG. 3A-3B illustrate examples of customer networks where some of the customer networks' network infrastructure is “in the cloud,” that is, is provided by a cloud services provider;
• FIG. 4 illustrates an example of an enterprise network;
• FIG. 5 illustrates a general example of an Internet-of-Things network;
• FIG. 6 illustrates an example of an Internet-of-Things network, here implemented in a private home;
• FIG. 7 illustrates an Internet-of-Things network, here implemented in a small business;
• FIG. 8 illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrial control system;
• FIG. 9 illustrates an example of a SCADA system, here used for distributed monitoring and control;
• FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a distributed control;
• FIG. 11 illustrates an example of a PLC implemented in a manufacturing control process;
• FIGS. 12A-12D illustrate an example of a network deception system configured to provide deception mechanisms for a site network;
• FIG. 13 illustrates an example of a network deception system configured to provide deception mechanisms for a site network;
• FIG. 14 illustrates an example of a deception system that includes a projection point with network tunnels to multiple deception farms;
• FIG. 15 illustrates an example of a deception system for a site network that incudes multiple sub-networks, or subnets;
• FIG. 16 illustrates an example of a network deception system, where multiple projection points have been connected to multiple deception centers; and
• FIGS. 17A-17B illustrate an example where a site network includes a local segment and a cloud segment.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
• Network deception mechanisms, often referred to as “honeypots,” “honey tokens,” and “honey nets,” among others, defend a network from threats by distracting or diverting the threat. Honeypot-type deception mechanisms can be installed in a network for a particular site, such as a business office, to act as decoys in the site's network. Honeypot-type deception mechanisms are typically configured to be indistinguishable from active, production systems in the network. Additionally, such deception mechanisms are typically configured to be attractive to a network threat by having seemingly valuable data and/or by appearing vulnerable to infiltration. Though these deception mechanisms can be indistinguishable from legitimate parts of the site network, deception mechanisms are not part of the normal operation of the network, and would not be accessed during normal, legitimate use of the site network. Because normal users of the site network would not normally use or access a deception mechanism, any use or access to the deception mechanism is suspected to be a threat to the network.
• “Normal” operation of a network generally includes network activity that conforms with the intended purpose of a network. For example, normal or legitimate network activity can include the operation of a business, medical facility, government office, education institution, or the ordinary network activity of a private home. Normal network activity can also include the non-business-related, casual activity of users of a network, such as accessing personal email and visiting websites on personal time, or using network resources for personal use. Normal activity can also include the operations of network security devices, such as firewalls, anti-virus tools, intrusion detection systems, intrusion protection systems, email filters, adware blockers, and so on. Normal operations, however, exclude deceptions mechanisms, in that deception mechanisms are not intended to take part in business operations or casual use. As such, network users and network systems do not normally access deceptions mechanisms except perhaps for the most routine network administrative tasks. Access to a deception mechanism, other than entirely routine network administration, may thus indicate a threat to the network.
• Threats to a network can include active attacks, where an attacker interacts or engages with systems in the network to steal information or do harm to the network. An attacker may be a person, or may be an automated system. Examples of active attacks include denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, spoofing attacks, “man-in-the-middle” attacks, attacks involving malformed network requests (e.g. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning, “ping of death,” etc.), buffer, heap, or stack overflow attacks, and format string attacks, among others. Threats to a network can also include self-driven, self-replicating, and/or self-triggering malicious software. Malicious software can appear innocuous until activated, upon which the malicious software may attempt to steal information from a network and/or do harm to the network. Malicious software is typically designed to spread itself to other systems in a network. Examples of malicious software include ransomware, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, keyloggers, rootkits, and rogue security software, among others.
• Honeypot-type deception mechanisms are typically installed in the network for a particular site, to act as decoys in the site's network. For honeypot-based systems to appear similar to legitimate network devices in a network, the decoys may be more effective if the decoys appear indistinguishable from legitimate, production devices. For example, having a network address, such as an Internet Protocol (IP) address, that is in a same domain as the network addresses of legitimate devices in the site's network can give the deception mechanisms some measure of authenticity.
• To have a network address that is in the domain of a particular site network, deception mechanism can be installed in the site network, for example by attaching network devices configured as deception mechanisms to switches, routers, or other infrastructure of the site network. In some situations, however, installing deception mechanisms in a site network may be inconvenient and/or inefficient. For example, there may not be physical or logical space in a site network for more than a few deception mechanisms. As another example, the configuration of deception mechanisms may need to be determined in advance, and it may be difficult to dynamically increase, reduce, and/or modify deceptions mechanisms installed directly in a site network. As another example, centralized administration of deception mechanism spread across multiple site networks, including coordination of activities of multiple deception mechanisms and monitoring for possible intrusions, may be difficult.
• In some cases, however, it may not be possible to install a deception mechanism directly into a site network. For example, a customer's network may be partially or fully “in the cloud;” that is, a cloud services provider may host all or part of a site network for a customer. In such cases, it may not be possible to gain access to the cloud portion of the network to install deception mechanisms.
• One alternative to installing deception mechanisms in a site network is to host the deception mechanisms at a remote site. The deception mechanisms, however, may have network addresses that are local to the remote site, rather than local to the site network, and thus may be more easily identified as decoys. The deception mechanisms' network addresses can be spoofed or masked, but once a network threat gains access to a deception mechanism, the network threat may discover that the deception mechanism's actual network address.
• Network tunnels provide a way to connect network and network devices together over other networks. Using tunneling protocols, a remote network device can connect to a private network over other networks, which may be private and/or public and may be unsecure. An example where tunnels are commonly used is for virtual private networks (VPN). A VPN tunnel allows a remote user to connect a computer to the network that is in another physical location, such as at an office. The VPN tunnel provides a path for network traffic between the remote user's computer and the office network. The tunnel can be secure, so that the remote user's network traffic cannot be snooped as the traffic travels across public networks. Once the tunnel has been established, the remote user's computer may be able to access the office network as if the computer were physically located at the office and physically connected to the office network.
• In various implementations, a network deception system can use network tunnels to project deceptions from a remote site into a site network, where the deceptions can defend the site network from network threats. In various implementations, a network device in the site network can be configured as a projection point, which implements an endpoint for a network tunnel. The network device can further be connected, using a secure network tunnel, to a remote deception farm. In some implementations, the deception farm can host a network emulator, which can emulate multiple network devices. In these implementations, the emulated network devices can be assigned network addresses from the site network's domain. The emulated network devices can further be projected by the projection point into the site network. The emulated network devices thus appear in the site network in the same manner as legitimate devices in the site network.
• In various implementations, a deception farm can host emulated network devices and/or physical network devices. Emulated network devices can be generated, for example, using virtual machines, where the virtual machines can be configured to resemble the devices found in a particular site network. The physical network devices can include devices that may be difficult to emulate, such as certain kinds of computers, machinery, and/or control systems. Emulated network devices and/or physical network devices deception farm can be used as deception mechanisms, and can be projected into a site network.
• In various implementations, a projection point can have network tunnels to more than one deception farm. In these implementations, the deceptions projected by a projection point can be selected from among the deception mechanisms hosted by multiple deception farms.
• In various implementations, a deception farm can be connected to projection points in multiple site networks. In some cases, the multiple site networks belong to the same customer, while in other cases the multiple site networks can be long to different customers. In each of these cases, the projection points and/or deception farms can maintain a context for each network tunnel, so that network traffic can be properly routed between each site network and the deceptions hosted by each deception farm.
• I. Deception-Based Security Systems
• FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a network threat detection andanalysis system100, in which various implementations of a deception-based security system can be used. The network threat detection andanalysis system100, or, more briefly,network security system100, provides security for asite network104 using deceptive security mechanisms, a variety of which may be called “honeypots.” The deceptive security mechanisms may be controlled by and inserted into thesite network104 using adeception center108 andsensors110, which may also be referred to as deception sensors, installed in thesite network104. In some implementations, thedeception center108 and thesensors110 interact with asecurity services provider106 located outside of thesite network104. Thedeception center108 may also obtain or exchange data with sources located on theInternet150.
• Security mechanisms designed to deceive, sometimes referred to as “honeypots,” may also be used as traps to divert and/or deflect unauthorized use of a network away from the real network assets. A deception-based security mechanism may be a computer attached to the network, a process running on one or more network systems, and/or some other device connected to the network. A security mechanism may be configured to offer services, real or emulated, to serve as bait for an attack on the network. Deception-based security mechanisms that take the form of data, which may be called “honey tokens,” may be mixed in with real data in devices in the network. Alternatively or additionally, emulated data may also be provided by emulated systems or services.
• Deceptive security mechanisms can also be used to detect an attack on the network. Deceptive security mechanisms are generally configured to appear as if they are legitimate parts of a network. These security mechanisms, however, are not, in fact, part of the normal operation of the network. Consequently, normal activity on the network is not likely to access the security mechanisms. Thus any access over the network to the security mechanism is automatically suspect.
• Thenetwork security system100 may deploy deceptive security mechanisms in a targeted and dynamic fashion. Using thedeception center108 thesystem100 can scan thesite network104 and determine the topology of thesite network104. Thedeception center108 may then determine devices to emulate with security mechanisms, including the type and behavior of the device. The security mechanisms may be selected and configured specifically to attract the attention of network attackers. The security mechanisms may also be selected and deployed based on suspicious activity in the network. Security mechanisms may be deployed, removed, modified, or replaced in response to activity in the network, to divert and isolate network activity related to an apparent attack, and to confirm that the network activity is, in fact, part of a real attack.
• Thesite network104 is a network that may be installed among the buildings of a large business, in the office of a small business, at a school campus, at a hospital, at a government facility, or in a private home. Thesite network104 may be described as a local area network (LAN) or a group of LANS. Thesite network104 may be one site belonging to an organization that hasmultiple site networks104 in one or many geographical locations. In some implementations, thedeception center108 may provide network security to onesite network104, or tomultiple site networks104 belonging to the same entity.
• Thesite network104 is where the networking devices and users of the an organizations network may be found. Thesite network104 may include network infrastructure devices, such as routers, switches hubs, repeaters, wireless base stations, and/or network controllers, among others. Thesite network104 may also include computing systems, such as servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, personal digital assistants, and smart phones, among others. Thesite network104 may also include other analog and digital electronics that have network interfaces, such as televisions, entertainment systems, thermostats, refrigerators, and so on.
• Thedeception center108 provides network security for the site network104 (or multiple site networks for the same organization) by deploying security mechanisms into thesite network104, monitoring thesite network104 through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for thesite network104, in various implementations thedeception center108 may communicate withsensors110 installed in thesite network104, usingnetwork tunnels120. As described further below, thetunnels120 may allow thedeception center108 to be located in a different sub-network (“subnet”) than thesite network104, on a different network, or remote from thesite network104, with intermediate networks (possibly including the Internet150) between thedeception center108 and thesite network104.
• In some implementations, thenetwork security system100 includes asecurity services provider106. In these implementations, thesecurity services provider106 may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled by different organizations. For example, thesecurity services provider106 may communicate withmultiple deception centers108 that each provide security for adifferent site network104 for the same organization. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider106 is located outside thesite network104. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider106 is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, thesecurity services provider106 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider106 is controlled by the same entity as that controls thesite network104.
• In some implementations, when thenetwork security system100 includes asecurity services provider106, thesensors110 and thedeception center108 may communicate with thesecurity services provider106 in order to be connected to each other. For example, thesensors110, which may also be referred to as deception sensors, may, upon powering on in thesite network104, send information over anetwork connection112 to thesecurity services provider106, identifying themselves and thesite network104 in which they are located. Thesecurity services provider106 may further identify acorresponding deception center108 for thesite network104. Thesecurity services provider106 may then provide the network location of thedeception center108 to thesensors110, and may provide thedeception center108 with the network location of thesensors110. A network location may take the form of, for example, an Internet Protocol (IP) address. With this information, thedeception center108 and thesensors110 may be able to configuretunnels120 to communicate with each other.
• In some implementations, thenetwork security system100 does not include asecurity services provider106. In these implementations, thesensors110 and thedeception center108 may be configured to locate each other by, for example, sending packets that each can recognize as coming for the other. Using these packets, thesensors110 anddeception center108 may be able to learn their respective locations on the network. Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator can configure thesensors110 with the network location of thedeception center108, and vice versa.
• In various implementations, thesensors110 are a minimal combination of hardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection with thesite network104 and atunnel120 with thedeception center108. For example, asensor110 may be constructed using a low-power processor, a network interface, and a simple operating system. In various implementations, thesensors110 provide thedeception center108 with visibility into thesite network104, such as for example being able to operate as a node in thesite network104, and/or being able to present or project deceptive security mechanisms into thesite network104, as described further below. Additionally, in various implementations, thesensors110 may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on thesite network104 can be redirected to thedeception center108, as is also described below.
• In various implementations, thedeception center108 may be configured to profile thesite network104, deploy deceptive security mechanisms for thesite network104, detect suspected threats to thesite network104, analyze the suspected threat, and analyze thesite network104 for exposure and/or vulnerability to the supposed threat.
• To provide thesite network104, thedeception center108 may include adeception profiler130. In various implementations, the deception profiler may130 deriveinformation114 from thesite network104, and determine, for example, the topology of thesite network104, the network devices included in thesite network104, the software and/or hardware configuration of each network device, and/or how the network is used at any given time. Using this information, thedeception profiler130 may determine one or more deceptive security mechanisms to deploy into thesite network104.
• In various implementations, the deception profiler may configure an emulatednetwork116 to emulate one or more computing systems. Using thetunnels120 andsensors110, the emulated computing systems may be projected into thesite network104, where they serve as deceptions. The emulated computing systems may include address deceptions, low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. In some implementations, the emulated computing systems may be configured to resemble a portion of the network. In these implementations, this network portion may then be projected into thesite network104.
• In various implementations, a networkthreat detection engine140 may monitor activity in the emulatednetwork116, and look for attacks on thesite network104. For example, the networkthreat detection engine140 may look for unexpected access to the emulated computing systems in the emulatednetwork116. The networkthreat detection engine140 may also useinformation114 extracted from thesite network104 to adjust the emulatednetwork116, in order to make the deceptions more attractive to an attack, and/or in response to network activity that appears to be an attack. Should the networkthreat detection engine140 determine that an attack may be taking place, the networkthreat detection engine140 may cause network activity related to the attack to be redirected to and contained within the emulatednetwork116.
• In various implementations, the emulatednetwork116 is a self-contained, isolated, and closely monitored network, in which suspect network activity may be allowed to freely interact with emulated computing systems. In various implementations, questionable emails, files, and/or links may be released into the emulatednetwork116 to confirm that they are malicious, and/or to see what effect they have. Outside actors can also be allowed to access emulated system, steal data and user credentials, download malware, and conduct any other malicious activity. In this way, the emulatednetwork116 not only isolated a suspected attack from thesite network104, but can also be used to capture information about an attack. Any activity caused by suspect network activity may be captured in, for example, a history of sent and received network packets, log files, and memory snapshots.
• In various implementations, activity captured in the emulatednetwork116 may be analyzed using a targetedthreat analysis engine160. Thethreat analysis engine160 may examine data collected in the emulatednetwork116 and reconstruct the course of an attack. For example, thethreat analysis engine160 may correlate various events seen during the course of an apparent attack, including both malicious and innocuous events, and determine how an attacker infiltrated and caused harm in the emulatednetwork116. In some cases, thethreat analysis engine160 may usethreat intelligence152 from theInternet150 to identify and/or analyze an attack contained in the emulatednetwork116. Thethreat analysis engine160 may also confirm that suspect network activity was not an attack. Thethreat analysis engine160 may produceindicators162 that describe the suspect network activity, including indicating whether the suspect activity was or was not an actual threat. Thethreat analysis engine160 may share theseindicators162 with thesecurity community180, so that other networks can be defended from the attack. Thethreat analysis engine160 may also send theindicators162 to thesecurity services provider106, so that thesecurity services provider106 can use theindicators162 to defend other site networks.
• In various implementations, thethreat analysis engine160 may also sendthreat indicators162, or similar data, to abehavioral analytics engine170. Thebehavioral analytics engine170 may be configured to use theindicators162 to probe118 thesite network104, and see whether thesite network104 has been exposed to the attack, or is vulnerable to the attack. For example, thebehavioral analytics engine170 may search thesite network104 for computing systems that resemble emulated computing systems in the emulatednetwork116 that were affected by the attack. In some implementations, thebehavioral analytics engine170 can also repair systems affected by the attack, or identify these systems to a network administrator. In some implementations, thebehavioral analytics engine170 can also reconfigure the site network's104 security infrastructure to defend against the attack.
• Thebehavioral analytics engine170 can work in conjunction with a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)172 system. In various implementations, SIEM includes software and/or services that can provide real-time analysis of security alerts generates by network hardware and applications. In various implementations, thedeception center108 can communicate with theSIEM172 system to obtain information about computing and/or networking systems in thesite network104.
• Using deceptive security mechanisms, thenetwork security system100 may thus be able to distract and divert attacks on thesite network104. Thenetwork security system100 may also be able to allow, using the emulatednetwork116, and attack to proceed, so that as much can be learned about the attack as possible. Information about the attack can then be used to find vulnerabilities in thesite network104. Information about the attack can also be provided to thesecurity community180, so that the attack can be thwarted elsewhere.
• II. Customer Installations
• The network security system, such as the deception-based system described above, may be flexibly implemented to accommodate different customer networks.FIGS. 2A-2D provide examples of different installation configurations200a-200dthat can be used fordifferent customer networks202. Acustomer network202 may generally be described as a network or group of networks that is controlled by a common entity, such as a business, a school, or a person. Thecustomer network202 may include one or more site networks204. The customer network's202site networks204 may be located in one geographic location, may be behind a common firewall, and/or may be multiple subnets within one network. Alternatively or additionally, a customer network's202site networks204 may be located in different geographic locations, and be connected to each other over various private and public networks, including theInternet250.
• Different customer networks202 may have different requirements regarding network security. For example, somecustomer networks202 may have relatively open connections to outside networks such as theInternet250, whileother customer networks202 have very restricted access to outside networks. The network security system described inFIG. 1 may be configurable to accommodate these variations.
• FIG. 2A illustrates one example of aninstallation configuration200a, where adeception center208 is located within thecustomer network202. In this example, being located within thecustomer network202 means that thedeception center208 is connected to thecustomer network202, and is able to function as a node in thecustomer network202. In this example, thedeception center208 may be located in the same building or within the same campus as thesite network204. Alternatively or additionally, thedeception center208 may be located within thecustomer network202 but at a different geographic location than thesite network204. Thedeception center208 thus may be within the same subnet as thesite network204, or may be connected to a different subnet within the customer network.
• In various implementations, thedeception center208 communicates withsensors210, which may also be referred to as deception sensors, installed in the site network overnetwork tunnels220 In this example, thenetwork tunnels220 may cross one or more intermediate within thecustomer network202.
• In this example, thedeception center208 is able to communicate with asecurity services provider206 that is located outside thecustomer network202, such as on theInternet250. Thesecurity services provider206 may provide configuration and other information for thedeception center208. In some cases, thesecurity services provider206 may also assist in coordinating the security for thecustomer network202 when thecustomer network202 includesmultiple site networks204 located in various geographic areas.
• FIG. 2B illustrates another example of aninstallation configuration200b, where thedeception center208 is located outside thecustomer network202. In this example, thedeception center208 may connected to thecustomer network202 over theInternet250. In some implementations, thedeception center208 may be co-located with a security services provider, and/or may be provided by the security services provider.
• In this example, thetunnels220 connect thedeception center208 to thesensors210 through agateway262. A gateway is a point in a network that connects the network to another network. For example, in this example, thegateway262 connects thecustomer network202 to outside networks, such as theInternet250. Thegateway262 may provide a firewall, which may provide some security for thecustomer network202. Thetunnels220 may be able to pass through the firewall using a secure protocol, such as Secure Socket Shell (SSH) and similar protocols. Secure protocols typically require credentials, which may be provided by the operator of thecustomer network202.
