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US20130183936A1 - Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
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Publication number
US20130183936A1
US20130183936A1US13/742,748US201313742748AUS2013183936A1US 20130183936 A1US20130183936 A1US 20130183936A1US 201313742748 AUS201313742748 AUS 201313742748AUS 2013183936 A1US2013183936 A1US 2013183936A1
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US
United States
Prior art keywords
smart card
card reader
radio transceiver
portable wireless
wireless device
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US13/742,748
Inventor
Clayton Douglas Smtih
Lindsay Martin Kent
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Entrust Corp
Original Assignee
Entrust Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to US13/742,748priorityCriticalpatent/US20130183936A1/en
Application filed by Entrust LtdfiledCriticalEntrust Ltd
Assigned to ENTRUST, INC.reassignmentENTRUST, INC.ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS).Assignors: MARTIN KENT, LINDSAY, SMITH, CLAYTON DOUGLAS
Priority to PCT/US2013/021917prioritypatent/WO2013109737A1/en
Priority to EP13701558.2Aprioritypatent/EP2805466A1/en
Priority to CA2861383Aprioritypatent/CA2861383A1/en
Priority to CN201380011366.2Aprioritypatent/CN104303481B/en
Assigned to ENTRUST, INC.reassignmentENTRUST, INC.ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS).Assignors: KENT, LINDSAY MARTIN, SMITH, CLAYTON DOUGLAS
Priority to US13/836,431prioritypatent/US10165440B2/en
Publication of US20130183936A1publicationCriticalpatent/US20130183936A1/en
Assigned to BMO HARRIS BANK N.A., AS AGENTreassignmentBMO HARRIS BANK N.A., AS AGENTSECURITY AGREEMENTAssignors: ENTRUST, INC.
Priority to US16/191,944prioritypatent/US10645581B2/en
Priority to US16/410,671prioritypatent/US20190268770A1/en
Assigned to Entrust CorporationreassignmentEntrust CorporationMERGER (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS).Assignors: ENTRUST, INC.
Abandonedlegal-statusCriticalCurrent

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Abstract

A method and apparatus provides for user authentication. In an example, the method and apparatus includes receiving a selected signal strength for smart card emulation authentication. The method and apparatus also includes receiving a signal from a portable wireless device radio transceiver. The method also includes measuring the signal strength of the signal. The method and apparatus also includes, if the signal is at or above the selected signal strength, transmitting one or more signals to the portable radio device radio transceiver requesting user authentication, and if the signal is not at or above a selected signal strength, refusing a request to authenticate by the portable radio device radio transceiver. The method and apparatus also includes receiving one or more authentication response signals from the portable radio device in response to the request for user authentication, the one or more response signals including at least authentication information unique to a user.

Description

Claims (17)

