US20060112275A1 - Facilitating and authenticating transactions - Google Patents

Abstract

A device or “dongle” (30) is provided for controlling communications between a Subscriber Identity Module (for SIM) (12), such as of the type used in a GSM cellular telephone system, and a computer, such as a Windows-based PC (10). The SIM (12) can be authenticated by the telephone network, in the same way as for authenticating SIMs of telephone handset users in the network, and can in this way authenticate the user of the PC (10) or the PC (10) itself. Such authentication can, for example, permit the use of the PC (10) for a time-limited session in relation to a particular application, which is released to the PC (10), after the authentication is satisfactorily completed. The application may be released to the PC (10) by a third party after and in response to the satisfactory completion of the authentication process. A charge for the session can be debited to the user by the telecommunications network and then passed on to the third party. The dongle (30) provides additional security for the authentication data stored on the SIM by requiring a PIN to be entered and/or by only being responsive to requests received from the PC (10) which are encrypted using a key, which requests are generated by a special PC interface driver (38).

Description

• The invention relates to the facilitation and authentication of transactions. In embodiments of the invention, to be described below in more detail by way of example only, transactions between data processing apparatus (such as a personal computer), or a user thereof, and a (possibly remote) third party are facilitated and authenticated, and such facilitation and authentication may also involve the facilitation and authentication of a payment or data transfer to be made by or on behalf of the user to the third party.
• According to the invention, there is provided a device for connection to a data processing apparatus, the device including means for operative coupling to authentication storage means storing predetermined information relating to the authentication of a transaction with the data processing apparatus, the device when operatively coupled to the data processing apparatus being responsive to an authentication process carried out via a communications link for authenticating the transaction, the authentication process involving the use of the predetermined information, and wherein the device controls access to the predetermined information.
• According to the invention, there is also provided a method for authenticating a transaction with data processing apparatus in which the data processing apparatus has operatively associated with it a security device which in turn has operatively associated with it authentication storage means for storing predetermined authentication information, and including the step of carrying out an authentication process via a communications link for authenticating the transaction, the authentication process involving the use of the predetermined authentication information obtained from the authentication storage means via the security device which controls access to the predetermined authentication information.
• According to the invention, there is further provided a device for controlling access to authentication data stored on a authentication storage means, the device including means for coupling the device to a data processing apparatus to allow the authentication data to be used to authenticate a transaction performed by the data processing apparatus, wherein security means is provided for controlling access to the authentication data via the data processing apparatus.
• A method according to the invention of facilitating and authenticating transactions involving data processing apparatus such as a personal computer, and devices for connection to data processing apparatus (such as a personal computer) embodying the invention, will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying diagrammatic drawings in which:
• FIG. 1 is a block diagram for explaining the operation of the method in relation to the data processing apparatus;
• FIG. 2 is a flow chart for use in the understanding of the block diagram ofFIG. 1;
• FIG. 3 is a block diagram corresponding toFIG. 1 in which a “dongle” in accordance with the invention is used;
• FIG. 4 is a perspective view of one configuration of a dongle;
• FIG. 5 shows a side elevation of a further configuration of the dongle;
• FIG. 6 shows a block diagram for explaining the operation of a method of authenticating a transaction using data processing apparatus;
• FIGS. 7A, 7B and7C are a flow chart for use in understanding the authentication process carried out by the data processing apparatus ofFIG. 6.
• FIG. 8A shows a front view of a third configuration of a dongle;
• FIG. 8B shows a side view of the dongle ofFIG. 8A;
• FIG. 8C shows a cross-sectional view taken along line x-x ofFIG. 8B but with the dongle connector extended;
• FIG. 8D shows a side view corresponding toFIG. 8B but with the dongle connector extended;
• FIG. 9A shows a front view of a fourth configuration of a dongle;
• FIG. 9B shows a side view of the dongle ofFIG. 9A;
• FIG. 9C shows a front view corresponding toFIG. 9A but with the dongle connector extended;
• FIG. 9D shows a side view corresponding toFIG. 9B but with the dongle connector extended;
• FIG. 10A shows a front view of a fifth configuration of a dongle;
• FIG. 10B shows a side view of the dongle ofFIG. 10A;
• FIG. 10C shows a front view corresponding toFIG. 10A but with the dongle connector extended;
• FIG. 10D shows a side view corresponding toFIG. 10B but with the dongle connector extended;
• FIG. 11A shows a front view of a sixth configuration of a dongle;
• FIG. 11B shows a side view of the dongle ofFIG. 11A; and
• FIG. 11C shows how the electrical connector emerges from the casing of the dongle.
• In the figures like elements are generally designated with the same reference numbers.
• There exist many instances when a transaction involving the use of data processing apparatus requires authentication. For example, the data processing apparatus may be required to carry out a transaction, such as the exchange of information, with a third party, such as a remote third party with which the communication must be made over a telecommunications link (including via the Internet). The third party may require that the data processing apparatus, or the user thereof for the time being, is authenticated to the satisfaction of the third party before the transaction takes place.
• As stated, the transaction may merely involve the exchange of information. For example, the user of the data processing apparatus may simply need to be authenticated in order to download information from the third party. Such information may be information kept by the third party on behalf of the user of the data processing apparatus (for example, information relating to the user's bank account). Instead, the information might be information held on other data processing apparatus, such as a data network belonging to an organisation or commercial entity with which the user is connected or by whom the user is employed, thus facilitating access to that network by the user when the user is travelling. Another possible transaction may involve the downloading by the data processing apparatus of software from the remote location.
• In addition, the transaction may require a payment to be made by the user in order to enable the transaction to take place, such as a payment to the third party in return for the information provided. Clearly, when such a payment is involved, it is important that the user is authenticated to the satisfaction of the third party and that the payment is made in a safe, simple and secure manner.
• Although the foregoing discussion has referred to a “user” of the data processing apparatus, some at least of the transactions described above may not in fact involve any human user: the data processing apparatus may be required to operate automatically (for example, intermittently operating in an information-gathering or monitoring role, and reporting the results to a third party). In such cases, it may alternatively or additionally be necessary for the data processing apparatus to authenticate itself to the satisfaction of the third party.
• The data processing apparatus is provided with, or associated with means (authentication storage means) for storing predetermined authentication information for authenticating that apparatus or a particular user thereof. In one embodiment, the means for storing the predetermined information is removable and can thus be taken by the user and inserted into any data processing apparatus (or computer) which is adapted to receive it, so as to enable that user to be authenticated in respect to a transaction to be carried out by that user with that computer. Advantageously, in such a case the means for storing the predetermined information is in the form of a smart card.
• In a more specific example, the smart card is a Subscriber Identity Module or SIM of the type used in and for authenticating the use of handsets in a mobile or cellular telecommunications network—such as a GSM (Group Special Mobile) or 3G (Third Generation) network. Such a network will store details of its users' (subscribers') SIMs. In operation of the network, a user's handset is authenticated (for example, when the user activates the handset on the network with a view to making or receiving calls) by the network sending a challenge to the handset incorporating that SIM, in response to which the SIM calculates a reply (dependent on the predetermined information held on the SIM—typically an authentication algorithm and a unique key Ki) and transmits it back to the network which checks it against its own information for that user or subscriber in order to complete the authentication process. In the same way, therefore, the SIM can be used in or in association with the data processing apparatus or computer so that the same form of authentication process can be carried out. In a case where the SIM is the SIM of a subscriber to a particular cellular telecommunications network, the authentication process can be carried out by that network.
• It should be noted that the authentication process being described does not necessarily authenticate the human identity of the user. For example, cellular telecommunication networks have pre-pay subscribers who are issued with SIMs in return for pre-payment enabling them to make calls on the network. However, the identity of such pre-pay subscribers is not known (or not necessarily known) by the networks. Nevertheless, such a user cannot make use of the network until the network has authenticated that user's SIM—that is, has confirmed that such user is a particular user who has a particular pre-paid account with the network. The SIMs of such pre-paid users or subscribers could equally well be used (in the manner described) in or in association with data processing apparatus or computers, for the purposes of authenticating that user.
• The SIM need not take the form of a physical (and removable) smart card but instead can be simulated by being embedded in the data processing apparatus or computer in the form of software or represented as a chip for example.
• It may be desirable to be able to change the authentication information on the SIM (or simulated SIM) to take account of changed circumstances. For example, the SIM may be a SIM registered with a particular cellular telecommunications network—a network applicable to the country or region where the data processing apparatus or computer is to be used. However, circumstances may arise (for example, the apparatus or the computer is physically moved to a different country or region) in which it is desirable or necessary to re-register the SIM with a different cellular telecommunications network. Ways in which this can be done are disclosed in our co-pending United Kingdom patent applications Nos. 0118406.8, 0122712.3 and 0130790.9 and in our corresponding PCT applications Nos. GB02/003265, GB02/003260 and GB02/003252. As described therein in more detail, a SIM (and thus also a simulated SIM) may be initially provided with authentication (and other) information relating to each of a plurality of networks, the information respective to the different networks being selectively activatable.