• FIG. 2C illustrates another example of aninstallation configuration200c, where thedeception center208 is located inside thecustomer network202 but does not have access to outside networks. In some implementations, thecustomer network202 may require a high level of network security. In these implementations, the customer network's202 connections to the other networks may be very restricted. Thus, in this example, thedeception center208 is located within thecustomer network202, and does not need to communicate with outside networks. Thedeception center208 may use thecustomer networks202 internal network to coordinate with and establishtunnels220 to thesensors210. Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator may configure thedeception center208 andsensors210 to enable them to establish thetunnels220.
• FIG. 2D illustrates another example of aninstallation configuration200d. In this example, thedeception center208 is located inside thecustomer network202, and further is directly connected to thesite network204. Directly connected, in this example, can mean that thedeception center208 is connected to a router, hub, switch, repeater, or other network infrastructure device that is part of thesite network204. Directly connected can alternatively or additionally mean that thedeception center208 is connected to thesite network204 using a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN). For example, thedeception center208 can be connected to VLAN trunk port. In these examples, thedeception center208 can project deceptions into thesite network204 with or without the use of sensors, such as are illustrated inFIGS. 2A-2C.
• In the example ofFIG. 2D, thedeception center208 can also optionally be connected to an outsidesecurity services provider206. Thesecurity services provider206 can manage thedeception center208, including providing updated security data, sending firmware upgrades, and/or coordinatingdifferent deception centers208 fordifferent site networks204 belonging to thesame customer network202. In some implementations, thedeception center208 can operate without the assistances of an outsidesecurity services provider206.
• III. Customer Networks
• The network security system, such as the deception-based system discussed above, can be used for variety of customer networks. As noted above, customer networks can come in wide variety of configurations. For example, a customer network may have some of its network infrastructure “in the cloud.” A customer network can also include a wide variety of devices, including what may be considered “traditional” network equipment, such as servers and routers, and non-traditional, “Internet-of-Things” devices, such as kitchen appliances. Other examples of customer networks include established industrial networks, or a mix of industrial networks and computer networks.
• FIG. 3A-3B illustrate examples of customer networks302a-302bwhere some of the customer networks'302a-302bnetwork infrastructure is “in the cloud,” that is, is provided by acloud services provider354. These example customer networks302a-302bmay be defended by a network security system that includes adeception center308 andsensors310, which may also be referred to as deception sensors, and may also include an off-site security services provider306.
• A cloud services provider is a company that offers some component of cloud computer—such as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as Service (PaaS)—to other businesses and individuals. A cloud services provider may have a configurable pool of computing resources, including, for example, networks, servers, storage, applications, and services. These computing resources can be available on demand, and can be rapidly provisioned. While a cloud services provider's resources may be shared between the cloud service provider's customers, from the perspective of each customer, the individual customer may appear to have a private network within the cloud, including for example having dedicated subnets and IP addresses.
• In the examples illustrated inFIGS. 3A-3B, the customer networks'302a-302bnetwork is partially in asite network304, and partially provided by thecloud services provider354. In some cases, thesite network304 is the part of the customer networks302a-302bthat is located at a physical site owned or controlled by the customer network302a-302b. For example, thesite network304 may be a network located in the customer network's302a-302boffice or campus. Alternatively or additionally, thesite network304 may include network equipment owned and/or operated by the customer network302a-302bthat may be located anywhere. For example, the customer networks'302a-302boperations may consist of a few laptops owned by the customer networks302a-302b, which are used from the private homes of the lap tops' users, from a co-working space, from a coffee shop, or from some other mobile location.
• In various implementations,sensors310 may be installed in thesite network304. Thesensors310 can be used by the network security system to project deceptions into thesite network304, monitor thesite network304 for attacks, and/or to divert suspect attacks into thedeception center308.
• In some implementations, thesensors310 may also be able to project deceptions into the part of the customer networks302a-302bnetwork that is provided by thecloud services provider354. In most cases, it may not be possible to installsensors310 inside the network of thecloud services provider354, but in some implementations, this may not be necessary. For example, as discussed further below, thedeception center308 can acquire the subnet address of the network provided by thecloud services provider354, and use that subnet address the create deceptions. Though these deceptions are projected form thesensors310 installed in thesite network304, the deceptions may appear to be within the subnet provided by thecloud services provider354.
• In illustrated examples, thedeception center308 is installed inside the customer networks302a-302b. Though not illustrated here, thedeception center308 can also be installed outside the customer networks302a-302b, such as for example somewhere on theInternet350. In some implementations, thedeception center308 may reside at the same location as the security service provider306. When located outside the customer networks302a-302b, thedeception center308 may connect to thesensors310 in thesite network304 over various public and/or private networks.
• FIG. 3A illustrates an example of aconfiguration300awhere the customer network's302anetwork infrastructure is located in the cloud and thecustomer network302aalso has asubstantial site network304. In this example, the customer may have an office where thesite network304 is located, and where the customer's employees access and use thecustomer network302a. For example, developers, sales and marketing personnel, human resources and finance employees, may access thecustomer network302afrom thesite network304. In the illustrated example, the customer may obtain applications and services from thecloud services provider354. Alternatively or additionally, thecloud services provider354 may provide data center services for the customer. For example, thecloud services provider354 may host the customer's repository of data (e.g., music provided by a streaming music service, or video provided by a streaming video provider). In this example, the customer's own customers may be provided data directly from thecloud services provider354, rather than from thecustomer network302a.
• FIG. 3B illustrates and example of aconfiguration300bwhere the customer network's302bnetwork is primarily or sometimes entirely in the cloud. In this example, the customer network's302bsite network304 may include a few laptops, or one or two desktop servers. These computing devices may be used by the customer's employees to conduct the customer's business, while thecloud services provider354 provides the majority of the network infrastructure needed by the customer. For example, a very small company may have no office space and no dedicated location, and have as computing resources only the laptops used by its employees. This small company may use thecloud services provider354 to provide its fixed network infrastructure. The small company may access this network infrastructure by connecting a laptop to any available network connection (e.g, in a co-working space, library, or coffee shop). When no laptops are connected to thecloud services provider354, thecustomer network302bmay be existing entirely within the cloud.
• In the example provided above, thesite network304 can be found wherever the customer's employees connect to a network and can access thecloud services provider354. Similarly, thesensors310 can be co-located with the employees' laptops. For example, whenever an employee connects to a network, she can enable asensor310, which can then project deceptions into the network around her. Alternatively or additionally,sensors310 can be installed in a fixed location (such as the home of an employee of the customer) from which they can access thecloud services provider354 and project deceptions into the network provided by thecloud services provider354.
• The network security system, such as the deception-based system discussed above, can provide network security for a variety of customer networks, which may include a diverse array of devices.FIG. 4 illustrates an example of anenterprise network400, which is one such network that can be defended by a network security system. Theexample enterprise network400 illustrates examples of various network devices and network clients that may be included in an enterprise network. Theenterprise network400 may include more or fewer network devices and/or network clients, and/or may include network devices, additional networks includingremote sites452, and/or systems not illustrated here. Enterprise networks may include networks installed at a large site, such as a corporate office, a university campus, a hospital, a government office, or a similar entity. An enterprise network may include multiple physical sites. Access to an enterprise networks is typically restricted, and may require authorized users to enter a password or otherwise authenticate before using the network. A network such as illustrated by theexample enterprise network400 may also be found at small sites, such as in a small business.
• Theenterprise network400 may be connected to an external network450. The external network450 may be a public network, such as the Internet. A public network is a network that has been made accessible to any device that can connect to it. A public network may have unrestricted access, meaning that, for example, no password or other authentication is required to connect to it. The external network450 may include third-party telecommunication lines, such as phone lines, broadcast coaxial cable, fiber optic cables, satellite communications, cellular communications, and the like. The external network450 may include any number of intermediate network devices, such as switches, routers, gateways, servers, and/or controllers that are not directly part of theenterprise network400 but that facilitate communication between thenetwork400 and other network-connected entities, such as aremote site452.
• Remote sites452 are networks and/or individual computers that are generally located outside theenterprise network400, and which may be connected to theenterprise network400 through intermediate networks, but that function as if within theenterprise network400 and connected directly to it. For example, an employee may connect to theenterprise network400 while at home, using various secure protocols, and/or by connecting to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) provided by theenterprise network400. While the employee's computer is connected, the employee's home is aremote site452. Alternatively or additionally, the enterprise network's400 owner may have a satellite office with a small internal network. This satellite office's network may have a fixed connection to theenterprise network400 over various intermediate networks. This satellite office can also be considered a remote site.
• Theenterprise network400 may be connected to the external network450 using a gateway device404. The gateway device404 may include a firewall or similar system for preventing unauthorized access while allowing authorized access to theenterprise network400. Examples of gateway devices include routers, modems (e.g. cable, fiber optic, dial-up, etc.), and the like.
• The gateway device404 may be connected to aswitch406a. Theswitch406aprovides connectivity between various devices in theenterprise network400. In this example, theswitch406aconnects together the gateway device404,various servers408,412,414,416,418, an anotherswitch406b. A switch typically has multiple ports, and functions to direct packets received on one port to another port. In some implementations, the gateway device404 and theswitch406amay be combined into a single device.
• Various servers may be connected to theswitch406a. For example, aprint server408 may be connected to theswitch406a. Theprint server408 may provide network access to a number ofprinters410. Client devices connected to theenterprise network400 may be able to access one of theprinters410 through theprinter server408.
• Other examples of servers connected to theswitch406ainclude afile server412,database server414, andemail server416. Thefile server412 may provide storage for and access to data. This data may be accessible to client devices connected to theenterprise network400. Thedatabase server414 may store one or more databases, and provide services for accessing the databases. Theemail server416 may host an email program or service, and may also store email for users on theenterprise network400.
• As yet another example, aserver rack418 may be connected to theswitch406a. Theserver rack418 may house one or more rack-mounted servers. Theserver rack418 may have one connection to theswitch406a, or may have multiple connections to theswitch406a. The servers in theserver rack418 may have various purposes, including providing computing resources, file storage, database storage and access, and email, among others.
• Anadditional switch406bmay also be connected to thefirst switch406a. Theadditional switch406bmay be provided to expand the capacity of the network. A switch typically has a limited number of ports (e.g., 8, 16, 32, 64 or more ports). In most cases, however, a switch can direct traffic to and from another switch, so that by connecting theadditional switch406bto thefirst switch406a, the number of available ports can be expanded.
• In this example, aserver420 is connected to theadditional switch406b. Theserver420 may manage network access for a number of network devices or client devices. For example, theserver420 may provide network authentication, arbitration, prioritization, load balancing, and other management services as needed to manage multiple network devices accessing theenterprise network400. Theserver420 may be connected to ahub422. Thehub422 may include multiple ports, each of which may provide a wired connection for a network or client device. A hub is typically a simpler device than a switch, and may be used when connecting a small number of network devices together. In some cases, a switch can be substituted for thehub422. In this example, thehub422 connectsdesktop computers424 andlaptop computers426 to theenterprise network400. In this example, each of thedesktop computers424 andlaptop computers426 are connected to thehub422 using a physical cable.
• In this example, theadditional switch406bis also connected to awireless access point428. Thewireless access point428 provides wireless access to theenterprise network400 for wireless-enabled network or client devices. Examples of wireless-enabled network and client devices includelaptops430,tablet computers432, andsmart phones434, among others. In some implementations, thewireless access point428 may also provide switching and/or routing functionality.
• Theexample enterprise network400 ofFIG. 4 is defended from network threats by a network threat detection and analysis system, which uses deception security mechanisms to attract and divert attacks on the network. The deceptive security mechanisms may be controlled by and inserted into theenterprise network400 using adeception center498 andsensors490, which may also be referred to as deception sensors, installed in various places in theenterprise network400. In some implementations, thedeception center498 and thesensors490 interact with asecurity services provider496 located outside of theenterprise network400. Thedeception center498 may also obtain or exchange data with sources located on external networks450, such as the Internet.
• In various implementations, thesensors490 are a minimal combination of hardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection with theenterprise network400 and anetwork tunnel480 with thedeception center498. For example, asensor490 may be constructed using a low-power processor, a network interface, and a simple operating system. In some implementations, any of the devices in the enterprise network (e.g., theservers408,412,416,418 theprinters410, thecomputing devices424,426,430,432,434, or thenetwork infrastructure devices404,406a,406b,428) can be configured to act as a sensor.
• In various implementations, one ormore sensors490 can be installed anywhere in theenterprise network400, include being attachedswitches406a,hubs422,wireless access points428, and so on. Thesensors490 can further be configured to be part of one or more VLANs. Thesensors490 provide thedeception center498 with visibility into theenterprise network400, such as for example being able to operate as a node in theenterprise network400, and/or being able to present or project deceptive security mechanisms into theenterprise network400. Additionally, in various implementations, thesensors490 may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on theenterprise network400 can be redirected to thedeception center498.
• Thedeception center498 provides network security for theenterprise network400 by deploying security mechanisms into theenterprise network400, monitoring theenterprise network400 through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for theenterprise network400, in various implementations thedeception center498 may communicate withsensors490 installed in theenterprise network400, using, for example,network tunnels480. Thetunnels480 may allow thedeception center498 to be located in a different sub-network (“subnet”) than theenterprise network400, on a different network, or remote from theenterprise network400, with intermediate networks between thedeception center498 and theenterprise network400. In some implementations, theenterprise network400 can include more than onedeception center498. In some implementations, the deception center may be located off-site, such as in an external network450.
• In some implementations, thesecurity services provider496 may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled by different organizations. For example, thesecurity services provider496 may communicate withmultiple deception centers498 that each provide security for adifferent enterprise network400 for the same organization. As another example, thesecurity services provider496 may coordinate the activities of thedeception center498 and thesensors490, such as enabling thedeception center498 and thesensors490 to connect to each other. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider496 is located outside theenterprise network400. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider496 is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, thesecurity services provider496 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider496 is controlled by the same entity as that controls theenterprise network400. In some implementations, the network security system does not include asecurity services provider496.
• FIG. 4 illustrates one example of what can be considered a “traditional” network, that is, a network that is based on the interconnection of computers. In various implementations, a network security system, such as the deception-based system discussed above, can also be used to defend “non-traditional” networks that include devices other than traditional computers, such as for example mechanical, electrical, or electromechanical devices, sensors, actuators, and control systems. Such “non-traditional” networks may be referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT). The Internet of Things encompasses newly-developed, every-day devices designed to be networked (e.g., drones, self-driving automobiles, etc.) as well as common and long-established machinery that has augmented to be connected to a network (e.g., home appliances, traffic signals, etc.).
• FIG. 5 illustrates a general example of anIoT network500. Theexample IoT network500 can be implemented wherever sensors, actuators, and control systems can be found. For example, theexample IoT network500 can be implemented for buildings, roads and bridges, agriculture, transportation and logistics, utilities, air traffic control, factories, and private homes, among others. In various implementations, theIoT network500 includescloud service554 that collects data from various sensors510a-510d,512a-512d, located in various locations. Using the collected data, thecloud service554 can provideservices520, control of machinery andequipment514, exchange of data withtraditional network devices516, and/or exchange of data withuser devices518. In some implementations, thecloud service554 can work with adeception center598 and/or asecurity service provider596 to provide security for thenetwork500.
• A cloud service, such as theillustrated cloud service554, is a resource provided over theInternet550. Sometimes synonymous with “cloud computing,” the resource provided by the cloud services is in the “cloud” in that the resource is provided by hardware and/or software at some location remote from the place where the resource is used. Often, the hardware and software of the cloud service is distributed across multiple physical locations. Generally, the resource provided by the cloud service is not directly associated with specific hardware or software resources, such that use of the resource can continue when the hardware or software is changed. The resource provided by the cloud service can often also be shared between multiple users of the cloud service, without affecting each user's use. The resource can often also be provided as needed or on-demand. Often, the resource provided by thecloud service554 is automated, or otherwise capable of operating with little or no assistance from human operators.
• Examples of cloud services include software as a service (SaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), desktop as a service (DaaS), managed software as a service (MSaaS), mobile backend as a service (MBaaS), and information technology management as a service (ITMaas). Specific examples of cloud services include data centers, such as those operated by Amazon Web Services and Google Web Services, among others, that provide general networking and software services. Other examples of cloud services include those associated with smartphone applications, or “apps,” such as for example apps that track fitness and health, apps that allow a user to remotely manage her home security system or thermostat, and networked gaming apps, among others. In each of these examples, the company that provides the app may also provide cloud-based storage of application data, cloud-based software and computing resources, and/or networking services. In some cases, the company manages the cloud services provided by the company, including managing physical hardware resources. In other cases, the company leases networking time from a data center provider.
• In some cases, thecloud service554 is part of one integrated system, run by one entity. For example, thecloud service554 can be part of a traffic control system. In this example, sensors510a-510d,512a-512dcan be used to monitor traffic and road conditions. In this example, thecloud service554 can attempt to optimize the flow of traffic and also provide traffic safety. For example, the sensors510a-510d,512a-512dcan include asensor512aon a bridge that monitors ice formation. When thesensor512adetects that ice has formed on the bridge, thesensor512acan alert thecloud service554. Thecloud service554, can respond by interacting with machinery andequipment514 that manages traffic in the area of the bridge. For example, thecloud service554 can turn on warning signs, indicating to drivers that the bridge is icy. Generally, the interaction between thesensor512a, thecloud service554, and the machinery andequipment514 is automated, requiring little or no management by human operators.
• In various implementations, thecloud service554 collects or receives data from sensors510a-510d,512a-512d, distributed across one or more networks. The sensors510a-510d,512a-512dinclude devices capable of “sensing” information, such as air or water temperature, air pressure, weight, motion, humidity, fluid levels, noise levels, and so on. The sensors510a-510d,512a-512dcan alternatively or additionally include devices capable of receiving input, such as cameras, microphones, touch pads, keyboards, key pads, and so on. In some cases, a group of sensors510a-510dmay be common to onecustomer network502. For example, the sensors510a-510dmay be motion sensors, traffic cameras, temperature sensors, and other sensors for monitoring traffic in a city's metro area. In this example, the sensors510a-510dcan be located in one area of the city, or be distribute across the city, and be connected to a common network. In these cases, the sensors510a-510dcan communicate with agateway device562, such as a network gateway. Thegateway device562 can further communicate with thecloud service554.
• In some cases, in addition to receiving data from sensors510a-510din onecustomer network502, thecloud service554 can also receive data from sensors512a-512din other sites504a-504c. These other sites504a-504ccan be part of thesame customer network502 or can be unrelated to thecustomer network502. For example, the other sites504a-504ccan each be the metro area of a different city, and the sensors512a-512dcan be monitoring traffic for each individual city.
• Generally, communication between thecloud service554 and the sensors510a-510d,512a-512dis bidirectional. For example, the sensors510a-510d,512a-512dcan send information to thecloud service554. Thecloud service554 can further provide configuration and control information to the sensors510a-510d,512a-512d. For example, thecloud service554 can enable or disable a sensor510a-510d,512a-512dor modify the operation of a sensor510a-510d,512a-512d, such as changing the format of the data provided by a sensor510a-510d,512a-512dor upgrading the firmware of a sensor510a-510d,512a-512d.
• In various implementations, thecloud service554 can operate on the data received from the sensors510a-510d,512a-512d, and use this data to interact withservices520 provided by thecloud service554, or to interact with machinery andequipment514,network devices516, and/oruser devices518 available to thecloud service554.Services520 can include software-based services, such as cloud-based applications, website services, or data management services.Services520 can alternatively or additionally include media, such as streaming video or music or other entertainment services.Services520 can also include delivery and/or coordination of physical assets, such as for example package delivery, direction of vehicles for passenger pick-up and drop-off, or automate re-ordering and re-stocking of supplies. In various implementations,services520 may be delivered to and used by the machinery andequipment514, thenetwork devices516, and/or theuser devices518.
• In various implementations, the machinery andequipment514 can include physical systems that can be controlled by thecloud service554. Examples of machinery andequipment514 include factory equipment, trains, electrical street cars, self-driving cars, traffic lights, gate and door locks, and so on. In various implementations, thecloud service554 can provide configuration and control of the machinery andequipment514 in an automated fashion.
• Thenetwork devices516 can include traditional networking equipment, such as server computers, data storage devices, routers, switches, gateways, and so on. In various implementations, thecloud service554 can provide control and management of thenetwork devices516, such as for example automated upgrading of software, security monitoring, or asset tracking. Alternatively or additionally, in various implementations thecloud service554 can exchange data with thenetwork devices516, such as for example providing websites, providing stock trading data, or providing online shopping resources, among others. Alternatively or additionally, thenetwork devices516 can include computing systems used by the cloud service provider to manage thecloud service554.