What is claimed is:
1. A method for user authentication, comprising:
receiving a selected signal strength for smart card emulation authentication;
receiving a signal from a portable wireless device radio transceiver;
measuring the signal strength of the signal;
if the signal is at or above the selected signal strength, transmitting one or more signals to the portable radio device radio transceiver requesting user authentication, and if the signal is not at or above a selected signal strength, refusing a request to authenticate by the portable radio device radio transceiver; and
receiving one or more authentication response signals from the portable radio device in response to the request for user authentication, the one or more response signals including at least authentication information unique to a user.
2. The method ofclaim 1, further comprising presenting a user interface containing data representing a selectable proximity range for smart card emulation authentication.
3. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the one or more signals includes a request for a security certificate.
4. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the one or more response signals includes a security certificate.
5. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the one or more response signals includes a coded response to a challenge issued by the smart card reader emulation device, wherein the coded response is based at least in part on the challenge and one or more encryption keys.
6. A method for user de-authentication, comprising:
receiving a selected signal strength for smart card emulation authentication;
receiving one or more response signals from the portable wireless device in response to a request for user authentication, the smart card reader emulation device radio transceiver receiving a signal; and
monitoring the strength of the signal, so that if the signal is at or below the selected signal strength, the smart card reader emulation device de-authenticates a portable wireless device associated with the portable wireless device radio transceiver.
7. The method ofclaim 6, further comprising presenting a user interface containing data representing a selectable proximity range for smart card emulation authentication.
8. The method ofclaim 6, wherein the threshold signal strength is set by a user.
9. The method ofclaim 6, wherein the threshold signal strength is set by one or more security policies.
10. The method ofclaim 6, wherein the smart card reader emulation device de-authenticates the portable wireless device by erasing one or more password values from memory associated with the smart card reader emulation device.
11. The method ofclaim 6, wherein the smart card reader emulation device de-authenticates the smart phone by locking an operating system associated with the smart card reader emulation device.
12. An apparatus for user authentication comprising:
logic operable to:
receive a selected signal strength for smart card emulation authentication;
receive a signal from a portable wireless device radio transceiver;
measure the signal strength of the signal;
if the signal is at or above the selected signal strength, transmit one or more signals to the portable radio device radio transceiver requesting user authentication, and if the signal is not at or above a selected signal strength, refuse a request to authenticate by the portable radio device radio transceiver; and
receive one or more authentication response signals from the portable radio device in response to the request for user authentication, the one or more response signals including at least authentication information unique to a user.
13. The apparatus ofclaim 12, further comprising presenting a user interface containing data representing a selectable proximity range for smart card emulation authentication.
14. The apparatus ofclaim 12, wherein the one or more signals includes a request for a security certificate.
15. The apparatus ofclaim 12, wherein the one or more response signals includes a security certificate.
16. The apparatus ofclaim 12, wherein the one or more response signals includes a coded response to a challenge issued by the smart card reader emulation device, wherein the coded response is based at least in part on the challenge and one or more encryption keys.
17. A computer-readable storage medium comprising executable instructions that when executed by one or more processors causes the one or more processors to:
receive a selected signal strength for smart card emulation authentication;
receive a signal from a portable wireless device radio transceiver;
measure the signal strength of the signal;
if the signal is at or above the selected signal strength, transmit one or more signals to the portable radio device radio transceiver requesting user authentication, and if the signal is not at or above a selected signal strength, refuse a request to authenticate by the portable radio device radio transceiver; and
receive one or more authentication response signals from the portable radio device in response to the request for user authentication, the one or more response signals including at least authentication information unique to a user.
US13/742,7482012-01-172013-01-16Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authenticationAbandonedUS20130183936A1 (en)

Priority Applications (8)

Application NumberPriority DateFiling DateTitle
US13/742,748US20130183936A1 (en)2012-01-172013-01-16Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
PCT/US2013/021917WO2013109737A1 (en)2012-01-172013-01-17Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
EP13701558.2AEP2805466A1 (en)2012-01-172013-01-17Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
CA2861383ACA2861383A1 (en)2012-01-172013-01-17Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
CN201380011366.2ACN104303481B (en)2012-01-172013-01-17Method and apparatus for the certification of long-range portable wireless apparatus
US13/836,431US10165440B2 (en)2012-01-172013-03-15Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
US16/191,944US10645581B2 (en)2012-01-172018-11-15Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
US16/410,671US20190268770A1 (en)2012-01-172019-05-13Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application NumberPriority DateFiling DateTitle
US201261587474P2012-01-172012-01-17
US13/742,748US20130183936A1 (en)2012-01-172013-01-16Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication

Related Child Applications (2)

Application NumberTitlePriority DateFiling Date
US13/836,431Continuation-In-PartUS10165440B2 (en)2012-01-172013-03-15Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
US16/410,671ContinuationUS20190268770A1 (en)2012-01-172019-05-13Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication

Publications (1)

Publication NumberPublication Date
US20130183936A1true US20130183936A1 (en)2013-07-18

Family

ID=48780302

Family Applications (2)

Application NumberTitlePriority DateFiling Date
US13/742,748AbandonedUS20130183936A1 (en)2012-01-172013-01-16Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication
US16/410,671AbandonedUS20190268770A1 (en)2012-01-172019-05-13Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication

