US20160071040A1 - Method and system for enabling data usage accounting through a relay - Google Patents

Abstract

A method and system for enabling data usage accounting is described herein. The method can be practiced on a computing device that has secure applications and unsecure applications installed thereon. Initially, a request for a data session that includes a final endpoint can be received through a secure application. The request for the data session can be intercepted and modified to cause the request to be re-directed back to the secure application. A connection with a relay server can be initiated instead of the final endpoint such that data usage accounting for the data session is to be conducted at a remote location.

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
• This patent application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/608,662, filed on Jan. 29, 2015, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/573,601, filed on Dec. 17, 2014, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/478,066, filed on Sep. 5, 2014, now issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,938,547 on Jan. 20, 2015, each of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY
• The present description relates to methods and systems for data usage accounting and more particularly, to methods and systems for data usage accounting in computing devices with secure enterprise applications and personal applications.
BACKGROUND
• In an effort to increase productivity, many employers allow their workers to conduct business related to the employer on their personal mobile devices. In some cases, employers also provide some of their employees with company-issued mobile devices. In either arrangement, an employer understands that a single device may include sensitive data related to that employer in addition to data that is personal to the employee. Several advances have been made in an effort to protect an employer's data in these circumstances. For example, OpenPeak Inc. of Boca Raton, Fla. has developed solutions that enable a mobile device to include both enterprise and personal data but that isolate the enterprise data from the personal data. As part of these solutions, an employee may download secure applications that may be used to conduct transactions related to the enterprise.
• Because the employee's device may include both personal and secure applications, it may be desirable to bifurcate the process of data usage accounting. In particular, the employer may wish to receive an accounting of the data usage associated with the secure applications that have been installed on the employee's device on behalf of the employer. This accounting, however, needs to be separate from data accounting that may be attributable to unsecure applications that the employee may have installed for personal use.
SUMMARY
• A method for enabling data usage accounting through a relay is described herein. The method can be practiced on a computing device that has secure applications and unsecure applications installed thereon. Initially, a request for a data session that includes a final endpoint can be received through a secure application. The request for the data session can be intercepted and modified to cause the request to be redirected back to the secure application. In addition, a connection with a relay component can be initiated instead of the final endpoint such that data usage accounting for the data session is to be conducted at a remote location.
• In one example, the final endpoint can be provided to the relay server to enable the relay component to establish a connection with the final endpoint. In another example, the connection with the relay component that is initiated can be transparent to the secure application, and the connection with the relay component that is initiated may be based on a protocol that is non-native to the secure application. This arrangement can mean that some portion of the secure application, such as the original code of the target application that comprises the secure application, may be abstracted away from the connection with the relay component, while some other portion of the secure application, like a secure framework and/or other code that has been integrated with the target application to create the secure application, may enable the abstraction and may facilitate the connection with the relay component. As such, the original code of the target application does not have to be restructured, altered or re-written to account for the redirection of the request or for the (incompatible) protocol of the relay component.
• In one embodiment, data from the secure application can be buffered while the connection with the relay component or the final endpoint is being established. Initiating the connection with the relay component may include providing an internet protocol (IP) address of the computing device to the relay component. Further, the connection that is initiated with the relay component is configured to support the transport of both unencrypted data and encrypted data for the secure application.
• Another method of enabling segregated data usage accounting on a computing device is described herein. At first, a secure application that is installed on the device can be launched in which the device may have unsecure applications installed thereon in addition to the secure application. Through the secure application, content may be requested from a final destination. In response, the content request may be redirected back to the secure application, and a connection with a relay server can be initiated to enable retrieval of the requested content from the final destination and to enable an accounting of data of the retrieved content. In one arrangement, the initiation of the connection with the relay server only occurs for the secure application and not for the unsecure applications.
• Additionally, the final destination and an IP address of the computing device may be provided to the relay server. Like the previous method, the connection of the relay server may be based on a protocol that is non-native to the secure application and redirecting the content request back to the secure application may include natively redirecting the content request back to the secure application. Natively redirecting may refer to the secure application relying on native calls when initially generating the data session request. Also like the previous method, initiating the connection with the relay server may include transparently initiating the relay connection with the relay server.
• In one embodiment, the content request can be redirected back to the secure application for a plurality of predetermined networking calls from the secure application. As an example, the connection with the relay server may be predefined and able to accommodate each of the predetermined networking calls. As another example, initiating the connection with the relay server may include authenticating the computing device with the relay server prior to permitting data exchange between the secure application and the relay server. In some cases, data from the secure application can be buffered while the connection with the relay server is established.
• In another arrangement, it can be determined whether the computing device is operating on a Wi-Fi communication network. In response to the determination, a setting can be activated that prevents the content request from being redirected back to the secure application and the initiation of the connection with the relay server.
• A method of counting data associated with secure applications is also described herein. In the method, a request can be received to establish a relay connection with a requesting secure application installed on a computing device that includes both secure applications and unsecure applications. In response, the computing device can be authenticated. If the device is authenticated, the relay connection with the requesting secure application can be established, and a connection with a final destination specified by the requesting secure application can be initiated. In addition, data associated with the final destination connection can be counted such that a data usage amount is determined for the requesting secure application. The counting of the data may only be performed for the secure applications.
• Further, data associated with the final destination connection may be returned to the secure application over the relay connection. As with the previous methods, the relay connection may be based on a protocol that is non-native to the requesting secure application. As another example, receiving the request to establish the relay connection may include receiving the final destination specified by the requesting secure application and an IP address of the computing device. Establishing the relay connection with the requesting secure application may include establishing the relay connection with the requesting secure application only if the computing device is operating on a predetermined cellular network. This predetermined cellular network may be owned, operated or maintained by the same entity that performs the counting of the data associated with the final destination. A report that details the data usage of the secure applications installed on the computing device may also be generated.
• A computing device is also described herein. The computing device may include a display that is configured to display both secure and unsecure applications that are installed on the computing device and may also include a processing unit that is communicatively coupled to the display. The processing unit can be configured to receive a data access request through one of the secure applications in which the data access request may include a final destination. The processing unit may also be configured to cause a redirection of the data access request back to the secure application and to cause a connection with a relay server to be initiated to enable an accounting of data associated with the data access request. The relay server can be configured to establish a connection with the final destination specified by the secure application. The processing unit can be further configured to cause the redirection of the data access request and the connection with the relay server for the secure applications but not for the unsecure applications.
• In one arrangement, the computing device can include a Wi-Fi communications stack that is communicatively coupled to the processing unit. The processing unit can be further configured to cause a setting to be activated to prevent the redirection of the data access request and the connection with the relay server if the computing device is connected to a Wi-Fi network through the Wi-Fi communications stack. This feature may be applicable to other networks. For example, the setting may be activated if the computing device is camped on a roaming network or a network in which data usage charges are not applicable or not otherwise incurred for access or use.
• The computing device may also include memory that is communicatively coupled to the processing unit. In this case, the processing unit can be further configured to cause data from the secure application to be buffered in the memory while the connection with the relay server is established. As another example, similar to the methods described above, the connection with the relay server may be based on a protocol that is non-native to the requesting secure application, and the processing unit is further configured to cause the connection with the relay server to be initiated transparently with respect to the requesting secure application. In one embodiment, the connection with the relay server can be configured to support unencrypted traffic between the secure application and the final destination. In another embodiment, the processing unit can be further configured to cause the connection with the relay server to be initiated by causing a listening socket on a loopback interface to be generated and a back-end socket to be generated.
• Further features and advantage, as well as the structure and operation of various embodiments, are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is noted that this description is not limited to the specific embodiments presented herein. Such embodiments are provided for illustrative purposes only. Additional embodiments will be apparent to persons skilled in the relevant art(s) based on the teachings contained herein.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS/FIGURES