• Theuser devices518 can include individual personal computers, smart phones, tablet devices, smart watches, fitness trackers, medical devices, and so on that can be associated with an individual user. Thecloud service554 can exchange data with theuser devices518, such as for example provide support for applications installed on theuser devices518, providing websites, providing streaming media, providing directional navigation services, and so on. Alternatively or additionally, thecloud service554 may enable a user to use auser device518 to access and/or view other devices, such as the sensors510a-510d,512a-512d, the machinery andequipment514, or thenetwork devices516.
• In various implementations, theservices520, machinery andequipment514,network devices516, anduser devices518 may be part of onecustomer network506. In some cases, thiscustomer network506 is the same as thecustomer network502 that includes the sensors510a-510d. In some cases, theservices520, machinery andequipment514,network devices516, anduser devices518 are part of the same network, and may instead be part of variousother networks506.
• In various implementations, customer networks can include adeception center598. Thedeception center598 provides network security for theIoT network500 by deploying security mechanisms into theIoT network500, monitoring theIoT network500 through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for theIoT network500, in various implementations thedeception center598 may communicate with the sensors510a-5106d,512a-512dinstalled in theIoT network500, for example through thecloud service554. In some implementations, theIoT network500 can include more than onedeception center598. For example, each ofcustomer network502 and customer networks orother networks506 can include adeception center598.
• In some implementations, thedeception center598 and the sensors510a-510d,512a-512dinteract with asecurity services provider596. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider596 may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled by different organizations. For example, thesecurity services provider596 may communicate withmultiple deception centers598 that each provide security for adifferent IoT network500 for the same organization. As another example, thesecurity services provider596 may coordinate the activities of thedeception center598 and the sensors510a-510d,512a-512d, such as enabling thedeception center598 and the sensors510a-510d,512a-512dto connect to each other. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider596 is integrated into thecloud service554. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider596 is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, thesecurity services provider596 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider596 is controlled by the same entity as that controls theIoT network500. In some implementations, the network security system does not include asecurity services provider596.
• IoT networks can also include small networks of non-traditional devices.FIG. 6 illustrates an example of a customer network that is asmall network600, here implemented in a private home. A network for a home is an example of small network that may have both traditional and non-traditional network devices connected to thenetwork600, in keeping with an Internet of Things approach. Home networks are also an example of networks that are often implemented with minimal security. The average homeowner is not likely to be a sophisticated network security expert, and may rely on his modem or router to provide at least some basic security. The homeowner, however, is likely able to at least set up a basic home network. A deception-based network security device may be as simple to set up as a home router or base station, yet provide sophisticated security for thenetwork600.
• Theexample network600 ofFIG. 6 may be a single network, or may include multiple sub-networks. These sub-networks may or may not communicate with each other. For example, thenetwork600 may include a sub-network that uses the electrical wiring in the house as a communication channel. Devices configured to communicate in this way may connect to the network using electrical outlets, which also provide the devices with power. The sub-network may include a central controller device, which may coordinate the activities of devices connected to the electrical network, including turning devices on and off at particular times. One example of a protocol that uses the electrical wiring as a communication network is X10.
• Thenetwork600 may also include wireless and wired networks, built into the home or added to the home solely for providing a communication medium for devices in the house. Examples of wireless, radio-based networks include networks using protocols such as Z-Wave™, Zigbee™ (also known as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4), Bluetooth™, and Wi-Fi (also known as IEEE 802.11), among others. Wireless networks can be set up by installing a wireless base station in the house. Alternatively or additionally, a wireless network can be established by having at least two devices in the house that are able to communicate with each other using the same protocol.
• Examples of wired networks include Ethernet (also known as IEEE 802.3), token ring (also known as IEEE 802.5), Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), and Attached Resource Computer Network (ARCNET), among others. A wired network can be added to the house by running cabling through the walls, ceilings, and/or floors, and placing jacks in various rooms that devices can connect to with additional cables. The wired network can be extended using routers, switches, and/or hubs. In many cases, wired networks may be interconnected with wireless networks, with the interconnected networks operating as one seamless network. For example, an Ethernet network may include a wireless base station that provides a Wi-Fi signal for devices in the house.
• As noted above, asmall network600 implemented in a home is one that may include both traditional network devices and non-traditional, everyday electronics and appliances that have also been connected to thenetwork600. Examples of rooms where one may find non-traditional devices connected to the network are the kitchen and laundry rooms. For example, in the kitchen arefrigerator604,oven606,microwave608, anddishwasher610 may be connected to thenetwork600, and in the laundry room awashing machine612 may be connected to thenetwork600. By attaching these appliances to thenetwork600, the homeowner can monitor the activity of each device (e.g., whether the dishes are clean, the current state of a turkey in the oven, or the washing machine cycle) or change the operation of each device without needing to be in the same room or even be at home. The appliances can also be configured to resupply themselves. For example, therefrigerator604 may detect that a certain product is running low, and may place an order with a grocery delivery service for the product to be restocked.
• Thenetwork600 may also include environmental appliances, such as athermostat602 and awater heater614. By having these devices connected to thenetwork600, the homeowner can monitor the current environment of the house (e.g., the air temperature or the hot water temperature), and adjust the settings of these appliances while at home or away. Furthermore, software on thenetwork600 or on theInternet650 may track energy usage for the heating and cooling units and thewater heater614. This software may also track energy usage for the other devices, such as the kitchen and laundry room appliances. The energy usage of each appliance may be available to the homeowner over thenetwork600.
• In the living room, various home electronics may be on thenetwork600. These electronics may have once been fully analog or may have been standalone devices, but now include a network connection for exchanging data with other devices in thenetwork600 or with theInternet650. The home electronics in this example include atelevision618, agaming system620, and a media device622 (e.g., a video and/or audio player). Each of these devices may play media hosted, for example, on network attachedstorage636 located elsewhere in thenetwork600, or media hosted on theInternet650.
• Thenetwork600 may also include home safety and security devices, such as asmoke detector616, anelectronic door lock624, and ahome security system626. Having these devices on the network may allow the homeowner to track the information monitored and/or sensed by these devices, both when the homeowner is at home and away from the house. For example, the homeowner may be able to view a video feed from asecurity camera628. When the safety and security devices detect a problem, they may also inform the homeowner. For example, thesmoke detector616 may send an alert to the homeowner's smartphone when it detects smoke, or theelectronic door lock624 may alert the homeowner when there has been a forced entry. Furthermore, the homeowner may be able to remotely control these devices. For example, the homeowner may be able to remotely open theelectronic door lock624 for a family member who has been locked out. The safety and security devices may also use their connection to the network to call the fire department or police if necessary.
• Another non-traditional device that may be found in thenetwork600 is thefamily car630. Thecar630 is one of many devices, such aslaptop computers638,tablet computers646, andsmartphones642, that connect to thenetwork600 when at home, and when not at home, may be able to connect to thenetwork600 over theInternet650. Connecting to thenetwork600 over theInternet650 may provide the homeowner with remote access to his network. Thenetwork600 may be able to provide information to thecar630 and receive information from thecar630 while the car is away. For example, thenetwork600 may be able to track the location of thecar630 while thecar630 is away.
• In the home office and elsewhere around the house, thisexample network600 includes some traditional devices connected to thenetwork600. For example, the home office may include adesktop computer632 and network attachedstorage636. Elsewhere around the house, this example includes alaptop computer638 and handheld devices such as atablet computer646 and asmartphone642. In this example, aperson640 is also connected to thenetwork600. Theperson640 may be connected to thenetwork600 wirelessly through personal devices worn by theperson640, such as a smart watch, fitness tracker, or heart rate monitor. Theperson640 may alternatively or additionally be connected to thenetwork600 through a network-enabled medical device, such as a pacemaker, heart monitor, or drug delivery system, which may be worn or implanted.
• Thedesktop computer632,laptop computer638,tablet computer646, and/orsmartphone642 may provide an interface that allows the homeowner to monitor and control the various devices connected to the network. Some of these devices, such as thelaptop computer638, thetablet computer646, and thesmartphone642 may also leave the house, and provide remote access to thenetwork600 over theInternet650. In many cases, however, each device on the network may have its own software for monitoring and controlling only that one device. For example, thethermostat602 may use one application while themedia device622 uses another, and the wireless network provides yet another. Furthermore, it may be the case that the various sub-networks in the house do not communicate with each other, and/or are viewed and controlled using software that is unique to each sub-network. In many cases, the homeowner may not have one unified and easily understood view of hisentire home network600.
• Thesmall network600 in this example may also include network infrastructure devices, such as a router or switch (not shown) and awireless base station634. Thewireless base station634 may provide a wireless network for the house. The router or switch may provide a wired network for the house. Thewireless base station634 may be connected to the router or switch to provide a wireless network that is an extension of the wired network. The router or switch may be connected to agateway device648 that connects thenetwork600 to other networks, including theInternet650. In some cases, a router or switch may be integrated into thegateway device648. Thegateway device648 is a cable modem, digital subscriber line (DSL) modem, optical modem, analog modem, or some other device that connects thenetwork600 to an Internet Services Provider (ISP). The ISP may provide access to theInternet650. Typically, a home network only has onegateway device648. In some cases, thenetwork600 may not be connected to any networks outside of the house. In these cases, information about thenetwork600 and control of devices in thenetwork600 may not be available when the homeowner is not connected to thenetwork600; that is, the homeowner may not have access to hisnetwork600 over theInternet650.
• Typically, thegateway device648 includes a hardware and/or software firewall. A firewall monitors incoming and outgoing network traffic and, by applying security rules to the network traffic, attempts to keep harmful network traffic out of thenetwork600. In many cases, a firewall is the only security system protecting thenetwork600. While a firewall may work for some types of intrusion attempts originating outside thenetwork600, the firewall may not block all intrusion mechanisms, particularly intrusions mechanisms hidden in legitimate network traffic. Furthermore, while a firewall may block intrusions originating on theInternet650, the firewall may not detect intrusions originating from within thenetwork600. For example, an infiltrator may get into thenetwork600 by connecting to signal from the Wi-Fi base station634. Alternatively, the infiltrator may connect to thenetwork600 by physically connecting, for example, to thewashing machine612. Thewashing machine612 may have a port that a service technician can connect to service the machine. Alternatively or additionally, thewashing machine612 may have a simple Universal Serial Bus (USB) port. Once an intruder has gained access to thewashing machine612, the intruder may have access to the rest of thenetwork600.
• To provide more security for thenetwork600, a deception-basednetwork security device660 can be added to thenetwork600. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 is a standalone device that can be added to thenetwork600 by connecting it to a router or switch. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 can alternatively or additionally be connected to the network's600 wireless sub-network by powering on thesecurity device660 and providing it with Wi-Fi credentials. Thesecurity device660 may have a touchscreen, or a screen and a keypad, for inputting Wi-Fi credentials. Alternatively or additionally, the homeowner may be able to enter network information into the security device by logging into thesecurity device660 over a Bluetooth™ or Wi-Fi signal using software on a smartphone, tablet, or laptop, or using a web browser. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 can be connected to a sub-network running over the home's electrical wiring by connecting thesecurity device660 to a power outlet. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may have ports, interfaces, and/or radio antennas for connecting to the various sub-networks that can be included in thenetwork600. This may be useful, for example, when the sub-networks do not communicate with each other, or do not communicate with each other seamlessly. Once powered on and connected, thesecurity device660 may self-configure and monitor the security of each sub-network in thenetwork600 that it is connected to.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may be configured to connect between thegateway device648 and the network's600 primary router, and/or between thegateway device648 and the gateway device's648 connection to the wall. Connected in one or both of these locations, thesecurity device660 may be able to control the network's600 connection with outside networks. For example, the security device can disconnect thenetwork600 from theInternet650.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660, instead of being implemented as a standalone device, may be integrated into one or more of the appliances, home electronics, or computing devices (in this example network600), or in some other device not illustrated here. For example, thesecurity device660—or the functionality of thesecurity device660—may be incorporated into thegateway device648 or adesktop computer632 or alaptop computer638. As another example, thesecurity device660 can be integrated into a kitchen appliance (e.g., therefrigerator604 or microwave608), a home media device (e.g., thetelevision618 or gaming system620), or thehome security system626. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may be a printed circuit board that can be added to another device without requiring significant changes to the other device. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may be implemented using an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that can be added to the electronics of a device. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may be implemented as a software module or modules that can run concurrently with the operating system or firmware of a networked device. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may have a physical or virtual security barrier that prevents access to it by the device that it is integrated into. In some implementations, the security device's660 presence in another device may be hidden from the device into which thesecurity device660 is integrated.
• In various implementations, thesecurity device660 may scan thenetwork600 to determine which devices are present in thenetwork600. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device660 may communicate with a central controller in the network600 (or multiple central controllers, when there are sub-networks, each with their own central controller) to learn which devices are connected to thenetwork600. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may undergo a learning period, during which thesecurity device660 learns the normal activity of thenetwork600, such as what time of day appliances and electronics are used, what they are used for, and/or what data is transferred to and from these devices. During the learning period, thesecurity device660 may alert the homeowner to any unusual or suspicious activity. The homeowner may indicate that this activity is acceptable, or may indicate that the activity is an intrusion. As described below, thesecurity device660 may subsequently take preventive action against the intrusion.
• Once thesecurity device660 has learned the topology and/or activity of thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may be able to provide deception-based security for thenetwork600. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may deploy security mechanisms that are configured to emulate devices that could be found in thenetwork600. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may monitor activity on thenetwork600, including watching the data sent between the various devices on thenetwork600, and between the devices and theInternet650. Thesecurity device660 may be looking for activity that is unusual, unexpected, or readily identifiable as suspect. Upon detecting suspicious activity in thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may deploy deceptive security mechanisms.
• In some implementations, the deceptive security mechanisms are software processes running on thesecurity device660 that emulate devices that may be found in thenetwork600. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may be assisted in emulating the security devices by another device on thenetwork600, such as thedesktop computer632. From the perspective of devices connected to thenetwork600, the security mechanisms appear just like any other device on the network, including, for example, having an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a Media Access Control (MAC) address, and/or some other identification information, having an identifiable device type, and responding to or transmitting data just as would the device being emulated. The security mechanisms may be emulated by thesecurity device660 itself; thus, while, from the point of view of thenetwork600, thenetwork600 appears to have additional devices, no physical equivalent (other than the security device660) can be found in the house.
• The devices and data emulated by a security mechanism are selected such that the security mechanism is an attractive target for intrusion attempts. Thus, the security mechanism may emulate valuable data, and/or devices that are easily hacked into, and/or devices that provide easy access to the reset of thenetwork600. Furthermore, the security mechanisms emulate devices that are likely to be found in thenetwork600, such as a second television, a second thermostat, or another laptop computer. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may contact a service on theInternet650 for assistance in selecting devices to emulate and/or for how to configure emulated devices. Thesecurity devices660 may select and configure security mechanisms to be attractive to intrusions attempts, and to deflect attention away from more valuable or vulnerable network assets. Additionally, the security mechanisms can assist in confirming that an intrusion into thenetwork600 has actually taken place.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may deploy deceptive security mechanisms in advance of detecting any suspicious activity. For example, having scanned the network, thesecurity device660 may determine that thenetwork600 includes only onetelevision618 and onesmoke detector616. Thesecurity device660 may therefore choose to deploy security mechanisms that emulate a second television and a second smoke detector. With security mechanisms preemptively added to the network, when there is an intrusion attempt, the intruder may target the security mechanisms instead of valuable or vulnerable network devices. The security mechanisms thus may serve as decoys and may deflect an intruder away from the network's600 real devices.
• In some implementations, the security mechanisms deployed by thesecurity device660 may take into account specific requirements of thenetwork600 and/or the type of devices that can be emulated. For example, in some cases, the network600 (or a sub-network) may assign identifiers to each device connected to thenetwork600, and/or each device may be required to adopt a unique identifier. In these cases, thesecurity device660 may assign an identifier to deployed security mechanisms that do not interfere with identifiers used by actual devices in thenetwork600. As another example, in some cases, devices on thenetwork600 may register themselves with a central controller and/or with a central service on theInternet650. For example, thethermostat602 may register with a service on theInternet650 that monitors energy use for the home. In these cases, the security mechanisms that emulate these types of devices may also register with the central controller or the central service. Doing so may improve the apparent authenticity of the security mechanism, and may avoid conflicts with the central controller or central service. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device660 may determine to deploy security mechanisms that emulate other devices, and avoid registering with the central controller or central service.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may dynamically adjust the security mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, when the homeowner adds devices to thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may remove security mechanisms that conflict with the new devices, or change a security mechanism so that the security mechanism's configuration is not incongruous with the new devices (e.g., the security mechanisms should not have the same MAC address as a new device). As another example, when the network owner removes a device from thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may add a security mechanism that mimics the device that was removed. As another example, the security device may change the activity of a security mechanism, for example, to reflect changes in the normal activity of the home, changes in the weather, the time of year, the occurrence of special events, and so on.
• Thesecurity device660 may also dynamically adjust the security mechanisms it has deployed in response to suspicious activity it has detected on thenetwork600. For example, upon detecting suspicious activity, thesecurity device660 may change the behavior of a security mechanism or may deploy additional security mechanisms. The changes to the security mechanisms may be directed by the suspicious activity, meaning that if, for example, the suspicious activity appears to be probing for awireless base station634, thesecurity device660 may deploy a decoy wireless base station.
• Changes to the security mechanisms are meant not only to attract a possible intrusion, but also to confirm that an intrusion has, in fact occurred. Since the security mechanisms are not part of the normal operation of thenetwork600, normal occupants of the home are not expected to access the security mechanisms. Thus, in most cases, any access of a security mechanism is suspect. Once thesecurity device660 has detected an access to a security mechanism, thesecurity device660 may next attempt to confirm that an intrusion into thenetwork600 has taken place. An intrusion can be confirmed, for example, by monitoring activity at the security mechanism. For example, login attempts, probing of data emulated by the security mechanism, copying of data from the security mechanism, and attempts to log into another part of thenetwork600 from the security mechanism indicate a high likelihood that an intrusion has occurred.
• Once thesecurity device660 is able to confirm an intrusion into thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may alert the homeowner. For example, thesecurity device660 may sound an audible alarm, send an email or text message to the homeowner or some other designated persons, and/or send an alert to an application running on a smartphone or tablet. As another example, thesecurity device660 may access other network devices and, for example, flash lights, trigger the security system's626 alarm, and/or display messages on devices that include display screens, such as thetelevision618 orrefrigerator604. In some implementations, depending on the nature of the intrusion, thesecurity device660 may alert authorities such as the police or fire department.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may also take preventive actions. For example, when an intrusion appears to have originated outside thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may block the network's600 access to theInternet650, thus possibly cutting off the intrusion. As another example, when the intrusion appears to have originated from within thenetwork600, thesecurity device660 may isolate any apparently compromised devices, for example by disconnecting them from thenetwork600. When only its own security mechanisms are compromised, thesecurity device660 may isolate itself from the rest of thenetwork600. As another example, when thesecurity device660 is able to determine that the intrusion very likely included physical intrusion into the house, thesecurity device660 may alert the authorities. Thesecurity device660 may further lock down the house by, for example, locking any electronic door locks624.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may be able to enable a homeowner to monitor thenetwork600 when a suspicious activity has been detected, or at any other time. For example, the homeowner may be provided with a software application that can be installed on a smartphone, tablet, desktop, and/or laptop computer. The software application may receive information from thesecurity device660 over a wired or wireless connection. Alternatively or additionally, the homeowner may be able to access information about his network through a web browser, where thesecurity device660 formats webpages for displaying the information. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device660 may itself have a touchscreen or a screen and key pad that provide information about thenetwork600 to the homeowner.
• The information provided to the homeowner may include, for example, a list and/or graphic display of the devices connected to thenetwork600. The information may further provide a real-time status of each device, such as whether the device is on or off, the current activity of the device, data being transferred to or from the device, and/or the current user of the device, among other things. The list or graphic display may update as devices connect and disconnect from thenetwork600, such as for example laptops and smartphones connecting to or disconnecting from a wireless sub-network in thenetwork600. Thesecurity device660 may further alert the homeowner when a device has unexpectedly been disconnected from thenetwork600. Thesecurity device660 may further alert the homeowner when an unknown device connects to thenetwork600, such as for example when a device that is not known to the homeowner connects to the Wi-Fi signal.
