US20110122563A1 - Anti-tamper protected enclosure - Google Patents
Anti-tamper protected enclosureDownload PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US20110122563A1 US20110122563A1US13/015,099US201113015099AUS2011122563A1US 20110122563 A1US20110122563 A1US 20110122563A1US 201113015099 AUS201113015099 AUS 201113015099AUS 2011122563 A1US2011122563 A1US 2011122563A1
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- United States
- Prior art keywords
- tamper
- protected enclosure
- grid array
- ball grid
- array device
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- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
Definitions
- the present inventionrelates to electronic devices containing sensitive data generally and more particularly to tamper-protected point of sale terminals.
- the present inventionseeks to provide an improved security system for electronic devices, especially tamper-protected point of sale terminals and other devices containing sensitive information, such as personal data.
- point of sale terminalsincludes, inter alia, PIN pads, electronic cash registers, ATMs, card payment terminals and the like.
- a device for containing sensitive dataincluding a housing, an anti-tamper protected enclosure located within the housing and being adapted to contain the sensitive data, anti-tamper protection circuitry located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure and at least one ball grid array device arranged within the housing, mounted on an outer surface of the anti-tamper protected enclosure and electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of the anti-tamper protected enclosure.
- ball grid array devicerefers to an electrical circuit device enclosed in a ball grid array package.
- the devicealso includes a confidential data storage element located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure. Additionally or alternatively, the device also includes a data entry element mounted in the housing.
- the ball grid array devicepreferably includes wire-bonded circuitry.
- the anti-tamper protection circuitryis operative, in the event of physical tampering with at least one of the at least one ball grid array device, to perform at least one of the following actions: generate an alarm indication, disable the device and erase the sensitive data.
- the deviceis a point of sale terminal.
- an anti-tamper protected enclosureincluding anti-tamper protection circuitry located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure and at least one ball grid array device mounted on an outer surface of the anti-tamper protected enclosure and electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of the anti-tamper protected enclosure.
- the ball grid array devicecomprises wire-bonded circuitry.
- the anti-tamper protected enclosureincludes at least one grid which is electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry. Additionally, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to the at least one conductor network via the at least one ball grid array device. Additionally, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to the at least one conductor network by electrical connections extending through vias which are physically protected by the at least one ball grid array device.
- the physical location of the at least one ball grid array deviceis selected to provide physical protection to at least one electrical connection within the anti-tamper protected enclosure.
- the at least one ball grid array deviceincludes balls which are not electrically connected to the anti-tamper protection circuitry.
- the anti-tamper protected enclosureincludes at least one flexible printed circuit board. Additionally or alternatively, the anti-tamper protected enclosure includes at least one rigid printed circuit board.
- the anti-tamper protected enclosurealso has a confidential data storage element located within.
- the anti-tamper protected circuitryincludes a comparison circuit. Additionally or alternatively, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is operative, in the event of physical tampering with at least one of the at least one ball grid array device, to generate an alarm indication.
- FIG. 1is a simplified pictorial illustration of a point of sale terminal constructed and operative in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2is a partially cut-away simplified pictorial illustration of an anti-tamper protected enclosure forming part of the point of sale terminal of FIG. 1 ;
- FIG. 3is a simplified circuit diagram of electrical connections to anti-tamper protection circuitry employed in the point of sale terminal of FIGS. 1 & 2 ;
- FIG. 4is a simplified, generalized illustration of part of the circuitry of FIG. 3 .
- FIGS. 1 & 2are a simplified pictorial illustration of a point of sale terminal 100 and a partially cut-away simplified pictorial illustration of an anti-tamper protected enclosure forming part of the point of sale terminal 100 constructed and operative in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
- the point of sale terminal of FIG. 1preferably includes a housing 110 and a data entry element, such as a keyboard 112 , mounted in the housing.
- an anti-tamper protected enclosure 114is located within the housing 110 and includes one or more conductor networks, such as networks 116 and 117 , of embedded electrical conductors 118 which are electrically connected to anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 , typically in the form of an integrated circuit located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure 114 .
- Anti-tamper protected enclosure 114may be formed of any suitable material. For example, it may be formed of a plurality of printed circuit boards wherein the conductor networks are defined by conductors 118 formed on one or more layers thereof, preferably including embedded layers. As an alternative, a rigid or non-rigid enclosure may be provided and wrapped in one or more layers of flexible circuit boards having formed thereon or imbedded therein one or more conductor networks.