• The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated herein and form part of the specification, illustrate embodiments of the subject matter described herein and, together with the description, further serve to explain the principles of such subject matter and to enable a person skilled in the relevant art(s) to make and use the subject matter.
• FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a block diagram of the system architecture of a computing device that is configured to practice the subject matter described herein.
• FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a system that shows the computing device ofFIG. 1 in communication with one or more remote servers.
• FIG. 3 illustrates an example of a method for data usage accounting.
• FIG. 4 illustrates an example of an interaction among a secure application, a remote server and a system service.
• FIG. 5 illustrates another example of a method for enabling data usage accounting.
• FIG. 6 illustrates an example of an interaction between a secure application and a system server.
• FIG. 7 illustrates an example of a system that shows the computing device ofFIG. 1 in communication with one or more relay servers and one or more remote servers.
• FIG. 8 illustrates an example of a method for data usage accounting through a relay.
• FIG. 9 illustrates an example of an interaction among a secure application, a relay server and a remote server.
• The features and advantages of the embodiments herein will become more apparent from the detailed description set forth below when taken in conjunction with the drawings, in which like reference characters identify corresponding elements throughout. In the drawings, like reference numbers generally indicate identical, functionally similar, and/or structurally similar elements.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
• The following detailed description refers to the accompanying drawings that illustrate exemplary embodiments; however, the scope of the present claims is not limited to these embodiments. Thus, embodiments beyond those shown in the accompanying drawings, such as modified versions of the illustrated embodiments, may nevertheless be encompassed by the present claims.
• References in the specification to “one embodiment,” “an embodiment,” “an example embodiment,” “one arrangement,” “an arrangement” or the like, indicate that the embodiment or arrangement described may include a particular feature, structure, or characteristic, but every embodiment may not necessarily include the particular feature, structure, or characteristic. Moreover, such phrases are not necessarily referring to the same embodiment or arrangement. Furthermore, when a particular feature, structure, or characteristic is described in connection with an embodiment or arrangement, it is submitted that it is within the knowledge of one skilled in the art to implement such feature, structure, or characteristic in connection with other embodiments or arrangements whether or not explicitly described. The word “among,” as it is used throughout this description, should not necessarily be interpreted as requiring exchanges or interaction among three or more applications, irrespective of grammar rules. The word “a” is not necessarily limited to a singular instance of something, as it may mean one or more.
• Several definitions that apply throughout this document will now be presented. The term “exemplary” as used herein is defined as an example or an instance of an object, apparatus, system, entity, composition, method, step or process. The term “communicatively coupled” is defined as a state in which two or more components are connected such that communication signals are able to be exchanged (directly or indirectly) between the components on a unidirectional or bidirectional (or multi-directional) manner, either wirelessly, through a wired connection or a combination of both. A “computing device” is defined as a component that is configured to perform some process or function for a user and includes both mobile and non-mobile devices. The term “computer readable storage medium” is defined as one or more components that are configured to store instructions that are to be executed by one or more processing units.
• An “application” is defined as a program or programs that perform one or more particular tasks on a computing device. Examples of an application include programs that may present a user interface for interaction with a user or that may run in the background of an operating environment that may not present a user interface while in the background. The term “operating system” is defined as a collection of software components that directs a computing device's operations, including controlling and scheduling the execution of other programs and managing storage, input/output and communication resources. A “processing unit” or “processor” is defined as one or more components that execute sets of instructions, and the components may be disparate parts or part of a whole unit and may not necessarily be located in the same physical location.
• The terms “memory,” “memory element” or “repository” are defined as one or more components that are configured to store data, either on a temporary or persistent basis. The term “shared memory” is memory, a memory element or a repository that is accessible (directly or indirectly) by two or more applications or other processes. An “interface” is defined as a component or a group of components that enable(s) a device to communicate with one or more different devices, whether through hard-wired connections, wireless connections or a combination of both. An “input/output device” is defined as a device that is configured to at least receive input from a user or a machine that is intended to cause some action or other effect on a component with which the input device is associated. A “display” is defined as an apparatus that presents information in visual form and may or may not receive input through a touch screen.
• The term “file system” is defined as an abstraction that is used to organize, store and retrieve data. The term “secure application” is defined as an application that has been modified or enhanced from its original form to restrict communications between the application and unauthorized programs, applications or devices and to restrict operation of the application based on policy or to alter, augment or add features associated with the operation of the application (or any combination thereof) or—in the case of the application not being modified—an application that is part of a secure workspace that is protected from data exchanges with applications that are part of a personal or an unsecure workspace. A “target application” is defined as an application that has been selected for conversion into a secure application. An “unsecure application” is defined as an application that has not undergone the modification required to convert the application into a secure application and, as such, is unable to obtain data from a secure application in view of an obfuscation scheme employed by that secure application or is an application that is not part of a secure workspace and is restricted from accessing data from the secure workspace. A “hub application” is defined as an application that receives input from one or more secure applications and establishes connections with external entities on behalf of the secure applications that provide such input. A “virtual machine” is defined as a platform-independent execution environment that emulates a physical machine.
• The term “personal workspace” is defined as a workspace, profile or partition that is configured to contain the personal content and unsecure applications or other unsecure programs associated with a user of a computing device on which the personal workspace sits. The term “secure workspace” is defined as a workspace, profile or partition that is configured to contain secure content, secure applications and other secure programs and requires some form of authentication to be accessed.
• The term “content provider” is defined as a site that offers data for consumption by a computing device. The term “system service” is defined as an application or a set of applications on a computing device that offer one or more features for access by an unsecure application or a secure application. A “secure connection” is defined as a connection in which at least some portion of the data that is exchanged over the connection is encrypted or otherwise obfuscated from unauthorized parties, entities or processes. To “consume data” means to receive data from a source, transmit data to a recipient or both. An “external network entity” means an entity—such as a component or a service—that is part of a network that is external to or located remotely from a computing device. An “external entity” is defined as an entity to which an application wishes to establish a connection. A “final endpoint” or “final destination” is the external entity with which an application or process intends to establish a connection based on a data request. A “relay server” is a server that facilitates a connection between a computing device and a remote or content server or some other final endpoint or destination.
• As explained earlier, solutions have been developed that enable a mobile device to include both personal and enterprise data. Accordingly, it may be useful to segregate data usage accounting associated with the enterprise side from usage associated with the personal space. This process can enable an enterprise to determine how much data that is consumed by the mobile device is the responsibility of the enterprise.
• In view of this need, a method and system for enabling data usage accounting is described herein. As an example, the method can be practiced on a computing device that has secure applications and unsecure applications installed thereon. A request for a data session that includes a final endpoint or destination can be received through a secure application. The request for the data session can be intercepted and modified to cause the request to be re-directed back to the secure application. In addition, a connection with a relay server can be initiated instead of the final endpoint such that data usage accounting for the data session is to be conducted at a remote location. Moreover, this technique can be limited to the secure applications on the computing device, meaning the unsecure applications are unaffected. Virtually any type of data can be tracked and counted under this scheme, including digitized voice signals and other forms of communication, including messaging.
• Through this arrangement, data tracking can be conducted for secure applications or other applications associated with an enterprise or organization that are installed on a user's computing device based on that user's relationship with that enterprise or organization. This tracking can also be kept apart from any accounting performed for a user's personal usage, such as that associated with unsecure applications on the device. Accordingly, an enterprise can accurately determine its accountability for data usage by a computing device that includes both enterprise and personal data. This solution may be particularly useful for counting the data of the sessions at a remote location.
• Referring toFIG. 1, an example of a block diagram10 of the system architecture of acomputing device15 is shown. In this arrangement, thecomputing device15 can include ahardware layer20, akernel layer25 and alibraries layer30, which may include a plurality of native libraries. This architecture may also include aruntime environment35, asystem server40, asecure framework45 and anapplication layer50.