• It is not necessary, however, for the users to be subscribers to a telecommunications network. Instead, they could be subscribers registered with some other centralised system which could then carry out the authentication process in the same way as in a telecommunications network. In such a case, the registration of a SIM (or simulated SIM) could be transferred from one such centralised system to another in the same manner as described above.
• As described above, an aim of the authentication process is to facilitate a transaction between the data processing apparatus or computer and a third party. Where the authentication process is carried out by a telecommunications network, or by some other system, to which the user of the SIM is a subscriber, the satisfactory completion of the authentication process would then be communicated by that network or system to the third party—to enable the transaction to proceed.
• For many transactions of the type described, a payment by the user to the third party may be involved. An arrangement as described above, in which the authentication process is carried out by a telecommunications network or other centralised system to which the user is a subscriber advantageously facilitates the making of such payments and is particularly advantageous where (as may often be the case) the payment is for a small amount (for example, payment in return for receipt of information—e.g. weather or traffic information, or for temporary use of specific software); in such a case, the payment can be debited to the account of the subscriber held by the telecommunications network or other centralised system—and then, of course, passed on to the third party, perhaps after deduction of a handling charge.
• The block diagram ofFIG. 1 schematically illustrates one way of operating the met hod described above.
• A Windows-based personal computer orPC10 is shown (‘Windows’ is a trade mark). ThePC10 is adapted to receive a SIM shown diagrammatically at12. The SIM may be removably fitted to the PC, for use in identifying a user (that is, the holder of the SIM) or may be fixed within the PC (for identifying the PC itself). ThePC10 incorporatestransaction management software14 which interacts with and controls some of the functions of the SIM.
• Although an arrangement has been described where thePC10 is adapted to receive a SIM, it should be appreciated that a smart card other than a SIM might be used, and this is in accordance with the invention. Further, rather than the SIM (or smartcard) being received by the PC—by being removably fitted to the PC or fixed within the PC—the SIM (or smartcard) could be associated with the PC in any way that allows communication between the SIM (or smartcard) and thePC10. For example, the SIM (or smartcard) could be provided with a “dongle” (examples of which are described hereinafter in detail) which allows wired or wireless communication with thePC10. Preferably, the communication between the SIM (or smartcard) and thePC10 is secure. The communications may be encrypted, or any other means for secure communication may be employed.
• Also shown inFIG. 1 is acellular telephone network16, such as the Vodafone (trade mark) network, and it is assumed that theSIM12 is registered with thenetwork16.
• The operation of the system shown inFIG. 1 will be explained in relation to the flow chart ofFIG. 2.
• At step A, the user of thePC10 requests use of aparticular application17 on the PC. For example, the user might wish to view web pages containing specialised information which are encrypted and thus not generally available. In order to do this, the user requests a “session key”—that is, for example, permission to carry out a transaction involving time-limited use of the particular application. The request for the session key is addressed to thetransaction manager14. Thetransaction manager14 then, transmits identification information derived from the SIM12 (an “I am here” message) to thesecurity services part18 of the network16 (step B). In response to the “I am here” message, the network transmits a random challenge (step C) to thetransaction manager14, this challenge being based on information known to the network about theSIM12.
• The double-headedarrow19 inFIG. 1 indicates schematically the two-way data communication between thePC10 and thenetwork16. This data communication may be over any suitable communication medium. For example, the communication medium may be a fixed telephone network (such as PSTN) or a wireless network. For example, the wireless network may be the same as thenetwork16 which providessecurity services18, or may be another network. The data communication may be performed via the Internet. The data communication is preferably in a form that is secure and encrypted.
• At step D, thetransaction manager14 transmits a response fromSIM12 to the challenge by providing an answer derived from the challenge and the key held on the SIM. The reply is checked by thesecurity services part18 of thenetwork16. Assuming that the response is satisfactory, thesecurity services part18 authenticates the user and confirms this to the transaction manager14 (step E)—possibly by providing a populate Security Token. At the same time, thesecurity services part18 in the network transmits the session key (step F) to theapplication services part22 of thenetwork16.
• Thetransaction manager14 also transmits the session key to the application17 (step G).
• In the embodiment described, the transaction manager facilitates the transfer of data to and from theSIM12. There is no requirement for the transaction manager to be able to understand or interpret this data. The function of the transaction manager in the embodiment being described is to act as a conduit for the data being passed to and from theSIM12.
• The user can now make the request for the particular application (step H), accompanying this application request with the session key received at step G. The application request of step H is transmitted to anapplication services part22 which may be part of the network16 (as shown) or may be separate and controlled by a third party. At step I the application services part compares the session key received with the application request (step H) with the session key received at step F. Assuming that the result of this check is satisfactory, theapplication services part22 now transmits acceptance of the application request (step J) to thePC10, and the application now proceeds. The session key may allow time limited use of theapplication server22, a single use or infinite use—depending on the circumstances. The network can now debit the user's account with a charge for the session. There may be communication link between theapplication services part22 and thesecurity services part18 to allow data exchange between those parts—for example to allow thesecurity services part18 to arrange for the user's account with thenetwork16 to be debited.
• The foregoing is of course merely one simple example of an implementation of what has been described.
• In an alternative arrangement, a data carrier may be provided with means for storing predetermined information such as in one of the forms described above—that is, a SIM or (more probably) software simulating a SIM. The simulated SIM is associated with data stored on the data carrier. The data carrier may, for example, be a DVD or CD ROM or some other similar data carrier, and the data thereon may be software or a suite of software.
• The simulated SIM may be used to identify and authenticate the data (such as the software) on the data carrier. The simulated SIM will be registered with a telecommunications network or some other centralised system, in the same manner as described above. When the data carrier is placed in data processing apparatus such as a computer, for use therein, the SIM would be used to identify and authenticate the data carrier and the data stored thereon and (for example) could then permit the software to be downloaded for use in the computer. In this way, the SIM could be used subsequently to block further use of the software (for example, in another computer), or to allow the data to be used for only a predetermined number of times (whether in the same or in a different computer). If, for example, the data carrier (with its SIM) is placed in a computer which has also received a particular user's SIM then (a) the SIM on the data carrier can be used to identify and authenticate the software and (b) the SIM in or associated with the computer can be used to authenticate the user and could subsequently be used to enable a charge to be debited to that user as payment for use of the software.
• The data stored on the data carrier with the SIM Nmay, for example, be encrypted data. That encrypted data can only be encrypted using information provided by the SIM on the data carrier. In this way, the SIM on the data carrier may control use of the data stored on the data carrier. For example, the data carrier may be sold with a particular licence giving a user restricted rights to use the data on the data carrier. The user may be allowed to use the data for a predetermined time period or for a predetermined number of times. Each time the data is used it is decrypted using data stored on the SIM. A record in the SIM (or elsewhere) is maintained of the number of times that the data is decrypted. When the number of times that the data has been decrypted equals the number of times provided in the licence sold with the data carrier, the SIM prevents further use of the data by not decrypting the data. If the data is provided with a licence that lasts until the predetermined time, each time the SIM decrypts the data, the SIM will check that the current time (with reference to a suitable clock provided, for example, on the SIM, on thePC10 or with reference to the network16) so that decryption of the data is only performed up to the time specified in the licence sold with the data carrier.
• Although a simulated SIM is described above, it is presently preferred that the SIM is implemented in hardware because this is more secure. The secret authentication data on a hardware SIM is inaccessible to unauthorised persons.
• Rather than the PC10 being adapted to receive aSIM12, or a data carrier being modified to incorporate a SIM or software simulating a SIM, a separate device or “dongle”30 may be provided for receiving theSIM12, or for incorporating software simulating theSIM12.
• FIG. 3 shows adongle30 that allows data for authenticating a transaction (or for any other appropriate purpose) to be passed between thedongle30 and thePC10 and onwardly to/from thenetwork16.
• Thedongle30 comprises ahousing32 having a slot for receiving aSIM12. Thehousing32 may be made of any suitable material. Preferably, this material is electrically insulating. For example, the housing may comprise laser activated resin or plastics.
• Appropriate connectors (not shown) are provided within thehousing32 for allowing electronic exchange of data between theSIM12 and thedongle30. Thedongle30 further comprises asuitable connector34 for allowing connection for data communication purposes to thePC10. For example, the connector could be a USB connector, a Firewire1394 connector or any other suitable connector. Of course, different configurations of the dongle may be provided. For example, theSIM12 may be accommodated completely within thedongle30, and may be removable from thedongle30 by opening thehousing32, or theSIM12 may be permanently sealed or encapsulated within thedongle casing32. If the latter arrangement is provided, a user of the telecommunication system may be provided with a first SIM for use, for example, in their mobile telephone handset and may be provided with adongle30 which houses a separate SIM which is used for performing transactions via aPC10. If desired, the telecommunications network will include a record indicating that the SIM within the user's mobile handset and the SIM within the user's dongle are commonly owned, and this information may be used to conveniently provide the user with a single account of charges incurred in respect of use of both the SIMs.
