US20170076106A1 - Apparatus and method to securely control a remote operation - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed is a device to securely authorize a software operation. The device may comprise: a processor to transmit a software operation including an operation parameter; and a security verification device. The security verification device may be coupled to the processor and may be configured to: receive a secret key selection and a first password; select a secret key; receive the software operation including the operation parameter; and implement a key derivation function to generate a second password based upon the selected secret key and the software operation including the operation parameter. Further, the security verification device may be configured to determine if the second password matches the first password, and if so, authorize the performance of the software operation.

Description

BACKGROUND
• Field
• The present invention relates to an apparatus and method to securely control a remote operation.
• Relevant Background
• When many different security requirements are required for a computing device, it is common place today that many different security solutions are implemented by a chip that consumes a large amount of chip space, are very complex, and are not unified in implementation.
• For small computing devices (e.g., Internet of Thing (IoT) devices), lightweight, low cost security solutions that have maximized sets of security features and simple operations, that provide unified implementations, and that consume a very efficient amount of chip space, are desirable.
SUMMARY
• Aspects may relate to a device to securely authorize a software operation. The device may comprise: a processor to transmit a software operation including an operation parameter; and a security verification device. The security verification device may be coupled to the processor and may be configured to: receive a secret key selection and a first password; select a secret key; receive the software operation including the operation parameter; and implement a key derivation function to generate a second password based upon the selected secret key and the software operation including the operation parameter. Further, the security verification device may be configured to determine if the second password matches the first password, and if so, authorize the performance of the software operation.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
• FIG. 1 is a diagram of a computing device in which embodiments may be practiced.
• FIG. 2 is a diagram of a system in which embodiments may be practiced.
• FIG. 3A is a diagram of a system to implement the security verification device including a key derivation function (KDF) device.
• FIG. 3B is a diagram illustrating examples of software operations and operation parameters.
• FIG. 4 is a diagram of system to generate a new secret key.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
• The word “exemplary” or “example” is used herein to mean “serving as an example, instance, or illustration.” Any aspect or embodiment described herein as “exemplary” or as an “example” in not necessarily to be construed as preferred or advantageous over other aspects or embodiments.
• As used herein, the terms “computing system”, “computing device”, or “device” may be used interchangeably and may refer to any form of computing device including but not limited to laptop computers, tablets, smartphones, televisions, desktop computers, home appliances, cellular telephones, watches, wearable devices, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, personal television devices, personal data assistants (PDA's), palm-top computers, wireless electronic mail receivers, multimedia Internet enabled cellular telephones, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, wireless gaming controllers, receivers within vehicles (e.g., automobiles), interactive game devices, notebooks, smartbooks, netbooks, mobile television devices, system on a chip (SoC), or any computing device or data processing apparatus.
• An example device100 (hereinafter referred to as a computing device) that may utilize asecurity verification device112 to securely activate or revoke software operations, as will be hereinafter described in detail, is illustrated inFIG. 1. Thecomputing device100 is shown comprising hardware elements that can be electrically coupled via a bus105 (or may otherwise be in communication, as appropriate). The hardware elements may include one ormore processors102, including without limitation one or more general-purpose processors and/or one or more special-purpose processors (such as digital signal processing chips, graphics acceleration processors, and/or the like); one or more input devices115 (e.g., keyboard, keypad, touchscreen, mouse, etc.); one ormore output devices122, such as adisplay device120, and can further include without limitation other output devices, such as, a speaker, a printer, and/or the like. Additionally,computing device100 may include a wide variety ofsensors123.Sensors123 may include: a clock, an ambient light sensor (ALS), a biometric sensor (e.g., blood pressure monitor, etc.), an accelerometer, a gyroscope, a magnetometer, an orientation sensor, a fingerprint sensor, a weather sensor (e.g., temperature, wind, humidity, barometric pressure, etc.), a Global Positioning Sensor (GPS), an infrared (IR) sensor, a proximity sensor, near field communication (NFC) sensor, a microphone, a camera. It should be appreciated thatcomputing device100 may include any type of sensor.
