US10776464B2 - System and method for adaptive application of authentication policies - Google Patents

Abstract

A system, apparatus, method, and machine readable medium are described for adaptively implementing an authentication policy. For example, one embodiment of a method comprises: detecting a user of a client attempting to perform a current interaction with a relying party; and responsively identifying a first interaction class for the current interaction based on variables associated with the current interaction and implementing a set of one or more authentication rules associated with the first interaction class.

Description

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/804,568, filed, Mar. 22, 2013, entitled, “Advanced Methods of Authentication And Its Applications”.

BACKGROUND

Field of the Invention

This invention relates generally to the field of data processing systems. More particularly, the invention relates to a system and method for adaptive application of authentication policies.

Description of Related Art

FIG. 1 illustrates anexemplary client120 with abiometric device100. When operated normally, abiometric sensor102 reads raw biometric data from the user (e.g., capture the user's fingerprint, record the user's voice, snap a photo of the user, etc) and afeature extraction module103 extracts specified characteristics of the raw biometric data (e.g., focusing on certain regions of the fingerprint, certain facial features, etc). Amatcher module104 compares the extracted features133 withbiometric reference data110 stored in a secure storage on theclient120 and generates a score based on the similarity between the extracted features and thebiometric reference data110. Thebiometric reference data110 is typically the result of an enrollment process in which the user enrolls a fingerprint, voice sample, image or other biometric data with thedevice100. Anapplication105 may then use the score to determine whether the authentication was successful (e.g., if the score is above a certain specified threshold).

Systems have been designed for providing secure user authentication over a network using biometric sensors. In such systems, the score generated by the application, and/or other authentication data, may be sent over a network to authenticate the user with a remote server. For example, Patent Application No. 2011/0082801 (“'801 application”) describes a framework for user registration and authentication on a network which provides strong authentication (e.g., protection against identity theft and phishing), secure transactions (e.g., protection against “malware in the browser” and “man in the middle” attacks for transactions), and enrollment/management of client authentication tokens (e.g., fingerprint readers, facial recognition devices, smartcards, trusted platform modules, etc).

The assignee of the present application has developed a variety of improvements to the authentication framework described in the '801 application. Some of these improvements are described in the following set of U.S. Patent Applications (“Co-pending Applications”), all filed Dec. 29, 1012, which are assigned to the present assignee and incorporated herein by reference: Ser. No. 13/730,761, Query System and Method to Determine Authentication Capabilities; Ser. No. 13/730,776, System and Method for Efficiently Enrolling, Registering, and Authenticating With Multiple Authentication Devices; Ser. No. 13/730,780, System and Method for Processing Random Challenges Within an Authentication Framework; Ser. No. 13/730,791, System and Method for Implementing Privacy Classes Within an Authentication Framework; Ser. No. 13/730,795, System and Method for Implementing Transaction Signaling Within an Authentication Framework.

Briefly, the Co-Pending applications describe authentication techniques in which a user enrolls with biometric devices of a client to generate biometric template data (e.g., by swiping a finger, snapping a picture, recording a voice, etc); registers the biometric devices with one or more servers over a network (e.g., Websites or other relying parties equipped with secure transaction services as described in the Co-Pending applications); and subsequently authenticates with those servers using data exchanged during the registration process (e.g., encryption keys provisioned into the biometric devices). Once authenticated, the user is permitted to perform one or more online transactions with a Website or other relying party. In the framework described in the Co-Pending applications, sensitive information such as fingerprint data and other data which can be used to uniquely identify the user, may be retained locally on the user's client device (e.g., smartphone, notebook computer, etc) to protect a user's privacy.

For certain classes of transactions, the riskiness associated with the transaction may be inextricably tied to the location where the transaction is being performed. For example, it may be inadvisable to allow a transaction that appears to originate in a restricted country, such as those listed on the US Office of Foreign Asset Control List (e.g., Cuba, Libya, North Korea, etc). In other cases, it may only be desirable to allow a transaction to proceed if a stronger authentication mechanism is used; for example, a transaction undertaken from within the corporation's physical premises may require less authentication than one conducted from a Starbucks located in a remote location where the company does not have operations.

However, reliable location data may not be readily available for a variety of reasons. For example, the end user's device may not have GPS capabilities; the user may be in a location where Wifi triangulation data is unavailable or unreliable; the network provider may not support provide cell tower triangulation capabilities to augment GPS, or Wifi triangulation capabilities. Other approaches to divine the device's location may not have a sufficient level of assurance to meet the organization's needs; for example, reverse IP lookups to determine a geographic location may be insufficiently granular, or may be masked by proxies designed to mask the true network origin of the user's device.

In these cases, an organization seeking to evaluate the riskiness of a transaction may require additional data to provide them with additional assurance that an individual is located in a specific geographic area to drive authentication decisions.

Another challenge for organizations deploying authentication is to match the “strength” of the authentication mechanism to the inherent risks presented by a particular user's environment (location, device, software, operating system), the request being made by the user or device (a request for access to restricted information, or to undertake a particular operation), and the governance policies of the organization.

To date, organizations have had to rely on a fairly static response to the authentication needs of its users: the organization evaluates the risks a user will face during operations they normally perform and the requirements of any applicable regulatory mandate, and then deploys an authentication solution to defend against that risk and achieve compliance. This usually requires the organization to deploy multiple authentication solutions to address the multitude and variety of risks that their different users may face, which can be especially costly and cumbersome to manage.

The techniques described in the Co-pending applications provide an abstraction that allows the organization to identify existing capabilities on the user's device that can be used for authentication. This abstraction shields an organization from the need to deploy a variety of different authentication solutions. However, the organization still needs a way to invoke the “correct” authentication mechanism when necessary. Existing implementations provide no capabilities for the organization to describe what authentication mechanism is appropriate under which circumstances. As a result, an organization would likely need to codify their authentication policy in code, making the solution brittle and necessitating code changes in the future to enable use of new authentication devices/tokens.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

A better understanding of the present invention can be obtained from the following detailed description in conjunction with the following drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary client equipped with a biometric device;

FIG. 2 illustrates one embodiment of a system for performing location-aware application of authentication policy;

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary set of authentication policy rules;

FIG. 4 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 5 illustrates one embodiment of the invention in which location is determined or confirmed by proximity of other peer or network devices;

FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment of a system for authentication which uses environmental sensors;

FIG. 7 illustrates one embodiment of a method for authentication which uses environmental sensors;

FIG. 8 illustrates one embodiment of a system for adaptively applying an authentication policy;

FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of a method for adaptively applying an authentication policy; and

FIGS. 10A-B illustrate exemplary system architectures on which the embodiments of the invention may be implemented.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

Described below are embodiments of an apparatus, method, and machine-readable medium for implementing a location-aware authentication policy. Throughout the description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without some of these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are not shown or are shown in a block diagram form to avoid obscuring the underlying principles of the present invention.