• Thedongle30 is provided with adongle interface driver36 which controls communication with thePC10. All communications from the PC10 are routed via thedongle interface driver36 and data stored on theSIM12 cannot be accessed other than by using thedongle interface driver36. A correspondingPC interface driver38 is provided for thePC10. ThePC interface driver38 may, for example, comprise a series of commands in the form of a computer programme which is loaded onto and run by thePC10. ThePC interface driver38 may, for example, be provided by or under the control of thenetwork16. ThePC interface driver38 will therefore be “trusted” by thenetwork16 and will be configured to only allow access to thedongle30 and consequently theSIM12 in an approved manner which will not allow the security information present on theSIM12 to be compromised.
• To prevent, or to reduce, the likelihood of thePC interface driver38 being replaced or bypassed by an alternative driver, which could compromise the security of the data on theSIM12, thePC interface driver38 and thedongle interface driver36 are provided with respective sharedsecret keys40,42. Each communication from thePC interface driver38 to thedongle30 is encrypted using the sharedsecret key40. All communications from thePC10 to thedongle30 are received by thedongle interface driver36. Thedongle interface driver36 comprises processing means for decrypting received communications using itssecret key42. To enhance security, thedongle interface driver36 will prevent all communications other than those encrypted using the shared secret key40 from sending data to or receiving data from theSIM12.
• Therefore, thePC interface driver38 controls and supervises access to thedongle30 and theSIM12 to reduce the likelihood of the data stored on theSIM12 being compromised by unauthorised attempts to access theSIM12.
• Provided that a request for access to data on theSIM12 is approved by the PC interface driver (according, for example, to criteria set by the network16), and is therefore communicated to thedongle interface driver36 with theappropriate key40, a transaction can be authenticated using theSIM12 in the manner described in relation toFIGS. 1 and 2.
• Although the provision of sharedsecret keys40,42 is advantageous, it should be appreciated that the provision of sharedsecret keys40,42 is not essential to the invention.
• In an alternative arrangement thePC interface driver38 is not provided with a particularsecret key40. However, thedongle interface driver36 is provided with a key42. When thedongle30 is coupled to thePC10 thePC interface driver38 detects that the dongle interface driver is provided with a key42. ThePC interface driver38 may then obtain from thenetwork16 via communications link19 a key that will allow data exchange between the PC interface driver13 and thedongle interface driver36 encrypted using the key42. For example, the key42 of thedongle interface driver36 may be a private key and the key40 provided to the PC interface driver by thenetwork16 may be a public key—the two keys being a public-private key pair. The keys provided by thenetwork16 are preferably not provided on request by any application. For example, thenetwork16 may be configured to only provide these keys to a trusted PC interface driver and/or after some authentication process.
• Alternatively, the data transfer between thedongle interface driver36 and thePC interface driver38 may be not encrypted, or may be encrypted in a way that is common to many dongle interface drivers and PC interface drivers provided on different equipment, which has the advantage of allowing thedongle30 to be used with a multiplicity of different PCs.
• As an added security measure, communications between thePC interface driver38 and thetransaction manager14 may be encrypted. For example, those parts may each have a shared secret key and communications between them may be encrypted using the shared secret key.
• A further embodiment to the present invention will be described in relation toFIG. 4. According toFIG. 4, thedongle30 has theSIM12 accommodated completely within itshousing32, and the SIM cannot therefore be seen in the Figure. Thedongle30 has aconnector34 for connection to aPC10 in a similar manner to theFIG. 3 embodiment. At the opposite end of thecasing32 anoptional loop connector44 may be provided to provide a convenient means for carrying thedongle30 by attaching it to a user's keyring.
• One face of thehousing32 has a variety ofpush buttons46 mounted thereon, ten of which have respective numerals from 0 to 9 displayed thereon. In this embodiment, thedongle30 includes means (such as software) for receiving the entry of a PIN number from a user by operating the appropriately designatedpush buttons46 which is compared to the PIN number provided for and stored on theSIM12. The SIMs used in the GSM telecommunications network are conventionally provided with such a PIN.
• Thehousing32 may further optionally provide adisplay48 for prompting the user to enter their PIN number and/or for displaying the PIN number as it is entered, if desired. On entry of the PIN number using thepush buttons46, the entered PIN number is compared to the PIN number stored on the SIM. If the PINs are found to match, communication between the SIM and the PC10 is permitted to authenticate one or more transactions. The comparison between the entered PIN number and the PIN number stored on theSIM12 is performed within thedongle30, and neither the entered PIN number nor the PIN number stored on the SIM is communicated to the PC10. This prevents or reduces the likelihood that the PINs will become compromised by disclosure to an authorised party.
• To allow entry of the PIN thedongle30 requires a power supply. Power can be provided by thePC10. Advantageously, the PIN has its own temporary power supply which allows the PIN to be entered and verified. Subsequently, the power supply is interrupted and the PIN data is lost. This is an additional security feature, and is described in more detail below.
• The PIN entry comparison arrangement ofFIG. 4 may be provided in addition to or as an alternative to theinterface drivers36,38 and sharedsecret keys40,42 of the arrangement shown inFIG. 3.
• It should be appreciated that as an alternative to pushbuttons46, other means could be provided for allowing PIN entry. Alternatively, the user could be authorised to use the SIM by obtaining some other security information from the user and comparing this with data stored on theSIM12. For example, the data obtained could be the user's fingerprint or some other characteristic which is unlikely to re-occur on another person—for example, any suitable biometric data. The details of the fingerprint (or other information) are stored on the SIM for comparison with the input data representing the characteristics.
• As an additional security feature in theFIG. 4 embodiment, a display may be provided which displays the name of the application or organisation which requests information from theSIM12. This would allow the user to monitor requests being made to hisSIM12.
• If therespective interface drivers36,38 and sharedsecret keys40,42 described in relation toFIG. 3 are used in a system which also includes the PIN entry and comparison arrangement described in relation toFIG. 4, to provide an added level of security, thedongle30 can be programmed to display the name of the application or organisation requesting data from theSIM12 and may then prompt the user to approve the supply of data for each or selected applications/organisations by entering the user'sPIN using keypad46. As an alternative to entering a PIN the, user could be prompted to activate a “confirm transaction” button or the like.
• Thedongle30 may be used to facilitate transactions with data processing apparatus other than PCs. For example, a user having an account withnetwork16 and being provided with adongle30 can insert theconnector34 into an appropriately configured slot in a parking meter which is connectable to thenetwork16. TheSIM12 contained within thedongle30 is authenticated in the manner described above using a transaction manager provided within the parking meter. By this means, payment for parking can be made by deducting an appropriate amount from the user's account with thenetwork16. Advantageously, thedongle30 will be provided withpush buttons46 and the dongle will prompt the user to enter a PIN which is compared to the PIN stored on the SIM so that thedongle30 cannot be used by an unauthorised party. The dongle could be programmed to allow thepush buttons46, under control of the parking meter, to allow entry of data relevant to the transaction—for example, the length of time for which the parking space is required.
• Thedongle30 could, for example, also be used in a similar way with an appropriately configured DVD player to allow a film to be viewed on payment of a fee deducted from the user's account with thenetwork16. The system may be arranged to allow thedongle30 to operate as a key in a digital rights management scheme, as described in our co-pending patent application entitled “Data Processing” filed on even date with the present application. The dongle could also allow products to be purchased from an appropriately configured vending machine or tickets to be purchased from an appropriately configured ticketing machine. Such machines will include a processor so that the functions corresponding to those performed by thetransaction manager14 of thePC10 can be performed by the machines.
• In the above description it has been indicated that the SIM used to authenticate the transaction could have the form of a conventional SIM which is either inserted in an appropriate slot within thePC10 or in the dongle30 (if provided). This could simply be the SIM that a subscriber to a mobile network uses in their conventional mobile terminal to make and receive calls. Alternatively, theSIM12 could be embedded within thePC10 or the dongle30 (such that it cannot be readily removed or cannot be removed at all). Further alternatively, the SIM may not have a separate physical form, but may be simulated by means of software and/or hardware within thePC10 or thedongle30. The SIM could be simulated or incorporated into the chip set of thePC10. For example, the SIM could be incorporated or simulated within the central processor unit of thePC10. Such an arrangement prevents the SIM (or simulated SIM) being removed from the PC10 (other than by rendering thePC10 useless).
• If the SIM is of a form that is not readily removable from thePC10 ordongle30, a subscriber to the telecommunications system may be provided with a second SIM for use, for example, in their mobile telephone handset.
• If, however, the same SIM is used (in thePC10 or the dongle30) to authenticate transactions and for use in the conventional manner with the telecommunications network (for example, to make and receive calls using a mobile telephone), the same data may be used to provide authentication of transactions as is used to authenticate the SIM with the mobile telephone network when a call is being made. Alternatively, the SIM may have separate records for performing each authentication type. There may be a first record containing data and/or algorithms for use in authenticating transactions, and a second, separate record for use in the conventional manner for authenticating the terminal with the telecommunications network. The first and second records may have respective authentication keys, unique identifiers to the telecommunications network and/or unique authentication algorithms.