• Thecomputing device100 may further include (and/or be in communication with) one or morenon-transitory storage devices125, which can comprise, without limitation, local and/or network accessible storage, and/or can include, without limitation, a disk drive, a drive array, an optical storage device, solid-state storage device such as a random access memory (“RAM”) and/or a read-only memory (“ROM”), which can be programmable, flash-updateable, and/or the like. Such storage devices may be configured to implement any appropriate data stores, including without limitation, various file systems, database structures, and/or the like.
• Thecomputing device100 may also include a communication subsystem and/orinterface130, which can include without limitation a modem, a network card (wireless or wired), an infrared communication device, a wireless communication device and/or chipset (such as a Bluetooth device, an 802.11 device, a Wi-Fi device, a WiMax device, cellular communication devices, etc.), and/or the like. The communications subsystem and/orinterface130 may permit data to be exchanged with a network, other computer systems, and/or any other devices described herein. In many embodiments, thecomputing device100 will further comprise aworking memory135, which can include a RAM or ROM device, as described above.
• Thecomputing device100 may also comprise firmware elements, software elements, shown as being currently located within theworking memory135, including anoperating system140,applications145, device drivers, executable libraries, and/or other code. In one embodiment, an application may be designed to implement methods, and/or configure systems, to implement embodiments, as described herein. Merely by way of example, one or more procedures described with respect to the method(s) discussed below may be implemented as code and/or instructions executable by a computing device (and/or a processor within a computing device); in an aspect, then, such code and/or instructions can be used to configure and/or adapt acomputing device100 to perform one or more operations in accordance with the described methods, according to embodiments described herein.
• A set of these instructions and/or code might be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, such as the storage device(s)125 described above. In some cases, the storage medium might be incorporated within a computer system, such ascomputing device100. In other embodiments, the storage medium might be separate from a computer system (e.g., a removable medium, such as a compact disc), and/or provided in an installation package, such that the storage medium can be used to program, configure, and/or adapt a general purpose computer with the instructions/code stored thereon. These instructions might take the form of executable code, which is executable by thecomputerized computing device100 and/or might take the form of source and/or installable code, which, upon compilation and/or installation on the computing device100 (e.g., using any of a variety of generally available compilers, installation programs, compression/decompression utilities, etc.), then takes the form of executable code.
• It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that substantial variations may be made in accordance with specific requirements. For example, customized hardware might also be used, and/or particular elements might be implemented in hardware, firmware, software, or combinations thereof, to implement embodiments described herein. Further, connection to other computing devices such as network input/output devices may be employed.
• Aspects may relate to utilizing asecurity verification device112 in acomputing device100 that implements a key derivation function to provide security features for the device. Such security features may include: passwords; feature control attestation, and other security services. In particular,security verification device112 may be utilized bycomputing device100 to securely authorize or revoke software operations from aprocessor102. As an example, in one embodiment, thesecurity verification device112 may implement a key derivation function (KDF) device and may perform an atomic operation that performs at least three operations: 1) Selecting a KDF input to the KDF device; 2) Including the software command ID in the KDF input so that it is impossible to attack one operation using another operation; and 3) setting the output of thesecurity verification device112 to include the software command to be performed by the requesting processor. In an atomic operation, thesecurity verification device112 either authorizes or revokes the software operation of the requesting processor.