- At least one ball grid array device 124which includes encapsulation which provides enhanced physical protection, is arranged within the housing 110 and mounted on an outer surface 126 of the anti-tamper protected enclosure 114 .
- the ball grid array device 124preferably is electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry and to conductor network or conductor networks 116 and 117 for protecting against unauthorized access to the anti-tamper protected enclosure 114 and more specifically against access to critical circuit elements, such as data storage elements 128 , anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 and electrical connections, such as vias 130 thereto. It is appreciated that were such critical circuit elements accessible to an unauthorized person, highly confidential information, such as encryption keys and personal identification information, could be compromised.
- two ball grid array devices 124are provided on two oppositely facing outside surfaces of protected enclosure 114 . It is appreciated that a greater or lesser number of ball grid array devices 124 may be employed on any suitable surface of the enclosure 114 , in accordance with the circuit layout therein. Preferably, the placement of the ball grid array devices 124 is such that they physically overlie critical circuit elements mounted or otherwise located at generally the same location.
- FIGS. 3 and 4illustrate a preferred arrangement of electrical connections to anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 .
- Anti-tamper protection circuitry 120preferably includes a comparison circuit which compares the impedance along the parallel pathways such that any physical tampering with the ball grid array device will result in an alarm indication being produced by anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 .
- Anti-tamper protection circuitry 120may take protective steps, such as disabling the point of sale terminal, erasure of all data on data storage elements 128 and sending a tamper alert message.
- the arrangement of the various conductive paths defined by the ball grid array device 124may be arbitrary but preferably includes conductive paths interconnecting balls which do not lie at the periphery of the ball grid array device. It is appreciated that not all balls necessarily form part of the connections.
- a DC voltage source VSRAM 200is provided, typically at a voltage of 3.3 Volts, and is coupled in series via a resistor 202 and via a first conductor network 117 to a ball A forming part of ball grid array device 124 .
- a ground connection 204is coupled in series via a resistor 206 and via another conductor network 117 to a ball B of ball grid array device 124 .
- Ball Ais electrically connected within the ball grid array device 124 , preferably by wire bonding, to a ball C of the ball grid array device 124 .
- Ball Cis connected in series via a resistor 208 and via a portion of a conductor element 116 to a ball D of ball grid array device 124 .
- Ball Dis electrically connected, preferably by wire bonding, to a ball E of the ball grid array device 124 .
- Ball Eis connected via a portion of conductor network 116 in series via a resistor 210 and a resistor 212 to a first input terminal 214 of anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 .
- Ball Cis connected via a portion of conductor network 116 in series via a resistor 216 to a ball F of the ball grid array device 124 .
- Ball Fis electrically connected, preferably by wire bonding, to a ball G of the ball grid array device 124 .
- Ball Gis connected via a portion of conductor network 116 in series via a resistor 218 and via resistor 212 to the first input terminal 214 of anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 .
- Circuitrywhich is similar or identical to that described hereinabove may be connected between ball B and a second input terminal 219 of anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 .
- FIG. 4illustrates, in somewhat expanded form, for the sake of clarity, a four layer PCB, which typically forms a wall of the enclosure 114 ( FIGS. 1 & 2 ) onto which ball grid array device 124 ( FIGS. 1 & 2 ) is mounted.
- a series connection between resistor 208 and ball Cpasses along a plated through hole (PTH) via 221 .
- a series connection between resistor 216 and ball Cpasses along a PTH via 222 and via a portion of conductor network 116 .
- a series connection between resistor 208 and ball Dpasses along a PTH via 224 , via a portion of conductor network 116 and along a PTH via 226 .
- a series connection between resistor 216 and ball Fpasses along a PTH via 228 .
- a series connection between ball E and resistor 210passes along a PTH via 230 , along a portion of conductor network 116 and along a blind via 232 .
- a series connection between resistor 218 and ball Gpasses along a blind via 234 , along a portion of conductor network 116 and along a PTH via 236 .
- a series connection between ball A and resistor 202passes along a PTH via 238 and along a conductor network 117 .
- a series connectionis also provided between resistor 212 and parallel resistors 210 and 218 .
- Ball Ais connected to ball C within the ball grid array device 124 , preferably by wire bonding, via an aluminum conductor 240 .