• The first record may itself comprise a series of separate records, each registered with the telecommunication network, for allowing transactions authenticated under the control of the separate records to be recognised and billed separately. This is now described in more detail in relation toFIG. 5. InFIG. 5, thedongle30 may contain a plurality ofSIMs12, or may have a plurality of SIMs simulated within the dongle. Alternatively, rather than a plurality of complete SIMs being provided or simulated, a plurality of different records could be stored on thedongle30. Whether a plurality of SIMs is provided, a plurality of simulated SIMs is provided or a plurality of alternative records is provided, these can be regarded as respective unique data records which are identifiable to the telecommunications network.
• Such an arrangement may be desirable, for example, when a user or subscriber wishes to use theirdongle30 in multiple environments. When the user or subscriber is performing duties for their employer, thedongle30 will activate the data record associated with the employer. Transactions authorised using that data record will, where appropriate, result in a charge being made to the employer's account. When the user or subscriber is not performing duties for their employer, the personal data record is then activated. Transactions authenticated using thedongle30 will result in a charge being deducted from the user's personal account. This allows transactions performed by the user or subscriber in a personal capacity to be separated from those performed on behalf of his employer. The mode of the dongle30 (that is, whether the data record for the employer or the personal data records are activated) may be controlled by amode switch50 provided on thedongle30, or the mode may be altered using software provided in thetransaction manager14 orPC interface driver38 running on thePC10. When instructed by the user, the software would cause appropriate signals to be sent to thedongle30 to change the active SIM, simulated SIM or data record.
• As an added security measure, the dongle may require the subscriber to enter a PIN (or provide other data) in order to activate different modes of the SIM (e.g. “employee” mode or “personal” mode). A different PIN could be required to activate each mode.
• Thedongle30 thus far described has a physical connector34 (such as a USB connector) to enable data communication with aPC10. As an alternative to aphysical connector34, a wireless link between thedongle30 and thePC10 may be provided. Data exchange may take place, for example, by using near field techniques, using Bluetooth technology, by infra-red signalling or any other suitable means.
• Rather than aseparate dongle30 being provided, a user's SIM may be located in a mobile terminal (such as a mobile telephone handset) in the conventional way. The SIM may authenticate transactions with thePC10 by suitable data exchange between the mobile terminal and thePC10. This could be achieved by providing the mobile terminal with a physical connector (such as a USB connector) to connect thePC10 when authorisation of a transaction is required, or could be done by any of the wireless techniques described above. Preferably, this communication is encrypted or made secure in some other way. If the SIM is provided with separate data records for conventional mobile telecommunications purposes and for authorising transactions, it may be possible to simultaneously make a telephone call, for example, with the telecommunications network and authenticate a transaction with thePC10. The mobile terminal may conveniently provide the communication link between thePC10 and thenetwork16. The coupling of the mobile terminal to thePC10 therefore in this arrangement not only allows authentication of transactions but also conveniently provides a communication medium between thePC10 and thenetwork16. In an alternative arrangement, the mobile terminal still provides communication over a mobile telecommunications network, but this is different to thenetwork16.
• Thedongle30 may also perform the functions of a conventional data card for use with a PC (or other computing device). With this arrangement, the dongle will be of a suitable size and will include suitable connectors for allowing it to operate as a data card, in addition to the dongle having the functions described above.
• A further enhanced embodiment of an arrangement for authorising a transaction will now be described with reference toFIG. 6 and the flow chart shown inFIGS. 7A,7B and7C.
• A client platform, such asPC10, includes atransaction manager14. Adongle30 having aSIM12 therein is provided and communication between thedongle30 and thetransaction manager14 is performed via connection34 (which may be a wired or wireless connection). In this embodiment thetransaction manager14 incorporates thePC interface driver38 shown inFIG. 3, and therefore the PC interface driver is not shown as a separate item inFIG. 6. Similarly, thedongle30 incorporates the dongle interface driver shown at36 inFIG. 3, and therefore a separate dongle interface driver is not shown inFIG. 6.
• ThePC10 may, for example, use the Windows (RTM) operating system.
• A plurality ofclient applications17 are provided on thePC10, which allow the user to obtain services from respectiveremote service providers22. It should be understood that by “remote” it is not intended to imply that there must be a particular geographical distance between thePC10 and theservice providers22. However, generally theservice providers22 will be controlled independently of thePC10—although this is not essential.
• In this embodiment amobile telecommunication network16 providesnetwork services100, such as SMS, MMS, location based services, etc. Thenetwork16 also provides anauthentication service102 and apayment service104. However, it should be understood that the network may be any type of network—the invention is not restricted to mobile telecommunication networks. For example, theauthentication service102 andpayment service104 may be provided in a computer that is linked toPC10 by a local area network, a wide area network and/or the Internet.
• When the subscriber wishes to use a service provided by a remote service provider22 (step A of the flow chart shown inFIG. 7A), the subscriber couples theirSIM12 to thePC10 by inserting theirdongle30 containing theSIM12 into the appropriate connecting slot of thePC12 or using a wireless link (step B). The subscriber then activates on thePC10 therelevant client application17 to obtain a required service (step C). For example, theclient application17 could be special software provided by or under control of aservice provider22 for installation on the subscriber'sPC10. Alternatively, aclient application17 might be a web browser for visiting an appropriate web site of theservice provider22.
• To illustrate the operation of the system shown inFIG. 6, an example will be given for a subscriber wishing to purchase a particular CD from a vendor which is aservice provider22. Using a graphical user interface present on thePC10 the subscriber launches web browser software provided on thePC10 and, via the Internet, accesses the web site of theservice provider22. The web browser software constitutes theclient application17, and allows access to the web site associated with theservice provider22 which distributes CDs.
• Data communication between theclient application17 and theservice provider22 may be by a fixed network (e.g. PSTN) or by a wireless network—such as thenetwork16 or another mobile telecommunications network.
• The facility for the subscriber to login to the website may be provided. Advantageously, service providers approved by thenetwork16 may allow subscribers to register a “pseudonym” with the service provider. The pseudonym has associated with it certain data that the subscriber may wish to use when obtaining service from the service provider. This data is stored by thenetwork16. The data is not permanently stored by the service provider (although of course the service provider maintains a list of pseudonyms associated with subscribers of the network16)—for example with reference to the subscriber's SIM identifier.
• The Authentication Service may allow a Service Provider to store Pseudonym data against a SIM—with the subscriber's permission. The Pseudonym data will be stored centrally and may be distributed to the SIM by the Authentication Service supplier.
• An example of the information that thenetwork16 holds for a subscriber (subscriber A) is set out below.
• DATA FOR SUBSCRIBER A
• • SIM IDENTIFIER(S)
  • MSISDN(S)
  • PSEUDONYMS
    • FOR Service Provider A
      • NAME
      • ADDRESS
      • PREFERENCES
      • BANK ACCOUNT DETAILS
    • FOR Service Provider B
      • NAME
      • ADDRESS
      • PREFERENCES
      • BANK ACCOUNT DETAILS
    • FOR Service Provider C
      • NAME
      • ADDRESS
      • PREFERENCES
      • BANK ACCOUNT DETAILS
        As well as thenetwork16 storing the data relating to a subscriber's SIM and their MSISDN, thenetwork16 also includes a list of pseudonyms that the subscriber has established with various service providers (service providers A,B,C, . . . ). The information stored for any particular service provider may be different, and will depend upon what information the service provider might usefully require from the subscriber and upon the information that the subscriber is willing to provide to the service provider. In the example shown, the pseudonym might include details of the name and address of the subscriber and any preferences that they may have relating to the particular service. In the example of a subscriber wishing to purchase a CD fromservice provider22, this might include the subscriber's preference for a particular type of music, allowing the service provider to tailor its service, perhaps to offer the subscriber CDs relating to a type of music that the subscriber prefers.
• When the user accesses the website, theservice provider22 will cause the subscriber as part of the login procedure to be prompted, using the web browser, to enter a “pseudonym” which that subscriber may have previously registered with the service provider22 (step D). If a pseudonym has been previously registered by that subscriber with theservice provider22, the subscriber enters their pseudonym and this is sent by the client application17 (step E) to theservice provider22. Theservice provider22, by means of link106 (FIG. 6) then transmits this pseudonym to theauthentication service102 of thenetwork16. Theauthentication service102 then determines whether the pseudonym is valid as far as thenetwork16 is concerned, and if it is determined to be valid, the network transmits details stored thereby that are associated with that pseudonym to the service provider22 (step F).
• If no pseudonym exists, the subscriber then enters the details required by the service provider22 (such as their name and address)—step G.
• At this point theservice provider22 may prompt the subscriber to ask whether it would like to set up a pseudonym for use with that service provider. If the subscriber wishes to set up a pseudonym with that service provider, the service provider then requests relevant information from the subscriber, such as their name, address, music preference details and the like. Some of this information may be essential to set up a pseudonym (such as the subscriber's name and address), whereas other data may be optional (such as the subscriber's music preferences). It is considered advantageous that the subscriber can select which information is provided to the service provider for use in their pseudonym, and also advantageous that a pseudonym is for use with a particular service provider only. When the data for establishing the pseudonym has been entered, this information is passed via thelink106 to theauthentication service102 of thenetwork16. The pseudonym is stored by theservice provider22 but the data associated with that pseudonym is not permanently stored by the service provider22 (that information is provided on request to theservice provider22 by theauthentication service102 of the network16).