• Thesecurity device660 may also maintain historic information. For example, thesecurity device660 may provide snapshots of thenetwork600 taken once a day, once a week, or once a month. Thesecurity device660 may further provide a list of devices that have, for example, connected to the wireless signal in the last hour or day, at what times, and for how long. Thesecurity device660 may also be able to provide identification information for these devices, such as MAC addresses or usernames. As another example, thesecurity device660 may also maintain usage statistics for each device in thenetwork600, such as for example the times at which each device was in use, what the device was used for, how much energy the device used, and so on.
• The software application or web browser or display interface that provides the homeowner with information about hisnetwork600 may also enable the homeowner to make changes to thenetwork600 or to devices in thenetwork600. For example, through thesecurity device660, the homeowner may be able to turn devices on or off, change the configuration of a device, change a password for a device or for the network, and so on.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may also display currently deployed security mechanisms and their configuration. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may also display activity seen at the security mechanisms, such as for example a suspicious access to a security mechanism. In some implementations, thesecurity device660 may also allow the homeowner to customize the security mechanisms. For example, the homeowner may be able to add or remove security mechanisms, modify data emulated by the security mechanisms, modify the configuration of security mechanism, and/or modify the activity of a security mechanism.
• A deception-basednetwork security device660 thus can provide sophisticated security for a small network. Thesecurity device660 may be simple to add to a network, yet provide comprehensive protection against both external and internal intrusions. Moreover, thesecurity device660 may be able to monitor multiple sub-networks that are each using different protocols. Thesecurity device660, using deceptive security mechanisms, may be able to detect and confirm intrusions into thenetwork600. Thesecurity device660 may be able to take preventive actions when an intrusion occurs. Thesecurity device660 may also be able to provide the homeowner with information about his network, and possibly also control over devices in the network.
• FIG. 7 illustrates another example of asmall network700, here implemented in a small business. A network in a small business may have both traditional and non-traditional devices connected to thenetwork700. Small business networks are also examples of networks that are often implemented with minimal security. A small business owner may not have the financial or technical resources, time, or expertise to configure a sophisticated security infrastructure for hernetwork700. The business owner, however, is likely able to at least set up anetwork700 for the operation of the business. A deception-based network security device that is at least as simple to set up as thenetwork700 itself may provide inexpensive and simple yet sophisticated security for thenetwork700.
• Theexample network700 may be one, single network, or may include multiple sub-networks. For example, thenetwork700 may include a wired sub-network, such as an Ethernet network, and a wireless sub-network, such as an 802.11 Wi-Fi network. The wired sub-network may be implemented using cables that have been run through the walls and/or ceilings to the various rooms in the business. The cables may be connected to jacks in the walls that devices can connect to in order to connect to thenetwork700. The wireless network may be implemented using awireless base station720, or several wireless base stations, which provide a wireless signal throughout the business. Thenetwork700 may include other wireless sub-networks, such as a short-distance Bluetooth™ network. In some cases, the sub-networks communicate with one another. For example, the Wi-Fi sub-network may be connected to the wired Ethernet sub-network. In some cases, the various sub-networks in thenetwork700 may not be configured to or able to communicate with each other.
• As noted above, thesmall business network700 may include both computers, network infrastructure devices, and other devices not traditionally found in a network. Thenetwork700 may also include electronics, machinery, and systems that have been connected to thenetwork700 according to an Internet-of-Things approach. Workshop machinery that was once purely analog may now have computer controls. Digital workshop equipment may be network-enabled. By connecting shop equipment and machinery to thenetwork700, automation and efficiency of the business can be improved and orders, materials, and inventory can be tracked. Having more devices on thenetwork700, however, may increase the number of vulnerabilities in thenetwork700. Devices that have only recently become network-enabled may be particularly vulnerable because their security systems have not yet been hardened through use and attack. A deception-based network security device may provide simple-to-install and sophisticated security for a network that may otherwise have only minimal security.
• The example small business ofFIG. 7 includes a front office. In the front office, the network may include devices for administrative tasks. These devices may include, for example, alaptop computer722 and atelephone708. These devices may be attached to thenetwork700 in order to, for example, access records related to the business, which may be stored on aserver732 located elsewhere in the building. In the front office, security devices for the building may also be found, including, for example, security system controls724 and anelectronic door lock726. Having the security devices on thenetwork700 may enable the business owner to remotely control access to the building. The business owner may also be able to remotely monitor the security of building, such as for example being able to view video streams fromsecurity cameras742. The front office may also be where environmental controls, such as athermostat702, are located. Having thethermostat702 on thenetwork700 may allow the business owner to remotely control the temperature settings. A network-enabledthermostat702 may also track energy usage for the heating and cooling systems. The front office may also include safety devices, such as a network-connectedsmoke alarm728. A network-connected smoke alarm may be able to inform the business owner that there is a problem in the building be connecting to the business owner's smartphone or computer.
• Another workspace in this example small business is a workshop. In the workshop, thenetwork700 may include production equipment for producing the goods sold by the business. The production equipment may include, for example, manufacturing machines704 (e.g. a milling machine, a Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine, a3D printer, or some other machine tool) and aplotter706. The production equipment may be controlled by a computer on thenetwork700, and/or may receive product designs over thenetwork700 and independently execute the designs. In the workshop, one may also find other devices related to the manufacturing of products, such as radiofrequency identification (RFID) scanners, barcode or Quick Response (QR) code generators, and other devices for tracking inventory, as well as electronic tools, hand tools, and so on.
• In the workshop and elsewhere in the building, mobile computing devices andpeople738 may also be connected to thenetwork700. Mobile computing devices include, for example,tablet computers734 andsmartphones736. These devices may be used to control production equipment, track supplies and inventory, receive and track orders, and/or for other operations of the business.People738 may be connected to the network through network-connected devices worn or implanted in thepeople738, such as for example smart watches, fitness trackers, heart rate monitors, drug delivery systems, pacemakers, and so on.
• At a loading dock, the example small business may have adelivery van748 and acompany car746. When these vehicles are away from the business, they may be connected to thenetwork700 remotely, for example over theInternet750. By being able to communicate with thenetwork700, the vehicles may be able to receive information such as product delivery information (e.g., orders, addresses, and/or delivery times), supply pickup instructions, and so on. The business owner may also be able to track the location of these vehicles from the business location, or over theInternet750 when away from the business, and/or track who is using the vehicles.
• The business may also have a back office. In the back office, thenetwork700 may include traditional network devices, such ascomputers730, amulti-function printer716, ascanner718, and aserver732. In this example, thecomputers730 may be used to design products for manufacturing in the workshop, as well as for management of the business, including tracking orders, supplies, inventory, and/or human resources records. Themulti-function printer716 andscanner718 may support the design work and the running of the business. Theserver732 may store product designs, orders, supply records, and inventory records, as well as administrative data, such as accounting and human resources data.
• The back office may also be where agateway device770 is located. Thegateway device770 connects the small business to other networks, including theInternet750. Typically, thegateway device770 connects to an ISP, and the ISP provides access to theInternet750. In some cases, a router may be integrated into thegateway device770. In some cases,gateway device770 may be connected to an external router, switch, or hub, not illustrated here. In some cases, thenetwork700 is not connected to any networks outside of the business'sown network700. In these cases, thenetwork700 may not have agateway device770.
• The back office is also where thenetwork700 may have a deception-basednetwork security device760. Thesecurity device760 may be a standalone device that may be enabled as soon as it is connected to thenetwork700. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device760 may be integrated into another device connected to thenetwork700, such as thegateway device770, a router, adesktop computer730, alaptop computer722, themulti-function printer716, or thethermostat702, among others. When integrated into another device, thesecurity device760 may use the network connection of the other device, or may have its own network connection for connecting to thenetwork700. Thesecurity device760 may connect to thenetwork700 using a wired connection or a wireless connection.
• Once connected to thenetwork700, thesecurity device760 may begin monitoring thenetwork700 for suspect activity. In some implementations, thesecurity device760 may scan thenetwork700 to learn which devices are connected to thenetwork700. In some cases, thesecurity device760 may learn the normal activity of thenetwork700, such as what time the various devices are used, for how long, by whom, for what purpose, and what data is transferred to and from each device, among other things.
• In some implementations, having learned the configuration and/or activity of thenetwork700, thesecurity device760 may deploy deceptive security mechanisms. These security mechanisms may emulate devices that may be found on thenetwork700, including having an identifiable device type and/or network identifiers (such as a MAC address and/or IP address), and being able to send and receive network traffic that a device of a certain time would send and receive. For example, for the example small business, thesecurity device760 may configure a security mechanism to emulate a3D printer, a wide-body scanner, or an additional security camera. Thesecurity device760 may further avoid configuring a security mechanism to emulate a device that is not likely to be found in the small business, such as a washing machine. Thesecurity device760 may use the deployed security mechanisms to monitor activity on thenetwork700.
• In various implementations, when thesecurity device760 detects suspect activity, thesecurity device760 may deploy additional security mechanisms. These additional security mechanisms may be selected based on the nature of suspect activity. For example, when the suspect activity appears to be attempting to break into the shop equipment, thesecurity device760 may deploy a security mechanism that looks like shop equipment that is easy to hack. In some implementations, thesecurity device760 may deploy security mechanisms only after detecting suspect activity on thenetwork700.
• Thesecurity device760 selects devices to emulate that are particularly attractive for an infiltration, either because the emulated device appears to have valuable data or because the emulated device appears to be easy to infiltrate, or for some other reason. In some implementations, thesecurity device760 connects to a service on theInternet750 for assistance in determining which devices to emulate and/or how to configure the emulated device. Once deployed, the security mechanisms serve as decoys to attract the attention of a possible infiltrator away from valuable network assets. In some implementations, thesecurity device760 emulates the security mechanisms using software processes. In some implementations, thesecurity device760 may be assisted in emulating security mechanisms by acomputer730 on the network.
• In some implementations, thesecurity device760 may deploy security mechanisms prior to detecting suspicious activity on thenetwork700. In these implementations, the security mechanisms may present more attractive targets for a possible, future infiltration, so that if an infiltration occurs, the infiltrator will go after the security mechanisms instead of the actual devices on thenetwork700.
• In various implementations, thesecurity device760 may also change the security mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, thesecurity device760 may add or remove security mechanisms as the operation of the business changes, as the activity on thenetwork700 changes, as devices are added or removed from thenetwork700, as the time of year changes, and so on.
• Besides deflecting a possible network infiltration away from valuable or vulnerable network devices, thesecurity device760 may use the security mechanisms to confirm that thenetwork700 has been infiltrated. Because the security mechanisms are not part of actual devices in use by the business, any access to them over the network is suspect. Thus, once thesecurity device760 detects an access to one of its security mechanisms, thesecurity device760 may attempt to confirm that this access is, in fact, an unauthorized infiltration of thenetwork700.
• To confirm that a security mechanism has been infiltrated, thesecurity device760 may monitor activity seen at the security mechanism. Thesecurity device760 may further deploy additional security mechanisms, to see if, for example, it can present an even more attractive target to the possible infiltrator. Thesecurity device760 may further look for certain activity, such as log in attempts to other devices in the network, attempts to examine data on the security mechanism, attempts to move data from the security mechanism to theInternet750, scanning of thenetwork700, password breaking attempts, and so on.
• Once thesecurity device760 has confirmed that thenetwork700 has been infiltrated, thesecurity device760 may alert the business owner. For example, thesecurity device760 may sound an audible alarm, email or send text messages to thecomputers730 and/orhandheld devices734,736, send a message to the business'scars746,748, flash lights, or trigger the security system's724 alarm. In some implementations, thesecurity device760 may also take preventive measures. For example, thesecurity device760 may disconnect thenetwork700 from theInternet750, may disconnect specific devices from the network700 (e.g., theserver732 or the manufacturing machines704), may turn some network-connected devices off, and/or may lock the building.
• In various implementations, thesecurity device760 may allow the business owner to monitor hernetwork700, either when an infiltration is taking place or at any other time. For example, thesecurity device760 may provide a display of the devices currently connected to thenetwork700, including flagging any devices connected to the wireless network that do not appear to be part of the business. Thesecurity device760 may further display what each device is currently doing, who is using them, how much energy each device is presently using, and/or how much network bandwidth each device is using. Thesecurity device760 may also be able to store this information and provide historic configuration and/or usage of thenetwork700.
• Thesecurity device760 may have a display it can use to show information to the business owner. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device760 may provide this information to a software application that can run on a desktop or laptop computer, a tablet, or a smartphone. Alternatively or additionally, thesecurity device760 may format this information for display through a web browser. The business owner may further be able to control devices on thenetwork700 through an interface provided by thesecurity device760, including, for example, turning devices on or off, adjusting settings on devices, configuring user accounts, and so on. The business owner may also be able to view any security mechanisms presently deployed, and may be able to re-configure the security mechanisms, turn them off, or turn them on.
• IoT networks can also include industrial control systems. Industrial control system is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS) and other control system configurations, such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), often found in the industrial sectors and infrastructures. Industrial control systems are often found in industries such as electrical, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods). While a large percentage of industrial control systems may be privately owned and operated, federal agencies also operate many industrial processes, such as air traffic control systems and materials handling (e.g., Postal Service mail handling).
• FIG. 8 illustrates an example of the basic operation of anindustrial control system800. Generally, anindustrial control system800 may include acontrol loop802, a human-machine interface806, and remote diagnostics andmaintenance808. In some implementations, the example industrial control system can be defended by a network threat detection and analysis system, which can include adeception center898 and asecurity services provider896.
• Acontrol loop802 may consist ofsensors812,controller804 hardware such as PLCs,actuators810, and the communication ofvariables832,834. Thesensors812 may be used for measuring variables in the system, while theactuators810 may include, for example, control valves breakers, switches, and motors. Some of thesensors812 may be deceptions sensors.Controlled variables834 may be transmitted to thecontroller804 from thesensors812. Thecontroller804 may interpret the controlledvariables834 and generates corresponding manipulatedvariables832, based on set points provided bycontroller interaction830. Thecontroller804 may then transmit the manipulatedvariables832 to theactuators810. Theactuators810 may drive a controlled process814 (e.g., a machine on an assembly line). The controlledprocess814 may accept process inputs822 (e.g., raw materials) and produce process outputs824 (e.g., finished products).New information820 provided to the controlledprocess814 may result innew sensor812 signals, which identify the state of the controlledprocess814 and which may also transmitted to thecontroller804.
• In some implementations, at least some of thesensors812 can also provide thedeception center898 with visibility into theindustrial control system800, such as for example being able to present or project deceptive security mechanisms into the industrial control system. Additionally, in various implementations, thesensors812 may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on the industrial control system can be redirected to thedeception center898. Thedeception center898 and thesensors812 may be able to communicate usingnetwork tunnels880.
• Thedeception center898 provides network security for theindustrial control system800 by deploying security mechanisms into theindustrial control system800, monitoring the industrial control system through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. In some implementations, theindustrial control system800 can include more than onedeception center898. In some implementations, the deception center may be located off-site, such as on the Internet.
• In some implementations, thedeception center898 may interact with asecurity services provider896 located outside theindustrial control system800. Thesecurity services provider896 may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple sites that are part of theindustrial control system800, and/or for multiple separate, possibly unrelated, industrial control systems. For example, thesecurity services provider896 may communicate withmultiple deception centers898 that each provide security for a differentindustrial control system800 for the same organization. As another example, thesecurity services provider896 may coordinate the activities of thedeception center898 and thesensors812, such as enabling thedeception center898 and thesensors812 to connect to each other. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider896 is located outside theindustrial control system800. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider896 is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, thesecurity services provider896 may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, thesecurity services provider896 is controlled by the same entity as that controls the industrial control system. In some implementations, the network security system does not include asecurity services provider896.
• The human-machine interface806 provides operators and engineers with an interface forcontroller interaction830.Controller interaction830 may include monitoring and configuring set points and control algorithms, and adjusting and establishing parameters in thecontroller804. The human-machine interface806 typically also receives information from thecontroller804 that allows the human-machine interface806 to display process status information and historical information about the operation of thecontrol loop802.
• The remote diagnostics andmaintenance808 utilities are typically used to prevent, identify, and recover from abnormal operation or failures. For diagnostics, the remote diagnostics andmaintenance utilities808 may monitor the operation of each of thecontroller804,sensors812, andactuators810. To recover after a problem, the remote diagnostics andmaintenance808 utilities may provide recovery information and instructions to one or more of thecontroller804,sensors812, and/oractuators810.
• A typical industrial control system contains many control loops, human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenance tools, built using an array of network protocols on layered network architectures. In some cases, multiple control loops are nested and/or cascading, with the set point for one control loop being based on process variables determined by another control loop. Supervisory-level control loops and lower-level control loops typically operate continuously over the duration of a process, with cycle times ranging from milliseconds to minutes.
• One type of industrial control system that may include many control loops, human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenance tools is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets, where centralized data acquisition is typically as important as control of the system. SCADA systems are used in distribution systems such as, for example, water distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and natural gas pipelines, electrical utility transmission and distribution systems, and rail and other public transportation systems, among others. SCADA systems typically integrate data acquisition systems with data transmission systems and human-machine interface software to provide a centralized monitoring and control system for numerous process inputs and outputs. SCADA systems are typically designed to collect field information, transfer this information to a central computer facility, and to display the information to an operator in a graphic and/or textual manner. Using this displayed information, the operator may, in real time, monitor and control an entire system from a central location. In various implementations, control of any individual sub-system, operation, or task can be automatic, or can be performed by manual commands.
• FIG. 9 illustrates an example of aSCADA system900, here used for distributed monitoring and control. Thisexample SCADA system900 includes aprimary control center902 and three field sites930a-930c. Abackup control center904 provides redundancy in case of there is a malfunction at theprimary control center902. Theprimary control center902 in this example includes acontrol server906—which may also be called a SCADA server or a Master Terminal Unit (MTU) —and a local area network (LAN)918. Theprimary control center902 may also include a human-machine interface station908, adata historian910,engineering workstations912, and various network equipment such asprinters914, each connected to theLAN918.
• Thecontrol server906 typically acts as the master of theSCADA system900. Thecontrol server906 typically includes supervisory control software that controls lower-level control devices, such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and PLCs, located at the field sites930a-930c. The software may tell thesystem900 what and when to monitor, what parameter ranges are acceptable, and/or what response to initiate when parameters are outside of acceptable values.
• Thecontrol server906 of this example may access Remote Terminal Units and/or PLCs at the field sites930a-930cusing a communications infrastructure, which may include radio-based communication devices, telephone lines, cables, and/or satellites. In the illustrated example, thecontrol server906 is connected to amodem916, which provides communication with serial-basedradio communication920, such as a radio antenna. Using theradio communication920, thecontrol server906 can communicate with field sites930a-930busing radiofrequency signals922. Some field sites930a-930bmay have radio transceivers for communicating back to thecontrol server906.
• A human-machine interface station908 is typically a combination of hardware and software that allows human operators to monitor the state of processes in theSCADA system900. The human-machine interface station908 may further allow operators to modify control settings to change a control objective, and/or manually override automatic control operations, such as in the event of an emergency. The human-machine interface station908 may also allow a control engineer or operator to configure set points or control algorithms and parameters in a controller, such as a Remote Terminal Unit or a PLC. The human-machine interface station908 may also display process status information, historical information, reports, and other information to operators, administrators, mangers, business partners, and other authorized users. The location, platform, and interface of a human-machine interface station908 may vary. For example, the human-machine interface station908 may be a custom, dedicated platform in theprimary control center902, a laptop on a wireless LAN, or a browser on a system connected to the Internet.
• Thedata historian910 in this example is a database for logging all process information within theSCADA system900. Information stored in this database can be accessed to support analysis of thesystem900, for example for statistical process control or enterprise level planning.
• Thebackup control center904 may include all or most of the same components that are found in theprimary control center902. In some cases, thebackup control center904 may temporarily take over for components at theprimary control center902 that have failed or have been taken offline for maintenance. In some cases, thebackup control center904 is configured to take over all operations of theprimary control center902, such as when theprimary control center902 experiences a complete failure (e.g., is destroyed in a natural disaster).