• With additional reference toFIG. 2, in one embodiment,computing device100 may comprise a plurality ofprocessors102 and asecurity verification device112 coupled together viabus105. A plurality ofhardware attributes202 may be coupled to thesecurity verification device112 viabus105. These hardware attributes may include: asecret key204; adevice key206; and a master identifier (MID)208. Thesecret key204 anddevice key206 may be implemented as one time programmable (OTP) memories. Further, thesecret key204 may be implemented as resistor transistor logic (RTL), ROM, or any suitable type of storage device to store a secret key. MID208 may be an identifier of acommanding processor102 that is transmitting a software operation including an operation parameter, as well as, one or more commands to be performed, as will be described. It should be appreciated that there may be multiple secret keys, device keys, MIDs, etc.
• As an example, aprocessor102 may transmit asoftware operation210 to be performed to thesecurity verification device112. Thesoftware operation210 may include a plurality of commands. In particular, aprocessor102 may transmit asoftware operation210 to thesecurity verification device112 that includes an operation parameter and a first password to thesecurity verification device112. Further, thesecurity verification device112 is configured to receive a secret key selection from the software operation. Based upon the secret key selection, thesecurity verification device112 selects asecret key204 from thehardware attributes202. Thesecurity verification device112 additionally receives the operation parameter from theprocessor102. Based upon thesesoftware operation inputs210, thesecurity verification device112 is configured to implement a key derivation function (KDF) to generate a second password based upon the selectedsecret key204 and thesoftware operation210 including the operation parameter. In particular, thesecurity verification device112 determines if the second password matches the first password, and, if so, thesecurity verification device112 authorizes the performance of the software operation. In this way, the commands of the software operation may be authorized to be performed by theprocessor102. However, if thesecurity verification device112 determines that the second password does not match the first password, the performance of the software operation is revoked. In one embodiment, the second password may be referred to as the hardware password as it is generated by thesecurity verification device112 and the first password may be referred to as the command password as it generated by the software. Hereinafter, the terms hardware password and command password will be utilized. It should be appreciated that, in one embodiment, thesecurity verification device112 is configured to determine if the hardware password matches the command password, such that that thesoftware operation210 is authorized for execution by theprocessor102, within a single atomic operation. Also, it should be appreciated that thesecurity verification device112 is configured to receive and provide routing information for the execution of the commands of the software operation, within a single atomic operation.
• Also, in one embodiment, a master identifier (MID208) identifying thecommanding processor102 that is transmitting thesoftware operation210 and the operation parameter is transmitted viabus105 to thesecurity verification device112. In this implementation, thesecurity verification device112 is configured to: implement a key derivation function to generate a hardware password (e.g., the second password) based upon the selectedsecret key204, theMID208, and thesoftware operation210 including the operation parameter. Further, based upon this, thesecurity verification device112 is configured to determine if the hardware password (e.g., the second password) matches the command password (e.g., the first password) of thecommanding processor102, and, if so, the performance of thesoftware operation210 is authorized for execution by thecommanding processor102. Alternatively, if the hardware password does not match the command password, thesoftware operation210 is revoked. Also, thesecurity verification device112 is configured to receive and provide routing information for the software operation including at least routing information for thecommanding processor102 and routing information for the software, as well as other types of hardware and software routing information. Therefore, the routing information includes hardware destination routing information and software destination routing information,
• As previously described, thesoftware operation210 triggers a sequence of hardware operations in which hardware inputs are selected to be utilized by thesecurity verification device112 and software inputs are set as inputs to the hardware of thesecurity verification device112, including the commands themselves, the command password, etc. In particular, the operation parameter is set as both an input to the KDF device of thesecurity verification device112 for authentication and as part of thesoftware operation210 that can be authorized to be performed if the command password is authenticated and approved. In this case, thesoftware operation210 may be authenticated and approved for execution by thecommanding processor102. Further, KDF output routings (e.g., software and hardware destinations) and password pass/fail routings are set as software inputs to the hardware of thesecurity verification device112. Based upon these software inputs, thesoftware operation210 