• It is important to note that theservice provider22 only has access to data associated with the particular pseudonym that the subscriber uses in relation to that service provider. The separate records associated with pseudonyms for other service providers are stored separately by thenetwork16. This is advantageous because, for example, a subscriber may be willing for personal medical data to be associated with a pseudonym that that subscriber uses when obtaining services from their physician but would not wish this information to be made available to other service providers.
• The subscriber searches the web site to identify the CD that the subscriber wishes to purchase. When the CD required by the subscriber is identified, the subscriber causes theclient application17 to send a request for service message to the service provider22 (step H)—for example by making a mouse click on a “purchase CD” button provided by the web site. The message includes data identifying the CD required, data identifying the subscriber (such as the subscriber's SIM identifier), including a field indicating that the subscriber has installed on their PC atransaction manager14 which can authenticate a transaction by means of the subscriber'sSIM12.
• At this stage in the transaction, theservice provider22 has been provided with certain details of the subscriber, including the subscriber's name, address and the CD that they wish to order. This information might be provided by somebody who is not truly the subscriber. To authenticate the transaction theservice provider22 constructs a service context SC (step I). The service context is a data packet including the following fields:
• • An identifier of theservice provider22
  • The subscriber's name (or other identifier such as a SIM identifier)
  • Details of the transaction to be authenticated (in this case the purchase of a CD)
• Additional or alternative information may of course also be provided.
• The service context S_Cis sent via the Internet to theclient application17. Theclient application17 passes the service context S_Cto the transaction manager14 (step J). Theclient application17 may add its own identifier to the service context S_Cto allow thenetwork16 to determine from which client application the transaction is derived.
• Thetransaction manager14 analyses the service context and establishes that a request for authentication of the transaction by thenetwork16 is required. The transaction manager detects whether the subscriber'sdongle30 containing theirSIM12 is present (step K). If thedongle30 is not present, the user is prompted to make their dongle available. Thetransaction manager14 may also display a description of the transaction to be authenticated—and the subscriber can be provided with the option to approve or disapprove the transaction. Assuming the dongle is present and the transaction is approved by the subscriber, thetransaction manager14 then sends a request to theauthentication service102 of thenetwork16 for a security token S_X(step L). The request sent to theauthentication service102 includes the service context S_C. That data may be transmitted over any suitable network. The data may be transmitted via the Internet. The data may be transmitted over a fixed telephone network, or over the mobile or cellular infrastructure oftelecommunications network16.
• Thedongle30 may include means for allowing a PIN or biometric data to be entered as described above in relation toFIG. 4. If the subscriber is prompted to enter their PIN, or provide other data, prior to authentication of a transaction, this provides an added level of security. Thetransaction manager14 and/orSIM12 may store a list of trustedclient applications17. These applications may be provided with a key (or other identifying data). For the trusted applications, the transaction manager and SIM may be configured to accept the key rather than requiring the subscriber to enter their PIN.
• As an additional security feature, the dongle may be provided with a screen which displays the name of the application or organisation which requests information from theSIM12, as described in relation to theFIGS. 3 and 4 embodiment. This would allow the user to monitor requests being made to hisSIM12. Thedongle30 can be programmed to display the name of the application or organisation requesting data from theSIM12 and may then prompt the user to approve the supply of data for each or selected applications/organisations by entering the user's PIN using a keypad, or by providing other identifying data.
• The subscriber will thereafter be authenticated by theauthentication service102 performing a challenge and response session with the SIM (by sending data via the transaction manager14)—step M. For example, theauthentication service102 will send a random challenge to thetransaction manager14, which is transmitted to the SIM. The SIM responds by encrypting the random challenge using both an authentication algorithm and a unique key Ki resident within the SIM and assigned to that particular subscriber. The response is transmitted by the transaction manager to theauthentication service102. Theauthentication service102 analyses the response to determine whether it is the response that would be expected from that subscriber's SIM. If the response is as expected, then theauthentication service106 issues a security token S_Xand sends this to the transaction manager (step N). Thetransaction manager14 itself need not understand the data exchanged during the challenge and response procedure—it merely acts as a conduit for this data.
• As described in relation toFIG. 3, to prevent, or to reduce, the likelihood of thetransaction manager14 being replaced or bypassed by an alternative application, which could compromise the security of the data on theSIM12, thetransaction manager14 and the dongle interface driver may be provided with respective shared secret keys. Each communication from thetransaction manager14 to thedongle30 is then encrypted using the sharedsecret key40. All communications from thePC10 to thedongle30 are received by the dongle interface driver. The dongle interface driver comprises processing means for decrypting received communications using its secret key. To enhance security, the dongle interface driver will prevent all communications other than those encrypted using the shared secret key from sending data to or receiving data from theSIM12.
• Therefore, thetransaction manager14 controls and supervises access to thedongle30 and theSIM12 to reduce the likelihood of the data stored on theSIM12 being compromised by unauthorised attempts to access theSIM12.
• However, it should be appreciated that the use of such shared secret keys is not essential.
• If a payment for the transaction is required, details of the required payment are included in the service context S_C. This information is extracted from the security context S_Cby theauthentication service102. Theauthentication service102 then sends a message to thepayment service104 vialink105 which reserves funds in the subscriber's account with thenetwork16. It is important to note that no payment is made, or authorised, at this stage. However, thepayment service104 is aware that a payment is likely to be required imminently, and appropriate funds are reserved in the user's account for that transaction.
• The security token is a data packet which includes the Security Token S_Xand the following fields:
• • subscriber's identity—such as a SIM identifier
  • an indication of theservice provider22 identity
  • an indication of the service that has been authenticated—in this example the order of a particular CD
  • an indication of theauthentication service102 identity
  • an indication of which payment service should be used (if payment is required)
• Other fields may be provided additionally or alternatively, depending on the circumstances.
• The security token S_Xis passed to the client application17 (step O).
• Theclient application17 then passes the security token to the service provider22 (step-P).
• The security token S_Xincludes data specific to a particular subscriber and a transaction with a particular by theservice provider22. Numerous transactions may be handled by thenetwork16,transaction manger14 andservice provider22 in parallel. These will be distinguishable from one another by virtue of the data specific to a particular transaction with a particular by theservice provider22 in the security token S_x.
• If the security token S_Xis intercepted as it passes between thenetwork16 and thetransaction manager14, or between theclient application17 and theservice provider22, it will have no value to the interceptor. The security token S_Xis specific to particular transaction with a particular by theservice provider22, and the provision of a service to a particular subscriber.
• On receipt of the security token S_Xby theservice provider22 its content is analysed and, if it is established that it corresponds to a service context Sc issued by theservice provider22, theservice provider22 may assume that the request for service (order of a CD) is legitimately made by the subscriber. TheService Provider22 could present the Security Token Sx to theAuthentication Service102 to check the validity of the token. Theauthentication service102 then checks the integrity of the Security Token Sx and validates the content of the Security Token Sx. Theauthentication service102 then sends a response to theservice provider22 indicating that the Security Token Sx is valid. Alternatively, theauthentication service102 may send data to theservice provider22 that allow theservice provider22 itself to determine the integrity and validity of the Security Token Sx.
• Theservice provider22 then determines whether a payment needs to be made (step Q). If no payment is required the CD can then be despatched. However, if a payment is required, theservice provider22 then generates a payment context P_Cwhich includes the following fields:
• • the security token Sx
  • the amount of the payment requested
• Of course, further or additional fields may be required in accordance with the circumstances.
• The payment context P_Cis sent to the client application17 (step R). The client application passes the payment context P_Cto the transaction manager14 (step S).
• Thetransaction manager17 then sends the payment context P_Cto thepayment service104 of the network16 (step T). The payment context P_Cis analysed by thepayment service106. The presence of the security token S_Xin the payment context indicates to the payment service that this is a genuine request for payment associated with the subscriber indicated by the security token S_X, and the payment service then consults the subscriber's account with thenetwork16 to determine that the payment can be authorised (which might depend on the subscriber's credit rating and/or payment history with thenetwork16 and/or the status of their pre-pay amount) and, if appropriate, authorises the payment by issuing a payment token P_X(step U).
• Thetransaction manager14 then sends the payment token P_Xto the client application17 (step V). Theclient application17 then sends the payment token P_Xto the service provider22 (step W). Theservice provider22 then uses the payment token Px to obtain payment from thepayment service106 of the network16 (step X). To do this theservice provider22 transmits the payment token P_Xto thepayment service104 vialink108. The payment service analyses the payment token P_Xand recognises that this is a payment token that has been legitimately issued by the payment service to thetransaction manager14, and then makes the appropriate adjustment to the subscriber's account with thenetwork16.
• Advantageously, if the user has a pseudonym associated with theservice provider22, theservice provider22 may update that pseudonym on the basis of any new information learnt about the subscriber from the transaction—for example, a change in music taste.
• The communications between thePC10 and thenetwork16 are preferably encrypted, as described above. It is also preferable for communications between the components within thePC10 and within thenetwork16 to be encrypted—for example by use of shared keys.