- Ball Gis connected to ball F within the ball grid array device 124 , preferably by wire bonding.
- Ball Eis connected to ball D within the ball grid array device 124 , preferably by wire bonding.
- the ball grid array device 124is placed at a location overlying the various vias, as shown, which substantially inhibits unauthorized access to those vias.
- the printed circuit boardsmay be of any suitable number of layers, preferably two layers or more.
- the ball grid array devicemay be employed to provide protection to various types of vias carrying sensitive signals, such as through vias, blind vias and buried vias.
- the conductor networkmay be obviated and the ball grid array device is connected directly to the tamper-detection circuitry.
- various conductor networksmay be connected to various voltage sources, each of a different voltage.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
- The present invention relates to electronic devices containing sensitive data generally and more particularly to tamper-protected point of sale terminals.
- The following U.S. Patent documents are believed to represent the current state of the art: U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,646,565; 6,917,299 and 6,853,093. The disclosures of these patent documents are hereby incorporated herein by reference.
- The present invention seeks to provide an improved security system for electronic devices, especially tamper-protected point of sale terminals and other devices containing sensitive information, such as personal data. For the purposes of the present description and claims, the term “point of sale terminals” includes, inter alia, PIN pads, electronic cash registers, ATMs, card payment terminals and the like.
- There is thus provided in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention a device for containing sensitive data including a housing, an anti-tamper protected enclosure located within the housing and being adapted to contain the sensitive data, anti-tamper protection circuitry located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure and at least one ball grid array device arranged within the housing, mounted on an outer surface of the anti-tamper protected enclosure and electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of the anti-tamper protected enclosure.
- The term “ball grid array device” refers to an electrical circuit device enclosed in a ball grid array package.
- Preferably, the device also includes a confidential data storage element located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure. Additionally or alternatively, the device also includes a data entry element mounted in the housing. The ball grid array device preferably includes wire-bonded circuitry.
- Preferably, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is operative, in the event of physical tampering with at least one of the at least one ball grid array device, to perform at least one of the following actions: generate an alarm indication, disable the device and erase the sensitive data.
- In accordance with a preferred embodiment the device is a point of sale terminal.
- There is also provided in accordance with another preferred embodiment of the present invention an anti-tamper protected enclosure including anti-tamper protection circuitry located within the anti-tamper protected enclosure and at least one ball grid array device mounted on an outer surface of the anti-tamper protected enclosure and electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of the anti-tamper protected enclosure. Preferably, the ball grid array device comprises wire-bonded circuitry.
- Preferably, the anti-tamper protected enclosure includes at least one grid which is electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry. Additionally, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to the at least one conductor network via the at least one ball grid array device. Additionally, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to the at least one conductor network by electrical connections extending through vias which are physically protected by the at least one ball grid array device.
- Preferably, the physical location of the at least one ball grid array device is selected to provide physical protection to at least one electrical connection within the anti-tamper protected enclosure. Additionally or alternatively, the at least one ball grid array device includes balls which are not electrically connected to the anti-tamper protection circuitry.
- Preferably, the anti-tamper protected enclosure includes at least one flexible printed circuit board. Additionally or alternatively, the anti-tamper protected enclosure includes at least one rigid printed circuit board.
- Preferably, the anti-tamper protected enclosure also has a confidential data storage element located within.
- Preferably, the anti-tamper protected circuitry includes a comparison circuit. Additionally or alternatively, the anti-tamper protection circuitry is operative, in the event of physical tampering with at least one of the at least one ball grid array device, to generate an alarm indication.