The embodiments of the invention discussed below involve client devices with authentication capabilities such as biometric devices or PIN entry. These devices are sometimes referred to herein as “tokens,” “authentication devices,” or “authenticators.” Various different biometric devices may be used including, but not limited to, fingerprint sensors, voice recognition hardware/software (e.g., a microphone and associated software for recognizing a user's voice), facial recognition hardware/software (e.g., a camera and associated software for recognizing a user's face), and optical recognition capabilities (e.g., an optical scanner and associated software for scanning the retina of a user). The authentication capabilities may also include non-biometric devices such as trusted platform modules (TPMs) smartcards, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), and Secure Elements (SEs)

As mentioned above, in a mobile biometric implementation, the biometric device may be remote from the relying party. As used herein, the “relying party” is the entity which utilizes the authentication techniques described herein to authenticate the end user. For example, the relying party may be an online financial service, online retail service (e.g., Amazon®), cloud service, or other type of network service with which the user is attempting to complete a transaction (e.g., transferring funds, making a purchase, accessing data, etc). In addition, as used herein, the term “remote” means that the biometric sensor is not part of the security boundary of the computer it is communicatively coupled to (e.g., it is not embedded into the same physical enclosure as the relying party computer). By way of example, the biometric device may be coupled to the relying party via a network (e.g., the Internet, a wireless network link, etc) or via a peripheral input such as a USB port. Under these conditions, there may be no way for the relying party to know if the device is one which is authorized by the relying party (e.g., one which provides an acceptable level of authentication and integrity protection) and/or whether a hacker has compromised the biometric device. Confidence in the biometric device depends on the particular implementation of the device.

Location-Aware Authentication Techniques

One embodiment of the invention implements an authentication policy that allows authentication mechanisms to be selected based on the physical location of the client device being used for authentication. For example, the client and/or server may make a determination of the physical location of the client device, and feed that location to a policy engine that evaluates an ordered set of policy rules. In one embodiment, these rules specify classes of locations and the authentication mechanism or mechanisms that must be applied if the client location matches the location definition in the rule.

As illustrated inFIG. 2, one embodiment of the invention includes aclient device200 with anauthentication policy engine210 for implementing the location-aware authentication policies described herein. In particular, this embodiment includes a locationclass determination module240 for using the current location of theclient device200, provided by location sensors241 (e.g., a GPS device), to identify a current location “class.” As discussed in detail below, different location “classes” may be defined comprising known geographical points and/or regions. Location class data may be continuously updated and stored in a persistent location data storage device245 (e.g., a flash storage or other persistent storage device). The locationclass determination module240 may then compare the current location provided by the sensor(s)241 against the defined “classes” to determine a current location class for theclient device200.

In one embodiment, the relyingparty250 specifies the authentication policy to be implemented by theauthentication policy engine210 for each transaction (as indicated by the dotted line from the relying party to the authentication policy engine). Thus, the authentication policy may be uniquely tailored to the authentication requirements of each relying party. In addition, the level of authentication required may be determined based on the current transaction (as defined by the authentication policy). For example, a transaction which requires a transfer of a significant amount of money may require a relatively high authentication assurance threshold, whereas non-monetary transaction may require a relatively lower authentication assurance threshold. Thus, the location-aware authentication techniques described herein may be sufficient for certain transactions but may be combined with more rigorous authentication techniques for other transactions.

In one embodiment, the locationclass determination module240 provides the determined class to anauthentication policy module211 which implements a set of rules to identify theauthentication techniques212 to be used for the determined class. By way of example, and not limitation,FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary set of rules 1-5 specifying one or more authentication techniques 1-5 which may be used for each defined location class 1-5. Although illustrated as a table data structure inFIG. 3, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of data structure for implementing the rule set.

Once theauthentication policy engine210 selects a set ofauthentication techniques212, theauthentication policy engine210 may implement the techniques using one or more explicit user authentication devices220-221 and/or non-intrusive authentication techniques242-243 to authenticate the user with a relyingparty250. By way of example, and not limitation, the explicit user authentication220-221 may include requiring the user to enter a secret code such as a PIN, fingerprint authentication, voice or facial recognition, and retinal scanning, to name a few.

The non-intrusive authentication techniques242-243 may includeuser behavior sensors242 which collect data related to user behavior for authenticating the user. For example, the biometric gait of the user may be measured using an accelerometer or other type ofsensor242 in combination with software and/or hardware designed to generate a gait “fingerprint” of the user's normal walking pattern. As discussed below,other sensors243 may be used to collect data used for authentication. For example, network data may be collected identifying network/computing devices within the local proximity of the client device200 (e.g., known peer computers, access points, cell towers, etc).

In one embodiment,secure storage225 is a secure storage device used to store authentication keys associated with each of the authentication devices220-221. As discussed below, the authentication keys may be used to establish secure communication channels with the relyingparty250 via asecure communication module213.

Various different “classes” of locations may be defined consistent with the underlying principles of the invention. By way of example, and not limitation, the following classes of locations may be defined:

Class 1: The client is within a given radius of a specified location. In this class, the associated authentication policy is applied if the current client location is within an area bounded by a circle of a given radius, centered at a specified latitude and longitude.

Class 2: The client is within a specified boundary region. In this class, the associated authentication policy is applied if the client is located within an area bounded by a polygon defined by an ordered set of latitude and longitude pairs (e.g., a closed polygon).

Class 3: The client is outside a specified boundary. In this class, the associated authentication policy is applied if the client is located outside an area bounded by a polygon defined by an ordered set of latitude and longitude pairs (e.g., a closed polygon).

In one embodiment, additional classes are defined using Boolean combinations of the classes and policy rules defined above. For example, the Boolean operations AND, OR, NOT, and the nesting of Boolean operations allow the expression of complex conditions. Such policies could be used, for example, to implement a policy that applies when the client is located in one of a variety of facilities owned by a company.

Various different mechanisms may be used to determine the current physical location of the client (represented generally inFIG. 2 as location sensors241), including, but not limited to the following:

GPS: Embedded GPS sensors can directly provide details on the location of the client. New emerging standards seek to add authentication of the location provided as a capability that address this shortcoming in current GPS solutions.

Geo-IP Lookup: Reverse lookups of the client's IP address can be used to determine a coarse approximation of the client's location. However, the trustworthiness of the location obtained through this method requires the IP address to be cross-checked against blacklists of known compromised hosts, anonymizing proxy providers, or similar solutions designed to obfuscate the source IP address of the host.