• In one arrangement, thehardware layer20 may include any number and type of hardware components, such as one ormore displays55, one or more input/output (I/O)devices60, one ormore processing units65 and any suitable type and number ofmemory devices70 and interfaces75. Examples of the I/O devices60 include speakers, microphones, physical keypads, etc. In addition, thedisplay55 can serve as an I/O device60 in the form of a touch-screen display. Theinterface75 can be configured to support various types of communications, including wired or wireless and through any suitable type of standards and protocols. As an example, theinterface75 can include one or more cellular communication stacks and one or more Wi-Fi communication stacks to enable thecomputing device15 to conduct bidirectional communications with one or more cellular networks and one or more Wi-Fi networks, respectively. In one arrangement, thehardware layer20 may also include acalculation unit77, which can be configured to calculate or determine (or at least assist in the determination or calculation of) data usage totals associated with any type of session conducted on thecomputing device15, including those originating from theapplication layer50. Thecalculation unit77 may be a separate component or may be part of theprocessing unit65. In another arrangement, thecalculation unit77 may be remotely located such that it is external to thecomputing device15. In such a case, information regarding the sessions may be sent to a remote location that supports thecalculation unit77, and theunit77 can perform its calculation functions once it receives the information.
• In addition, theruntime environment35 can support any suitable number ofvirtual machines80 andcore libraries85, although a virtual machine may not be needed in other arrangements, such as where native code is employed. Thesystem server40 can serve as an abstraction for the underlying layers for the applications in theapplication layer50 and can provide numerous system services for the applications. As is known in the art, a system framework, which may be part of an application's process, can be employed to enable interaction with thesystem server40 or other components. In this example, theapplication layer50 may include any number ofunsecure applications90 and any number ofsecure applications95, one of which may be a coresecure application100. Thesecure framework45 can function in a manner similar to that of a conventional framework, but thesecure framework45 can facilitate the encapsulation of a number ofsecure applications95 to selectively restrict their data exchanges with theunsecure applications90. In particular, thesecure framework45 can be configured to intercept and modify certain calls from thesecure applications95, prior to passing them to thesystem server40. In one arrangement, these calls may be from thesecure applications95 or the system framework.
• In many cases, theunsecure applications90 are associated with the personal data of a user of thecomputing device15. In contrast, thesecure applications95 are typically associated with confidential or otherwise sensitive information that belongs to or is associated with an enterprise or some other organization, and the user of thedevice15 may work for such an entity. In one arrangement, a virtual partition or workspace may be created on thecomputing device15 in which the secure applications95 (and the core secure application100) are part of asecure workspace105, and theunsecure applications90 are part of apersonal workspace110. In certain cases, a user may be required to provide authentication information, such as a password, PIN or biometric data, to gain access to thesecure workspace105 or to any individual or group ofsecure applications95.
• In some cases, some of theunsecure applications90 may besystem services115 that provide features or functionality that is associated with the type of operating system that is installed on thecomputing device15. In some cases, thesystem service115 may be an application or a set of applications that live in the background and support different tasks associated with the operating system of thedevice15.System services115 may facilitate the exposure of low-level functions of thehardware layer20 and thekernel layer25 to the higher-level application layer50.Many system services115 may operate with elevated privileges, in comparison to other applications. For example, acommon system service115 that is typically found oncomputing devices15 is a media player, which processes and presents media data for a user. Another example of asystem service115 may be a photo viewer, which presents digital images for the user. As those skilled in the art will appreciate, the examples listed here are not meant to be limiting, and there areother system services115 that may be available on thecomputing device15.
• In another embodiment, the system services115 may be trustedunsecure applications90 that secureapplications95 are permitted to share or otherwise exchange data with. An example of a trustedunsecure application90 may be anunsecure application90 that is by default installed on thecomputing device15, such as by the manufacturer of thedevice15 or a wireless carrier or other entity that provides services to thedevice15. Another example of a trustedunsecure application90 may be anunsecure application90 that is listed on an application whitelist for one or moresecure applications95. By being part of the application whitelist, the trustedunsecure application90 may be preapproved for data exchange with the relevant secure application(s)95. Additional information on application whitelisting can be found in U.S. patent application No. 61/973,898, filed on Apr. 2, 2014, which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.
• As noted above, thesecure applications95 and the system architecture may be configured to enable at least some of the calls to thesystem server40 to be intercepted. There are several processes available for such a process. For example, U.S. patent application No. 62/033,142, which was filed on Aug. 5, 2014 and is herein incorporated by reference in its entirety, describes a method and system in which some of the system classes are overridden by classes associated with the coresecure application100, which can allow runtime hooks to be applied against certain system calls. Based on this technique, some of the calls that the secure applications95 (or a system framework) make to the system services115 can be intercepted and modified, a process that will described below.
• As another example, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/205,661, which was filed on Mar. 12, 2014, and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/205,686, which was also filed on Mar. 12, 2014, each of which is herein incorporated by reference in its entirety, present methods and systems by which target applications are encapsulated as secure applications for distribution. Once installed and initiated on acomputing device15, the encapsulated application described in these references is loaded into memory, and runtime hooks are set to enable application programming interface (API) calls from the secure application to be intercepted. Similar to the description above, at least some of the calls to the system services115 from the secure applications95 (or a system framework) can be modified once they are intercepted. Other information on the process of intercepting certain functions of secure applications can be found in U.S. Pat. No. 8,695,060, issued on Apr. 8, 2014, which is also herein incorporated by reference in its entirety.
• As described in these incorporated references, asecure application95 can be configured to provide additional features that may not have been otherwise available prior to it being converted into asecure application95. As an example, asecure application95 can be arranged to track the amount of data that it uses for a particular session. This process enables an administrator to determine data usage on a per-application basis. Of course,secure applications95 may be managed in accordance with many other policies or configurations, as is known in the art.
• While many applications (or target applications) are able to be converted intosecure applications95, there are some applications that may not be so modified. For example,many system services115 are default applications that are provided as part of the base configuration of thecomputing device15. The developer of the operating system that provides thesesystem services115 may not permit the system services115 to be converted intosecure applications95. As such,many system services115 may remain asunsecure applications90 on thecomputing device15. Accordingly, the operation of asystem service115 may not be amenable to being controlled or managed, as is the case withsecure applications95. The relevance of this condition will be explained below.
• In one embodiment, ahub application120 may be part of theapplication layer50. Thehub application120 may serve as a connection point for any number ofsecure applications95 to enable thesecure applications95 to connect to any suitable external entity, including various network components. In particular, if asecure application95 requires a connection with an external entity, thesecure application95 can request thehub application120 to facilitate the communication. Thehub application120 can accept such requests from any of thesecure applications95, including from a singlesecure application95 at a time or from multiple secure applications simultaneously. In accordance with the description herein, such a technique can facilitate the accounting of data usage associated withsecure applications95. In one example, thehub application120 can be a daemon or some other process that runs in the background. Because thehub application120 accepts requests from thesecure applications95, it may be considered as part of thesecure workspace105 and may not be permitted to accept requests from theunsecure applications90. As an option, a similar arrangement can be made for theunsecure applications90, or, alternatively, thehub application120 can be configured to accept requests from bothsecure applications95 andunsecure applications90.
• In an alternative arrangement, thecomputing device15 may contain personal applications and enterprise applications. In this example, the personal applications are designed for the personal interactions of a user, while the enterprise applications may be developed for the work or business interactions of a user. The enterprise applications in this setting may not necessarily besecure applications95, as described herein. In addition, a partition may be implemented in thecomputing device15 to separate the personal applications from the enterprise applications. For example, a user may have separate log-ins for gaining access to the personal applications and to the enterprise applications. In this example, separate billing paths may be established for the personal applications and the enterprise applications, as is presented herein.
• Referring toFIG. 2, asystem200 that shows thecomputing device15 in communication with one or moreremote servers205 is shown. One ormore communication networks210 may facilitate the communications between thecomputing devices15 and theremote servers205. In this example, thecomputing device15 may be a mobile computing device, although the principles described herein may apply to desktop computers or other fixed equipment. In addition, a mobile computing device may be, for example, a smartphone, laptop, tablet or other devices that may be carried by an individual. The network(s)210 may be composed of various types of components to support wireless or wired communications (including both). The network(s)210 may also be configured to support local or wide area communications (or both). Theremote servers205 may host any number of web sites that offer content that may be retrieved by thecomputing device15 and may also be configured to accept data from thecomputing device15. Because theservers205 offer content, they may also be referred to as content providers, although the term “content provider” is certainly not limited to this particular example.
• When operating thecomputing device15, a user may wish to access data from any one of theremote servers205. In some cases, the data access request may originate from anunsecure application90. In the standard flow, theunsecure application90 may sometimes forward the request to arelevant system service115. For example, if a user wishes to view a video associated with one of theremote servers205 through anunsecure application90, theunsecure application90 passes the request to a media player of thecomputing device15. The media player then retrieves the data from theappropriate server205 and presents such data to the user.
• In the case of asecure application95, a similar request would normally be passed to the media player, as well. In addition, the media player would conventionally establish a connection with the relevantremote server205 and would present the requested data to the user. But because the system services115 are typically not permitted to be converted intosecure applications95, implementing the feature of data accounting in them, as can be done withsecure applications95, may not be possible. In this instance, difficulties are presented in determining the percentage of data usage that is associated withsecure applications95 in comparison to the consumption of data byunsecure applications90.