• In the arrangement described above, the subscriber is authenticated only when they wish to purchase a CD. In an alternative arrangement, the subscriber may be authenticated when they log onto the web site. The service provider will then have a security Token Sx relating to that subscriber's session with the web site. When the subscriber wishes to make a purchase, the Security Token S_Xis sent to theauthentication service102. Theauthentication service22, depending on the value of the purchase, for example, my either validate the Security Token S_Xor require theservice provider22 to obtain a further security token via theclient application17,transaction manager14 in the manner described above. Any pseudonym data relating to that subscriber and for thatservice provider22 can be provided to theservice provider22 upon authentication of the subscriber.
• The Security Token S_Xmay be valid for a limited time period. The SIM is advantageously provided with means for accurately determining the true time—for example with a tamper-resistant internal clock, a clock provided by thePC10, or a time indication from the network16 (which will be a “trusted” time).
• The subscriber may obtainnetwork services100 from thenetwork16 in a similar manner to the way in which services are obtained from theservice provider22. That is, thenetwork service provider100 will issue a service context S_Cwhen the request for service is received from theclient application17. A security token S_Cis obtained from theauthentication service102 via thetransaction manager14 following authentication using theSIM12. Payment by the subscriber for the network services may be performed in the manner as described in relation to the service provider22 (by issuance of a payment context P_Cand the generation of a payment token P_X).
• It is also possible that a direct link is provided between aremote service provider22 and anetwork service provider100, as indicated by alink107. This will allow network services to be provided to a subscriber by means of a remote service request made to aservice provider22.
• For the purposes of theremote service provider22 obtaining services fromnetwork service provider100, theremote service provider22 is provided with a unique identifier for use with thenetwork service provider100. When theremote service provider22 wishes to obtain a network service fromnetwork service provider100 on behalf of a subscriber, this unique identifier is transmitted to the network service provider together with a request for the network service. The network service is then provided as requested and a charge made by thenetwork service provider100 to the account of theservice provider22 with thenetwork16. Theremote service provider22 will typically wish to make a charge to the subscriber for use of the relevant network service (to cover the costs that theremote service provider22 has incurred and charges for any additional services provided by the remote service provider22), and payment for this will be obtained by issuing a payment context P_Cand obtaining a payment token P_Xin the manner described above.
• It has already been explained above that thetransaction manager14 andclient application17 could be provided in a device other than aPC10—such as in a parking meter or a vending machine or ticketing.
• A further example of the use of this system will now be described in relation to the renting of a vehicle. A subscriber to network16 couples their dongle to a PC10 (or other processing device) at the offices of the vehicle rental company. ThePC10 includes thetransaction manager14 and aclient application17 for providing access to the vehiclerental service provider22.
• If the subscriber has a pseudonym for use with theservice provider22, the subscriber will provide this to theservice provider22, which is then able to access relevant data relating to the subscriber from theauthentication service102 of thenetwork16. If the subscriber does not have a pseudonym associated with theservice provider22, the user provides relevant details when prompted by theservice provider22, such as the subscriber's name, address, the type of vehicle they wish to rent and the duration of the rental period.
• Theservice provider22 then creates an appropriate service context S_Cand transmits this to theclient application17. Thetransaction manager14 receives the service context S_Cand passes this to theauthentication service102 of thenetwork16 to seek a security token S_Xfollowing authentication of the transaction by the challenge and response procedure performed between theauthentication service102 and theSIM12 via thetransaction manager14 in the manner described above. If theSIM12 is authenticated by theauthentication service102 of thenetwork16, a security token S_Xis issued to thetransaction manager14. The security token S_Sis passed to theclient application17, and from there to theservice provider22 to authenticate the transaction.
• By means of alink105 between theauthentication service102 and thepayment service104, appropriate funds can be reserved from the subscriber's account with thenetwork16. For example, finds may be reserved to cover the expected rental charges and possibly a deposit.
• Because the total charge for renting the car may not be known (as it may depend on the distance travelled by the subscriber, the amount of time the subscriber spends driving the vehicle and the date on which the vehicle is in fact returned), a payment context P_Cmay not be issued by theservice provider22 at this stage.
• Thus far, the subscriber has authenticated the transaction with the vehicle rental company. The vehicle rental company will then allocate a car. According to an optional feature of this embodiment, the dongle may allow the user to enter and drive the car—that is, the dongle will act as substitute to a conventional key for the vehicle. This may be achieved by providing the vehicle with means for authenticating the SIM on the subscriber's dongle, or alternatively may be performed by providing the dongle with a storage location for storing security information specific to the vehicle rental company. This security information is interrogated by the vehicle, and if validated will allow use of the vehicle.
• Whether or not the dongle is in fact used to obtain access to the vehicle and allow the vehicle to be driven, by coupling the dongle to the vehicle access to themobile network16 may be provided in the conventional way using a mobile telephone transceiver built into the vehicle. The coupling of the dongle to the telecommunication system of the vehicle is analogous to inserting the subscriber's SIM into a fixed telephone provided on the vehicle. If there is not coverage by thenetwork16 in the area that the vehicle is located, telephone calls can still be made where a roaming agreement is present between the subscriber'snetwork16 and any network that is operational in the locality of the vehicle.
• The coupling of the dongle to the vehicle systems may also allow the vehicle rental company to calculate the amount of time that the subscriber has spent using the vehicle, and the vehicle rental company may wish to charge the user on this basis.
• When the vehicle is returned to the rental company, an appropriate charge is calculated by the vehicle rental company service provider22 (possibly using information from the vehicle systems as described above), and an appropriate payment context P_Cis generated and transmitted to theclient application17 present on PC10 (which could be a different PC from thePC10 used to initiate the transaction with the vehicle rental company. Thetransaction manager14 of thePC10 then receives the payment context P_Cand obtains from thepayment service104 of the network16 a payment token P_X. This is passed to theservice provider22 via thetransaction manager14 andclient application17, and theservice provider22 is then able to collect the appropriate payment from thepayment service104 of thenetwork16.
• In a further example, thetransaction manager14 and theclient application17 are provided in a vehicle as part of the vehicle's on-board telecommunication system. The vehicle, for example in a convenient position on the dashboard, includes a connector to receive a subscriber's dongle30 (although, of course, a wireless connection could alternatively be provided). When the subscriber inserts thedongle30, access to remote services provided byservice providers22 may be obtained using thetransaction manager14 andclient application17 in the manner described in relation toFIGS. 6 and 7.
• Because the vehicle is, of course, mobile, communications between theclient application17 and theremote service provider22 and communications between thetransaction manager14 and theauthentication service102 and the payment service104 (or between theclient application17 and the network service100) will be provided by a wireless link, such as by use of a mobile or cellular radio network using a telephone transceiver already present in the vehicle. The network used to perform these communications may be the same as thenetwork16 providing the authentication andpayment services102 and104, or may be a different network.
• While inserting thedongle30 into the connector of the vehicle, the user may also be able to make and receive telephone calls in the usual manner as if the user had inserted their SIM card in a fixed mobile telephone system of the vehicle. However, because thetransaction manager14 andclient application17 are present, the subscriber is also able to obtain other services fromremote service providers22. For example, the subscriber may wish to download music in the form MP3 files to the car audio system, or obtain navigation or traffic information.
• The authentication and payment procedure described above in relation toFIGS. 6 and 7 may be modified from step N onwards. When theauthentication service102 has received the service context Sc and has authenticated the subscriber, a request to thepayment service104 is then made vialink105 to reserve the appropriate funds. This request includes the security token Sx—which allows thepayment service104 to validate the request. Thepayment service104 then issues a payment token P_x. Thetransaction manager14 then passes the payment token P_xwith the security token Sx to theclient application17. Theclient application17 sends the payment token P_xwith the security token Sx to theservice provider22. Theservice provider22 then confirms the validity of the payment token P_xby sending this to thepayment service104 vialink108 and confirms the validity of the security token Sx by sending this to theauthentication service102 vialink106.
• As an alternative to obtaining subscriber pseudonyms in the manner described above, theService Provider22 may present the Security Token S_xto theAuthentication Service102 in conjunction with a request for any pseudonym associated with theSIM12 and theService Provider22. TheAuthentication Service102 validates the token and returns the appropriate Pseudonym (or related data) to theService Provider22.
• To enhance the security of the system theService Provider22 could be provided with a Certificate (shared key) which is used to encode all requests from theService Provider22 to theAuthentication service102. Thus theAuthentication Service22 can then have a degree of trust in who is making the requests for Pseudonym or associated SIM data.
• The service provider, being sure that the subscriber or payment is authenticated, is then able to despatch the CD to the subscriber.
• In order to obtain payment theservice provider22 may proceed in one or two ways.