• Theprimary control center902 may collect and log information gathered by the field sites930a-930cand display this information using the human-machine interface station908. Theprimary control center902 may also generate actions based on detected events. Theprimary control center902 may, for example, poll field devices at the field sites930a-930cfor data at defined intervals (e.g., 5 or 60 seconds), and can send new set points to a field device as required. In addition to polling and issuing high-level commands, theprimary control center902 may also watch for priority interrupts coming from the alarm systems at the field sites930a-930c.
• In this example, theprimary control center902 uses point-to-point connections to communication with three field sites930a-930c, using radio telemetry for two communications with two of the field sites930a-930b. In this example, theprimary control center902 uses a wide area network (WAN)960 to communicate with thethird field site930c. In other implementations, theprimary control center902 may use other communication topologies to communicate with field sites. Other communication topologies include rings, stars, meshes, trees, lines or series, and busses or multi-drops, among others. Standard and proprietary communication protocols may be used to transport information between theprimary control center902 and field sites930a-930c. These protocols may use telemetry techniques such as provided by telephone lines, cables, fiber optics, and/or radiofrequency transmissions such as broadcast, microwave, and/or satellite communications.
• The field sites930a-930cin this example perform local control of actuators and monitor local sensors. For example, afirst field site930amay include aPLC932. A PLC is a small industrial computer originally designed to perform the logic functions formerly executed by electrical hardware (such as relays, switches, and/or mechanical timers and counters). PLCs have evolved into controllers capable of controlling complex processes, and are used extensively in both SCADA systems and distributed control systems. Other controllers used at the field level include process controllers and Remote Terminal Units, which may provide the same level of control as a PLC but may be designed for specific control applications. In SCADA environments, PLCs are often used as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable than special-purpose controllers.
• ThePLC932 at a field site, such as thefirst field site930a, may controllocal actuators934,936 and monitorlocal sensors938,940,942. Examples of actuators includevalves934 and pumps936, among others. Examples of sensors includelevel sensors938,pressure sensors940, and flowsensors942, among others. Any of theactuators934,936 orsensors938,940,942 may be “smart” actuators or sensors, more commonly called intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Intelligent electronic devices may include intelligence for acquiring data, communicating with other devices, and performing local processing and control. An intelligent electronic device could combine an analog input sensor, analog output, low-level control capabilities, a communication system, and/or program memory in one device. The use of intelligent electronic devices in SCADA systems and distributed control systems may allow for automatic control at the local level. Intelligent electronic devices, such as protective relays, may communicate directly with thecontrol server906. Alternatively or additionally, a local Remote Terminal Unit may poll intelligent electronic devices to collect data, which it may then pass to thecontrol server906.
• Field sites930a-930care often equipped with remote access capability that allows field operators to perform remote diagnostics and repairs. For example, the first remote930amay include amodem916 connected to thePLC932. Aremote access950 site may be able to, using a dial up connection, connect to themodem916. Theremote access950 site may include itsown modem916 for dialing into to thefield site930aover a telephone line. At theremote access950 site, an operator may use acomputer952 connected to themodem916 to perform diagnostics and repairs on thefirst field site930a.
• Theexample SCADA system900 includes asecond field site930b, which may be provisioned in substantially the same way as thefirst field site930a, having at least a modem and a PLC or Remote Terminal that controls and monitors some number of actuators and sensors.
• Theexample SCADA system900 also includes athird field site930cthat includes a network interface card (NIC)944 for communicating with the system's900WAN960. In this example, thethird field site930cincludes aRemote Terminal Unit946 that is responsible for controllinglocal actuators934,936 and monitoringlocal sensors938,940,942. A Remote Terminal Unit, also called a remote telemetry unit, is a special-purpose data acquisition and control unit typically designed to support SCADA remote stations. Remote Terminal Units may be field devices equipped with wireless radio interfaces to support remote situations where wire-based communications are unavailable. In some cases, PLCs are implemented as Remote Terminal Units.
• TheSCADA system900 of this example also includes aregional control center970 and acorporate enterprise network990. Theregional control center970 may provide a higher level of supervisory control. Theregional control center970 may include at least a human-machine interface station908 and acontrol server906 that may have supervisory control over thecontrol server906 at theprimary control center902. Thecorporate enterprise network990 typically has access, through the system's900WAN960, to all the control centers902,904 and to the field sites930a-930c. Thecorporate enterprise network990 may include a human-machine interface station908 so that operators can remotely maintain and troubleshoot operations.
• Another type of industrial control system is the distributed control system (DCS). Distributed control systems are typically used to control production systems within the same geographic location for industries such as oil refineries, water and wastewater management, electric power generation plants, chemical manufacturing plants, and pharmaceutical processing facilities, among others. These systems are usually process control or discrete part control systems. Process control systems may be processes that run continuously, such as manufacturing processes for fuel or steam flow in a power plant, for petroleum production in a refinery, or for distillation in a chemical plant. Discrete part control systems have processes that have distinct processing steps, typically with a distinct start and end to each step, such as found in food manufacturing, electrical and mechanical parts assembly, and parts machining. Discrete-based manufacturing industries typically conduct a series of steps on a single item to create an end product.
• A distributed control system typically uses a centralized supervisory control loop to mediate a group of localized controllers that share the overall tasks of carrying out an entire production process. By modularizing the production system, a distributed control system may reduce the impact of a single fault on the overall system. A distributed control system is typically interfaced with a corporate network to give business operations a view of the production process.
• FIG. 10 illustrates an example of a distributedcontrol system1000. This example distributedcontrol system1000 encompasses a production facility, including bottom-level production processes at afield level1004, supervisory control systems at asupervisory level1002, and a corporate or enterprise layer.
• At thesupervisory level1002, acontrol server1006, operating as a supervisory controller, may communicate with subordinate systems via acontrol network1018. Thecontrol server1006 may send set points to distributed field controllers, and may request data from the distributed field controllers. Thesupervisory level1002 may includemultiple control servers1006, with one acting as the primary control server and the rest acting as redundant, back-up control servers. Thesupervisory level1002 may also include a main human-machine interface1008 for use by operators and engineers, adata historian1010 for logging process information from thesystem1000, andengineering workstations1012.
• At thefield level1004, thesystem1000 may include various distributed field controllers. In the illustrated example, the distributedcontrol system1000 includes amachine controller1020, aPLC1032, aprocess controller1040, and asingle loop controller1044. The distributed field controllers may each control local process actuators, based oncontrol server1006 commands and sensor feedback from local process sensors.
• In this example, themachine controller1020 drives amotion control network1026. Using themotion control network1026, themachine controller1020 may control a number of servo drives1022, which may each drive a motor. Themachine controller1020 may also drive alogic control bus1028 to communicate withvarious devices1024. For example, themachine controller1020 may use thelogic control bus1028 to communicate with pressure sensors, pressure regulators, and/or solenoid valves, among other devices. One or more of thedevices1024 may be an intelligent electronic device. A human-machine interface1008 may be attached to themachine controller1020 to provide an operator with local status information about the processes under control of themachine controller1020, and/or local control of themachine controller1020. Amodem1016 may also be attached to themachine controller1020 to provide remote access to themachine controller1020.
• ThePLC1032 in thisexample system1000 uses afieldbus1030 to communicate withactuators1034 andsensors1036 under its control. Theseactuators1034 andsensors1036 may include, for example, direct current (DC) servo drives, alternating current (AC) servo drives, light towers, photo eyes, and/or proximity sensors, among others. A human-machine interface1008 may also be attached to thefieldbus1030 to provide operators with local status and control for thePLC1032. Amodem1016 may also be attached to thePLC1032 to provide remote access to thePLC1032.
• Theprocess controller1040 in thisexample system1000 also uses afieldbus1030 to communicate with actuators and sensors under its control, one or more of which may be intelligent electronic devices. Theprocess controller1040 may communicate with itsfieldbus1030 through an input/output (I/O)server1042. An I/O server is a control component typically responsible for collecting, buffering, and/or providing access to process information from control sub-components. An I/O server may be used for interfacing with third-party control components. Actuators and sensors under control of theprocess controller1040 may include, for example, pressure regulators, pressure sensors, temperature sensors, servo valves, and/or solenoid valves, among others. Theprocess controller1040 may be connected to amodem1016 so that aremote access1050 site may access theprocess controller1040. Theremote access1050 site may include acomputer1052 for use by an operator to monitor and control theprocess controller1040. Thecomputer1052 may be connected to alocal modem1016 for dialing in to themodem1016 connected to theprocess controller1040.
• The illustratedexample system1000 also includes asingle loop controller1044. In this example, thesingle loop controller1044 interfaces withactuators1034 andsensors1036 with point-to-point connections, instead of a fieldbus. Point-to-point connections require a dedicated connection for each actuator1034 and eachsensor1036. Fieldbus networks, in contrast, do not need point-to-point connections between a controller and individual field sensors and actuators. In some implementations, a fieldbus allows greater functionality beyond control, including field device diagnostics. A fieldbus can accomplish control algorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing back to a PLC for every control operation. Standard industrial communication protocols are often used on control networks and fieldbus networks.
• Thesingle loop controller1044 in this example is also connected to amodem1016, for remote access to the single loop controller.
• In addition to thesupervisory level1002 andfield level1004 control loops, the distributedcontrol system1000 may also include intermediate levels of control. For example, in the case of a distributed control system controlling a discrete part manufacturing facility, there could be an intermediate level supervisor for each cell within the plant. This intermediate level supervisor could encompass a manufacturing cell containing a machine controller that processes a part, and a robot controller that handles raw stock and final products. Additionally, the distributed control system could include several of these cells that manage field-level controllers under the main distributed control system supervisory control loop.
• In various implementations, the distributed control system may include a corporate or enterprise layer, where anenterprise network1080 may connect to the example production facility. Theenterprise network1080 may be, for example, located at a corporate office co-located with the facility, and connected to thecontrol network1018 in thesupervisory level1002. Theenterprise network1080 may provide engineers and managers with control and visibility into the facility. Theenterprise network1080 may further include Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)1092, control systems for managing and monitoring work-in-process on a factory floor. An MES can track manufacturing information in real time, receiving up-to-the-minute data from robots, machine monitors and employees. Theenterprise network1080 may also include Management Information Systems (MIS)1094, software and hardware applications that implement, for example, decision support systems, resource and people management applications, project management, and database retrieval applications, as well as basic business functions such as order entry and accounting. Theenterprise network1080 may further include Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)systems1096, business process management software that allows an organization to use a system of integrated applications to manage the business and automate many back office functions related to technology, services, and human resources.
• Theenterprise network1080 may further be connected to aWAN1060. Through theWAN1060, theenterprise network1080 may connect to a distributedplant1098, which may include control loops and supervisory functions similar to the illustrated facility, but which may be at a different geographic location. TheWAN1060 may also connect the enterprise network to theoutside world1090, that is, to the Internet and/or various private and public networks. In some cases, theWAN1060 may itself include the Internet, so that theenterprise network1080 accesses the distributedplant1098 over the Internet.
• As described above, SCADA systems and distributed control systems use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) as the control components of an overall hierarchical system. PLCs can provide local management of processes through feedback control, as described above. In a SCADA implementation, a PLC can provide the same functionality as a Remote Terminal Unit. When used in a distributed control system, PLCs can be implemented as local controllers within a supervisory scheme. PLCs can have user-programmable memory for storing instructions, where the instructions implement specific functions such as I/O control, logic, timing, counting, proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control, communication, arithmetic, and data and file processing.
• FIG. 11 illustrates an example of aPLC1132 implemented in amanufacturing control process1100. ThePLC1132 in this example monitors and controls various devices overfieldbus network1130. ThePLC1132 may be connected to aLAN1118. Anengineering workstation1112 may also be connected to theLAN1118, and may include a programming interface that provides access to thePLC1132. Adata historian1110 on theLAN1118 may store data produced by thePLC1132. ThePLC1132 can also be connected to amodel1116, which enables remote access to thePLC1132.
• ThePLC1132 in this example may control a number of devices attached to itsfieldbus network1130. These devices may include actuators, such as aDC servo drive1122, anAC drive1124, avariable frequency drive1134, and/or alight tower1138. ThePLC1132 may also monitor sensors connected to thefieldbus network1130, such asproximity sensors1136, and/or a photo eye1142. A human-machine interface1108 may also be connected to thefieldbus network1130, and may provide local monitoring and control of thePLC1132.
• Most industrial control systems were developed years ago, long before public and private networks, desktop computing, or the Internet were a common part of business operations. These well-established industrial control systems were designed to meet performance, reliability, safety, and flexibility requirements. In most cases, they were physically isolated from outside networks and based on proprietary hardware, software, and communication protocols that included basic error detection and correction capabilities, but lacked secure communication capabilities. While there was concern for reliability, maintainability, and availability when addressing statistical performance and failure, the need for cyber security measures within these systems was not anticipated. At the time, security for industrial control systems mean physically securing access to the network and the consoles that controlled the systems.
• Internet-based technologies have since become part of modern industrial control systems. Widely available, low-cost IP devices have replaced proprietary solutions, which increases the possibility of cyber security vulnerabilities and incidents. Industrial control systems have adopted Internet-based solutions to promote corporate connectivity and remote access capabilities, and are being designed and implemented using industry standard computers, operating systems (OS) and network protocols. As a result, these systems may to resemble computer networks. This integration supports new networking capabilities, but provides less isolation for industrial control systems from the outside world than predecessor systems. Networked industrial control systems may be exposed to similar threats as are seen in computer networks, and an increased likelihood that an industrial control system can be compromised.
• Industrial control system vendors have begun to open up their proprietary protocols and publish their protocol specifications to enable third-party manufacturers to build compatible accessories. Organizations are also transitioning from proprietary systems to less expensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft Windows and Unix-like operating systems as well as common networking protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to reduce costs and improve performance. Another standard contributing to this evolution of open systems is Open Platform Communications (OPC), a protocol that enables interaction between control systems and PC-based application programs. The transition to using these open protocol standards provides economic and technical benefits, but also increases the susceptibility of industrial control systems to cyber incidents. These standardized protocols and technologies have commonly known vulnerabilities, which are susceptible to sophisticated and effective exploitation tools that are widely available and relatively easy to use.
• Industrial control systems and corporate networking systems are often interconnected as a result of several changes in information management practices, operational, and business needs. The demand for remote access has encouraged many organizations to establish connections to the industrial control system that enable of industrial control systems engineers and support personnel to monitor and control the system from points outside the control network. Many organizations have also added connections between corporate networks and industrial control systems networks to allow the organization's decision makers to obtain access to critical data about the status of their operational systems and to send instructions for the manufacture or distribution of product.
• In early implementations this might have been done with custom applications software or via an OPC server/gateway, but, in the past ten years this has been accomplished with TCP/IP networking and standardized IP applications like File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Extensible Markup Language (XML) data exchanges. Often, these connections were implemented without a full understanding of the corresponding security risks. In addition, corporate networks are often connected to strategic partner networks and to the Internet. Control systems also make more use of WANs and the Internet to transmit data to their remote or local stations and individual devices. This integration of control system networks with public and corporate networks increases the accessibility of control system vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can expose all levels of the industrial control system network architecture to complexity-induced error, adversaries and a variety of cyber threats, including worms and other malware.
• Many industrial control system vendors have delivered systems with dial-up modems that provide remote access to ease the burdens of maintenance for the technical field support personnel. Remote access can be accomplished, for example, using a telephone number, and sometimes an access control credential (e.g., valid ID, and/or a password). Remote access may provide support staff with administrative-level access to a system. Adversaries with war dialers—simple personal computer programs that dial consecutive phone numbers looking for modems—and password cracking software could gain access to systems through these remote access capabilities. Passwords used for remote access are often common to all implementations of a particular vendor's systems and may have not been changed by the end user. These types of connections can leave a system highly vulnerable because people entering systems through vendor-installed modems are may be granted high levels of system access.
• Organizations often inadvertently leave access links such as dial-up modems open for remote diagnostics, maintenance, and monitoring. Also, control systems increasingly utilize wireless communications systems, which can be vulnerable. Access links not protected with authentication and/or encryption have the increased risk of adversaries using these unsecured connections to access remotely controlled systems. This could lead to an adversary compromising the integrity of the data in transit as well as the availability of the system, both of which can result in an impact to public and plant safety. Data encryption may be a solution, but may not be the appropriate solution in all cases.
• Many of the interconnections between corporate networks and industrial control systems require the integration of systems with different communications standards. The result is often an infrastructure that is engineered to move data successfully between two unique systems. Because of the complexity of integrating disparate systems, control engineers often fail to address the added burden of accounting for security risks. Control engineers may have little training in security and often network security personnel are not involved in security design. As a result, access controls designed to protect control systems from unauthorized access through corporate networks may be minimal. Protocols, such as TCP/IP and others have characteristics that often go unchecked, and this may counter any security that can be done at the network or the application levels.
• Public information regarding industrial control system design, maintenance, interconnection, and communication may be readily available over the Internet to support competition in product choices as well as to enable the use of open standards. Industrial control system vendors also sell toolkits to help develop software that implements the various standards used in industrial control system environments. There are also many former employees, vendors, contractors, and other end users of the same industrial control system equipment worldwide who have inside knowledge about the operation of control systems and processes.
• Information and resources are available to potential adversaries and intruders of all calibers around the world. With the available information, it is quite possible for an individual with very little knowledge of control systems to gain unauthorized access to a control system with the use of automated attack and data mining tools and a factory-set default password. Many times, these default passwords are never changed.
• IV. Tunneling for Network Deceptions
• In various implementations, the systems and methods discussed above can be used to implement a deception system that uses network tunnels to project deception mechanisms from a deception farm into a network. The network can then be monitored and defended by the deception mechanisms.
• FIGS. 12A-12D illustrate an example of anetwork deception system1200 configured to provide deception mechanisms for asite network1204. Asite network1204 is a network installed at a customer site, such as a business, an office complex, an educational institution, or a private home. Some or all of thesite network1204 may be “in the cloud,” meaning that some or all of thesite network1204 is hosted by a cloud services provider. Theexample site network1204 includes variousnetwork infrastructure devices1274, such as routers, switches, hubs, repeaters, andgateway devices1262, among others.Gateway devices1262 can provide thesite network1204 access to other networks. Theexample site network1204 also includes various other network devices1276a-1276d, such as servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, netbook computers, tablet computers, personal digital assistants, smartphones, smart home assistants, printers, scanners, and/or other network devices, among others. In some cases, theexample site network1204 can also include other electronic devices that have network interfaces, such as televisions, gaming consoles, thermostats, refrigerators, and so on. Some of the network devices1276a-1276dmay be virtual; for example, some network devices may be virtual machines. In some cases, thesite network1204 can include wired and/or wireless segments.
• In some cases, thesite network1204 can have one or more broadcast domains. A broadcast domain is a logical division within a network, in which all the nodes can reach other nodes in the network using broadcast packets. As an example, quite often all the network devices connected to the same repeater or switch are in the same broadcast domain. As a further example, routers frequently form the boundaries of a broadcast domain.
• In various implementations, thenetwork deception system1200 can provide deception mechanisms (also referred to herein as deceptions) for the broadcast domains in thesite network1204. In the example ofFIGS. 12A-12D, a deception mechanism can be a network device that is added to thesite network1204 as a decoy. The deception mechanisms do not participate in the ordinary activities of thesite network1204, where the ordinary activities include functions for which thesite network1204 was set up. For example, when thesite network1204 hosts a website, ordinary activities can include transferring data between webservers, responding to external requests for webpages, conducting database searches, and so on. As another example, when thesite network1204 is used by a research and development company to develop new software, ordinary activities can include storing data, providing data to network devices1276a-1276bwhere engineers work, executing compilation software, and so on.
• Ordinary activities of thesite network1204, with some exceptions, do not normally include exchanging network traffic with deception mechanisms. Exceptions can include, for example, broadcast and multicast network traffic, and/or accesses for purposes of administrating the deception mechanisms. Because the deception mechanisms do not participate in the ordinary activities of thesite network1204, any network access to a deception mechanism is automatically suspect. The deception mechanisms can thus be used to detect suspicious activity within thesite network1204, where the suspicious activity may be generated by a network threat.
• To provide deception mechanisms to thesite network1204, in various implementations, thenetwork deception system1200 can include adeception farm1240. In various implementations, a deception farm can include a number of network devices, configured to operate as deception mechanisms. Similar to a server farm or a data center, deception mechanisms in a deception farm can be allocated to particular site networks and/or specific customers of the deception farm. In the example ofFIG. 12A, thedeception farm1240 includes a network device, configured as anetwork emulator1220. Thenetwork emulator1220 can be configured to host an emulatednetwork1216, which can include a number of emulatednetwork devices1218.