• A solution is described here, however, that enables such an accounting to take place. In particular, the initial data request from thesecure application95 can be intercepted and modified prior to being passed to the media player. In view of the modification, the media player (or other system service115) can direct the request back to thesecure application95, and a connection can be established between thesecure application95 and the appropriateremote server205 to facilitate the exchange of data between thesecure application95 and theremote server205. This redirection of the request through thesecure application95 can enable an accounting of the amount of data that is associated with this particular session, a feature that can be incorporated intosecure applications95. Accordingly, an accurate accounting of data usage associated with at least some or allsecure applications95 on thecomputing device15 is now possible. As previously mentioned, the counting of the data associated with asecure application95 is not limited to being performed by thesecure application95 or even thecomputing device15, as the calculation can be performed remotely.
• This arrangement can enable an entity to determine the percentage of data usage that is attributable to it and to the user on a personal basis. Because data usage may be segregated between enterprise use and personal use, the enterprise may be able to craft more accurate data plans with wireless carriers or other similar entities. Moreover, the user, who may own thecomputing device15, would understand that the user would not be charged for data usage associated with that user's work or business and that the user would only be paying for personal data consumption.
• Referring toFIG. 3, a method300 of data usage accounting is shown. The method300, however, may include additional or even fewer steps or processes in comparison to what is illustrated inFIG. 3. Moreover, the method300 is not necessarily limited to the chronological order that is shown inFIG. 3. In describing the method300, reference may be made toFIGS. 1,2 and4, although it is understood that the method300 may be practiced with any other suitable systems and components and may take advantage of other suitable processes.
• Atstep305, in a setting that includes both secure applications and unsecure applications, a request to access data can be received via one of the secure applications in which the request is intended for a content provider via a system service. The request intended for the content provider via the system service can be intercepted, as shown atstep310. Atstep315, the intercepted request can be modified, which can cause the system service to direct the request back to the secure application instead of the content provider. A connection can be established with the content provider for the request through the secure application to enable data usage accounting of data that is returned by the content provider, as shown atstep320. Additionally, atstep325, content from the content provider can be received at the secure application, and the received content from the content provider can be forwarded to the system service for processing, as shown atstep330. An amount of data that is carried over the established connection associated with the secure application can be determined, as shown atstep335.
• Referring toFIGS. 1 and 2, a user may wish to access data through, for example, asecure application95 that is installed on thecomputing device15. As an example, the user may desire to retrieve some type of content, such as video, through thesecure application95. The content may need to be retrieved from one of theremote servers205. Conventionally, the data access request would be passed to therelevant system service115 and thesystem service115 would fetch the content from theremote server205. Here, however, the data access request may be intercepted prior to being handled by the operating system and can be modified to direct the request back to thesecure application95 instead of theremote server205. Reference will be made toFIG. 4 to help explain this process.
• InFIG. 4, an example of aninteraction400 between thesecure application95, thesystem service115 and theremote server205 is shown. In the initial step, the data access request is received and is intercepted and modified. In this example, the data access request is for video that is stored at one of theremote servers205 that is associated with a website or some other form of digital content, and thesystem service115 is a media playback application. As such, in accordance with earlier discussion, the API that is associated with the media playback service can be hooked.
• Based on conventional techniques, the uniform resource indicator (URI) related to this data request may be a uniform resource locator (URL) with the associated content available via the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) or the hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS). As part of the modification process, the URL may be changed prior to being passed to thesystem service115. The modification of the URL, in one embodiment, may be based on a port number that is provided by the operating system. For example, thesecure application95 may create a listening socket on a loopback interface by requesting a socket and port number from the operating system. As is known in the art, the loopback interface can support inter-process or inter-app communications on thecomputing device15. The requested port may be a predetermined value or may be simply a request to the operating system to provide an available port number. Continuing with the example, the URL may be converted into a local-host URL that includes the assigned port number and the rest of the information from the original URL. The modified URL may then be passed across to thesystem service115, in this case, the media player. As will be explained later, multiple listening sockets and ports may be requested from the operating system as part of this process.
• Consider the following specific but non-limiting example. A user may select a link through asecure application95, which may have the following exemplary URL associated with it:
• • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWHRqspFke0
• As noted earlier, thesecure application95 may request a socket and port value from the operating system, and the port value can factor into the modified URL. In this example, the original URL may be transformed into the following local-host URL:
• • http://localhost:4444?t=www.youtube.com&p=watch&r=v=uWHRqspFke0
• Here, the port value “4444” is now part of the URL string, which can cause thesystem service115 to point back to this port created by thesecure application95. In addition, as can be seen, the original hostname can be encoded in the “t=” parameter, the original path can be encoded in the “p=” parameter and the original parameters can be encoded in the “r=” parameter. Thus, the modified URL can include the port value, and the remote information can be added as parameters in the modified URL. A similar example for an HTTPS request will be presented below.
• In some arrangements, as part of this process, thesecure application95 can create a proxy when the data is initially requested through thesecure application95. The proxy can act as the intermediary between thesystem service115 and theremote server205. In doing so, the proxy may listen in on any sockets that were created for the overall modification of the data access request. As an example, eachsecure application95 can be individually configured to generate the proxy for relevant data requests that it receives.
• In another arrangement, thesecure application95 may record a copy of the information associated with the original data request and can map that information to the redirect address that has been created. For example, in the example above, thesecure application95 may record the information associated with the original URL in any suitable database, such as thememory70 ofFIG. 1, and can map this information to the port that was assigned to the modified URL. This way, thesecure application95 can easily determine the originalremote server205 when it receives the modified URL. In an alternative embodiment, the information of the original data request may not need to be stored and mapped to the redirect address. In the URL example, the original information from the URL can simply be obtained from the modified URL because the original information may be part of the modified information.
• Moving back toFIG. 4, in the second step, the modified data access request can cause thesystem service115 to direct the request back to thesecure application95, instead of the originalremote server205. That is, thesystem service115 will establish a connection with thesecure application95 via the port that thesecure application95 created. In view of the mapping process described above, thesecure application95 is able to determine the original data access request and can establish a connection with the relevant content provider, such as an appropriateremote server205. In particular, based on the example above, thesecure application95 can determine the original URL request and can open a connection with the location specified by the original URL. This process is reflected in the third step ofFIG. 4. At this point, thesecure application95 can fetch the content from theremote server205 and can return this content to thesystem service115 for processing, as shown in the fourth step. The user may then consume the requested data similar to a normal session. As will be explained below, there may be scenarios where a similar re-routing process can be performed to enable data usage tracking but without the invocation of asystem service115.
• As previously noted, thesecure application95 may be configured to track data usage. In this case, thesecure application95 can determine an amount of data that is carried over the connection that is established with theremote server205. This can include both incoming (i.e., fromremote server205 to secure application95) and outgoing (i.e., fromsecure application95 to remote server205) content. For example, thecalculation unit77 ofFIG. 1 can work with thesecure application95 to tally the amount of data consumed by this particular session. In addition, because each session associated with this particularsecure application95 can be tracked, a cumulative amount of data usage for thesecure application95 over a certain time period can be determined. This process may also be conducted for all or at least some of the othersecure applications95 that are installed on thecomputing device15. As previously mentioned, the data usage associated with thesecure applications95 may also be counted at a location that is remote to thecomputing device15.
• If thesecure applications95 are associated with an enterprise, the enterprise can determine the amount of data usage that is tied to each of itssecure applications95. This feature can enable the enterprise to determine data usage on thedevice15 that is solely attributable to it. As a result, data usage tracking associated with the secure applications can be segregated from data usage that originates from the unsecure applications.
• In one embodiment, the connection that is established between thesecure application95 and theremote server205 can be a secure connection. For example, as is known in the art, thesecure application95 can be configured to establish virtual private network (VPN) connections with remote locations. Such a VPN connection is individual to thesecure application95 and is different from a system-level VPN. If desired, however, the connection between thesecure application95 and theremote server205 is not required to be a secure connection. In addition, in another embodiment, thesecure application95 may use a system-level VPN.
• The description above may apply to other protocols that facilitate the exchange of data. For example, HTTPS traffic may also be tracked in accordance with the procedures presented herein. In one embodiment, additional steps can be taken when dealing with HTTPS traffic to ensure accurate and complete accounting. For example, if a user is accessing an HTTPS link through thesecure application95, the original URL may be modified similar to the HTTP examples above, but the connection between thesystem service115 and thesecure application95 may be left in the open.