• In the first procedure theservice provider22 issues a request for payment clearance by sending a data packet including the payment token P_x(and the Security Token S_x) to theclient application17. Theclient application17 passes the payment clearance request to thetransaction manager14, which in turn passes the payment clearance request (with the payment token P_x) to thepayment service104. At this point the payment service may instruct theauthentication service102, vialink105, to authenticate the subscriber by challenge and response data exchanged with the SIM12 (via the transaction manager14), although this is an optional step. In any event, thepayment service104 checks the payment token P_xand the security token S_x(contained in the same packet) and then clears funds in the subscriber's account with thenetwork16. Thepayment service104 then sends a modified payment token P_x1to thetransaction manager14. Thetransaction manager14 passes the modified payment token P_x1to theservice provider22 via theclient application17. Theservice provider22 is then able to validate the payment token bydirect link108 with apayment service104.
• As an alternative to the procedure described above, theservice provider22 may request thepayment service104 for payment clearance vialink108 by sending the appropriate payment token P_x. Thepayment service104 then validates the payment token and clears the funds. Thepayment service104 responds to theservice provider22 confirming that the payment has been cleared.
• FIGS.8 to11 show further examples of dongle configurations that could be used in conjunction with the systems described in relation toFIG. 1 or6 as an alternative to the first configuration shown inFIG. 4 and the second configuration shown inFIG. 5.
• FIGS. 8A to8D show a third configuration of a dongle indicated generally at250. Thedongle250 does not include a display or push buttons. Thedongle50 is of generally elliptical cross-section and includes a generallyrectangular aperture252 formed in the top end thereof that allows anelectrical connector254 of generally rectangular cross-section to emerge therefrom. Theaperture252 is closed by aclosure member256 which is generally C-shaped in cross-section, extending from the top ofdongle250 along eachside face258, and pivoted about a centrally mountedpivot point260. The connection between theclosure member256 and theside walls258 of thedongle250 at the pivot point60 allows theclosure member256 to be rotated about thepivot point260 as shown byarrow262.
• FIG. 8C is a cross-section taken along line X-X ofFIG. 8B and shows schematically the mechanism by which theelectrical connector254 can be moved between a first position, shown inFIGS. 8A and 8B, where the connector54 is contained wholly within the casing of thedongle250, and the second position, shown inFIGS. 8C and 8D, where theelectrical connector254 protrudes from the casing of thedongle250. The mechanism for providing this movement of theelectrical connector254 comprises arack264 which is coupled to theconnector254 and a cooperatingpinion266, mounted atpivot point260, the teeth of which engage therack264. Thepinion266 is fixed with respect to theclosure member256. Rotation of theclosure member256 causes rotation of thepinion266, which causes linear displacement of therack264 as shown byarrow268. Of course, a mechanism for slidably supporting theelectrical connector254 andrack264 is provided in a manner that will be understood by those skilled in the art, and is not illustrated or described further here.
• FIGS. 9A to9D show a fourth configuration of a dongle. As in the third configuration of dongle described in relation toFIGS. 8A to8D, theelectrical connector254 is movable between a first position, shown inFIGS. 9A and 9B, where it is contained completely within the casing of thedongle270, and a second position, shown inFIGS. 9C and 9D, where theconnector254 is shown extending from the casing ofdongle270. However, in the third configuration, the linear movement of theelectrical connector254 in the direction ofarrow268 is provided byrotating knob272 with respect to the casing ofdongle270 as shown byarrow274. Rotation of theknob272 in a first direction causes theconnector254 to emerge from the casing ofdongle270, and rotation in the opposite direction causes theconnector254 to be retracted within the casing of thedongle270. Any suitable mechanism for converting the rotary motion of theknob272 into linear motion of theconnector254 may be provided. For example, a mechanism described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,813,421 (which is incorporated herein by reference) for a lipstick swivel mechanism may be employed. Other suitable mechanisms will be known to those skilled in the relevant art.
• Thedongle270 includes adisplay248 for prompting the user to enter their PIN number and/or for displaying the PIN number as it is entered. Thedongle270, rather than having a series of push buttons (such as a numerical key pad) comprises adata entry knob276 which is mounted to the dongle for rotation as shown byarrow278 and also for linear motion with respect to the dongle as shown byarrow280. Each digit of the PIN number is input by the user grasping theknob276 and pulling it in a direction away from the casing of the dongle270 (in the direction of arrow280). An indication, such as a flashing cursor then appears on thedisplay248 indicating that the first digit of the PIN number is expected. The number is input by rotation of the knob276 (arrow278), the displayed number increasing in value with further rotation of theknob276. When the required number appears on thedisplay248 the user confirms that this is the number they wish to input by pushing theknob276 in the opposite direction toarrow280. To input the next digit of the PIN number theknob276 is again lifted (arrow280) and the correct number is selected by rotation of the knob. The required number is entered by returning theknob276 to its original position by moving it in the direction opposite to thearrow280. This procedure is repeated until all of the digits of the PIN number have been entered. Each digit of the PIN number as it is entered will be displayed on thedisplay248.
• In theFIG. 9A to9D embodiment of thedongle270, a piezoelectric cell282 is associated with theknob280. The piezoelectric cell282 allows power to be generated by movement of theknob276. This power may either be stored in an integral capacitor or may be stored in anoptional cell284 which is electrically coupled to the piezoelectric cell282. Such an arrangement obviates the requirement for thedongle270 to have its own replaceable power source, whilst allowing the dongle to be operated when not connected to thePC10. The charge generated by the piezo electric cell is transient, and after a period of time (for example, 5 minutes), the charge is dissipated and any PIN number entered by means of theknob276 is lost from the memory of thedongle270 and cannot later be retrieved even when power is supplied. This provides an additional security feature to thedongle270. Of course, if thedongle270 is connected to thePC10 while the charge is still present (within 5 minutes of entering the PIN in the example given above), the PIN can be verified and the dongle can then obtain power from the PC10 via theconnector254 which allows authentication operations described above to be performed despite the transient nature of the power from the piezoelectric cell282.
• FIGS. 10A to10D show a fifth configuration ofdongle290. In this embodiment thedongle290 comprises amain body part292 to which theelectrical connector254 is attached in a fixed position, and a removableprotective cap294 which, when in position, covers themain body292 and theconnector254 to protect those components and to provide thedongle290 with an attractive external appearance.
• At the top end of themain body292 anannular knob296 is mounted to thebody292 for rotation with respect to thebody292, as shown byarrow298. Theknob296 includes a series ofmarkings300 visible to the user of thedongle290—for example, eachmark300 indicating a different digit from 0 to 9. A marking302 is provided at the top of thecasing292. In this embodiment, the first digit of the user's PIN number is entered by rotating the knob96 until the correct digit of the PIN number (indicated at300) is aligned with themark302. When the relevant digit and themark302 are aligned, the user stops rotation of theknob296. When movement of theknob296 stops, the position of theknob296 is recorded by thedongle290 so that the digit of the PIN number can be detected. The next digit of the PIN number is entered by rotating theknob296 in an anti-clockwise direction (opposite to arrow298) until the relevant digit of the PIN number is aligned with marking302. Again, when the rotation of the knob stops, the position of the knob is recorded so that the PIN number can be recorded by thedongle290. The next digit of the PIN number is entered by clockwise rotation of theknob296, and so on, until all of the digits of the PIN number have been entered. The manner of data entry using theknob296 and the marking302 is similar to that used to enter the combination of a safe.
• Thedongle290 further includes an optionaldigital camera304 mounted at the axis of rotation of the knob296 (but fixed with respect to the main body292).Dongle290 includes processing means and memory for storing one or more images captured by thecamera304, and allows these images to be transferred to thePC10 using theconnector254.
• FIGS. 11A to11C show a sixth configuration of adongle310. Thedongle310 comprises acasing312 which has anopening314 at one side thereof. Contained within thecasing312 is acoupling portion316 to which theelectrical connector254 is fixed. Thecoupling portion316 is connected to thecasing312 in such a manner that thecoupling portion316 is rotatable about an axis indicated bydotted line318.
• Connected to theloop connector244 is aring320, which provides a convenient means by means aslidable part322, which is mounted for sliding with respect to thecasing312, may be moved with respect to thecasing312 in the direction ofarrow324. By means of a rack and pinion or any other suitable mechanism (not shown) the movement of the slidingpart322 with respect to thecasing312 in the direction ofarrow324 is translated into rotational movement of thecoupling portion316 about theaxis318. The different positions that thecoupling part316 moves through as the slidingpart322 is moved with respect to thecasing312 are shown by the ghost lines inFIG. 11C.
• When the slidingpart322 reaches its maximum travel in the direction ofarrow324, thecoupling part316 is rotated 180° with respect to thecasing312. Thecoupling portion316 is returned to the position shown inFIGS. 11A and 11B by sliding the slidingpart322 in the direction opposite toarrow324. When thecoupling part316 is in the position shown inFIGS. 11A and 11B, theconnector254 is protected by the slidingpart322.
• The embodiments shown in FIGS.8,9,10 and11 provide various means by which theelectrical connector254 can be concealed and protected when not required.
• In theFIG. 9 embodiment the power source of the dongle is piezoelectric cell282.
• A similar power source may be provided in the dongles illustrated inFIGS. 8,10 and11, with power being generated by movement of theclosure member256 of thedongle250 ofFIG. 8, the movement of theknob296 of thedongle290 ofFIG. 107, or movement of the slidingpart322 ofFIG. 11. Alternatively, or additionally, these dongles may include a replaceable battery or a rechargeable battery which is recharged when thedongle250,280,290,310 is connected to thePC10.
• Whilst the dongles described include anelectrical connector254 which is shown as a USB connector, it should be appreciated that any other suitable type of electrical connector may be provided. For example, theconnector254 may be a SmartMedia (trade mark) device. Alternatively, data and/or power may be transmitted between the dongle and thePC10 by “near field” technology, for example, in accordance with the Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1) protocol. If near field technology is employed, the provision of a movableelectrical connector254 will not be necessary:
• The dongles of FIGS.8 to11 may or may not include thedongle interface driver36 described in relation toFIGS. 3 and 4.
• The dongles ofFIGS. 9 and 10 may allow the PIN to be passed to thePC10 for validation, or such validation may be performed within the dongle for improved security.
• Of course, the dongles ofFIGS. 8 and 11 may be provided with a PIN entry means if required.

