Disclosure of Invention
According to a first aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of operating a telecommunications network, the telecommunications network comprising: a user equipment UE; a first wireless local area network, WLAN, the first WLAN identifiable by a first network identity; concealing the WLAN; a target WLAN; and the method comprises the steps of: configuring the hidden WLAN to have a hidden network identity cryptographically derived from the first network identity; by the UE: retrieving the first network identification from the first WLAN; cryptographically processing the obtained first network identity, thereby deriving the hidden network identity; searching for a WLAN using the derived hidden network identification; and requesting a connection to or via the target WLAN only after the hidden WLAN is discovered.
As used herein, the phrase "hidden" with respect to "WLAN" and/or "network identification" preferably means not discoverable to the UE, and preferably not publicly broadcasted. Preferably, the retrieving the first network identity is performed by the UE searching (or probing) for the WLAN and subsequently detecting the first WLAN. Optionally, the UE is configured to favor, be forced, prioritize, and more preferably optimize attempting/attempting to connect to the target WLAN. Optionally, the first WLAN, the hidden WLAN and/or the target WLAN are not secure (public or unencrypted), so access credentials for the UE to connect to the WLAN may not be needed. Optionally, the first WLAN, the hidden WLAN and/or the target WLAN are secure (private or encrypted), thus requiring access credentials for the UE to connect to the WLAN. Preferably, the cryptographically processing the first network identity is performed in response to the UE recognizing a predefined string in the first network identity.
Preferably, the cryptographically processing the first network identity is performed only on a part of the first network identity, which part is identifiable by the UE by a predefined string in the first network identity. Optionally, the target WLAN is also hidden (wherein the target WLAN and the first WLAN are different). Preferably, the UE is simultaneously within range of the first WLAN, the hidden WLAN and/or the target WLAN. As used herein, "cryptographically derived" and/or "cryptographically processed" preferably means generated as a result of performing a cryptographic function, which in turn may include encryption, decryption, encoding, decoding, hashing, and/or salinization.
Preferably, the method further comprises the steps of: the UE is prevented from requesting a connection with the target WLAN in response to the hidden WLAN remaining hidden from the UE. Preferably, the preventing is performed continuously so that the target WLAN may be blocked or blacklisted. Preferably, after the UE performs a search for a predetermined period of time and fails to identify the WLAN using the resulting hidden network identity within the period of time, it is determined that the hidden WLAN remains hidden from the UE.
Preferably, the method further comprises the steps of: configuring the target WLAN to be accessible only by the UE using access credentials; providing the first network identification to include an output of an encryption function performed on the access credentials; decoding, by the UE, the first network identity in response to retrieving the first network identity, thereby outputting the access credential; and wherein requesting a connection to the target WLAN is performed using the outputted access credentials. Preferably, the UE is provided with a decryption function corresponding to the encryption function, thereby allowing the UE to output the access credentials. Optionally, the first network identification is generated based on the access credentials. Optionally, the access credentials are generated based on the first network identification. Preferably, the access credentials comprise: a user name, a password, and/or a token. Preferably, the encryption function is performed by: generating a Wireless Access Point (WAP) of the first WLAN; or a server remote from and accessible to the WAP. Optionally, decoding of the first network identity is performed only on a portion of the first network identity, which portion is identifiable by the UE by a predefined string in the first network identity.
Preferably, the target WLAN is connected to a wide area network, and wherein a request is performed via connection of the target WLAN to connect the UE to the wide area network. Preferably, the method further comprises the steps of: configuring the wide area network to be accessible only by the UE via the target WLAN by using access credentials; providing the first network identification to include an output of an encryption function performed on the access credentials; decoding, by the UE, the first network identity in response to retrieving the first network identity, thereby outputting the access credential; and wherein requesting a connection to the wide area network via the target WLAN is performed using the access credentials. Preferably, the wide area network is only accessible by the UE through a captive portal (captive portal).
Preferably, the target WLAN is identifiable by a target network identity, and wherein the first network identity is provided to include the target network identity; and wherein the target network identity is derived by the UE from the retrieved first network identity and used by the UE to request the connection to the target WLAN. Alternatively, the UE may be preloaded with the target network identity, and the UE may also be configured to attempt to connect to the target WLAN by default. Preferably, the "network identification" (e.g., "first," "hidden," and/or "target") is a Service Set Identification (SSID).