• Consider the following example. If an HTTPS request is generated, thesecure application95 can convert the HTTPS request to an HTTP request when thesecure application95 modifies the URL for purposes of directing thesystem service115 back to thesecure application95. That is, thesecure application95 can change the connection type of the data request from a secure connection to an open connection when the data request is modified. Referring back to the URL example above, the following HTTPS URL may be received:
• • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWHRqspFke0
• Thesecure application95 can determine that this is an HTTPS request and can modify the URL. An exemplary conversion is presented here:
• • http://localhost:4444?s=www.youtube.com&p=watch&r=v=uWHRqspFke0
• As reflected in the string, the HTTPS request is converted to an HTTP request. As a result, the connection between thesystem service115 and thesecure application95 can be out in the open. As will be explained below, this feature can enable thesecure application95 to handle re-directs from theremote server205.
• As can also be seen in the string, the “s=” parameter can provide an indication that the original URL was an HTTPS request. Accordingly, when thesecure application95 establishes the connection between it and theremote server205, an HTTPS connection can be created. In other words, thesystem service115 may not be responsible for establishing the HTTPS connection, and thesecure application95 may be in control of any security-related handshaking and getting the encryption keys in place. The session between thesecure application95 and theremote server205 can be a transport layer security (TLS) connection, which can terminate at thesecure application95.
• As explained earlier, thesecure application95 may be configured to arrange VPN connections in an individual manner. Such an application-level VPN can support any type of traffic that is exchanged between thesecure application95 and theremote server205, including both HTTP and HTTPS streams. In other words, the ability of thesecure application95 to provide an application-level VPN does not impede the ability of thesecure application95 to modify data access requests and then convert them back to their original form, as described above. Further, these techniques can be practiced if thesecure application95 is using a system-level VPN or is not relying on a VPN connection at all.
• As is known in the art, some initial data access requests are answered with a re-direct, which instructs the requesting source to another destination to retrieve the desired content. For example, in the case of an HTTP request, the requesting device may receive an HTTP re-direct from the server, which causes the device to generate another HTTP request based on the re-direct destination. In addition, in some cases, a URL playlist may be sent from the server, which may include a plurality of URLs. This particular feature may support HTTP live-streaming, a protocol that enables a client to select from a number of different alternate streams containing the same material encoded at a variety of data rates, which can allow the streaming session to adapt to the available data rate.
• In one arrangement, thesecure application95 may be configured to account for these re-directs. For example, if the initial data request is an HTTP request and theremote server205 returns an HTTP re-direct, thesecure application95 may transform that HTTP re-direct in accordance with the modification process described above. By doing so, thesecure application95 can ensure that thesystem service115 establishes the new re-direct connection with thesecure application95. As such, when thesecure application95 detects a re-direct, thesecure application95 can request another socket and port from the operating system to account for the new destination that originates from the re-direct. Thesecure application95 can then open a connection between itself and the new (and appropriate)remote server205. This process can be expanded to account for re-direct playlists, such that socket/port pairs are generated when needed for the URLs that make up the playlists.
• As can be gleaned from this example, thesecure application95 may be required to detect the re-directs in the incoming streams. If the original data access request is not based on a secure protocol, like HTTPS, then thesecure application95 is easily able to detect the re-directs. If the original request is based on a secure protocol, however, complications may arise because the traffic being streamed to thesystem service115 may be encrypted. As noted above, when dealing with a secure protocol, the termination point for the secure connection can be placed at thesecure application95, not thesystem service115. As a result, thesecure application95 can decrypt the incoming traffic and can detect the re-directs, similar to how it would for an unsecure protocol. Thus, as an example, re-directs can be handled for both HTTP and HTTPS.
• In some cases, other components may assist in the calculation of data for purposes of usage accounting. For example, somesystem services115 may offer notifications based on certain events that may be related to data usage. In one particular example, thesecure applications95 can register for certain callbacks from the system services115 that are equipped to provide such notifications. As an example, if a data session is initiated through asecure application95, thesystem service115 can provide one or more notifications that inform thesecure application95 of the start of the session and its eventual ending. Statistics related to the amount of data that was consumed during the session can be incorporated into the notifications, which thesecure application95 can use to track its data usage. The overall total usage related to all or at least some of thesecure applications95 can be determined, which can allow the segregation of data consumption between secure and personal profiles, as described earlier. In this case, however, the modification of the data access requests is not required, and the system service may fetch data in its conventional manner. When available with the system services115, this feature may be useful for data accounting, particularly when application-level VPNs are not incorporated into thesecure applications95.
• The description herein has been presented primarily in terms of asecure application95 handling the modification of data requests and the data usage tracking. The description, however, is not so limited. In particular, these features can be implemented into an unsecure application such that data usage can be tracked for these types of applications on an individual basis. Similarly, the system service that is involved in this process is not limited to a media player. In fact, any system service that is involved in the exchange of data with a remote location may be applicable to the description provided herein. For example, other system services that apply here may include a texting application, a dialer or any other application that facilitates or otherwise supports voice communications, a video or camera application, or a map application or other application that supports mapping features. In fact, the description herein may apply to any type of application, whether secure or unsecure, that may involve the consumption of content or the use of services in which it may be necessary to distinguish between personal use of such content and services and secure or workspace or enterprise use of the content and services.
• In some cases, it may not be necessary to invoke thesystem service115 to handle a request for a data session. That is, the request for the data session may not require the launching of a separate application to handle the request. For example, thesecure application95 may be a secure web browser, through which a user may attempt to retrieve some data. As is known in the art, in prior art cases, an application may work with the operating system of a computing device to establish a connection to an external entity, such as a web server. In a typical mobile device setting, the application may be configured to generate calls for an application programming interface (API) defined by the portable operating system interface (POSIX). In response, the operating system can establish a connection to the external entity on behalf of the application.
• Similar to the description above, techniques can be implemented that enablesecure applications95 to have such calls natively redirected back to them for the purpose of establishing a connection with the appropriate external entity and for enabling an accounting of the data session. This process can also make possible a scheme in which data usage forsecure applications95 is counted separately from that associated withunsecure applications90.
• Referring toFIG. 5, amethod500 for enabling data usage accounting is shown. Themethod500, however, may include additional or even fewer steps or processes in comparison to what is illustrated inFIG. 5. Moreover, themethod500 is not necessarily limited to the chronological order that is shown inFIG. 5. In describing themethod500, reference may be made to the drawings attached hereto, although it is understood that themethod500 may be practiced with any other suitable systems and components and may take advantage of other suitable processes.
• Atstep505, a request for a data session can be received through a secure application, and atstep510, in response, a listening socket can be created. The request for the data session can be intercepted, as shown atstep515, and the request for the data session can be modified to cause the request to be re-directed back to the secure application, as shown atstep520. Atstep525, a connection can be initiated to enable retrieval of the data in response to the request and an accounting of the data session. Atstep530, the listening socket can be torn down. In addition, atdecision block535, it can be determined whether a connection with a Wi-Fi network is in place. If no, themethod500 can resume atdecision block535. If yes, a setting can be activated that prevents the request for the data session from being intercepted and modified, as shown atstep540.
• To help explain themethod500, reference will be made toFIG. 6, which presents an example of aninteraction600 between asecure application95 and thesystem server40 with thesecure framework45 facilitating the operation. Although thesecure framework45 may be considered part of and can work in conjunction with thesecure application95 to carry out the operations described herein, reference may in some cases be made solely to thesecure application95 when explaining thisinteraction600 for purposes of convenience. Initially, a user may be interacting with thesecure application95, and the user may wish to retrieve some content from, for example, an external entity. As noted earlier, thecomputing device15 may have bothsecure applications95 andunsecure applications90 installed thereon.
• In response to the user interaction, thesecure application95 may generate a request for a data session. As an example, the request may be a POSIX connect call, although the principles outlined herein are not limited to such an arrangement. This request may include addressing information that is intended to be used to establish the connection with the external entity. Examples of addressing information include the following arguments: socket (specifies the file descriptor associated with the socket); address (points to a sockaddr structure containing the peer address); and address_len (specifies the length of the sockaddr structure pointed to by the address argument. Other exemplary arguments and parameters may also be applicable here. In addition, the term “addressing information” is defined as data that is configured to facilitate or enable a connection with one or more destinations. This request may be from thesecure application95 or the system framework associated with thesecure application95. In either case, in response, thesecure application95 can generate a listening socket on the loopback interface—similar to the procedures previously described. In one arrangement, the listening socket can be a temporary socket in that it can be torn down once it serves its purpose of establishing a connection through thesecure application95.