is either approved or revoked (e.g., if the passwords of the hardware and software match or do not match). If the command password is approved by thesecurity verification device112, thesoftware operation210 is approved and the commands are routed back to thecommanding processor102 for execution, and if not, thesoftware operation210 is revoked, and the commands are rejected and not allowed to be executed by thecommanding processor102. In this manner, the operation parameter of thesoftware operation210 is utilized as an input to the KDF device such that the hardware password is tied to a pre-defined operation parameter and is utilized in the password approval or disapproval process. Also, the MID is used as a hardware indication of thecommanding processor102 and serves as an input to the KDF device (e.g., different results for different commanding processors) and the commands can be routed back to the commanding processor.
• Therefore, utilizing these aspects, software is enabled to do many operations at the hardware level with a very small chipset fingerprint (e.g., the main hardware component being thesecurity verification device112 including a KDF device). All of the decisions are linked together so that the software needs little protection while the hardware of thesecurity verification device112 may prevent attacks. Also, thesecurity verification device112 decides on routing and keys based upon thecommanding processor102—removing the need for access control. Additionally, the atomicity of all of the above operations into onesoftware operation210, makes thesecurity verification device112 an extremely powerful tool to perform many operations. In particular, this implementation replaces many previous security solutions.
• With additional reference toFIG. 3A, asystem300 to implement thesecurity verification device112 including a key derivation function (KDF)device307 is shown. It should be noted that functions implemented by hardware are in dashed lines and functions implemented by software are in solid lines.
• In this example, acommanding processor102 may transmit asoftware operation210 to the hardware components of thesecurity verification device112. Thesoftware operation210 may include anoperation parameter212. The operation parameter may include particular parameters associated with the software operation. Also,MID208 identifying thecommanding processor102 may be transmitted via the bus. Thesoftware operation210 may include a command that is being requested to be performed by thecommanding processor102 based upon authorization by thesecurity verification device112.
• In particular, thesoftware operation210 may transmit an input selection to ahardware data selector306 to select asecret key204. It should be appreciated that the input selection may select a particularsecret key204 and/orother device keys206 that are selected byhardware data selector306. Further,software operation210 includes data input to a key derivation function (KDF)device307. The data input includes the software command itself and the operation parameter.
• Based upon this data input and the secret key selection,KDF device307 implements a key derivation function to generate a hardware password based upon the selected secret key and thesoftware operation210,operation parameter212, and theMID208. The hardware password ofKDF device307 is transmitted through hardware data selection router308 ashardware password320 to ahardware comparator330.
• At this point,security verification device112 compares thehardware password320 to thecommand password214 transmitted by thesoftware operation210 utilizing thehardware comparator330. Ifcomparator330 determines that thehardware password320 matches thecommand password214, then the password pass/faildecision routing device332 selects theperform operation selector350, which allows for authorization of thesoftware operation210 such that thesoftware operation210 is allowed to be executed by thecommanding processor102. In this way, thesoftware operation210 is approved or authenticated by thesecurity verification device112 and is transmitted back to thecommanding processor102 for execution.
• On the other hand, ifhardware comparator330 determines that thehardware password320 does not match thecommand password214, then the password pass/faildecision routing device332 selects the revokeoperation selector352, which revokes the authentication of thesoftware operation210. In this way, thesoftware operation210 is revoked by thesecurity verification device112 such that the requestedsoftware operation210 by thecommanding processor102 is not allowed and is terminated.
• Also, it should be appreciated that hardware data selection router308 of thesecurity verification device112 based upon received output routing data from thesoftware operation210 may further include software destinations (1 . . . n)310 and hardware destinations (1 . . . n)312 for the commands from thecommanding processor102. Therefore, if thesoftware operation210 is approved, various software destinations and/or hardware destinations utilized by the commands may be routed. It should be appreciated that such destinations may include processors, memory, software, firmware, sensors, or any software or hardware component.