Cell Tower Triangulation: Integration between the client, the server, and wireless carrier infrastructure could allow the client and server to perform high resolution determination of physical location using cellular signal strength triangulation.

Wi-Fi Access Point Triangulation: A higher resolution method to determine physical location is to triangulate the signal strength of nearby Wifi access points with known physical locations. This method is particularly effective in determining the location of a device within facilities.

Location Displacement Inference: A device's exact location may be unknown, but a statistical probability of location may be used as an approximation for the purpose of evaluating policy. This may be calculated by noting the change in the device's position relative to a starting point with a known location; the user's device may have, in the past, had a known starting point, and in the interim has moved a known or estimate distance and bearing, allowing an approximate location to be calculated. Possible methods to calculate the displacement from the starting point may include inferring distance travelled using measurements gathered from an accelerometer (i.e. using the accelerometer to measure how far the user walked based on gait measurement), changes in signal strength from a known, stationary set of signal sources, and other methods.

FIG. 4 illustrates one embodiment of a method for implementing a location-aware authentication policy. The method may be executed within the context of the system architecture shown inFIGS. 2-3 but is not limited to any particular system architecture.

At401 the client's location is identified using one or more available techniques (e.g., GPS, triangulation, peer/network device detection, etc). At402, one or more location classes (and potentially Boolean combinations of classes) are identified for the current location based on an existing set of policy rules. At403, one or more authentication techniques are identified according to the location class(es). For example, if the client device is currently at a location known to be the user's home or office or within a defined radius of another trusted location, then minimal (or no) authentication may be required. By contrast, if the client device is currently at an unknown location and/or a location known to be untrusted, then more rigorous authentication may be required (e.g., biometric authentication such as a fingerprint scan, PIN entry, etc). At404, the authentication techniques are employed and if authentication is successful, determined at405, then the transaction requiring authentication is authorized at406.

As mentioned above, the level of authentication required may be determined based on the current transaction. For example, a transaction which requires a transfer of a significant amount of money may require a relatively high authentication assurance threshold, whereas non-monetary transaction may require a relatively lower authentication assurance threshold. Thus, the location-aware authentication techniques described herein may be sufficient for certain transactions but may be combined with more rigorous authentication techniques for other transactions.

If authentication is not successful, then the transaction is blocked at407. At this stage, the transaction may be permanently blocked or additional authentication steps may be requested. For example, if the user entered an incorrect PIN, the user may be asked to re-enter the PIN and/or perform biometric authentication.

The embodiments of the invention described herein provide numerous benefits to authentication systems. For example, the described embodiments may be used to efficiently block access from unauthorized locations, reducing unauthorized access by limiting the location from which users are permitted to attempt authentication (e.g., as defined by location classes). In addition, the embodiments of the invention may selectively require stronger authentication to respond to location-specific risks. For example, the relying party can minimize the inconvenience of authentication when a user is entering into a transaction from a known location, while retaining the ability to require stronger authentication when the user/client is connecting from an unknown or unexpected location. Moreover, the embodiments of the invention enable location-aware access to information. Alternatively, a location-centric policy may be used by a relying party to provide a user with additional access to location-specific information. By way of example, and not limitation, a user located in a Walmart may be granted access to special offers from Amazon.com when the user logs into their Amazon.com account on their mobile phone.

As mentioned above, the location of theclient device200 may be determined using a variety of different techniques. In one particular embodiment, the definition of a “location” may not be tied to a set of physical coordinates (as with GPS), but instead be prescribed by the presence of a set of peer devices or other types of network devices. For example, when at work, the client's wireless network adapters (e.g., Wifi adapter, Bluetooth adapter, LTE adapter, etc) may “see” a set of peer network devices (e.g., other computers, mobile phones, tablets, etc) and network infrastructure devices (e.g., Wifi access points, cell towers, etc) on a consistent basis. Thus, the presence of these devices may be used for authentication when the user is at work. Other locations may be defined by the presence of devices in a similar manner such as when the user is at home.

For example, using the techniques described herein, a location may be defined as “with my work colleagues” or “at work” where the presence of a set of peer devices known to be owned by the user's work colleagues may be used as a proxy for the risk that needs to be mitigated by authentication policy. For example, if a user is surrounded by a set of known peer devices or other types of network devices, then the user may be deemed to be less of a risk than if no known devices are detected.

FIG. 5 illustrates one embodiment in which a “location” is defined by a set of peer devices and other network devices. In the illustrated example, theclient device200 “sees” two different peer devices505-506 (e.g., client computers, mobile phones, tablets, etc); two different wireless access points510-511; and two different cell towers520-521. As used herein, theclient device200 may “see” without formally establishing a connection with each of the other devices. For example, the client may see a variety of peer devices connected to the work LAN and/or may see the wireless signals generated by those devices regardless of whether the client connects to those devices. Similarly, theclient device200 may see the basic service set identification (BSSID) for a variety of different Wifi access points (e.g., Wifi from nearby hotels, coffee shops, work Wifi access points). Theclient device200 may also see a variety of different cell towers520-521, potentially even those operated by different cell carriers. The presence of these devices may be used to define a location “fingerprint” for the user's work location.

As illustrated, deviceproximity detection logic501 on theclient device200 may capture data related to visible devices and compare the results against historicaldevice proximity data504. The historicaldevice proximity data504 may be generated over time and/or through a training process. For example, in one embodiment, the user may specify when he/she is at work, at home, or at other locations (either manually, or when prompted to do so by the client200). In response, the deviceproximity detection logic501 may detect the devices in the vicinity and persistently store the results as historicaldevice proximity data504. When the user subsequently returns to the location, the deviceproximity detection logic501 may compare the devices that it currently “sees” against the devices stored ashistorical proximity data504 to generate a correlation between the two. In general, the stronger the correlation, the more likely it is that the client is at the specified location. Over time, devices which are seen regularly may be prioritized above other devices in the historical device proximity data504 (e.g., because these devices tend to provide a more accurate correlation with the user's work location).

In one embodiment, theauthentication policy engine210 may use the correlation results provided by the deviceproximity detection logic501 to determine the level of authentication required by the user for each relyingparty250. For example, if a high correlation exists (i.e., above a specified threshold), then the authentication policy engine may not require explicit authentication by the end user. By contrast, if there is a low correlation between the user's current location and the historical device proximity data504 (i.e., below a specified threshold), then theauthentication policy engine210 may require more rigorous authentication (e.g., a biometric authentication such as a fingerprint scan and/or requesting PIN entry).