- The present invention will be understood and appreciated more fully from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the drawings in which:
FIG. 1 is a simplified pictorial illustration of a point of sale terminal constructed and operative in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;FIG. 2 is a partially cut-away simplified pictorial illustration of an anti-tamper protected enclosure forming part of the point of sale terminal ofFIG. 1 ;FIG. 3 is a simplified circuit diagram of electrical connections to anti-tamper protection circuitry employed in the point of sale terminal ofFIGS. 1 & 2 ; andFIG. 4 is a simplified, generalized illustration of part of the circuitry ofFIG. 3 .- Reference is now made to
FIGS. 1 & 2 , which are a simplified pictorial illustration of a point ofsale terminal 100 and a partially cut-away simplified pictorial illustration of an anti-tamper protected enclosure forming part of the point ofsale terminal 100 constructed and operative in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The point of sale terminal ofFIG. 1 preferably includes ahousing 110 and a data entry element, such as akeyboard 112, mounted in the housing. Preferably an anti-tamper protectedenclosure 114 is located within thehousing 110 and includes one or more conductor networks, such asnetworks electrical conductors 118 which are electrically connected toanti-tamper protection circuitry 120, typically in the form of an integrated circuit located within the anti-tamper protectedenclosure 114. - Anti-tamper protected
enclosure 114 may be formed of any suitable material. For example, it may be formed of a plurality of printed circuit boards wherein the conductor networks are defined byconductors 118 formed on one or more layers thereof, preferably including embedded layers. As an alternative, a rigid or non-rigid enclosure may be provided and wrapped in one or more layers of flexible circuit boards having formed thereon or imbedded therein one or more conductor networks. - In accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention, at least one ball
grid array device 124, which includes encapsulation which provides enhanced physical protection, is arranged within thehousing 110 and mounted on anouter surface 126 of the anti-tamper protectedenclosure 114. The ballgrid array device 124 preferably is electrically coupled to the anti-tamper protection circuitry and to conductor network orconductor networks enclosure 114 and more specifically against access to critical circuit elements, such asdata storage elements 128,anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 and electrical connections, such asvias 130 thereto. It is appreciated that were such critical circuit elements accessible to an unauthorized person, highly confidential information, such as encryption keys and personal identification information, could be compromised. - In the illustrated embodiment of
FIGS. 1 & 2 , two ballgrid array devices 124 are provided on two oppositely facing outside surfaces of protectedenclosure 114. It is appreciated that a greater or lesser number of ballgrid array devices 124 may be employed on any suitable surface of theenclosure 114, in accordance with the circuit layout therein. Preferably, the placement of the ballgrid array devices 124 is such that they physically overlie critical circuit elements mounted or otherwise located at generally the same location. - Reference is now made to
FIGS. 3 and 4 , which illustrate a preferred arrangement of electrical connections toanti-tamper protection circuitry 120. It is seen that preferably there is provided a pair of electrically parallel conductive pathways, each providing a connection extending between a voltage source across one ormore conductor networks 117 of embedded electrical conductors, across various conductive paths at least partially defined by the ball grid array device and by one ormore conductor networks 116, including selected resistances, to inputs ofanti-tamper protection circuitry 120.Anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 preferably includes a comparison circuit which compares the impedance along the parallel pathways such that any physical tampering with the ball grid array device will result in an alarm indication being produced byanti-tamper protection circuitry 120.Anti-tamper protection circuitry 120 may take protective steps, such as disabling the point of sale terminal, erasure of all data ondata storage elements 128 and sending a tamper alert message. - It is appreciated that the arrangement of the various conductive paths defined by the ball
grid array device 124 may be arbitrary but preferably includes conductive paths interconnecting balls which do not lie at the periphery of the ball grid array device. It is appreciated that not all balls necessarily form part of the connections. - In the illustrated example of
FIG. 3 , a DCvoltage source VSRAM 200 is provided, typically at a voltage of 3.3 Volts, and is coupled in series via aresistor 202 and via afirst conductor network 117 to a ball A forming part of ballgrid array device 124. Aground connection 204 is coupled in series via aresistor 206 and via anotherconductor network 117 to a ball B of ballgrid array device 124. - Ball A is electrically connected within the ball
grid array device 124, preferably by wire bonding, to a ball C of the ballgrid array device 124. Ball C is connected in series via aresistor 208 and via a portion of aconductor element 116 to a ball D of ballgrid array device 124. Ball D is electrically connected, preferably by wire bonding, to a ball E of the ballgrid array device 124. Ball E is connected via a portion ofconductor network 116 in series via aresistor 210 and aresistor 212 to afirst input terminal 214 ofanti-tamper protection circuitry 120. - Ball C is connected via a portion of