• With additional reference toFIG. 3B, a diagram is shown that provides examples 390 of software operations and operation parameters. Examples 390 of software operations may include: key activation; key revocation; debug re-enable; feature activation; and feature deactivation. For the key activation and key revocation software operations, the operation parameters or parameters may be the index or bitmap of the predefined keys to activate or revoke. For the debug re-enable software operation, the operation parameters or parameters may include a list of debug or monitoring facilities to re-enable. For the feature activation and deactivation software operations, the operation parameters or parameters may be the list of product features to activate or deactivate. Examples of these features for activation or deactivation may include: The number of CPU cores to be utilized and/or their maximum operation frequencies (MHz); Various performance points for Graphic Processor Units GPUs; Various radio interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi, Cellular, etc.); The settings for maximum resolution supportable by a video player or camera and/or other related features, such as, frame per second, color depth and dynamic brightness range. Further, example features for activation or deactivation may apply to the device that incorporates the chip (e.g., a SoC), such as: Automotive—the Horse Power the engine can generate; Drones—the upper height limit and distance the Drone may go, etc. It should be appreciated that these are just examples of software operations and corresponding operation parameters and that any suitable software operation may be securely controlled and implemented. Further, it should be appreciated that any type of software operation may be securely controlled remotely utilizing embodiment disclosed herein.
• In particular, as previously described, thesoftware operation210 triggers a sequence of hardware operations in which hardware inputs are selected to be utilized by thesecurity verification device112 and software inputs are set as inputs to the hardware of thesecurity verification device112 including thesoftware operation210 itself and theoperation parameter212, as well as, theMID208. Theoperation parameter212 is set as both an input to theKDF device307 of thesecurity verification device112 for authentication purposes, and, as an operation parameter for thesoftware operation210 to be performed, if thecommand password214 is authenticated and approved—in which case thesoftware operation210 is authenticated and approved for execution by the commanding processor102 (e.g., perform operation350). Further, KDF output routings (e.g., software andhardware destinations310 and312) and password pass/fail routings are set as software inputs to the hardware of thesecurity verification device112. Based upon these software inputs, thesoftware operation210 is either approved or revoked by the hardware (e.g., if the passwords of the hardware and software match or do not match at the hardware comparator330). If thecommand password214 is approved by the hardware of security verification device112 (i.e., at thecomparator330 compared to hardware password320), then the password pass/faildecision routing device332 selects theperform operation selector350, which allows for authorization of thesoftware operation210 such that thesoftware operation210 is allowed to be executed by thecommanding processor102. In this way, thesoftware operation210 is approved or authenticated by thesecurity verification device112 and is transmitted back to thecommanding processor102 for execution. On the other hand, ifhardware comparator330 determines that thehardware password320 does not match thecommand password214, then the password pass/faildecision routing device332 selects the revokeoperation selector352, which revokes the authentication of thesoftware operation210. In this way, thesoftware operation210 is revoked by thesecurity verification device112 such that the requestedsoftware operation210 by thecommanding processor102 is not allowed and is terminated.
• In this way, theoperation parameter212 is utilized as an input to theKDF device307 such that thehardware password320 is tied to apre-defined operation parameter212 and is utilized in the password approval or disapproval process. Also, theMID208 is used as a hardware indication of thecommanding processor102 and serves as an input to the KDF device307 (e.g., different results for different commanding processors) and the commands can be routed back to thecommanding processor120.
• Thus, utilizing these aspects, software is enabled to do many operations at the hardware level with a very small chipset fingerprint (e.g., the main hardware component being thesecurity verification device112 including the KDF device307). All of the decisions are linked together so that the software needs little protection while the hardware of thesecurity verification device112 may prevent attacks. In particular, thesecurity verification device112 decides on routing and keys based upon thecommanding processor102—removing the need for access control. Additionally, the atomicity of all of the above operations into onesoftware operation210, makes thesecurity verification device112 an extremely powerful tool to perform many operations. In particular, this implementation replaces many previous security solutions.