• In various implementations, the emulatednetwork devices1218 can mimic network devices that can be found in thesite network1204. For example, when thesite network1204 includes computers running the Windows or Linux operating systems, the emulatednetwork devices1218 can include emulated computers running Windows or Linux. In this example, the emulated network devices can further be configured with the specific versions and/or patch levels that are common among the network devices1276a-1276din thesite network1204.
• In various implementations, the emulatednetwork devices1218 can be simple or more complex deceptions, as the need requires. For example, one or more of the emulatednetwork devices1218 may be super-low interaction deceptions (also referred to as address deceptions), low-interaction deceptions, or high-interaction deceptions. Low-interaction and high-interaction can also be referred to collectively as interactive deceptions.
• In various implementations, a super-low interaction deception is a deception mechanism that includes an network address, such as an IP address, and can also have a hardware address, such as a MAC address. Super-low-interaction deceptions can respond to simple queries about whether the network address is in use, and thus can establish that a node exists in thesite network1204 at the network address. Multiple super-low interaction deceptions can be hosted by an address deception engine, and can occupy few processing resources. Super-low interaction deceptions do not otherwise have dedicated hardware, and are not associated with an operating system or network services.
• A low interaction deception is an emulated system executing a basic installation of an operating system. A low-interaction deception can also be executing some network services. A low-interaction deception can be initiated when a network interaction with a particular network address becomes more complicated than simple queries about whether a network address is in use. A low-interaction deception can respond to network traffic for multiple network addresses, where the responses may be formatted as appropriate for the operating system executing on the low-interaction deception. A low-interaction deception can thus represent multiple nodes in thesite network1204.
• A high-interaction deception is an emulated system configured to resemble a network device that may be found in the site network. A high-interaction deception may have a particular variation of an operating system installed, may have certain services and ports available, and may have a usage history in the form of data and log files. A high-interaction deception can be the most convincing type deception, and can be initiated when a network interaction escalates to a serious probe of a network device.
• In various implementations, thedeception farm1240 can be located remotely from thesite network1204. “Remotely” can mean that thedeception farm1240 is in a different network domain, and/or is outside of the security perimeter of thesite network1204. Stated another way, thedeception farm1240 can connect to thesite network1204 over other,intermediate networks1250. Theintermediate networks1250 can be public and/or private and can include, for example, the Internet.
• To provide deception mechanisms to thesite network1204, in various implementations, thedeception farm1240 can be connected, using anetwork tunnel1222, to a network device in the site network, where the network device is configured as aprojection point1210. The network device configured as aprojection point1210 can be, for example, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a server computer, a hand-held computer, or some other computing device that includes an integrated circuit configured as a processor, memory, and a network interface. In some implementations, theprojection point1210 can be a network infrastructure device, such as a switch. In some implementations, theprojection point1210 can be a virtual machine. In some implementations, a site network can include multiple projection points, each connected to thedeception farm1240 by a network tunnel.
• In various implementations, theprojection point1210 can serve as an endpoint for anetwork tunnel1222. The other end of thenetwork tunnel1222 can terminate attunneling endpoint1214 in thedeception farm1240. In various implementations, thetunneling endpoint1214 can be a physical or a virtual switch. Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, thetunneling endpoint1214 can be hosted by a network device, such as a server or desktop computer. In some implementations, a network device that hosts thetunneling endpoint1214 can be configured as a tunneling and traffic manager, possibly also as a configuration manager, as discussed further below. In some implementations, thetunneling endpoint1214 can provide physical port through which the network emulator1220 (and other devices hosted by the deception farm1240) can be connected toother networks1250.
• Thetunnel1222 between thedeception farm1240 and theprojection point1210 can be configured using various tunneling protocols. Examples of tunneling protocols and network protocols that include tunneling include Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), IP in IP, point-to-point tunneling protocols (PPTP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and Virtual Extensible Local Area Network (VXLAN), among others. A tunneling managing can configure thetunnel1222 to be secure, using various tunneling security protocols. Examples of tunneling security protocols include Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), and secure socket layer (SSL), among others.
• In various implementations, thedeception farm1240 can obtain network addresses in each of the broadcast domains of thesite network1204. For example, each broadcast domain may have a server running Domain Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). In this example, a configuration manager can request network addresses from a DHCP server, and thereby obtain network addresses for the domain in which the DHCP server is running. The configuration manager can then assign these network addresses to emulatednetwork devices1218 in the emulatednetwork1216. By having network addresses in a domain of thesite network1204, the emulatednetwork devices1218 can appear indistinguishable from legitimate network devices1276a-1276din thesite network1204. In other examples, network addresses can be manually configured for thedeception farm1240, for example by network administrators of thesite network1204 and/or by administrators of thedeception farm1240.
• In some implementations, instead of or in addition to adeception farm1240, deceptions can be provided to thesite network1204 using appliances installed in thesite network1204 itself. For example, a local network emulator can be installed in thesite network1204. In this example, the local network emulator can also connect to a projection point in thesite network1204, which can be thesame projection point1210 that is connected to thedeception farm1240 or can be a different projection point. The local network emulator can further obtain network addresses that are local to thesite network1204. The local network emulator can further assign these network addresses to emulated network devices executing in the network emulator.
• In various implementations, thenetwork tunnel1222 enables the emulatednetwork devices1218 to be “projected” into thesite network1204.FIG. 12B illustrates an example in which the emulatednetwork1216 has been connected to thesite network1204 using thenetwork tunnel1222.
• A tunnel is a mechanism that can be used to transmit network traffic that has one network protocol over a network that normally would not support the network protocol. Tunneling uses the packet encapsulation, in which a header and sometimes also a trailer is added to a packet. The original packet becomes the data portion of a new packet. For example, anetwork device1276ain thesite network1204 can address a packet to an emulatednetwork device1218 in thedeception farm1240. Theprojection point1210, as one endpoint of thetunnel1222, can add one or more headers to the packet, where the headers can be formatted according to a tunneling protocol. When the encapsulated packet reaches thetunneling endpoint1214 in thedeception farm1240, thetunneling endpoint1214 can remove the headers added by theprojection point1210, and produce the original packet. Thetunneling endpoint1214 can then put the original packet on the emulatednetwork1216, where the original packet can be treated in the same way as the packet would be treated in thesite network1204.
• The effect of thenetwork tunnel1222, in the example ofFIG. 12B, can thus be to make the emulatednetwork devices1218 appear as nodes in thesite network1204. Network devices projected into asite network1204 will be referred to herein in as projectednodes1242. As discussed above, the emulatednetwork devices1218 can be given network addresses that are in a broadcast domain of thesite network1204. The projectednodes1242 can thus appear as network neighbors, in the same broadcast domain, as the network devices1276a-1276din thesite network1204. For example, the network devices1276a-1276dmay have IP addresses 10.10.1.1200, 10.10.1.101, 10.10.1.102, and 10.10.1.103. In this example, the emulated network devices can thus be assigned, for example, IP address 10.10.1.1204, 10.10.1.105, 10.10.1.106, and 10.10.1.107. So configured, the emulatednetwork devices1218 can receive broadcast traffic sent within thesite network1204.
• Being a network neighbor can mean that the projectednodes1242 can be treated by thesite network1204, and by devices in thesite network1204, in the same way as the legitimate network devices1276a-1276din thesite network1204. For example, legitimate network device1276a-1276doccupies a particular network address, and, similarly, each emulatednetwork device1218 also occupies a network address. Thus, in this example, a host discovery tool running from afirst network device1276acan discover each emulatednetwork device1218 in the same way that the discovery tool discovers itsneighbor network device1276b, without the tool determining any difference between the emulatednetwork device1218 and thelegitimate network device1276b. As another example, network packets from thefirst network device1276acan be exchanged with one of the emulatednetwork devices1218 without seeming to leave thesite network1204. As yet another example, network traffic originating outside of thesite network1204 can reach an emulatednetwork device1218 by being addressed to thesite network1204.
• Thetunnel1222 provides a path for network traffic to be exchanged between devices in thesite network1204 and emulated devices in the emulatednetwork1216. Theprojection point1210, as the tunnel endpoint in thesite network1204, can be configured to receive any network traffic that is addressed to one of the emulatednetwork devices1218. This network traffic passes over thetunnel1222 to emulatednetwork1216 in thedeception farm1240, where the network traffic can be directed to the appropriate emulatednetwork device1218. Similarly, network traffic from an emulatednetwork device1218 can pass over the tunnel back to thesite network1204.
• Thetunnel1222 can be transparent, and may not visible to the network devices1276a-1276din the site network. In some implementations, theprojection point1210 can also hide itself, so that the projection point's function as a tunnel endpoint cannot be readily discovered. For example, theprojection point1210 can have a network address within thesite network1204 that is distinct from any network address assigned to the emulatednetwork devices1218. In this example, theprojection point1210 may hide its own network address by not responding to any network traffic that is addressed to projection point's network address.
• In various implementations, the emulatednetwork1216 can also be dynamically reconfigured.FIG. 12C illustrates an example of thenetwork deception system1200, where the emulatednetwork1216 has been reconfigured. In various implementations, the emulatednetwork1216 can be reconfigured in response tonetwork traffic1224 received by emulatednetwork1216 from thesite network1204. For example,network traffic1224 may be received that indicates that one of thenetwork devices1276cin thesite network1204 is attempting to connect with an emulatednetwork device1218. The connection attempt may be suspicious, so thenetwork emulator1220 may “escalate” a deception to respond to the connection attempt. For example, a low-interaction deception may be switched to a high-interaction deception.
• In various implementations, reconfiguring the emulatednetwork1216 can also include adding and/or removing deception mechanisms in response tonetwork traffic1224 received by the emulatednetwork1216. For example, a network threat may have connected to one of the emulatednetwork devices1218 from anetwork device1276cin thesite network1204. The network threat may then attempt to connect from the emulatednetwork device1218 to alegitimate network device1276ain thesite network1204. Rather than providing the network threat with access to thelegitimate network device1276aover thetunnel1222, in this example, thenetwork emulator1220 can add an emulatednetwork device1286athat is configured to resemble thelegitimate network device1276athat the network threat is attempting to reach. To resemble thelegitimate network device1276a, the new emulatednetwork device1286acan have the same MAC and IP address as thelegitimate network device1276a. The new emulatednetwork device1286acan also have the same operating system or a similar operating system as thelegitimate network device1276a, and be running the same or similar services. By having the new emulatednetwork device1286amimic thelegitimate network device1276a, the network threat can be kept contained within the emulatednetwork1216. The network threat might also not be aware that, by moving to the new emulatednetwork device1286a, the network threat has not left the emulatednetwork1216. In some cases, thenetwork emulator1220 may also add emulatednetwork devices1286b-1286cto mimicother network devices1276b-1276cin thesite network1204. Thus, no matter which network device the network threat attempts to move to, threat can be contained to the emulated network.
• To assist in containing a network threat in the emulatednetwork1216, thenetwork emulator1220 can provide isolation mechanisms between the emulatednetwork1216 and thesite network1204. For example, thenetwork emulator1220 can include packet filters. Packet filters can prevent packets to or from the new emulated network devices1286a-1286cto go back over thetunnel1222 to thesite network1204. Packet filters can also prevent some broadcast network traffic originating in the emulatenetwork1216 from going across thetunnel1222. Packet filters and other isolation mechanisms can also prevent any problems that can be caused by two network devices (e.g., alegitimate network device1276aand a corresponding an emulatednetwork device1286athat mimics thelegitimate network device1276a) appearing to be identical, including having identical MAC and IP addresses. For example, network traffic can be allowed to flow into the emulatednetwork1216, but not out.
• In various implementations, reconfiguring the emulatednetwork1216 can also include adding and/or removing deception mechanism for purposes other than mimicking the network devices1276a-1276din thesite network1204. For example, thenetwork emulator1220 can occasionally remove and/or add emulatednetwork devices1218 to simulate network devices disconnecting and reconnecting to thesite network1204. This behavior can mimic, for example, a user leaving the office with her laptop at the end of the day and coming back the next day. As another example, when it appears that an attack on thesite network1204 is in progress, thenetwork emulator1220 can add emulatednetwork devices1218 that have open ports or appear to have valuable data, or are otherwise attractive as targets.
• As illustrated in the example ofFIG. 12D, in some implementations, theprojection point1210 can also project some simple deceptions. For example, theprojection point1210 can be configured with one or moresuper-low interaction deceptions1212. As discussed above, a super-low interaction deception can respond to simple queries, such as ARP requests and/or other requests that ask whether a network address is occupied. In this and similar examples, theprojection point1210 can respond to such requests, and the requests need not be sent over thetunnel1222 to thedeception farm1240.
• As in the above examples, theprojection point1210 can be hidden, such that network scanning tools may not readily identify theprojection point1210. For example, theprojection point1210 can avoid responding to any network traffic broadcast, multicast, or unicast to the projection point's network address. As another example, the network address of theprojection point1210 can be used as a network address of one of thesuper-low interaction deceptions1212 hosted by theprojection point1210.
• In various implementations, theprojection point1210 can continue to project emulatednetwork devices1218 into thesite network1204. For example, in addition to accepting network traffic directed to thesuper-low interaction deceptions1212, theprojection point1210 can also accept network traffic directed to an emulatednetwork device1218. In this example, theprojection point1210 can send any network traffic for an emulatednetwork device1218 over thetunnel1222 to thedeception farm1240.
• In various implementations, a deception farm can provide deception mechanisms using emulated network devices and/or physical network devices.FIG. 13 illustrates an example of anetwork deception system1300 configured to provide deception mechanisms for asite network1304. Theexample site network1304 includes variousnetwork infrastructure devices1374, such as routers, switches, hubs, repeaters, andgateway devices1362, among others.Gateway devices1362 can provide thesite network1304 access to other networks. Theexample site network1304 also includes various other network devices1376a-1376d, which may be physical or virtual devices. In some cases, thesite network1304 can include wired and/or wireless segments.
• To provide deceptions mechanisms to thesite network1204, in various implementations, thenetwork deception system1300 can include adeception farm1340. In various implementations, thedeception farm1340 can include an emulatednetwork1316 that can include a number of emulatednetwork devices1318. The emulatednetwork devices1318 can be configured to resemble the network devices1376a-1376din thesite network1304, including having similar hardware and software configurations. The emulatednetwork devices1318 can be, for example, super-low interaction deceptions, low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. The emulatednetwork1316 can be hosted by one or more network devices, such as server computers, which are not illustrated here.
• In various implementations, thedeception farm1340 can alternatively or additionally include aphysical network1330, where thephysical network1330 includesphysical network devices1332. A physical device, in this example, can be a computing device (e.g., a chassis containing a circuit board and integrated circuit devices such as processors and memory), such as a laptop computer or a handheld device. In some implementations,physical devices1332 in thephysical network1330 can alternatively or additionally include home appliances, such as network-enabled refrigerators, thermostats, televisions, gaming consoles, home security controllers, and so on. In some implementations, thephysical devices1332 can alternatively or additionally include machinery and/or factory equipment, such as Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines, 3-D printers, industrial robots, and so on. In various implementations, physical devices that can be difficult to emulate can be added to thephysical network1330.
• In various implementations, thedeception farm1340 can be located remotely from thesite network1304. For example, thedeception farm1340 can be in a different network domain, in a different geographical location, and/or outside of the security perimeter of thesite network1304. In these and other examples, thedeception farm1340 can communicate with thesite network1304 overintermediate network1350. The intermediate networks can be public and/or private, and can include, for example, the Internet.
• To provide deception mechanisms to thesite network1304, in various implementations, thedeception farm1340 can use anetwork tunnel1322 to connect to a network device in thesite network1304, where the network device is configured as aprojection point1310. Theprojection point1310 can serve as an endpoint of thetunnel1322. The other end of thetunnel1322 can terminate at atunneling endpoint1314 in thedeception farm1340. Thetunneling endpoint1314 can be hosted by a network device in thedeception farm1340. In some implementations, the network device that hosts thetunneling endpoint1314 can be configured as a tunneling and traffic manager and/or a configuration manager. In various implementations, theprojection point1310 can hide its presence from other devices in thesite network1304, for example by hiding the network address used by theprojection point1310.
• In various implementations, thephysical devices1332 in thedeception farm1340 can be projected into thesite network1304. As discussed above, thenetwork tunnel1322 can provide a conduit for network traffic between network devices1376a-1376bin thesite network1304 and emulatednetwork devices1318 and/orphysical devices1332 in thedeception farm1340. Services, such as packet encapsulation, provided by a tunneling protocol can enable network traffic to pass over thetunnel1322 transparently, meaning that, from the point of the view of the network devices1376a-1376din thesite network1304 and devices in thedeception farm1340, the tunnel does not appear to exist.
• In various implementations, particular deceptions in thedeception farm1340 can be selected for projection into a site network. For example, in the example illustrated inFIG. 13,physical devices1332 have been selected for projection into theexample site network1304. Thephysical devices1332 thus appear as projectednodes1342 in thesite network1304. Thephysical devices1332 may have been selected because thephysical devices1332 are representative of the type of devices that can be found in thesite network1304, because thephysical devices1332 are similar to the network devices1376a-1376din the site network, because thephysical devices1332, when present alongside the network devices1376a-1376d, appear as attractive targets for network threats, or for some other reason. In various implementations, it may have been determined that emulatednetwork devices1318 may not have been suitable at the present time, and/or may be useful deceptions at a later time.
• In various implementations, a network device configured as a configuration manager can determine the appropriate deceptions for thesite network1304 at any given time. The configuration manager can be located at thesite network1304, at thedeception farm1340, and/or at another network location, such as at a security services provider. In some implementations, the configuration manager can execute on theprojection point1310.
• To assist in making the devices in thedeception farm1340 appear as nodes in thesite network1304, a configuration manager can obtain network addresses that are local to thesite network1304. These network addresses can then be assigned, in the example ofFIG. 13, to thephysical devices1332 in thedeception farm1340. With local network addresses, thephysical network devices1332 can appear as network neighbors of the network devices1376a-1376din thesite network1304.
• In various implementations, thenetwork deception system1300 can alternatively or additionally include physical devices, configured as deception mechanisms, that are in thesite network1304 itself. For example, one or more physical devices, which are designated for use as decoys, can be connected to available ports in thesite network1304. Because these physical devices are intended for use as deceptions, these physical devices would not be used for the ordinary, legitimate uses of thesite network1304. In this and similar examples, network traffic to these local physical devices need not be passed over thetunnel1322 to thedeception farm1340.
• In various implementations, a projection point in a site network can be configured to connect to more than one deception farm.FIG. 14 illustrates an example of adeception system1400 that includes aprojection point1410 withnetwork tunnels1422 to multiple deception farms1440a-1440c.
• In this example, theprojection point1410 is providing deception mechanisms for aparticular site network1404. Theexample site network1404 includes variousnetwork infrastructure devices1474, such as routers, switches, hubs, repeaters, andgateway devices1462, among others.Gateway devices1462 can provide thesite network1404 access to other networks. Theexample site network1404 also includes various other network devices1476a-1476d, which may be physical or virtual devices. In some cases, thesite network1404 can include wired and/or wireless segments.
• Theexample site network1404 also includes a network device configured as aproject point1410. In various implementations, theprojection point1410 can act as an endpoint of one ormore network tunnels1422, where eachnetwork tunnel1422 terminates at a different deception farm1440a-1440b. In these implementations, theprojection point1410 can project deceptions from different deceptions farms1440a-1440b. For example, in the example illustrated inFIG. 14, theprojection point1410 is projecting one set ofdeceptions1432 from afirst deception farm1440aand a second set ofdeceptions1434 from asecond deception farm1440b. The first set ofdeceptions1432 and the second set ofdeceptions1434 thus appear as projectednodes1442 in thesite network1404. The deception farms1440a-1440ccan be in different geographical locations. Alternatively or additionally, some of the deception farms1440a-1440ccan be in the same geographical location. In some cases, one or more of the deception farms1440a-1440ccan be in the same physical location as thesite network1404.
• Theprojection point1410 can connect to more than one deception farm1440a-1440bfor different purposes. For example, onedeception farm1440acan be a back-up for thesecond deception farm1440b, such that, should thefirst deception farm1440aexperience technical problems, theprojection point1410 can switch to thesecond deception farm1440bto obtain deceptions to project. As another example, theprojection point1410 may need more deceptions and thefirst deception farm1440amay be at full utilization, such that additional deceptions may not be available from thefirst deception farm1440a. In this example, theprojection point1410 can obtain additional deceptions from thesecond deception farm1440b. As another example, different deception farms may host different deceptions. For example, thesecond deception farm1440bmay have physical devices that are not available from thefirst deception farm1440a, and it may be determined that theprojection point1410 should project those physical devices. In other example, there may be additional or other reasons for connecting theprojection point1410 to multiple deception farms1440a-1440b.
• In various implementations, when theprojection point1410 is enabled in thesite network1404, a network device configured as a configuration manager can determine to which deception farms1440a-1440ctheprojection point1410 should be connected. In various implementations, the configuration manager can be located in thesite network1404 and be configured to communicate with the deception farms1440a-1440c. Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, the configuration manager can be located at adeception farm1440a, and can coordinate withother deception farms1440b-1440coverintermediate networks1450. Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, each deception farm1440a-1440ccan include a configuration manager, and the various configuration managers can coordinate the activities of each deception farm1440a-1440c. Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, the configuration manager can be located in another network, such as at a security services provider, and can coordinate between theprojection point1410 and the deception farms1440a-1440coverintermediate networks1450. In some implementations, a configuration manager can be running on theprojection point1410. In some cases, the configuration manager can be executing in a deception center.