In one embodiment, the deviceproximity detection logic501 identifies the set of other devices that are in the client's proximity which have been authenticated. For example, if several of a user's colleagues have already authenticated successfully, then there may be less risk associated with allowing the user to access certain data with a less reliable authenticator, simply because the user is operating in the presence of his/her peers. In this embodiment, peer-to-peer communication over standards such as 802.11n may be used to collect authentication tokens from peers that can be used to prove those peers have already authenticated.

In another embodiment, the deviceproximity detection logic501 may also detect a previously authenticated device that is paired with the user's client (e.g., such as the user's mobile phone or tablet). The presence of another authenticated device that is used by the same user that is attempting to authenticate may be used as an input to the authentication decision, particularly when accessing the same application.

In one embodiment, the historicaldevice proximity data504 is collected and shared across multiple devices, and may be stored and maintained on an intermediate authentication service. For example, a history of groups of peers and network devices in each location may be tracked and stored in a central database accessible to the deviceproximity detection logic501 on each device. This database may then be used as an input to determine the risk of an attempted authentication from a particular location.

Embodiments for Confirming Location Using Supplemental Sensor and/or Location Data

As mentioned above, one embodiment of the invention leverages data fromadditional sensors243 from the mobile device to provide supplemental inputs to the risk calculation used for authentication. These supplemental inputs may provide additional levels of assurance that can help to either confirm or refute claims of the location of the end user's device.

As illustrated inFIG. 6 theadditional sensors243 which provide supplemental assurance of the device's location may includetemperature sensors601,humidity sensors602 and pressure sensors603 (e.g., barometric or altimeter pressure sensors). In one embodiment, the sensors provide temperature, humidity, and pressure readings, respectively, which are used by a supplementaldata correlation module640 of theauthentication policy engine210 to correlate againstsupplemental data610 known about the location provided by the location sensor(s)241 (or the location derived using the various other techniques described herein). The results of the correlation are then used by theauthentication policy module211 to select one ormore authentication techniques212 for a given transaction. As indicated inFIG. 6, thesupplemental location data610 may include data collected from external sources (e.g., the Internet or other mobile devices) and local data sources (e.g., historical data collected during periods when the device is known to be in possession of the legitimate user).

The supplementaldata correlation module640 may use the data provided by theadditional sensors243 in a variety of different ways to correlate against thesupplemental location data610. For example, in one embodiment, thesupplemental location data610 includes current local meteorological conditions at the location provided by the location sensor(s)241. By comparing the humidity, temperature, or barometric pressure gathered from theadditional sensors243 against real-timelocal weather data610, the supplementaldata correlation module640 identifies cases where the sensor data is inconsistent with local conditions. For example, if the client device's GPS reading indicates that the device is outside, yet the temperature, humidity, or barometric pressure are not consistent with the local weather conditions, then the supplementaldata correlation module640 may generate a low correlation score and the location may be deemed less trustworthy. Consequently, theauthentication policy module211 may require more rigorous authentication techniques212 (e.g., fingerprint, PIN entry, etc) to approve a transaction.

As another example, by comparing the altitude provided by analtimeter pressure sensor603 against the known geographical or network topology of the claimed location (provided with the supplemental location data610), the supplementaldata correlation module640 may identify discrepancies that signal the claimed location is not genuine. For example, if a reverse IP lookup of the user's claimed location identifies them as being in the Andes Mountains, but altimeter data from the device indicates the device is at sea level, then the supplementaldata correlation module640 may generate a low correlation score and the location may be deemed less trustworthy. As a result of the low correlation score, theauthentication policy module211 may attempt to mitigate the higher risk with stronger authentication for the transaction.

In one embodiment, the supplementaldata correlation module640 compares data gathered fromsensors243 on the user's device against multiple other end users in the immediate area to identify anomalies that suggest the user is not operating in the same physical location as those known users. For example, if a set of authenticated users are identified who are operating the same physical area, and all of those users' devices note that the local temperature in the area is 10° C., the supplementaldata correlation module640 may generate a low correlation score for an end user whosetemperature sensor601 indicates the local temperature is 20° C. As a result, theauthentication policy211 may require morerigorous authentication techniques212.

As yet another example, the supplementaldata correlation module640 may compare current readings against historical data for a particular user. For example, as mentioned, sensor data may be analyzed during periods of time when the user is known to be in possession of the device200 (e.g., for a time period following an explicit authentication). The supplementaldata correlation module640 may then look for discontinuities in the local data to identify suspicious behavior. For example, if the user's ambient temperature normally floats between 10° C. and 20° C. and it is currently at 30° C., this may indicate the user is not in a typical location, thereby generating a low correlation and causing theauthentication policy module211 to require an additional level of scrutiny for a transaction.

The supplementaldata correlation module640 may perform various different types of correlations between sensor data and supplemental location data while still complying with the underlying principles of the invention. For example, various known correlation mechanisms may be used to determine the statistical relationship between the two sets of data. In one embodiment, the correlation score provided to theauthentication policy engine211 comprises a normalized value (e.g., between 0-1) indicating a level of correlation. In one embodiment, various threshold levels may be set for detected differences between thesensors243 andsupplemental location data610. For example, if thetemperature sensor601 measures a temperature of more than 3 degrees off of the current temperature (gathered from other devices or the Internet), then a first threshold may be triggered (resulting in a lowering of the correlation score). Each additional 3 degrees off from the current temperature may then result in a new threshold being met (resulting in a corresponding lowering of the correlation score). It should be noted, however, that these are merely examples of one embodiment of the invention; the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular manner of performing a correlation.

A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated inFIG. 7. At701, the current location being reported by the client device (e.g., via the GPS module on the device) is read. At702, supplemental location data is collected for the reported location along with sensor data from the client device. As mentioned above, the supplemental location data may be collected locally or remotely (e.g., from other clients and/or servers on the Internet) and may include data such as the current temperature, pressure and/or humidity for the reported location. The sensor data may be provided by temperature sensors, barometric or altimeter pressure sensors, and/or humidity sensors.

At703, a correlation is performed between the supplemental location data and the sensor data provided by the device sensors. In one embodiment, a relatively higher correlation will result in a relatively higher correlation score at704 whereas lower correlations will result in relatively lower correlation scores. As mentioned, in one embodiment, the correlation score is a normalized value (e.g., between 0-1) indicating the similarity between the sensor readings and supplemental data.

At705 one or more authentication techniques are selected based (at least in part) on the correlation score. For example, if a relatively low correlation score is provided, then more rigorous authentication techniques may be selected whereas if a relatively high correlation exists then less rigorous authentication techniques may be selected (potentially those which do not require explicit authentication by the end user).