Family Applications After (1)

Application NumberTitlePriority DateFiling Date
US16/410,671AbandonedUS20190268770A1 (en)2012-01-172019-05-13Method and apparatus for remote portable wireless device authentication

Country Status (5)

CountryLink
US (2)US20130183936A1 (en)
EP (1)EP2805466A1 (en)
CN (1)CN104303481B (en)
CA (1)CA2861383A1 (en)
WO (1)WO2013109737A1 (en)

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US20130316644A1 (en)*2012-05-232013-11-28Hitachi Consumer Electronics Co., Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
CN103618842A (en)*2013-12-022014-03-05南京理工大学连云港研究院Multifunctional smart phone system capable of recording magnetic track
US20140359714A1 (en)*2013-05-292014-12-04Marcel PlüssMobile electronic device with transceiver for wireless data exchange
US20150169857A1 (en)*2013-12-182015-06-18Medtronic Minimed, Inc.Fingerprint enhanced authentication for medical devices in wireless networks
US9143496B2 (en)*2013-03-132015-09-22Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Device authentication using device environment information
US20160020829A1 (en)*2013-03-112016-01-21Wise-Sec Ltd.Wireless signal generating cards and methods and system of using such cards
US9264421B2 (en)*2013-08-222016-02-16Google Technology Holdings LLCAccessing a primary device using a wearable device and a wireless link
US9286466B2 (en)2013-03-152016-03-15Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Registration and authentication of computing devices using a digital skeleton key
US20170026781A1 (en)*2015-07-232017-01-26Legic Identsystems AgMobile communication device and cloud-based computer system
US9756133B2 (en)2011-08-152017-09-05Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Remote recognition of an association between remote devices
US11270176B2 (en)*2018-01-192022-03-08Capital One Services, LlcConfiguring a set of applets on a battery-less transaction card
US11409852B2 (en)*2019-07-302022-08-09Idex Biometrics AsaDevice with biometric-gated display
US20230291749A1 (en)*2020-08-112023-09-14Capital One Services, LlcSystems and methods for verified messaging via short-range transceiver
US12381872B2 (en)2021-12-152025-08-05Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method and system for authenticating wireless devices

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JP6465098B2 (en)*2016-11-242019-02-06トヨタ自動車株式会社 Vehicle authentication system
EP4429075A1 (en)*2021-11-012024-09-11LG Electronics Inc.Method and device for authentication in wireless power transfer system

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Cited By (33)