• In various implementations, the configuration manager can be manually configured with profiles that describe the hardware and/or software configuration of the network devices1476a-1476din thesite network1404. Alternatively or additionally, the configuration manager can automatically and dynamically profile the network devices1476a-1476d. In various implementations, the configuration manager can use these profiles to determine suitable deceptions for thesite network1404. For example, the configuration manager can select deceptions that are representative of typical devices found in thesite network1404. Alternatively or additionally, the configuration manager can be configured with descriptions of the desired deceptions for thesite network1404.
• In various implementations, once deceptions for thesite network1404 have been selected, the configuration manager can determine which deception farms1440a-1440chave suitable deceptions and/or have capacity to provide deceptions. For example, in the illustrated example, two of three available deception farms1440a-1440cwere selected. The configuration manager can then configurenetwork tunnels1422 between theprojection point1410 and each selected deception farm1440a-1440b.
• In various implementations, the configuration manager can continuously monitor the deception needs for thesite network1404. For example, when thesite network1404 appears to be experiencing a network attack, the configuration manager can determine that additional deceptions may be needed. In this example, the configuration manager may determine to obtain the additional deceptions from athird deception farm1440c, and thus configuretunnel1422 between theprojection point1410 and thethird deception farm1440c. Should the deceptions from thethird deception farm1440cno longer be needed, in some cases, the configuration manager can remove thetunnel1422 to thethird deception farm1440c.
• In the example ofFIG. 14, in some implementations, theprojection point1410 can include context management logic. Context management can enable theprojection point1410 to manage network traffic between the network devices1476a-1476dand the different deception farms1440a-1440c. Specifically, when theprojection point1410 receives network traffic for aparticular deception1432, the projection point's context management system can determine that theparticular deception1432 is located in thefirst deception farm1440a. Theprojection point1410 can use this information to select thecorrect tunnel1422 to send the network traffic through. The context information for eachnetwork tunnel1422 can be maintained using, for example, tables, lists, associative arrays, databases, and/or another data structure.
• In various implementations, one deception farm can provide deceptions to multiple projection points in the same site network.FIG. 15 illustrates an example of adeception system1500 for asite network1504 that incudes multiple sub-networks, or subnets1508a-1508c. A subnet is a logical group of devices in a larger network (e.g., thesite network1504, in the illustrated example). Nodes in a subnet tend to be located in close proximity to one another within a local area network (LAN). Subnets enable a site's network administrators to partition a large network into logical segments, which may be easier to administer, including administration of network security. In many cases, the nodes in a subnet have a same subnet address, as well as an address that is distinct within the subnet.
• In the example ofFIG. 15, projection point1510a-1510chas been configured for each subnet1508a-1508cin thesite network1504. Additionally, atunnel1522 has been configured between each projection point1510 and thedeception farm1540. In this example, thedeception farm1540 can provide deceptions for each subnet1508a-1510c. Specifically, thedeception farm1540 can maintain a set of deceptions for each subnet1508a-1510c, where, for example, the set of deceptions for thefirst subnet1508ahave network addresses that are within thefirst subnet1508a(e.g., within the domain of thefirst subnet1508a). Similarly, a set of deceptions for thesecond subnet1508bcan have network addresses that are within thesecond subnet1508b. Similarly, a set of deceptions for thethird subnet1508ccan have network addresses that are within thethird subnet1508c. In other examples, more than one projection point can be installed in any particular subnet1508a-1508c, where the additional projection points are also connected to thedeception farm1540.
• Thedeception farm1540 can use various techniques to provide deceptions that are within different network address domains. For example, thedeception farm1540 can be configured with multiple subnets. In this example, devices within a subnet can be assigned to a particular projection point1510a-1510c, and devices within a different subnet can be assigned to a different projection point1510a-1510c. Alternatively or additionally, an entire subnet within thedeception farm1540 can be assigned to one projection point1510a-1510c.
• As another example, thedeception farm1540 can include a software defined network (SDN). In software defined network, network devices and/or network infrastructure can be configured in a software layer, independent from the underlying hardware. Using a software defined network, in some implementations, thedeception farm1540 can dynamically configure a virtual subnet, without needing to reconfigure network hardware within thedeception farm1540. The virtual subnet can then be assigned to a particular projection point1510a-1510c, where the virtual subnet can provide deceptions for a particular subnet in thesite network1504.
• In some implementations, thedeception farm1540 can include tunneling and traffic management logic. For example, a network device configured as an endpoint for thetunnels1522 can maintain a context for eachtunnel1522. The context can include for example, which deceptions within thedeception farm1540 are associated with aparticular tunnel1522, the network addresses for deceptions that are currently being used, and/or active connections between devices in thesite network1504 and deceptions in thedeception farm1540. For traffic management, the network device can additionally or alternatively direct network traffic arriving over atunnel1522 to the appropriate deception mechanism. In various implementations, the network device can also manage establishing new tunnels to projection points, commissioning new deceptions for new tunnels, and/or decommissioning active deceptions when a tunnel is shut down.
• FIG. 16 illustrates an example of anetwork deception system1600, where multiple projection points1610a-1610dhave been connected to multiple deception farms1640a-1640c. In this example, afirst projection point1610ahas been configured for afirst site network1604aand asecond projection point1610bhas been configured for asecond site network1604b. Additionally, twoprojection points1610c-1610dhave been configured for athird site network1604c.
• In this example, thefirst site network1604aand thesecond site network1604bare part of asame customer network1602. Being part of asame customer network1602 means that the first1604aand second1604bsite networks are controlled and/or administered by the same entity. For example, both site networks1604a-1604bcan be part of the same corporate VLAN. In some cases, both site network1604a-1604bcan be within the same broadcast domain. In some cases, each site network1604a-1604bcan be within a different broadcast domain.
• In some cases, the two site networks1604a-1604bcan be in physical proximity, such as being in the same office complex, but may have separate security perimeters, and hence are distinct site networks. Alternatively, the two site networks1604a-1604bcan be in different geographical locations, and may connect to each other over intermediate, public and/or private networks. In some cases, thecustomer network1602 can include additional site networks, which are not illustrated here.
• In the example ofFIG. 16, thethird site network1604cis controlled by a different entity. This may mean, for example, that thethird site network1604cis independently administered from the site networks1604a-1604cin thecustomer network1602, and/or that a free exchange of data between thethird site network1604cand thecustomer network1602 is not anticipated.
• The projection points1610a-1610din each site network1604a-1604ccan be connected to one or more deception farms1640a-1640c. For example, in the illustrated example, some of the projection points1610a-1610care each connected to all three example deception farms1640a-1640c. A projection point need not be connected to all available deception farms1640a-1640c. For example, oneprojection point1610din thethird site network1604cis connected to only twodeception farms1640b-1640c. As discussed above, a projection point1610a-1610dcan be connected to deception farms that are hosting suitable deceptions, that have capacity to provide deceptions, because a site network's deception needs have increased, and/or for some other reason.
• To manage the multi-to-multi connectivity illustrated inFIG. 16, in various implementations, each projection point1610a-1610dand/or each deception farm1640a-1640bcan include context management logic. For example, the projection points1610a-1610dcan maintain a context for eachtunnel1622, such that the projection point1610a-1610dcan track associations between projected deceptions and tunnels. For example, thefirst projection point1610acan determine that a set of deceptions being projected by thefirst projection point1610aare being hosted by thesecond deception farm1640b, and that a different set of deceptions are being hosted by thethird deception farm1640c. By maintaining a context, when a deception receives network traffic, the projection points1610a-1610dare able to direct the network traffic over the appropriate tunnel a deception farm1640a-1640c.
• In various implementations, the deception farms1640a-1640ccan also maintain a context. By maintaining a context, the deception farms1640a-1640ccan direct network traffic between a deception hosted by a deception farm1640a-1640cto an appropriate site network1604a-1604c. In the case of thecustomer network1602, context management can ensure that network traffic does not flow across thetunnels1622 in unexpected ways. For example, the first1604aand second1604bsite networks may be in the same broadcast domain. In this example, when a broadcast packet originates from a legitimate network device in thefirst site network1604a, the broadcast packet should be transmitted across thetunnels1622 to any deceptions being projected into thefirst site network1604a. In some cases, however, the broadcast packet should not be transmitted from a deception farm1640a-1640cto thesecond site network1604b. Network tunnels can act as simple conduits that enable remote networks to function as one, unified network, where traffic flows across the tunnels as if the networks were directly connected. Thus, in various implementations, the deception farms1640a-1640cand/or projection points1610a-1610dcan include filters and/or similar logic that prevents some packets from being transmitted from a site network1604a-1604cto a deception farm1640a-1640cand/or from a deception farm1640a-1640cto a site network1604a-1604c.
• In the example above, thesecond site network1604bmay receive the broadcast packet by some other route; for example, the first1604aand second1604bsite networks may have a separate network tunnel, not illustrate here, where the separate network tunnel is part of the customer network's configuration. In this example, broadcast packet can be transmitted over thetunnels1622 so that the packet can be received by deceptions for thecustomer network1602, but the broadcast packet should not be transmitted back to thecustomer network1602, or else the broadcast packet may appear twice in thesecond site network1604b. Similarly, broadcast traffic originating from a deception in a deception farm1640a-1640ccan be transmitted across thetunnels1622 to thecustomer network1602, but, in some cases, should not be transmitted from thecustomer network1602 back to the deception farms1640a-1640c.
• In various implementations, for the above example and other examples, context management can include tracking the source of a packet, and determining whether the source is a legitimate network device or a deception. In some implementations, context management can be aided by systems that generate traffic for deceptions. For example, a network traffic generation system can inform the context management system of any network traffic being generated, where the network traffic is configured to appear to come from a deception. In various implementations, the projection points1610a-1610dand/or deception farms1640a-1640ccan operate cooperatively, using, for example, packet exchanges (which may be encrypted) Alternatively or additionally, a deception center and/or security services provider can manage cooperation between the projection points1610a-1610dand/or deception farms1640a-1640c.
• In various implementations, a site network can be partially “in the cloud.”FIGS. 17A-17B illustrate an example where a site network includes alocal segment1704 and acloud segment1706. Thelocal segment1704 of the site network can be where the human operators of the site network may be able to access and/or administer the site network. In this example, thelocal segment1704 includes some network devices1726a-1726b, such as laptop, desktop, and/or handheld computers. Thelocal segment1704 can also includenetwork infrastructure devices1724, such as routers, gateways, and/or wireless access points, that enable the network devices1726a-1726bto connect to a network. Thelocal segment1704 can be connected to thecloud segment1706 over various intermediate, private and/or public networks.
• Thecloud segment1706 of the site network can be hosted by acloud services provider1754. Thecloud services provider1754 can, for example, operate a data center, where hardware and/or software resources can be dynamically allocated to different customers at the same time or at different times. In the illustrated example, a set of network devices1776a-1776candnetwork infrastructure1774 have been allocated to thecloud segment1706 of the site network. The set of network devices1776a-1776ccan, for example, have more bandwidth, processing capacity, functionality, and/or storage than is available in thelocal segment1704. The set of network devices1776a-1776cand thenetwork infrastructure1774 can include physical hardware and/or virtual machines. In some cases, the set of network devices1776a-1776cand thenetwork infrastructure1774 can be a software defined network. In most cases, thecloud services provider1754 can include additional hardware and/or virtual resources that are allocated to other site networks, and which are not illustrated here.
• In some cases, thelocal segment1704 and thecloud segment1706 of the site network can be in a same broadcast domain. In these cases, the network devices1726a-1726bin thelocal segment1704 can exchange network traffic with the network devices1776a-1776cin thecloud segment1706 as though thelocal segment1704 and thecloud segment1706 were directly connected, and not connected by way of intermediate networks. In some cases, thecloud services provider1754 can provide an interface through which network devices1726a-1726bin thelocal segment1704 communicate with thecloud segment1706. In these cases, thecloud segment1706 can be kept isolated from thelocal segment1704, for security and/or ease of administration. In these cases, thelocal segment1704 and thecloud segment1706 may not be in the same broadcast domain.
• In various implementations, adeception farm1740 can provide deceptions to monitor and defend the site network from network threats. In various implementations, thedeception farm1740 can include an emulatednetwork1716 that can include a number of emulatednetwork devices1718. The emulatednetwork devices1718 can be configured to resemble the network devices in either or both of thelocal segment1704 and thecloud segment1706 of the site network. The emulatednetwork devices1718 can be, for example, super-low interaction deceptions, low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. The emulatednetwork1716 can be hosted by one or more network devices, such as server computers, which are not illustrated here.
• In various implementations, thedeception farm1740 can alternatively or additionally include aphysical network1730, where thephysical network1730 includesphysical devices1732. Thephysical devices1732 can include computers, appliances, equipment, machinery, and/or other network-enabled devices that can be found in thelocal segment1704 and/or thecloud segment1706 of the site network.
• In the example ofFIG. 17A, aprojection point1710 has been configured in thelocal segment1704 of the site network. Theprojection point1710 can function as an endpoint for anetwork tunnel1722 to thedeception farm1740. Thedeception farm1740 can include a network device that is configured as atunneling endpoint1714 for thetunnel1722.
• In various implementations, theprojection point1710 can project deceptions into either thelocal segment1704 or thecloud segment1706 of the site network. For example, in the illustrated example, an emulatednetwork device1718 has been projected into the local segment1704 (referred to herein as local projected nodes1744), and a combination of emulatednetwork devices1718 andphysical network devices1732 have been projected into the cloud segment1706 (referred to herein as remote projected nodes1742).
• In various implementations, the local projectednodes1744 can be provided by assigning network addresses from thelocal segment1704 to deceptions in thedeception farm1740. By having a network address that is local to thelocal segment1704, a deception can appear as a network neighbor in thelocal segment1704.
• In some cases, as noted, above, thecloud segment1706 may be in the same broadcast domain as thelocal segment1704. In these cases, the remote projectednodes1742 can be provided by obtaining network addresses that are within the broadcast domain. Theprojection point1710 can provide these deceptions by way of the projection point's connection to thelocal segment1704, and the local segment's connection to thecloud segment1706. In these cases, the remote projectednodes1742 may be indistinguishable from the network devices1776a-1776cin thecloud segment1706. In cases where thecloud segment1706 is not in the same broadcast domain as thelocal segment1706, the remote projectednodes1742 can be provided, for example, by obtaining network addresses that are local to thecloud segment1706. In some cases, such network addresses can be requested from thecloud services provider1754.
• FIG. 17B illustrates an example where theprojection point1710 has been configured for thecloud segment1706 of the site network. Theprojection point1710 can be configured on, for example, a network device allocated to thecloud segment1706. Alternatively or additionally, theprojection point1710 can, for example, be an appliance installed in the network of thecloud services provider1754.
• Configuring theprojection point1710 in thecloud segment1706 is an alternate technique for providing deceptions in thecloud segment1706. In this example, theprojection point1710 can tunnel directly from thecloud services provider1754 to thedeception farm1740. Theprojection point1710 can possibly also communicate directly with systems at thecloud services provider1754, to determine suitable deception mechanisms and/or obtain network addresses for the deceptions.
• Specific details were given in the preceding description to provide a thorough understanding of various implementations of systems and components for projecting deceptions using a network tunnel. It will be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, however, that the implementations described above may be practiced without these specific details. For example, circuits, systems, networks, processes, and other components may be shown as components in block diagram form in order not to obscure the embodiments in unnecessary detail. In other instances, well-known circuits, processes, algorithms, structures, and techniques may be shown without unnecessary detail in order to avoid obscuring the embodiments.
• It is also noted that individual implementations may be described as a process which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a data flow diagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchart may describe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process is terminated when its operations are completed, but could have additional steps not included in a figure. A process may correspond to a method, a function, a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, etc. When a process corresponds to a function, its termination can correspond to a return of the function to the calling function or the main function.
• The term “computer-readable medium” includes, but is not limited to, portable or non-portable storage devices, optical storage devices, and various other mediums capable of storing, containing, or carrying instruction(s) and/or data. A computer-readable medium may include a non-transitory medium in which data can be stored and that does not include carrier waves and/or transitory electronic signals propagating wirelessly or over wired connections. Examples of a non-transitory medium may include, but are not limited to, a magnetic disk or tape, optical storage media such as compact disk (CD) or digital versatile disk (DVD), flash memory, memory or memory devices. A computer-readable medium may have stored thereon code and/or machine-executable instructions that may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via any suitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, or the like.
• The various examples discussed above may further be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, firmware, middleware or microcode, the program code or code segments to perform the necessary tasks (e.g., a computer-program product) may be stored in a computer-readable or machine-readable storage medium (e.g., a medium for storing program code or code segments). A processor(s), implemented in an integrated circuit, may perform the necessary tasks.
• Where components are described as being “configured to” perform certain operations, such configuration can be accomplished, for example, by designing electronic circuits or other hardware to perform the operation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (e.g., microprocessors, or other suitable electronic circuits) to perform the operation, or any combination thereof.
• The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, firmware, or combinations thereof. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present disclosure.
• The techniques described herein may also be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, firmware, or any combination thereof. Such techniques may be implemented in any of a variety of devices such as general purposes computers, wireless communication device handsets, or integrated circuit devices having multiple uses including application in wireless communication device handsets and other devices. Any features described as modules or components may be implemented together in an integrated logic device or separately as discrete but interoperable logic devices. If implemented in software, the techniques may be realized at least in part by a computer-readable data storage medium comprising program code including instructions that, when executed, performs one or more of the methods described above. The computer-readable data storage medium may form part of a computer program product, which may include packaging materials. The computer-readable medium may comprise memory or data storage media, such as random access memory (RAM) such as synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), read-only memory (ROM), non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), FLASH memory, magnetic or optical data storage media, and the like. The techniques additionally, or alternatively, may be realized at least in part by a computer-readable communication medium that carries or communicates program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed, read, and/or executed by a computer, such as propagated signals or waves.
• The program code may be executed by a processor, which may include one or more processors, such as one or more digital signal processors (DSPs), general purpose microprocessors, an application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable logic arrays (FPGAs), or other equivalent integrated or discrete logic circuitry. Such a processor may be configured to perform any of the techniques described in this disclosure. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor; but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. Accordingly, the term “processor,” as used herein may refer to any of the foregoing structure, any combination of the foregoing structure, or any other structure or apparatus suitable for implementation of the techniques described herein. In addition, in some aspects, the functionality described herein may be provided within dedicated software modules or hardware modules configured for tunneling for network deceptions.
• As used below, any reference to a series of examples is to be understood as a reference to each of those examples disjunctively (e.g., “Examples 1-4” is to be understood as “Examples 1, 2, 3, or 4”).
• Example 1 is a computer-implemented method, the method including determining, by a network device on a first network, a network address, wherein the network address is determined from available network addresses in the first network. The method further includes configuring a network tunnel to a second network, wherein the second network includes one or more deception mechanisms. The method further includes selecting a deception mechanism from among the one or more deception mechanisms. The method further includes assigning the network address to the selected deception mechanism, wherein the network address and the network tunnel enable the selected deception mechanism to be a node on the first network.
• Example 2 is the computer-implemented method of example 1, the method further including determining a configuration of one or more other network devices on the first network, wherein the selected deception mechanism is selected using the configuration.
• Example 3 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-2, the method further including determining a configuration of one or more other network devices on the first network. The method further includes configuring the selected deception mechanism using the configuration of the one or more other network devices.
• Example 4 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-3, the method further including selecting the second network from among a plurality of deception networks, wherein the plurality of deception networks host deception mechanisms.
• Example 5 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-4, the method further including receiving network traffic from the first network, wherein the network traffic is addressed to the network address. The method further includes transmitting the network traffic over the network tunnel.
• Example 6 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-5, the method further including receiving network traffic from the first network, wherein the network traffic requests information about the network address. The method further includes responding to the request.
• Example 7 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-6, the method further including hiding the network device from the first network, wherein hiding includes not responding to network traffic addressed to the network device.
• Example 8 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-7, the method further including determining to add an additional deception mechanism to the first network. The method further includes configuring a different network tunnel to a third network, wherein the third includes one or more additional deception mechanisms. The method further includes selecting the additional deception mechanism from among the one or more additional deception mechanisms.
• Example 9 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-8, wherein the second network is associated with a deception farm, wherein a deception farm includes network devices configured as deception mechanisms.
• Example 10 is the computer-implemented method of examples 1-9, wherein a deception mechanism is an emulated network device or a physical network device.
• Example 11 a network device, which includes one or more processors and a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The non-transitory compute readable medium includes instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operations according to the method(s) of examples 1-10.
• Example 12 is a computer-program product tangibly embodied in a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, including instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform steps according to the method(s) of examples 1-10.