If the user successfully authenticates using the selected techniques, determined at706, then the transaction is allowed to proceed at707. If not, then the transaction is blocked at708.

Numerous benefits are realized from the above embodiments. For example, these embodiments provide an additional level of assurance for location data gather from other sources: Allows the organization to supplement location data gathered from other sources (IP, GPS, etc) in order to gain additional assurance that the location is authentic. In addition, the embodiments of the invention may block a transaction from an unauthorized location, reducing unauthorized access by limiting the location from which users can even attempt authentication. Moreover, these embodiments may force stronger authentication to respond to location-specific risks (e.g., the relying party can minimize the inconvenience of authentication when the user is accessing information from a known location, while retaining the ability to require stronger authentication when the user/client is accessing from an unknown or unexpected location, or a location whose veracity can't be sufficiently qualified using multiple inputs).

Adaptive Application of Authentication Policy Based on Client Authentication Capabilities

As illustrated inFIG. 8, one embodiment of the invention includes an adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 that allows an organization—e.g., a relying party with secure transaction services250 (hereinafter simply referred to as the “relying party”)—to specify which types of authentication are appropriate for a particular class of interactions. As illustrated, the adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 may be implemented as a module within theauthentication engine811 executed at the relyingparty250. In this embodiment, the adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 executes in accordance with apolicy database825 containing data for existingauthentication devices829, authentication device classes828, interaction classes827, and authentication rules826.

In one embodiment, theauthentication device data829 comprises data associated with each of the explicit user authentication devices220-221 known to be used withclients200. For example, thepolicy database825 may include an entry for a “Validity Model 123” fingerprint sensor along with technical details related to this sensor such as the manner in which the sensor stores sensitive data (e.g., in cryptographically secure hardware,EAL 3 certification, etc) and the false acceptance rate (indicating how reliable the sensor is when generating a user authentication result).

In one embodiment, the authentication device classes828 specify logical groupings ofauthentication devices829 based on the capabilities of those devices. For example, one particular authentication device class828 may be defined for (1) fingerprint sensors (2) that store sensitive data in cryptographically secure hardware that has been EAL 3 certified, and (3) that use a biometric matching process with a false acceptance rate less than 1 in 1000. Another device class828 may be (1) facial recognition devices (2) which do not store sensitive data in cryptographically secure hardware, and (3) that use a biometric matching process with a false acceptance rate less than 1 in 500. Thus, a fingerprint sensor or facial recognition implementation which meets the above criteria will be added to the appropriate authentication device class(es)828.

Various individual attributes may be used to define authentication device classes, such as the type of authentication factor (fingerprint, PIN, face, for example), the level of security assurance of the hardware, the location of storage of secrets, the location where cryptographic operations are performed by the authenticator (e.g., in a secure chip or Secure Enclosure), and a variety of other attributes. Another set of attributes which may be used are related to the location on the client where the “matching” operations are performed. For example, a fingerprint sensor may implement the capture and storage of fingerprint templates in a secure storage on the fingerprint sensor itself, and perform all validation against those templates within the fingerprint sensor hardware itself, resulting in a highly secure environment. Alternatively, the fingerprint sensor may simply be a peripheral that captures images of a fingerprint, but uses software on the main CPU to perform all capture, storage, and comparison operations, resulting in a less secure environment. Various other attributes associated with the “matching” implementation may also be used to define the authentication device classes (e.g., whether the matching is (or is not) performed in a secure element, trusted execution environment (TEE)), or other form of secure execution environment).

Of course, these are merely examples for illustrating the concept of authentication device classes. Various additional authentication device classes may be specified while still complying with the underlying principles. Moreover, it should be noted that, depending on how the authentication device classes are defined, a single authentication device may be categorized into multiple device classes.

In one embodiment, thepolicy database825 may be updated periodically to include data fornew authentication devices829 as they come to market as well as new authentication device classes828, potentially containing new classes into which thenew authentication devices829 may be classified. The updates may be performed by the relying party and/or by a third party responsible for providing the updates for the relying party (e.g., a third party who sells the secure transaction server platforms used by the relying party).

In one embodiment, interaction classes827 are defined based on the particular transactions offered by the relyingparty825. For example, if the relying party is a financial institution, then interactions may be categorized according to the monetary value of the transaction. A “high value interaction” may be defined as one in which an amount of $5000 or more is involved (e.g., transferred, withdrawn, etc); a “medium value interaction” may be defined as one in which an amount between $500 and $4999 is involved; and a “low value transaction” may be defined as one in which an amount of $499 or less is involved.

In addition to the amount of money involved, interaction classes may be defined based on the sensitivity of the data involved. For example, transactions disclosing a user's confidential or otherwise private data may be classified as “confidential disclosure interactions” whereas those which do not disclose such data may be defined as “non-confidential disclosure interactions.” Various other types of interactions may be defined using different variables and a variety of minimum, maximum, and intermediate levels.

Finally, a set of authentication rules826 may be defined which involve theauthentication devices829, authentication device classes827, and/or interaction classes827. By way of example, and not limitation, a particular authentication rule may specify that for “high value transactions” (as specified by an interaction class827) only fingerprint sensors that store sensitive data in cryptographically secure hardware that has been EAL 3 certified, and that use a biometric matching process with a false acceptance rate less than 1 in 1000 (as specified as an authentication device class828) may be used. If a fingerprint device is not available, the authentication rule may define other authentication parameters that are acceptable. For example, the user may be required to enter a PIN or password and also to answer a series of personal questions (e.g., previously provided by the user to the relying party). Any of the above individual attributes specified for authentication devices and/or authentication device classes may be used to define the rules, such as the type of authentication factor (fingerprint, PIN, face, for example), the level of security assurance of the hardware, the location of storage of secrets, the location where cryptographic operations are performed by the authenticator.

Alternatively, or in addition, a rule may specify that certain attributes can take on any value, as long as the other values are sufficient. For example, the relying party may specify that a fingerprint device must be used which stores its seed in hardware and performs computations in hardware, but does not care about the assurance level of the hardware (as defined by an authentication device class828 containing a list of authentication devices meeting these parameters).

Moreover, in one embodiment, a rule may simply specify that onlyspecific authentication devices829 can be used for authenticating a particular type of interaction. For example, the organization can specify that only a “Validity Model 123 fingerprint sensor” is acceptable.