• With additional reference toFIG. 4, in conjunction withFIG. 3A, in one embodiment, thesecret key204 may be based upon a wrapped secret key that is generated and transmitted from aserver402 to thecomputing device100, as a wrappedsecret key408. For example, in one embodiment, afirst software operation210 byprocessor102 of the computing device may command a new secret key from aserver402. In this embodiment, the newsecret key204 may be generated at theserver402, but may be transmitted as a wrappedsecret key408 to thecomputing device100. In this way, based upon a request by thecomputing device100, theserver402, repeating theKDF calculation403, generates a newsecret key204 for thecomputing device100 that is transmitted as wrappedsecret key408, such that thecomputing device100 may generate thesecret key204, based upon theKDF device307 of thecomputing device100, utilizing only the wrappedsecret key408. The wrapped key implementation provides a method in which the new secret key is not exposed in delivery or even to the computing device's software.
• For example, asoftware operation210 of thecomputing device100 may request a new secret key from theserver402. In this example,computing device100 may transmit a new secret key request through communication interface130 (e.g., a transceiver) toserver402. Based upon this,server402 may request an identifier of thecomputing device100, such as, the computing device's100 serial number (S/N) and/or original equipment manufacturer ID (OEM_ID)406.Computing device100 may then transmit its SN andOEM_ID406 toserver402. It should be appreciated thatserver402 may include an appropriate processor, memory, transceiver, etc., to implemented the previous and hereinafter described functionality. In particular,server403 implements aKDF calculation403 that is similar/linked and/or the same as the KDF calculation ofKDF307 of thecomputing device100, to implement this functionality.
• Based upon the received SN andOEM_ID406,server402 may generate a newsecret key204 utilizingKDF calculation403. In particular,server402 utilizingKDF calculation403 may generate a newsecret key204. The newsecret key204 may be generated by a key derivation function of at least the wrapped secret key, the S/N of thecomputing device100, and the OEM_ID of thecomputing device100. Based upon this,server402 may transmit the wrappedsecret key408 to thecomputing device100. Thus, only the wrappedsecret key408 may be transmitted to the computing device. It should be noted that newsecret key204 itself is not transmitted (e.g., only the wrapped secret key).
• Based upon the received wrappedsecret key408, theprocessor102 ofcomputing device100 commands asecond software operation210 to theKDF307 to unwrap the wrappedsecret key408. Because thecomputing device100 and theserver402 utilize the same KDF and utilize the same S/N and OEM_ID, theKDF307 of thecomputing device100 generates an unwrappedsecret key204, based upon the received wrapped key408, along with the known S/N and OEM_ID, and via hardware router308 andbus411, transmits the newsecret key204 for storage in a storage device (seeFIG. 3A). As previously described, thesecret key204 may be stored in OTP, ROM, etc. This secret key204 may then be utilized by software operations for further commands and function, as previously described in detail. It should be appreciated that other factors such as the ID of the command processor, global keys, etc., may be utilized as additional KDF inputs. In this way, a secret key may be sent over the air (OTA) in a secure and low cost fashion. The new secret key may be generated and transmitted at any instance when computingdevice100 requests a new secret key fromserver402. The wrapped key implementation provides a method in which the new secret key is not exposed in delivery or even to the computing device's software.
• It should be appreciated that aspects of the invention previously described may be implemented in conjunction with the execution of instructions by processors (e.g., processor102) of the devices (e.g., computing device100), as previously described. Particularly, circuitry of the devices, including but not limited to processors, may operate under the control of a program, routine, or the execution of instructions to execute methods or processes in accordance with embodiments of the invention (e.g., the processes and functions ofFIGS. 2-4). For example, such a program may be implemented in firmware or software (e.g. stored in memory and/or other locations) and may be implemented by processors and/or other circuitry of the devices. Further, it should be appreciated that the terms device, processor, microprocessor, circuitry, controller, SoC, etc., refer to any type of logic or circuitry capable of executing logic, commands, instructions, software, firmware, functionality, etc.