Claims (55)

1. A device for connection to a data processing apparatus, the device including means for operative coupling to authentication storage means storing predetermined information relating to the authentication of a transaction with the data processing apparatus, the device when operatively coupled to the data processing apparatus being responsive to an authentication process carried out via a communications link for authenticating the transaction, the authentication process involving the use of the predetermined information, and wherein the device controls access to the predetermined information.

2. The device ofclaim 1, comprising security data entry means for obtaining security data independently of the data processing apparatus, and means for analysing the entered security data for determining whether to allow access to the predetermined information.

3. The device ofclaim 2, wherein the security data entry means comprises alphanumeric data entry means.

4. The device ofclaim 2 or3, wherein the security data entry means comprises a keypad.

5. The device ofclaim 2,3 or4, wherein the security data comprises a Personal Identification Number (PIN) and the analysing means compares the PIN obtained by the security data entry means with a PIN stored on the authentication storage means and only allows access to the predetermined information when the respective PINs match.

6. The device of any one of the preceding claims, comprising a display for displaying security information.

7. The device of any one of the preceding claims, comprising a data processing module for controlling the communication with the data processing apparatus.

8. The device ofclaim 7, wherein the data processing module of the device is configured for communicating with a corresponding data processing module of the data processing apparatus.

9. The device ofclaim 8, wherein communication between the authentication storage means and the data processing apparatus is performed via the respective data processing modules.

10. The device ofclaim 7,8 or9, wherein the data processing module of the device includes means for decrypting encrypted data received from the data processing module of the data processing apparatus.

11. The device ofclaim 7,8,9 or10, wherein the data processing module of the device includes means for encrypting data transmitted to the data processing module of the data processing apparatus.

12. The device of claims10 or11, wherein the respective data processing modules comprise a key for allowing encryption and/or decryption of data.

13. The device ofclaim 12, wherein the key comprises a shared secret key for each of the respective data processing modules.

14. The device of any one of the preceding claims, wherein the device is operatively coupleable to one of more of a plurality of said authentication storage means, each of which is registerable with a common telecommunication system, and wherein the authentication process is performed by a communications link with the telecommunications system.

15. The device ofclaim 14, in which the predetermined authentication information stored by each authentication storage means corresponds to information which is used to authenticate a user of that authentication storage means in relation to the telecommunications system.

16. The device ofclaim 15, in which each user is authenticated in the telecommunications system by means of the use of a smart card or subscriber identity module (e.g. SAM), and in which the authentication storage means respective to that user corresponds to or simulates the smart card for that user.

17. The device of any one ofclaims 1 to16, in which the transaction is a transaction involving use of the data processing functions of the data processing apparatus.

18. The device of any one ofclaims 1 to17, in which the authentication storage means is specific to that device.

19. The device of any one ofclaims 1 to18, in which the authentication process involves the sending of a message and the generation of a response dependent on the message and the predetermined information.

20. The device of any one ofclaims 14 to19, wherein the telecommunications system includes means for levying a charge for the transaction when authorised.

21. The device of any one of the preceding claims in combination with the data processing apparatus.

22. The device of any one of the preceding claims in combination with the telecommunications system.

23. A method for authenticating a transaction with data processing apparatus in which the data processing apparatus has operatively associated with it a security device which in turn has operatively associated with it authentication storage means for storing predetermined authentication information, and including the step of carrying out an authentication process via a communications link for authenticating the transaction, the authentication process involving the use of the predetermined authentication information obtained from the authentication storage means via the security device which controls access to the predetermined authentication information.

24. The method ofclaim 23, comprising obtaining security data independently of the data processing apparatus, and analysing the security data for deter ing whether to allow access to the predetermined information.

25. The method ofclaim 24, wherein the security data is obtained by alphanumeric data entry means.

26. The method ofclaim 23 or24, wherein the alphanumeric data entry means comprises a keypad.

27. The method ofclaim 24,25 or26, wherein the security data comprises a Personal Identification Number (PIN) and the analysing step compares the PIN obtained by the security data entry means with a PIN stored on the authentication storage means and only allows access to the predetermined information when the respective PINs match.

28. The method of any one ofclaims 23 to27, comprising displaying security information.

29. The method of any one ofclaims 23 to28, wherein communication with the data processing apparatus is controlled by a data processing module.

30. The method ofclaim 29, wherein the data processing module of the device is configured for communicating with a corresponding data processing module of the data processing apparatus.

31. The method ofclaim 30, wherein communication between the authentication storage means and the data processing apparatus is performed via the respective data processing modules.

32. The method ofclaim 29,30 or31, wherein the data processing module of the device decrypts encrypted data received from the data processing module of the data processing apparatus.

33. The method ofclaim 29,30,31 or32, wherein the data processing module of the device encrypts data transmitted to the data processing module of the data processing apparatus.

34. The method of claims32 and33, wherein the respective data processing modules comprise a key for allowing encryption and/or decryption of data.

35. The method ofclaim 34, wherein the key comprises a shared secret key for each of the respective data processing modules.

36. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to35, wherein the security means is operatively associated with one or more authentication storage means of a plurality of authentication storage means each for storing predetermined authentication information, the authentication storage means being registerable with a common telecommunications system, and wherein the step of carrying out the authentication process is performed via a communications link with the telecommunications system.

37. A method according toclaim 36, in which the predetermined authentication information stored by each authentication storage means corresponds to information which is used to authenticate a user of that authentication storage means in relation to the telecommunications system.

38. A method according toclaim 37, in which each user is authenticated in the telecommunications system by means of the use of a smart card or subscriber identity module (e.g. SIM, and in which the authentication storage means respective to that user corresponds to or simulates the smart card for that user.

39. A method according to any one ofclaims 37 to38, in which the transaction is a transaction involving use of the data processing functions of the data processing apparatus.

40. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to39, in which each authentication storage is associated with a specific security device.

41. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to40, in which the authentication storage means is associated with the data processing apparatus by being associated with data or software for use by that data processing apparatus.

42. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to41, in which the authentication process involves the sending of a message and the generation of a response dependent on the message and the predetermined information.

43. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to42, including the step of levying a charge for the transaction when authenticated.

44. A method according toclaim 43, in which the step of levying the charge is carried out by the said telecommunication system.

45. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to44, in which the data processing apparatus is a personal computer.

46. A device for controlling access to authentication data stored on a authentication storage means, the device including means for coupling the device to a data processing apparatus to allow the authentication data to be used to authenticate a transaction performed by the data processing apparatus, wherein security means is provided for controlling access to the authentication data via the data processing apparatus.

47. The device ofclaim 46, wherein the security means comprises means for obtaining security data from a user and means for checking the validity of the security data and only allowing access to the authentication data if the security data is valid.

48. The device ofclaim 46 or47, wherein the security means comprises data processing means for receiving an encrypted authentication request, encrypted using a predetermined key, from the data processing apparatus and for decrypting the request.

49. The device ofclaim 48 in combination with the data processing means, wherein the data processing means comprises means for encrypting the authentication request using said key.

50. A device according to any one ofclaims 1 to22 or46 to49, wherein the authentication storage means communicates wirelessly to authenticate the transaction.

51. A device acording toclaim 16, wherein the smart card or SIM authenticates the transaction when the smart card or SIM is operable in a mobile terminal.

52. A device according toclaim 16, wherein the smart card or SIM is further operable to authenticated a mobile terminal for use in the system.

53. A method according to any one ofclaims 23 to45, wherein the authentication storage means communicates wirelessly to authenticate the transaction.

54. A method according toclaim 38, wherein the smart card or SIM authenticates the transaction when the smart card or SIM is operable in a mobile terminal.

55. A method according toclaim 38, wherein the smart card or SIM is further operable to authenticate a mobile terminal for use in the system.

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