In addition, a rule or set of rules may be used to create ordered, ranked combinations of authentication policies for an interaction. For example, the rules may specify combinations of policies for individual authentication policies, allowing the creation of rich policies that accurate reflect the authentication preferences of the relying party. This would allow, for example, the relying party to specify that fingerprint sensors are preferred, but if none is available, then either trusted platform module (TPM)-based authentication or face recognition are equally preferable as the next best alternatives (e.g., in a prioritized order).

In one embodiment, the adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 implements the authentication rules826, relying on the interaction classes827, authentication device classes828, and/orauthentication device data829, when determining whether to permit a transaction with theclient200. For example, in response to the user of theclient device200 attempting to enter into a transaction with the relying party website or otheronline service846, the adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 may identify a set of one or more interaction classes827 and associated authentication rules826 which are applicable. It may then apply these rules via communication with an adaptiveauthentication policy module850 on the client device200 (illustrated inFIG. 8 as a component within the client's authentication engine810). The adaptiveauthentication policy module850 may then identify a set of one or more authentication techniques812 to comply with the specified authentication policy. For example, if a prioritized set of authentication techniques are specified by the adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 of the relying party, then the adaptiveauthentication policy module850 may select the highest priority authentication technique which is available on theclient200.

The results of the authentication techniques812 are provided to anassurance calculation module840 which generates an assurance level that the current user is the legitimate user. In one embodiment, if the assurance level is sufficiently high, then the client will communicate the results of the successful authentication to theauthentication engine811 of the relying party, which will then permit the transaction.

In one embodiment, data from the client device sensors241-243 may also be used by theassurance calculation module840 to generate the assurance level. For example, the location sensor (e.g., a GPS device) may indicate a current location for theclient device200. If the client device is in an expected location (e.g., home or work), then theassurance calculation module840 may use this information to increase the assurance level. By contrast, if theclient device200 is in an unexpected location (e.g., a foreign country not previously visited by the user), then theassurance calculation module840 may use this information to lower the assurance level (thereby requiring more rigorous explicit user authentication to reach an acceptable assurance level). As discussed above, various additional sensor data such as temperature, humidity, accelerometer data, etc, may be integrated into the assurance level calculation.

The system illustrated inFIG. 8 may operate differently based on specificity with which the client authentication capabilities and other information are communicated to the relying party. For example, in one embodiment, the specific models of each of the explicit user authentication devices220-221 and specific details of the security hardware/software and sensors241-243 on theclient device200 may be communicated to the relyingparty250. As such, in this embodiment, the adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 may specifically identify the desired mode(s) of authentication, based on the authentication rules implemented for the current transaction and the risk associated with the client. For example, the adaptiveauthentication policy module845 may request authentication via the “Validity Model 123” fingerprint sensor installed on the client for a given transaction.

In another embodiment, only a generic description of the authentication capabilities of theclient device200 may be provided to protect the user's privacy. For example, the client device may communicate that it has a fingerprint sensor that stores sensitive data in a cryptographically secure hardware that has been EAL 3 certified and/or that uses a biometric matching process with a false acceptance rate less than 1 in N. It may specify similar generic information related to the capabilities and specifications of other authentication devices, without disclosing the specific models of those devices. The adaptiveauthentication policy engine845 may then use this general information to categorize the authentication devices in applicable authentication device classes838 within thedatabase825. In response to a request to perform a transaction, the adaptiveauthentication policy module845 may then instruct theclient device200 to use a particular authentication device if its class is sufficient to complete the transaction.

In yet another embodiment, theclient device200 does not communicate any data related to its authentication capabilities to the relying party. Rather, in this embodiment, the adaptiveauthentication policy module845 communicates the level of authentication required and the adaptiveauthentication policy module850 on the client selects one or more authentication techniques which meet that level of authentication. For example, the adaptiveauthentication policy module845 may communicate that the current transaction is classified as a “high value transaction” (as specified by an interaction class827) for which only certain classes of authentication devices may be used. As mentioned, it may also communicate the authentication classes in a prioritized manner. Based on this information, the adaptiveauthentication policy module850 on the client may then select one or more authentication techniques812 required for the current transaction.

As indicated inFIG. 8, theclient device200 may include its own policy database(s)890 to store/cache policy data for each relying party. The policy database890 may comprise a subset of the data stored within thepolicy database825 of the relying party. In one embodiment, a different set of policy data is stored in the database890 for each relying party (reflecting the different authentication policies of each relying party). In these embodiments, the mere indication of a particular category of transaction (e.g., a “high value transaction,” “low value transaction”, etc) may be sufficient information for the adaptiveauthentication policy module850 on theclient device200 to select the necessary authentication techniques812 (i.e., because the rules associated with the various transaction types are available within the local policy database890). As such, the adaptiveauthentication policy module845 may simply indicate the interaction class of the current transaction, which the adaptiveauthentication policy module850 uses to identify the authentication techniques812 based on the rules associated with that interaction class.

A method for performing adaptive authentication based on client device capabilities is illustrated inFIG. 9. The method may be implemented on the system illustrated inFIG. 8, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.

At901 a client attempts to perform a transaction with a relying party. By way of example, and not limitation, the client may enter payment information for an online purchase or attempt to transfer funds between bank accounts. At902, the transaction is categorized. For example, as discussed above, the transaction may be associated with a particular interaction class based on variables such as the amount of money involved or the sensitivity of information involved.

At903, one or more rules associated with the category of transaction are identified. Returning to the above example, if the transaction is categorized as a “high value transaction” then a rule associated with this transaction type may be selected. At904, the rule(s) associated with the transaction type are executed and, as discussed above, information is sent to the client indicating the authentication requirements to complete the transaction. As discussed above, this may involve identifying specific authentication devices, identifying classes of authentication devices, or merely indicating the particular rule which needs to be implemented (e.g., if the client maintains local copies of the rules).

In any case, at905 a set of one or more authentication techniques are selected based on the requirements specified via the rule(s) and the authentication capabilities of the client. If authentication is successful, determined at906, then the transaction is permitted at907. If not, then the transaction is blocked at908 (or additional authentication is requested from the user).

There are numerous benefits realized from the embodiments of the invention described herein. For example, these embodiments reduce the effort required to integrate authentication capabilities at the relying party. For example, instead of writing code to codify an authentication policy, rules can be configured through a simple graphical user interface. All the relying party needs to do to integrate is define a policy for a class of interactions (for example: “Large Money Transfers”) and have the integration code use that policy identifier when interacting with the policy engine to determine the correct authentication mechanism to leverage.

Moreover, these embodiments simplify authentication policy administration. By expressing the authentication policy outside of code, this approach allows the organization to easily update their authentication policies without requiring code changes. Changes to reflect new interpretations of regulatory mandates, or respond to attacks on existing authentication mechanisms become a simple change in the policy, and can be effected quickly.