• Once the listening socket is created, thesecure application95 can intercept the request for the data session. This interception can occur because thesecure framework45 can be shimmed between the system framework and the operating system and can be configured to recognize predetermined calls for modification or other processing, while allowing others to pass unfettered. In any event, the data session request can be modified by re-writing portions of the request based on the newly-created listening socket. For example, the addressing information of the connect call may be re-written with the addressing information associated with the listening socket. As shown inFIG. 6, the modified data session request can then be passed to thesystem server40. This modified call may still be in the native format, or in the form that is normally used by thesecure application95 and other applications on thecomputing device15 to make calls to the operating system. That is, the native version of the relevant function can be called at this stage, where it is modified to include the new addressing information for the listening socket.
• As part of the modification process, the original addressing information (or at least some portion of it) can be stored and assigned to the listening socket. The original addressing information includes the final destination address and can be used to establish the intended connection, as will be explained below. As another part of this process, a return can be generated to inform the system framework or thesecure application95 that the requested connect is in progress.
• When the operating system receives the data session request, the operating system can redirect the data session request back to thesecure application95, as opposed to the intended final destination address. In particular, the data session request is returned to the listening socket based on the re-written addressing information that replaced the original addressing information. In this case, the operating system can wire up a connection between the relevant socket of thesecure application95 and the listening socket through the loopback interface. Once the redirected connection is established on the listening socket, thesecure application95 can retrieve the original addressing information and can initiate and establish the connection with the external entity, using the original addressing information. Specifically, a connect socket can be generated, and this connect socket can be used to establish a connection with the appropriate socket of the external entity. Further, once the connection with the intended external entity has been initiated (or completed), thesecure application95 can tear down the listening socket to return system resources.
• In this case, similar to the process associated with the system service redirection described above, the redirection here can be transparent to thesecure application95 or the system framework. That is, no changes are required to be made to thesecure application95 or the system framework to enable the interception and modification of the data session request. These objects can continue to make their native calls when seeking to exchange data with an external entity, and they are unaware that their calls are being manipulated in this manner. The terms “transparent redirection of a request” or “transparently redirecting a request” are defined as a redirection of a request in which the source of the request is unaware of its redirection, and examples of a request include a call, command or function. The terms “native redirection of a request” or “natively redirecting a request” are defined as a redirection of a request in which the source of the request maintains its reliance on native or pre-existing protocols or structure to generate or to facilitate the request.
• The connection between thesecure application95 and the external entity may support various types of formats or protocols. In some cases, the connection to the external entity may be through an application-level virtual private network (VPN), as thesecure application95 may be configured to provide such a feature. The connection may also utilize a system-level VPN, if desired. In this case, the socket of the external entity can be the appropriate socket of the VPN, as opposed to a native socket for the back-end location. Moreover, the connection with the external entity is not necessarily limited to being a secure connection, as unsecure connections may be used.
• As noted earlier, thecomputing device15 in which the previously described techniques may be practiced may include a Wi-Fi communications stack. The Wi-Fi stack can enable thedevice15 to exchange data with external entities over a Wi-Fi network using any of the protocols within that family for which thedevice15 is configured. In some cases, it may not be necessary to track data usage associated with secure applications95 (or even unsecure applications90) when thedevice15 is camped on a Wi-Fi network. In fact, it may not be necessary to do so when thedevice15 is operating on any non-cellular network or other networks that do not bill users for access. In this instance, when thedevice15 is using a Wi-Fi network or other non-billable or free network for data access, a setting in the device may be activated to prevent the process of redirecting data access requests. That is, because users are typically permitted to access Wi-Fi networks for free, it may not be necessary to track data usage when thedevice15 is using such a network, thereby obviating the need to intercept and modify the data access requests in accordance with the processes described above. When thecomputing device15 leaves the Wi-Fi network and returns to the billing network, the setting can be deactivated, and the process of data usage counting can begin again.
• In another arrangement, the tracking of data usage may be limited to a particular network, such as a predefined cellular network. Thus, the processes described herein may only be executed on this predetermined network. When thecomputing device15 is operating on any other network, the redirection process may not be carried out. For example, if thecomputing device15 is roaming on a network, or operating on a network that is not its home network, the setting that prevents the redirection process may be activated, even though use of the roaming network may cause the user to incur data usage charges. Nonetheless, if desired, data usage tracking based on the techniques described herein may be conducted on roaming networks or Wi-Fi or other free-access networks.
• As previously noted, the counting or calculation of data can be performed at a location that is remote to thecomputing device15. For example, an arrangement may be configured in which certain data sessions are facilitated by a remote relay to enable data tracking at the relay or some other suitable location. Referring toFIG. 7, an example of asystem700 that enables data usage accounting through a relay is illustrated. Thesystem700 can include one ormore computing devices15—which may have bothunsecure applications90 andsecure applications95 installed thereon—and one or moreremote servers205. Theremote servers205 and thecomputing devices15 may exchange various forms of data with one another. Similar toFIG. 2, one ormore networks210 may facilitate the exchange of data between thecomputing devices15 and theremote servers205. The network(s)210 may be composed of various types of components to support wireless or wired communications (including both). The network(s)210 may also be configured to support local or wide area communications (or both).
• In one arrangement, thenetwork210 may include one ormore relay servers705, and at least some of therelay servers705 may include acalculation unit710. Thecalculation unit710 may be a part of therelay server705 or may be an independent component that is communicatively coupled to therelay server705. In either case, connections may be established between any of therelay servers705 and any of thecomputing devices15 and between any of therelay servers705 and any of theremote servers205. As will be explained further below, when such connections are established, the data that is transferred between thecomputing devices15 and theremote servers205 may be calculated or counted, such as by theappropriate calculation units710. To enable the segregation of data usage accounting between enterprise and personal use, such tracking may only be conducted forsecure applications95 or other processes associated with the enterprise and not the user's personal activities.
• As mentioned above, there may benumerous networks210 involved to handle the exchange of data between thecomputing devices15 and theremote servers205. Therelay servers705, however, may be associated with a predetermined network, such that thecomputing device15 is directed to aserver705 in thisparticular network210. Moreover, the use of the relay servers705 (and hence, the calculation units710) may be selective in nature. For example, this arrangement may only be utilized forsecure applications95 and when thecomputing device15 is camped on acertain network210 for service, such as a predetermined cellular network.
• Referring toFIG. 8, amethod800 of enabling data usage accounting through a relay is illustrated. Themethod800, however, may include additional or even fewer steps or processes in comparison to what is illustrated inFIG. 8. Moreover, themethod800 is not necessarily limited to the chronological order that is shown inFIG. 8. In describing themethod800, reference may be made to the drawings attached hereto, although it is understood that themethod800 may be practiced with any other suitable systems and components and may take advantage of other suitable processes.
• Atstep805, on a computing device that has secure applications and unsecure applications installed thereon, a request for a data session can be received through a secure application. The request may include a final endpoint. Atstep810, the request for the data session can be intercepted, and the request can be modified to cause the request to be redirected back to the secure application, as shown atstep815. Atstep820, a connection can be initiated with a relay server instead of the final endpoint such that data usage accounting for the data session is to be conducted at a remote location.
• In addition, atstep825, the computing device can be authenticated with the relay server prior to permitting data exchange between the secure application and the relay server. Atstep830, the final endpoint can be provided to the relay server to enable the relay server to establish a connection with the final endpoint. Atstep835, data from the secure application may be buffered while the connection with the relay server or the final endpoint is being established. Data associated with the final endpoint may be counted such that a data usage amount is determined for the requesting secure application, as shown atstep840. Atstep845, a report can be generated that details the data usage of the secure applications installed on the computing device. Additionally, atdecision block850, it can be determined whether the computing device is operating on a Wi-Fi communication network. If not, themethod800 can resume atdecision block850. If yes, in response to such a determination, a setting can be activated that prevents the data session request to be redirected back to the secure application and the initiation of the connection with the relay server, as shown atstep855.
• To help explain themethod800, reference will be made toFIG. 9, which shows an example of aninteraction900 among a secure application95 (along with the secure framework45), a relay server705 (and calculation unit710) and aremote server205. As previously explained, thesecure framework45 may be considered to be part of thesecure application95, and thecalculation unit710 may be part of therelay server710, although other suitable arrangements may apply to these principles.
• As an example, a user may initiate a data session request through asecure application95, which may be intercepted and modified to be redirected back to thesecure application95. This process may be similar to the exemplary techniques described above with respect to re-writing URLs and addressing information. That is, thesecure application95, via thesecure framework45, may set up a listening socket on a loopback interface, and the relevant data can be re-written to cause the request to be redirected to the listening socket. Here, however, thesecure application95 can initiate a connection with therelay server705. Therelay server705, which can be any suitable combination of hardware and software, can be used to initiate and establish a connection with the final endpoint of the data session request, which may be theremote server205.