• It should be appreciated that when the devices are wireless devices that they may communicate via one or more wireless communication links through a wireless network that are based on or otherwise support any suitable wireless communication technology. For example, in some aspects the wireless device and other devices may associate with a network including a wireless network. In some aspects the network may comprise a body area network or a personal area network (e.g., an ultra-wideband network). In some aspects the network may comprise a local area network or a wide area network. A wireless device may support or otherwise use one or more of a variety of wireless communication technologies, protocols, or standards such as, for example, 3G, LTE, Advanced LTE, 4G, 5G, CDMA, TDMA, OFDM, OFDMA, WiMAX, and WiFi. Similarly, a wireless device may support or otherwise use one or more of a variety of corresponding modulation or multiplexing schemes. A wireless device may thus include appropriate components (e.g., air interfaces) to establish and communicate via one or more wireless communication links using the above or other wireless communication technologies. For example, a device may comprise a wireless transceiver with associated transmitter and receiver components (e.g., a transmitter and a receiver) that may include various components (e.g., signal generators and signal processors) that facilitate communication over a wireless medium. As is well known, a wireless device may therefore wirelessly communicate with other mobile devices, cell phones, other wired and wireless computers, Internet web-sites, etc.
• The teachings herein may be incorporated into (e.g., implemented within or performed by) a variety of apparatuses (e.g., devices). For example, one or more aspects taught herein may be incorporated into a phone (e.g., a cellular phone), a personal data assistant (“PDA”), a tablet, a wearable device, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, a mobile computer, a laptop computer, an entertainment device (e.g., a music or video device), a headset (e.g., headphones, an earpiece, etc.), a medical device (e.g., a biometric sensor, a heart rate monitor, a pedometer, an EKG device, etc.), a user I/O device, a computer, a wired computer, a fixed computer, a desktop computer, a server, a point-of-sale device, a set-top box, or any other type of computing device. These devices may have different power and data requirements.
• In some aspects a wireless device may comprise an access device (e.g., a Wi-Fi access point) for a communication system. Such an access device may provide, for example, connectivity to another network (e.g., a wide area network such as the Internet or a cellular network) via a wired or wireless communication link. Accordingly, the access device may enable another device (e.g., a WiFi station) to access the other network or some other functionality.
• Those of skill in the art would understand that information and signals may be represented using any of a variety of different technologies and techniques. For example, data, instructions, commands, information, signals, bits, symbols, and chips that may be referenced throughout the above description may be represented by voltages, currents, electromagnetic waves, magnetic fields or particles, optical fields or particles, or any combination thereof.
• Those of skill would further appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, firmware, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware, firmware, or software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware, firmware, or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present invention.
• The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a system on a chip (SoC), or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or may be any type of processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
• The steps of a method or algorithm described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in firmware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination thereof. A software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor such the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium. In the alternative, the storage medium may be integral to the processor. The processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC. The ASIC may reside in a user terminal. In the alternative, the processor and the storage medium may reside as discrete components in a user terminal.
• In one or more exemplary embodiments, the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software as a computer program product, the functions may be stored on or transmitted over as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media includes both computer storage media and communication media including any medium that facilitates transfer of a computer program from one place to another. A storage media may be any available media that can be accessed by a computer. By way of example, and not limitation, such computer-readable media can comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer. Also, any connection is properly termed a computer-readable medium. For example, if the software is transmitted from a web site, server, or other remote source using a coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave, then the coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, DSL, or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave are included in the definition of medium. Disk and disc, as used herein, includes compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk and blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.
• The previous description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims (29)