conductor network 116 in series via aresistor 216 to a ball F of the ballgrid array device 124. Ball F is electrically connected, preferably by wire bonding, to a ball G of the ballgrid array device 124. Ball G is connected via a portion ofconductor network 116 in series via aresistor 218 and viaresistor 212 to thefirst input terminal 214 ofanti-tamper protection circuitry 120. - Circuitry which is similar or identical to that described hereinabove may be connected between ball B and a
second input terminal 219 ofanti-tamper protection circuitry 120. - A
portion 220 forming part of one of the parallel pathways in the above-described circuitry is shown in detail inFIG. 4 .FIG. 4 illustrates, in somewhat expanded form, for the sake of clarity, a four layer PCB, which typically forms a wall of the enclosure114 (FIGS. 1 & 2 ) onto which ball grid array device124 (FIGS. 1 & 2 ) is mounted. - It is seen in
FIG. 4 that a series connection betweenresistor 208 and ball C passes along a plated through hole (PTH) via221. A series connection betweenresistor 216 and ball C passes along a PTH via222 and via a portion ofconductor network 116. A series connection betweenresistor 208 and ball D passes along a PTH via224, via a portion ofconductor network 116 and along a PTH via226. A series connection betweenresistor 216 and ball F passes along a PTH via228. A series connection between ball E andresistor 210 passes along a PTH via230, along a portion ofconductor network 116 and along a blind via232. A series connection betweenresistor 218 and ball G passes along a blind via234, along a portion ofconductor network 116 and along a PTH via236. A series connection between ball A andresistor 202 passes along a PTH via238 and along aconductor network 117. A series connection is also provided betweenresistor 212 andparallel resistors - Ball A is connected to ball C within the ball
grid array device 124, preferably by wire bonding, via analuminum conductor 240. Ball G is connected to ball F within the ballgrid array device 124, preferably by wire bonding. Ball E is connected to ball D within the ballgrid array device 124, preferably by wire bonding. - Preferably, the ball
grid array device 124 is placed at a location overlying the various vias, as shown, which substantially inhibits unauthorized access to those vias. - It is appreciated that multiple circuits similar to the circuitry described hereinabove may be provided. It is also appreciated that the printed circuit boards may be of any suitable number of layers, preferably two layers or more. It is additionally appreciated that the ball grid array device may be employed to provide protection to various types of vias carrying sensitive signals, such as through vias, blind vias and buried vias.
- According to an alternative embodiment, the conductor network may be obviated and the ball grid array device is connected directly to the tamper-detection circuitry. According to another alternative embodiment, various conductor networks may be connected to various voltage sources, each of a different voltage.
- It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited by what has been particularly shown and described hereinabove. Rather the scope of the present invention includes both combinations and sub-combinations of various feature of the invention and modifications thereof which may occur to persons skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description and which are not in the prior art.
Claims (24)
1. A device for containing sensitive data comprising:
a housing;
an anti-tamper protected enclosure located within said housing and being adapted to contain said sensitive data;
anti-tamper protection circuitry located within said anti-tamper protected enclosure; and
at least one ball grid array device arranged within said housing and mounted on an outer surface of said anti-tamper protected enclosure, said at least one ball grid array device including a multiplicity of balls, at least a plurality of which are electrically coupled to said anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of said anti-tamper protected enclosure,
said anti-tamper protection circuitry being operative, in the event of physical tampering with at least one of said at least one ball grid array device, to perform at least one of the following actions: generate an alarm indication, disable the device and erase said sensitive data.
2. The device according toclaim 1 , and also comprising a confidential data storage element located within said anti-tamper protected enclosure.
3. The device according toclaim 1 , wherein said at least one ball grid array device includes wire-bonded circuitry.
4. The device according toclaim 1 , wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure includes at least one conductor network which is electrically coupled to said anti-tamper protection circuitry.
5. The device according toclaim 4 , wherein said anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to said at least one conductor network via said at least one ball grid array device.
6. The device according toclaim 5 , wherein said anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to said at least one conductor network by electrical connections extending through vias which are physically protected by said at least one ball grid array device.
7. The device according toclaim 1 , wherein a physical location of said at least one ball grid array device is selected to provide physical protection to at least one electrical connection within said anti-tamper protected enclosure.
8. (canceled)
9. The device according toclaim 1 , wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one flexible printed circuit board.
10. The device according toclaim 1 , wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one rigid printed circuit board.