• For example, when the data session request is intercepted, thesecure application95 can re-write the addressing information of the request with the addressing information of the listening socket of the loopback interface and can store the replaced addressing information. The stored addressing information may be the addressing information of the final endpoint. As before, a return can be generated to inform the system framework or thesecure application95 that the requested connect is in progress. When the operating system establishes the connection between the socket of thesecure application95 and the listening socket, thesecure application95 may then generate an accepted or connected socket. The connected socket may enable data to be passed to and from thesecure application95 through the loopback interface. As an example, after the connected socket is generated, the listening socket may be torn down to preserve system resources, although such a step may be bypassed in other circumstances.
• In one arrangement, when the connection is accepted on the listening socket, thesecure application95 may generate a back-end socket for initiating and establishing the connection with, for example, theappropriate relay server705, which may be listening for connections on its public IP address. As part of initiating the connection with therelay server705, the connection protocol with therelay server705 may be negotiated, which may include authentication of thecomputing device15 or some other process, service or component that is part of thedevice15. As an example, the IP address of thecomputing device15 may be provided to enable the authentication of thedevice15.
• While the connection between thesecure application95 and therelay server705 is being negotiated, any data that may be generated by thesecure application95 may be buffered, at least until, for example, the connection with therelay server705 is established. In particular, the connection between the relevant socket of thesecure application95 and the connected socket of the loopback interface may be operatively the same as a connection with a final endpoint. In view of this connection, a one-to-one mapping between the socket of thesecure application95 and the connected socket may exist. As such, thesecure application95 may behave naturally and to support this feature, any portion of the data generated by thesecure application95 during the negotiation with therelay server705 can be saved for eventual transmission to therelay server705.
• In one arrangement, once the connection with therelay server705 is established, thesecure application95 can send the final endpoint of the data session request to therelay server705. For example, thesecure application95 may, in accordance with the protocol of therelay server705, package the addressing information of the final endpoint as part of a payload for therelay server705. In one arrangement, any buffered data from thesecure application95 may be sent to therelay server705. Therelay server705 can establish the connection with the remote server205 (i.e., final endpoint) on behalf of thesecure application95. If necessary, therelay server705 may also buffer data during its negotiation with theremote server205. Once the connection is established between therelay server705 and theremote server205, data exchanges may occur between thesecure application95 of thecomputing device15 and theremote server205, via therelay server705. In an alternative arrangement, the buffered data may be held at thecomputing device15 until the connection between therelay server705 and theremote server205 is completed.
• Eventually, the data session may end, either through thesecure application95, therelay server705, theremote server205 or some other process or component. In either case, the components/processes may tear down the connections and release any relevant system resources. As an example, thesecure application95 may close the loopback interface (and any associated sockets) in the event the session is completed. These principles may also apply in the event that any of the connections are unable to be established in response to the initial request.
• As noted previously, uniform resource locators (URL) may be re-written, particularly in the case of calls being made to asystem service115. The process of establishing the connection with therelay server705 and theremote server205 is similar to that described above. In this case, however, during the time the connection with therelay server705 is being established, thesecure application95 can perform a domain name system (DNS) look-up of the original host name to determine the appropriate IP address for the final endpoint. Once the IP address is retrieved and the connection with therelay server705 is established, thesecure application95 can provide the IP address as part of the addressing information that is packaged and sent to therelay server705. That is, the re-written URL may be resolved into an address that can be used to establish the connection with the appropriateremote server205 through therelay server705.
• In either arrangement, any data that is exchanged between thesecure application95 and theremote server205 may be routed through therelay server705. As such, therelay server705 can be configured to facilitate the remote tracking of data usage for thesecure application95 for this exchange, as well as other sessions in the future. For example, thecalculation unit710 may determine the data usage for thesecure application95, as well as othersecure applications95, and can generate one or more reports that indicate the details of such usage. As an example, the data usage can be correlated with aparticular computing device15 through the received IP address of thedevice15. The report can include usage totals on an individual or group basis for any number ofsecure applications95. These reports may then be disseminated to the relevant parties for purposes of billing.
• As illustrated here, a relay scheme can be leveraged to enable remote data counting for thecomputing device15. There are other alternatives, however, that may apply. For example, the counting of the data based on the exchanges with the external entity may be performed at thecomputing device15, such as through thesecure application95 that requested the session or a hub application120 (seeFIG. 1). Moreover, thecalculation units710 may not necessarily be at the same location as therelay servers705, as theunits710 may be remote to both thecomputing device15 and therelay servers705. In addition, any number ofcalculation units710 may be associated with any number ofrelay servers705. In fact, these components may be grouped together in any suitable fashion. For example, any number ofrelay servers705 andcalculation units710 may be grouped together for an enterprise in which the users of thecomputing devices15 being tracked are associated with the enterprise, such as employees of the enterprise. These groupings may be isolated from one another to prevent comingling of data streams associated with different enterprises to ensure accurate billing.
• As explained earlier, this process of establishing a connection with arelay server705 to enable data exchange with a final destination and for tracking and counting the data associated with such sessions may be restricted to secureapplications95, such as those installed on thecomputing device15. As such, this procedure may not be performed for any data sessions associated withunsecure applications90. Because thesecure applications95 may likely be associated with or sponsored by an enterprise, the process presented here can allow for separate data usage charges for thecomputing device15 with respect to a user's personal data and that affiliated with, for example, the user's employer. Of course, such an arrangement may be implemented for any application, including individual applications or for certain groups of applications, and may not necessarily be limited only to secureapplications95.
• In another arrangement, the process of establishing the connection with therelay server705 as described above may be transparent to thesecure application95. As another example, this connection may be based on a protocol that is non-native to thesecure application95. As is known in the art, asecure application95 is created from a target application that is typically available to one or more parties for download, such as through an app store or some other electronic storefront. The original portions of the target application that make up thesecure application95 may be unaware of the connection with therelay server705 and such portions may continue to make calls in their native formats. This principle also applies to the system framework. Thesecure framework45 of thesecure application95, however, may be configured to abstract the necessary calls and protocol associated with establishing the connection with therelay server705. As such, the original developer is relieved of having to change any of the original code to facilitate the relaying arrangement or to operate in accordance with the non-native protocol of therelay server705.
• In one embodiment, the protocol for the connection to therelay server705 can be configured to traverse firewalls or other security features to permit access to protected internal resources. For example, this connection may be based on a layer4 solution (transport) per the open systems interconnection (OSI) model, as opposed to tunneling or networking technologies associated with layer3 of the OSI model. This arrangement reduces the complexities of the connection because there are no addressing resolution issues, as would be the case for a VPN solution. That is, the transport layer solution obviates the need to deploy a networking infrastructure, and the non-native protocol can be resolved by thesecure framework45. Almost any type of data may flow over the relay connection, as well, including encrypted and unencrypted traffic.
• Thesecure application95 may be configured to connect to an external entity in multiple ways. For example, thesecure application95 may use blocking or non-blocking sockets or transmission control protocol (TCP) or user datagram protocol (UDP) connections. The solutions presented here can accommodate all or at least a portion of the possible ways asecure application95 may be designed to connect to the external entity. That is, thesecure framework45 may be constructed to intercept the various networking calls of thesecure application95 and to perform the redirects and connection-initiation with therelay server705 in accordance with the protocol of therelay server705, as described above. Thus, in one arrangement, a plurality of predetermined disparate networking calls or functions of thesecure applications95 that are based on various connection modes may be identified. These calls or functions may then be manipulated when they are activated in accordance with the descriptions above to permit data exchange over a relay connection that is based on a single connection mode.
• In some cases, the execution of this relaying process may hinge on the type of network to which thecomputing device15 is connected. For example, if thecomputing device15 is camped on a Wi-Fi network or some other public, private or free access network, a setting may be activated that prevents the data session request from being redirected back to the secure application or the initiation of the connection with therelay server705, or both. In addition, the relaying process may only be conducted if thecomputing device15 is camped on a predetermined network, such as its home cellular network. As such, if thedevice15 is roaming, the setting described above may be activated. Of course, these embodiments are not meant to be limiting, as the techniques presented here may be applicable to any one of the networks with which thecomputing device15 may conduct communications.
• While various embodiments have been described above, it should be understood that they have been presented by way of example only, and not limitation. It will be understood by those skilled in the relevant art(s) that various changes in form and details may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the subject matter as defined in the appended claims. Accordingly, the breadth and scope of the present subject matter should not be limited by any of the above-described exemplary embodiments, but should be defined only in accordance with the following claims and their equivalents.
• The flowchart and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved.