What is claimed is:

1. A device comprising:

a processor to transmit a software operation including an operation parameter;

a security verification device, coupled to the processor, the security verification device configured to:

receive a secret key selection and a first password;

select a secret key;

receive the software operation including the operation parameter;

implement a key derivation function to generate a second password based upon the selected secret key and the software operation including the operation parameter; and

determine if the second password matches the first password, and if so, authorize the performance of the software operation.

2. The device ofclaim 1, wherein, if the security verification device determines that the second password does not match the first password, the performance of the software operation is revoked.

3. The device ofclaim 1, wherein, the security verification device is further configured to receive routing information for the software operation.

4. The device ofclaim 1, wherein, the security verification device is further configured to determine if the second password matches the first password such that the software operation is authorized to be performed, within a single atomic operation.

5. The device ofclaim 1, wherein, a master identifier identifying a commanding processor that has commanded the software operation is transmitted to the security verification device by a bus.

6. The device ofclaim 5, wherein, the security verification device is further configured to:

implement the key derivation function to generate the second password based upon the selected secret key, the master identifier, and the software operation including the operation parameter; and

determine if the second password matches the first password of the commanding processor, and if so, authorizing the performance of the software operation.

7. The device ofclaim 1, wherein the software operation includes at least one of: a key activation operation, a key revocation operation, a feature activation operation, or a feature deactivation operation.

8. A method to securely activate commands comprising:

receiving a software operation including an operation parameter;

receiving a first password;

selecting a secret key;

implementing a key derivation function to generate a second password based upon the selected secret key and the software operation including the operation parameter; and

determining if the second password matches the first password, and if so, authorize the performance of the software operation by a processor.

9. The method ofclaim 8, wherein, if the second password does not match the first password, further comprising revoking the performance of the software operation by the processor.

10. The method ofclaim 8, further comprising receive routing information for the software operation.

11. The method ofclaim 8, further comprising determining if the second password matches the first password such that the software operation is authorized to be performed, within a single atomic operation.

12. The method ofclaim 8, wherein, a master identifier identifying a commanding processor that has commanded the software operation is transmitted by a bus.

13. The method ofclaim 12, further comprising:

implementing the key derivation function to generate the second password based upon the selected secret key, the master identifier, and the software operation including the operation parameter; and

determining if the second password matches the first password of the commanding processor, and if so, authorizing the performance of the software operation.

14. The method ofclaim 12, wherein the software operation includes at least one of:

a key activation operation, a key revocation operation, a feature activation operation, or a feature deactivation operation.

15. A device comprising:

means for receiving a software operation including an operation parameter;

means for receiving a first password;

means for selecting a secret key;

means for implementing a key derivation function to generate a second password based upon the selected secret key and the software operation including the operation parameter; and

means for determining if the second password matches the first password, and if so, means for authorizing the performance of the software operation.

16. The device ofclaim 15, wherein, if the second password does not match the first password, further comprising means for revoking the performance of the software operation.

17. The device ofclaim 15, further comprising means for receive routing information for the software operation.

18. The device ofclaim 15, further comprising means for determining if the second password matches the first password such that the software operation is authorized to be performed, within a single atomic operation.

19. The device ofclaim 15, wherein, a master identifier identifying a commanding processor that has commanded the software operation is transmitted by a bus.

20. The device ofclaim 19, further comprising:

means for implementing the key derivation function to generate the second password based upon the selected secret key, the master identifier, and the software operation including the operation parameter; and

means for determining if the second password matches the first password of the commanding processor, and if so, authorizing the performance of the software operation.

21. The device ofclaim 15, wherein the software operation includes at least one of:

a key activation operation, a key revocation operation, a feature activation operation, or a feature deactivation operation.

22. A device comprising:

a transceiver configured to:

transmit a command for a secret key to a server;

transmit an identifier to the server;

receive a wrapped secret key from the server;

a storage device; and

a processor coupled to the transceiver and the storage device, the processor configured to:

receive the wrapped secret key from the transceiver;

unwrap the wrapped secret key to obtain the secret key; and

store the secret key in the storage device.

23. The device ofclaim 22, wherein unwrapping the wrapped secret key further comprises utilizing a key derivation function with the wrapped secret key and the identifier as inputs.

24. The device ofclaim 23, wherein the identifier includes at least one of a serial number or a manufacturer identifier.

25. The device ofclaim 24, wherein the identifier further comprises at least one of an identifier of a command processor or a global key.

26. The device ofclaim 23, wherein a first software operation by the processor commands the secret key from the server.

27. The device ofclaim 26, wherein a second software operation by the processor commands unwrapping the wrapped secret utilizing the key derivation function implemented by a key derivation device and storing the secret key in the storage device.

28. The device ofclaim 27, wherein the server utilizes a key derivation function to generate the wrapped secret key that is linked to the key derivation function of the computing device.

29. The device ofclaim 22, wherein the storage device is a one time programmable (OTP) memory or a ROM.

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