11. (canceled)
12. The device according toclaim 1 , wherein said device is a point of sale terminal.
13. An anti-tamper protected enclosure comprising:
anti-tamper protection circuitry located within said anti-tamper protected enclosure; and
at least one ball grid array device mounted on an outer surface of said anti-tamper protected enclosure, said at least one ball grid array device including a multiplicity of balls, at least a plurality of which are electrically coupled to said anti-tamper protection circuitry for protecting against unauthorized access to the interior of said anti-tamper protected enclosure,
said anti-tamper protection circuitry being operative, in the event of physical tampering with at least one of said at least one ball grid array device, to generate an alarm indication.
14. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , and also comprising a confidential data storage element located within.
15. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , including at least one conductor network which is electrically coupled to said anti-tamper protection circuitry.
16. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 15 , wherein said anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to said at least one conductor network via said at least one ball grid array device.
17. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 16 , wherein said anti-tamper protection circuitry is coupled to said at least one conductor network by electrical connections extending through vias which are physically protected by said at least one ball grid array device.
18. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , wherein a physical location of said at least one ball grid array device is selected to provide physical protection to at least one electrical connection within said anti-tamper protected enclosure.
19. (canceled)
20. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one flexible printed circuit board.
21. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , wherein said anti-tamper protected enclosure comprises at least one rigid printed circuit board.
22. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , wherein said anti-tamper protection circuitry includes a comparison circuit.
23. (canceled)
24. The anti-tamper protected enclosure according toclaim 13 , wherein said at least one ball grid array device includes wire-bonded circuitry.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US13/015,099US20110122563A1 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2011-01-27 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US11/627,166US7898413B2 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-01-25 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
| US13/015,099US20110122563A1 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2011-01-27 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Related Parent Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US11/627,166ContinuationUS7898413B2 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-01-25 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| US20110122563A1true US20110122563A1 (en) | 2011-05-26 |
Family
ID=39644774
Family Applications (2)
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|---|---|---|---|
| US11/627,166Active2029-10-17US7898413B2 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-01-25 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
| US13/015,099AbandonedUS20110122563A1 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2011-01-27 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Family Applications Before (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| US11/627,166Active2029-10-17US7898413B2 (en) | 2007-01-25 | 2007-01-25 | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
Country Status (4)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (2) | US7898413B2 (en) |
| EP (1) | EP2108150A4 (en) |
| CN (1) | CN101611382B (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2008091470A1 (en) |
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| US20130015972A1 (en)* | 2011-07-11 | 2013-01-17 | Verifone, Inc. | Anti-tampering protection assembly |
| USD685787S1 (en)* | 2011-09-21 | 2013-07-09 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Solid state drive |
| US10678958B2 (en) | 2015-12-28 | 2020-06-09 | Intelligent Technologies International, Inc. | Intrusion-protected memory component |
| US12051277B1 (en) | 2021-06-03 | 2024-07-30 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Multi-sensor input device |
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| US7898413B2 (en)* | 2007-01-25 | 2011-03-01 | Verifone, Inc. | Anti-tamper protected enclosure |
| US9013336B2 (en) | 2008-01-22 | 2015-04-21 | Verifone, Inc. | Secured keypad devices |
| US8595514B2 (en) | 2008-01-22 | 2013-11-26 | Verifone, Inc. | Secure point of sale terminal |
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| BRPI1010889B1 (en)* | 2009-06-09 | 2024-01-23 | Gilbarco, S.R.L. | USER INTERFACE FOR A FUEL DISPENSER, AND, FUEL DISPENSER |
| CN101697182B (en)* | 2009-09-29 | 2011-10-05 | 广州广电运通金融电子股份有限公司 | Encryption keyboard |
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| US8621235B2 (en) | 2011-01-06 | 2013-12-31 | Verifone, Inc. | Secure pin entry device |
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| US12051277B1 (en) | 2021-06-03 | 2024-07-30 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Multi-sensor input device |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN101611382A (en) | 2009-12-23 |
| CN101611382B (en) | 2012-07-04 |
| EP2108150A1 (en) | 2009-10-14 |
| US20080180245A1 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
| WO2008091470A1 (en) | 2008-07-31 |
| EP2108150A4 (en) | 2013-12-11 |
| US7898413B2 (en) | 2011-03-01 |
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| Date | Code | Title | Description |
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| AS | Assignment | Owner name:JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT, IL Free format text:SECURITY INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:VERIFONE, INC.;HYPERCOM CORPORATION;GLOBAL BAY MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;REEL/FRAME:033282/0757 Effective date:20140708 | |
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