Finally, these embodiments allow for future refinement of authentication techniques. As new authentication devices become available, an organization can evaluate its appropriateness to addressing new or emerging risks. Integrating a newly available authentication device only requires adding the authentication device to a policy; no new code has to be written to deploy the new capability immediately.

Exemplary System Architectures

It should be noted that the term “relying party” is used herein to refer, not merely to the entity with which a user transaction is attempted (e.g., a Website or online service performing user transactions), but also to the secure transaction servers implemented on behalf of that entity which may performed the underlying authentication techniques described herein. The secure transaction servers may be owned and/or under the control of the relying party or may be under the control of a third party offering secure transaction services to the relying party as part of a business arrangement. These distinctions are indicated inFIGS. 10A-B discussed below which show that the “relying party” may includeWebsites1031 andother network services1051 as well as the secure transaction servers1032-1033 for performing the authentication techniques on behalf of the websites and network services.

In particular,FIGS. 10A-B illustrate two embodiments of a system architecture comprising client-side and server-side components for authenticating a user. The embodiment shown inFIG. 10A uses a browser plugin-based architecture for communicating with a website while the embodiment shown inFIG. 10B does not require a browser. The various techniques described herein for adaptively implementing an authentication policy may be employed on either of these system architectures. For example, theauthentication engine811 at the relying party andlocal authentication engine810 on the client inFIG. 8 may be implemented as part of thesecure transaction service1001 includinginterface1002. It should be noted, however, that the embodiment illustrated inFIG. 8 stands on its own and may be implemented using logical arrangements of hardware and software other than those shown inFIGS. 10A-B.

Turning toFIG. 10A, the illustrated embodiment includes aclient1000 equipped with one or more authentication devices1010-1012 for enrolling and authenticating an end user. As mentioned above, the authentication devices1010-1012 may include biometric devices such as fingerprint sensors, voice recognition hardware/software (e.g., a microphone and associated software for recognizing a user's voice), facial recognition hardware/software (e.g., a camera and associated software for recognizing a user's face), and optical recognition capabilities (e.g., an optical scanner and associated software for scanning the retina of a user) and non-biometric devices such as a trusted platform modules (TPMs) and smartcards. A user may enroll the biometric devices by providing biometric data (e.g., swiping a finger on the fingerprint device) which thesecure transaction service1001 may store as biometric template data in secure storage1020 (via interface1002).

While thesecure storage1020 is illustrated outside of the secure perimeter of the authentication device(s)1010-1012, in one embodiment, each authentication device1010-1012 may have its own integrated secure storage. Additionally, each authentication device1010-1012 may cryptographically protect the biometric reference data records (e.g., wrapping them using a symmetric key to make thestorage1020 secure).

The authentication devices1010-1012 are communicatively coupled to the client through an interface1002 (e.g., an application programming interface or API) exposed by asecure transaction service1001. Thesecure transaction service1001 is a secure application for communicating with one or more secure transaction servers1032-1033 over a network and for interfacing with asecure transaction plugin1005 executed within the context of aweb browser1004. As illustrated, theInterface1002 may also provide secure access to asecure storage device1020 on theclient1000 which stores information related to each of the authentication devices1010-1012 such as a device identification code, user identification code, user enrollment data (e.g., scanned fingerprint or other biometric data), and keys used to perform the secure authentication techniques described herein. For example, as discussed in detail below, a unique key may be stored into each of the authentication devices and used when communicating toservers1030 over a network such as the Internet.

In addition to enrollment of devices, thesecure transaction service1001 may then register the biometric devices with the secure transaction servers1032-1033 over the network and subsequently authenticate with those servers using data exchanged during the registration process (e.g., encryption keys provisioned into the biometric devices). The authentication process may include any of the authentication techniques described herein (e.g., generating an assurance level on theclient1000 based on explicit or non-intrusive authentication techniques and transmitting the results to the secure transaction servers1032-1033).

As discussed below, certain types of network transactions are supported by thesecure transaction plugin1005 such as HTTP or HTTPS transactions withwebsites1031 or other servers. In one embodiment, the secure transaction plugin is initiated in response to specific HTML tags inserted into the HTML code of a web page by theweb server1031 within the secure enterprise or Web destination1030 (sometimes simply referred to below as “server1030”). In response to detecting such a tag, thesecure transaction plugin1005 may forward transactions to thesecure transaction service1001 for processing. In addition, for certain types of transactions (e.g., such as secure key exchange) thesecure transaction service1001 may open a direct communication channel with the on-premises transaction server1032 (i.e., co-located with the website) or with an off-premises transaction server1033.

The secure transaction servers1032-1033 are coupled to asecure transaction database1040 for storing user data, authentication device data, keys and other secure information needed to support the secure authentication transactions described below. It should be noted, however, that the underlying principles of the invention do not require the separation of logical components within the secure enterprise orweb destination1030 shown inFIG. 10A. For example, thewebsite1031 and the secure transaction servers1032-1033 may be implemented within a single physical server or separate physical servers. Moreover, thewebsite1031 and transaction servers1032-1033 may be implemented within an integrated software module executed on one or more servers for performing the functions described below.

As mentioned above, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to a browser-based architecture shown inFIG. 10A.FIG. 10B illustrates an alternate implementation in which a stand-alone application1054 utilizes the functionality provided by thesecure transaction service1001 to authenticate a user over a network. In one embodiment, theapplication1054 is designed to establish communication sessions with one ormore network services1051 which rely on the secure transaction servers1032-1033 for performing the user/client authentication techniques described in detail below.

In either of the embodiments shown inFIGS. 10A-B, the secure transaction servers1032-1033 may generate the keys which are then securely transmitted to thesecure transaction service1001 and stored into the authentication devices within thesecure storage1020. Additionally, the secure transaction servers1032-1033 manage thesecure transaction database1040 on the server side.

Embodiments of the invention may include various steps as set forth above. The steps may be embodied in machine-executable instructions which cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processor to perform certain steps. Alternatively, these steps may be performed by specific hardware components that contain hardwired logic for performing the steps, or by any combination of programmed computer components and custom hardware components.

Elements of the present invention may also be provided as a machine-readable medium for storing the machine-executable program code. The machine-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, floppy diskettes, optical disks, CD-ROMs, and magneto-optical disks, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, magnetic or optical cards, or other type of media/machine-readable medium suitable for storing electronic program code.