Claims (21)

1. (canceled)

2. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

determining, by a projection point configured on a network device on a first network, a network address, wherein:

the network address is determined from available network addresses in the first network; and

the first network is a cloud segment;

configuring a network tunnel to a second network, wherein the second network includes one or more deception mechanisms;

selecting a deception mechanism from among the one or more deception mechanisms; and

assigning the network address to the selected deception mechanism, wherein the network address and the network tunnel enable the selected deception mechanism to be on the first network.

3. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 2, wherein, when selected, the selected deception mechanism does not have a network address in the first network.

4. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 2, wherein the cloud segment is hosted by a cloud services provider.

5. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 4, the computer-implemented method further comprising communicating with systems of the cloud services provider to determine a suitable deception mechanism.

6. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 2, wherein the network tunnel is hidden from other devices on the first network.

7. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 2, wherein the network device on the first network is an appliance of the first network.

8. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 2, wherein:

the first network includes a local segment;

the cloud segment has cloud network devices; and

the local segment has local network devices.

9. A network device comprising:

one or more processors; and

a non-transitory computer-readable medium including instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operations including:

determining a network address on a first network, wherein:

the network address is determined from available network addresses in the first network; and

the first network is a cloud segment;

configuring a network tunnel to a second network, wherein the second network includes one or more deception mechanisms;

selecting a deception mechanism from among the one or more deception mechanisms; and

assigning the network address to the selected deception mechanism, wherein the network address and the network tunnel enable the selected deception mechanism to be on the first network.

10. The network device ofclaim 9, wherein, when selected, the selected deception mechanism does not have a network address in the first network.

11. The network device ofclaim 9, wherein the cloud segment is hosted by a cloud services provider.

12. The network device ofclaim 11, wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the one or more processors to communicate with systems of the cloud services provider to determine a suitable deception mechanism.

13. The network device ofclaim 9, wherein the network tunnel is hidden from other devices on the first network.

14. The network device ofclaim 9, wherein the cloud segment comprises virtual machines.

15. The network device ofclaim 9, wherein:

the first network includes a local segment;

the cloud segment has cloud network devices; and

the local segment has local network devices.

16. A computer-program product tangibly embodied in a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, including instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to:

determine, by a projection point configured on a network device on a first network, a network address, wherein:

the network address is determined from available network addresses in the first network; and

the first network is a cloud segment;

configure a network tunnel to a second network, wherein the second network includes one or more deception mechanisms;

select a deception mechanism from among the one or more deception mechanisms; and

assign the network address to the selected deception mechanism, wherein the network address and the network tunnel enable the selected deception mechanism to be on the first network.

17. The computer-program product ofclaim 16, wherein, when selected, the selected deception mechanism does not have a network address in the first network.

18. The computer-program product ofclaim 16, wherein the cloud segment of the first network is hosted by a cloud services provider, and the cloud services provider operates a data center where hardware and/or software resources can be dynamically allocated to different customers.

19. The computer-program product ofclaim 18, wherein the instructions, when executed, cause the one or more processors to communicate with systems of the cloud services provider to determine a suitable deception mechanism.

20. The computer-program product ofclaim 16, wherein the network tunnel is hidden from other devices on the first network.

21. The computer-program product ofclaim 16, wherein:

the first network includes a local segment;

the cloud segment has cloud network devices; and

the local segment has local network devices.

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