Claims (22)

What is claimed is:

1. A method for enabling data usage accounting through a relay, comprising:

on a computing device that has secure applications and unsecure applications installed thereon, receiving through a secure application a request for a data session that includes a final endpoint;

intercepting the request for the data session;

modifying the request for the data session to cause the request to be redirected back to the secure application; and

initiating a connection with a relay component instead of the final endpoint such that data usage accounting for the data session is to be conducted at a remote location.

2. The method according toclaim 1, further comprising providing the final endpoint to the relay server to enable the relay component to establish a connection with the final endpoint.

3. The method according toclaim 1, wherein the connection with the relay component is initiated transparently with respect to the secure application.

4. The method according toclaim 3, wherein the connection with the relay component that is initiated is based on a protocol that is non-native to the secure application.

5. The method according toclaim 1, further comprising buffering data from the secure application while the connection with the relay component or the final endpoint is being established.

6. The method according toclaim 1, wherein initiating the connection with the relay component comprises providing an internet protocol (IP) address of the computing device to the relay component.

7. The method according toclaim 1, wherein the connection that is initiated with the relay component is configured to support the transport of both unencrypted data and encrypted data for the secure application.

8. A method of enabling segregated data usage accounting on a computing device, comprising:

launching a secure application that is installed on the device, wherein the device has unsecure applications installed thereon in addition to the secure application;

through the secure application, requesting content from a final destination;

redirecting the content request back to the secure application; and

initiating a connection with a relay server to enable retrieval of the requested content from the final destination and to enable an accounting of data of the retrieved content;

wherein the initiation of the connection with the relay server only occurs for the secure application and not for the unsecure applications.

9. The method according toclaim 8, further comprising providing the final destination and an IP address of the computing device to the relay server.

10. The method according toclaim 8, wherein the connection of the relay server is based on a protocol that is non-native to the secure application.

11. The method according toclaim 10, wherein redirecting the content request back to the secure application comprises natively redirecting the content request back to the secure application and initiating the connection with the relay server comprises transparently initiating the relay connection with the relay server.

12. The method according toclaim 8, further comprising redirecting the content request back to the secure application for a plurality of predetermined networking calls from the secure application, wherein the connection with the relay server is predefined and able to accommodate each of the predetermined networking calls.

13. The method according toclaim 8, wherein initiating the connection with the relay server comprises authenticating the computing device with the relay server prior to permitting data exchange between the secure application and the relay server.

14. The method according toclaim 8, further comprising buffering data from the secure application while the connection with the relay server is established.

15. The method according toclaim 8, further comprising:

determining that the computing device is operating on a Wi-Fi communication network; and

in response to the determination, activating a setting that prevents the content request from being redirected back to the secure application and the initiation of the connection with the relay server.

16. A computing device, comprising:

a display that is configured to display both secure and unsecure applications that are installed on the computing device;

a processor that is communicatively coupled to the display, wherein the processor is configured to:

receive a data access request through one of the secure applications, wherein the data access request includes a final destination;

cause a redirection of the data access request back to the secure application; and

cause a connection with a relay server to be initiated to enable an accounting of data associated with the data access request, wherein the relay server is configured to establish a connection with the final destination specified by the secure application;

wherein the processor is further configured to cause the redirection of the data access request and the connection with the relay server for the secure applications but not for the unsecure applications.

17. The computing device according toclaim 16, further comprising a Wi-Fi communications stack that is communicatively coupled to the processor, wherein the processor is further configured to cause a setting to be activated to prevent the redirection of the data access request and the connection with the relay server if the computing device is connected to a Wi-Fi network through the Wi-Fi communications stack.

18. The computing device according toclaim 16, further comprising memory that is communicatively coupled to the processor, wherein the processor is further configured to cause data from the secure application to be buffered in the memory while the connection with the relay server is established.

19. The computing device according toclaim 16, wherein the connection with the relay server is based on a protocol that is non-native to the requesting secure application.

20. The computing device according toclaim 16, wherein the processor is further configured to cause the connection with the relay server to be initiated transparently with respect to the requesting secure application.

21. The computing device according toclaim 16, wherein the connection with the relay server is configured to support unencrypted traffic between the secure application and the final destination and is an unsecure connection.

22. The computing device according toclaim 16, wherein the processor is further configured to cause the connection with the relay server to be initiated by causing a listening socket on a loopback interface to be generated and a back-end socket to be generated.

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