Throughout the foregoing description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details were set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the invention may be practiced without some of these specific details. For example, it will be readily apparent to those of skill in the art that the functional modules and methods described herein may be implemented as software, hardware or any combination thereof. Moreover, although some embodiments of the invention are described herein within the context of a mobile computing environment, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to a mobile computing implementation. Virtually any type of client or peer data processing devices may be used in some embodiments including, for example, desktop or workstation computers. Accordingly, the scope and spirit of the invention should be judged in terms of the claims which follow.

Claims (28)

I claim:

1. A method for user authentication comprising:

initially defining a plurality of authentication device classes based on characteristics of client authentication devices, the characteristics comprising a type of authentication device and a level of security assurance of the client device's hardware and/or software;

initially defining a plurality of interaction classes for a relying party, the interaction classes defined based on variables associated with interactions between a client and the relying party, the variables including an amount of money or a level of sensitivity of information involved in the interactions;

initially defining one or more authentication rule sets specifying authentication devices or classes of authentication devices to be used for different interaction classes, the one or more authentication rule sets comprising a first rule set;

detecting, by a secure transaction services engine, a user of a client attempting to perform a current interaction with a relying party over a network; and

responsively identifying a first interaction class for the current interaction, by an adaptive authentication policy hardware engine, based on variables associated with the current interaction and

implementing a first rule set of one or more authentication rules associated with the first interaction class to authenticate the user of the client, wherein implementing the first rule set of one or more authentication rules comprises the adaptive authentication policy hardware engine implementing a first rule specifying a particular authentication device class required to authenticate the user for the current interaction, wherein the first rule comprises a prioritized list of acceptable authentication device classes for the current interaction.

2. The method as inclaim 1 further comprising:

initially classifying a plurality of authentication device models into the plurality of authentication device classes based on characteristics of the authentication device models.

3. The method as inclaim 1 wherein the client selects a first authentication device to be used for authentication based on the prioritized list of acceptable authentication device classes.

4. The method as inclaim 1 wherein the variables associated with the current interaction comprises an amount of money or sensitivity of data involved in the current interaction.

5. The method as inclaim 1 wherein the type of authentication device includes fingerprint authentication, PIN or password entry, face recognition authentication, voice recognition authentication, authentication using a trusted platform module (TPM) device, and/or retinal scanning authentication.

6. The method as inclaim 2 wherein at least one authentication device class is defined to have a particular authentication factor with a false acceptance rate below a specified threshold.

7. The method as inclaim 2 wherein at least one authentication device class is defined based on where and/or how a matching algorithm is implemented to match biometric data extracted from an authentication device with biometric template data stored in a secure storage.

8. The method as inclaim 7 wherein the authentication device class is defined based on the matching algorithm being, or not being implemented within a secure execution environment.

9. The method as inclaim 6 wherein the one authentication device class is further defined to store sensitive data in cryptographically secure hardware and/or software.

10. The method as inclaim 3 further comprising:

generating an assurance level based, at least in part, on a user authentication with the first authentication device.

11. The method as inclaim 10 wherein the interaction is permitted if the assurance level is above a specified threshold.

12. The method as inclaim 11 wherein the assurance level is generated, at least in part, based on current sensor data read from client sensors, wherein at least one of the sensors comprises a location sensor providing a current location of the client.

13. An authentication system comprising:

an authentication policy database to store authentication policies for a relying party;

a secure transaction services engine of the relying party to detect a user of a client attempting to perform a current interaction with the relying party over a network;

an adaptive authentication policy hardware engine of the relying party to perform operations of:

initially define a plurality of interaction classes in the authentication policy database, the interaction classes defined based on variables associated with interactions between the client and the relying party, the variables including an amount of money or a level of sensitivity of information involved in the interactions;

initially define one or more authentication rule sets in the authentication policy database specifying authentication devices or classes of authentication devices to be used for different interaction classes, the one or more authentication rule sets comprising a first rule set; and

query the authentication policy database to identify a first interaction class for the current interaction based on variables associated with the current interaction and to implement the first rule set of one or more authentication rules associated with the first interaction class to authenticate the user of the client, wherein implementing a first rule set of one or more authentication rules comprises the adaptive authentication policy hardware engine implementing a first rule specifying a particular authentication device class required to authenticate the user for the current interaction, the first rule comprising a prioritized list of acceptable authentication device classes for the current interaction, and wherein the adaptive authentication policy hardware engine is to perform additional operations of initially defining a plurality of authentication device classes in the authentication policy database based on characteristics of client authentication devices, the characteristics comprising a type of authentication device and a level of security assurance of the client device's hardware and/or software.

14. The authentication system as inclaim 13 further comprising:

initially classifying a plurality of authentication device models into the plurality of authentication device classes in the authentication policy database based on characteristics of the authentication device models.

15. The authentication system as inclaim 13 wherein the client selects a first authentication device to be used for authentication based on the prioritized list of acceptable authentication device classes.

16. The authentication system as inclaim 13 wherein the variables associated with the current interaction comprises an amount of money or sensitivity of data involved in the current interaction.

17. The authentication system as inclaim 13 wherein the type of authentication device includes fingerprint authentication, PIN or password entry, face recognition authentication, voice recognition authentication, authentication using a trusted platform module (TPM) device, and/or retinal scanning authentication.

18. The authentication system as inclaim 14 wherein at least one authentication device class is defined to have a particular authentication factor with a false acceptance rate below a specified threshold.

19. The authentication system as inclaim 14 wherein at least one authentication device class is defined based on where and/or how a matching algorithm is implemented to match biometric data extracted from an authentication device with biometric template data stored in a secure storage.

20. The authentication system as inclaim 19 wherein the authentication device class is defined based on the matching algorithm being, or not being implemented within a secure execution environment.

21. The authentication system as inclaim 18 wherein the one authentication device class is further defined to store sensitive data in cryptographically secure hardware and/or software.

22. The authentication system as inclaim 15 further comprising:

the client generating an assurance level based, at least in part, on a user authentication with the first authentication device.

23. The authentication system as inclaim 22 wherein the interaction is permitted if the assurance level is above a specified threshold.

24. The authentication system as inclaim 23 wherein the assurance level is generated, at least in part, based on current sensor data read from client sensors, wherein at least one of the sensors comprises a location sensor providing a current location of the client.

25. The method as inclaim 1, wherein the characteristics of client authentication devices further comprises a type of location in which secrets are stored.

26. The method as inclaim 1, wherein the characteristics of client authentication devices further comprises a type of location where cryptographic operations are performed by the authentication devices.

27. The authentication system as inclaim 13, wherein the characteristics of client authentication devices further comprises a type of location in which secrets are stored.

28. The authentication system as inclaim 13, wherein the characteristics of client authentication devices further comprises a type of location where cryptographic operations are performed by the authentication devices.

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