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US8897825B2 (en)*2010-09-282014-11-25Ntt Docomo, Inc.Wireless communication device and wireless communication method
US20130165047A1 (en)*2010-09-282013-06-27Ntt Docomo Inc.Wireless communication device and wireless communication method
US9756133B2 (en)2011-08-152017-09-05Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Remote recognition of an association between remote devices
US11388593B2 (en)*2012-05-232022-07-12Maxell, Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US20130316644A1 (en)*2012-05-232013-11-28Hitachi Consumer Electronics Co., Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US12389221B2 (en)2012-05-232025-08-12Maxell, Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US10212586B2 (en)*2012-05-232019-02-19Maxell, Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US11924633B2 (en)2012-05-232024-03-05Maxell, Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US10264456B2 (en)*2012-05-232019-04-16Maxell, Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US20190014473A1 (en)*2012-05-232019-01-10Maxell, Ltd.Mobile terminal and control method thereof
US9621226B2 (en)*2013-03-112017-04-11Wise-Sec Ltd.Wireless signal generating cards and methods and system of using such cards
US20160020829A1 (en)*2013-03-112016-01-21Wise-Sec Ltd.Wireless signal generating cards and methods and system of using such cards
US9143496B2 (en)*2013-03-132015-09-22Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Device authentication using device environment information
US9286466B2 (en)2013-03-152016-03-15Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Registration and authentication of computing devices using a digital skeleton key
US9740849B2 (en)2013-03-152017-08-22Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.Registration and authentication of computing devices using a digital skeleton key
US9483417B2 (en)*2013-05-292016-11-01Legic Identsystems AgMobile electronic device with transceiver for wireless data exchange
US20140359714A1 (en)*2013-05-292014-12-04Marcel PlüssMobile electronic device with transceiver for wireless data exchange
US9264421B2 (en)*2013-08-222016-02-16Google Technology Holdings LLCAccessing a primary device using a wearable device and a wireless link
CN103618842A (en)*2013-12-022014-03-05南京理工大学连云港研究院Multifunctional smart phone system capable of recording magnetic track
US20150169857A1 (en)*2013-12-182015-06-18Medtronic Minimed, Inc.Fingerprint enhanced authentication for medical devices in wireless networks
US20170351851A1 (en)*2013-12-182017-12-07Medtronic Minimed, Inc.Fingerprint enhanced authentication for medical devices in wireless networks
US9779226B2 (en)*2013-12-182017-10-03Medtronic Minimed, Inc.Fingerprint enhanced authentication for medical devices in wireless networks
US10776466B2 (en)*2013-12-182020-09-15Medtronic Minimed, Inc.Fingerprint enhanced authentication for medical devices in wireless networks
US11361059B2 (en)*2013-12-182022-06-14Medtronic Minimed, Inc.Fingerprint enhanced authentication for medical devices in wireless networks
US20170026781A1 (en)*2015-07-232017-01-26Legic Identsystems AgMobile communication device and cloud-based computer system
US9924302B2 (en)*2015-07-232018-03-20Legic Identsystems AgMobile communication device and cloud-based computer system
US11507791B2 (en)2018-01-192022-11-22Capital One Services, LlcConfiguring a set of applets on a battery-less transaction card
US11836559B2 (en)2018-01-192023-12-05Capital One Services, LlcConfiguring a set of applets on a battery-less transaction card
US12197982B2 (en)2018-01-192025-01-14Capital One Services, LlcConfiguring a set of applets on a battery-less transaction card
US11270176B2 (en)*2018-01-192022-03-08Capital One Services, LlcConfiguring a set of applets on a battery-less transaction card
US11409852B2 (en)*2019-07-302022-08-09Idex Biometrics AsaDevice with biometric-gated display
US20230291749A1 (en)*2020-08-112023-09-14Capital One Services, LlcSystems and methods for verified messaging via short-range transceiver
US12381872B2 (en)2021-12-152025-08-05Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method and system for authenticating wireless devices

Also Published As

Publication numberPublication date
EP2805466A1 (en)2014-11-26
CN104303481B (en)2019-02-19
CN104303481A (en)2015-01-21
CA2861383A1 (en)2013-07-25
WO2013109737A1 (en)2013-07-25
US20190268770A1 (en)2019-08-29

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Legal Events

DateCodeTitleDescription
ASAssignment

Owner name:ENTRUST, INC., TEXAS

Free format text:ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:SMITH, CLAYTON DOUGLAS;MARTIN KENT, LINDSAY;REEL/FRAME:029640/0374

Effective date:20130104

ASAssignment

Owner name:ENTRUST, INC., TEXAS

Free format text:ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:SMITH, CLAYTON DOUGLAS;KENT, LINDSAY MARTIN;REEL/FRAME:029813/0593

Effective date:20130104

ASAssignment

Owner name:BMO HARRIS BANK N.A., AS AGENT, ILLINOIS

Free format text:SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:ENTRUST, INC.;REEL/FRAME:045945/0602

Effective date:20180413

STCVInformation on status: appeal procedure

Free format text:BOARD OF APPEALS DECISION RENDERED

STCBInformation on status: application discontinuation

Free format text:ABANDONED -- AFTER EXAMINER'S ANSWER OR BOARD OF APPEALS DECISION

ASAssignment

Owner name:ENTRUST CORPORATION, MINNESOTA

Free format text:MERGER;ASSIGNOR:ENTRUST, INC.;REEL/FRAME:066806/0175

Effective date:20220329


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