Preferably, the first network identity is provided to further comprise an output of a cryptographic function performed on the target network identity; and wherein the target network identity is derived by the UE performing the cryptographic function on the first network identity. Preferably, the cryptographic function is performed by the WAP or a server remote from and accessible to the WAP in order to generate the first network identification. Optionally, the first network identity is (only) output by the cryptographic function and/or the encryption function. Optionally, the target WLAN and the first WLAN are the same. Alternatively, the target WLAN and the hidden WLAN are the same.
Preferably, the method further comprises the steps of: acquiring a network equipment identifier associated with a wireless access point WAP, wherein the WAP provides a first WLAN; the first network identity is also provided to comprise an output of the encryption function or (further) encryption function performed on the network device identity. Preferably, the network device identification is a Basic Service Set Identification (BSSID) of the WAP. Optionally, the first WLAN is provided by a first Wireless Access Point (WAP), the hidden WLAN is provided by a second WAP, and the target WLAN is provided by a third WAP. Optionally, the first WAP is identical to the second WAP and/or the third WAP. Alternatively, the second WAP may be identical to the third WAP.
Preferably, the method further comprises the step of changing the network device identity after establishing a connection between the UE and the target WLAN. Preferably, the network device identity is changed upon termination of the connection. Alternatively, the network device identity may be changed after each communication between the UE and the target WLAN.
According to another aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of operating a user equipment, UE, the UE forming part of a telecommunications network comprising: a first wireless local area network, WLAN, the first WLAN identifiable by a first network identity; a hidden WLAN having a hidden network identity cryptographically derived from the first network identity; a target WLAN; and the method comprises the steps of: retrieving the first network identification from the first WLAN; cryptographically processing the obtained first network identity, thereby deriving the hidden network identity; searching for a WLAN using the derived hidden network identification; and requesting a connection to or via the target WLAN only after the hidden WLAN is discovered.
According to another aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of operating a set of wireless access points, WAPs, the set of WAPs forming part of a telecommunications network including user equipment, UE, operable to connect to WAPs in the set of WAPs, the method comprising the steps of: providing a first WLAN, the first WLAN identifiable by a first network identification; and providing a hidden WLAN having a hidden network identity, the hidden network identity being cryptographically derived from the first network identity; and in response to the UE identifying the hidden WLAN, providing a target WLAN to which the UE is operable to connect or via. Alternatively, the group includes a single WAP. Alternatively, the UE may be available to connect to the target WLAN only after confirming that the UE has identified a hidden WLAN to the WAP set, in particular to the WAP providing the target WLAN.
According to a further aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computer readable carrier medium comprising a computer program which, when executed by a computer, causes the computer to perform the steps of any of the methods described above.
According to yet another aspect of the present invention there is provided a user equipment, UE, configured to access a telecommunications network, the telecommunications network comprising: a first wireless local area network, WLAN, the WLAN identifiable by a first network identity; a hidden WLAN having a hidden network identity cryptographically derived from the first network identity; a target WLAN; and the UE includes: a processor configured to cause the UE to: retrieving the first network identification from the first WLAN; cryptographically processing the obtained first network identity, thereby deriving the hidden network identity; searching for a WLAN using the derived hidden network identification; and a controller configured to cause the UE to request a connection to or via the target WLAN only after the hidden WLAN is found.
According to another aspect of the invention, there is provided a set of Wireless Access Points (WAPs) forming part of a telecommunications network including User Equipment (UE) operable to connect to WAPs of the set of WAPs, the set of WAPs comprising: a first controller configured to provide a first WLAN, the first WLAN identifiable by a first network identification; a second controller configured to provide a hidden WLAN with a hidden network identity, the hidden network identity being cryptographically derived from the first network identity; and a third controller configured to provide a target WLAN in response to the UE identifying the hidden WLAN, the UE being operable to connect to or via the target WLAN.
According to a further aspect of the present invention there is provided a telecommunications system comprising: a User Equipment (UE) as described above; and a set of Wireless Access Points (WAPs) as described above.
The invention includes any novel aspects described and/or illustrated herein. The invention also extends to a method and/or apparatus substantially as described herein and/or as illustrated with reference to the accompanying drawings. The present invention is also provided as a computer program and/or computer program product for performing any of the methods described herein and/or for implementing any of the apparatus features described herein, and a computer readable medium having stored thereon a program for performing any of the methods described herein and/or for implementing any of the apparatus features described herein. Features described as being implemented in hardware are alternatively implemented in software and vice versa.
The present invention also provides a method of transmitting a signal, and a computer product having an operating system supporting a computer program for performing any of the methods described herein and/or for implementing any of the apparatus features described herein.
Any device feature may also be provided as a corresponding step of the method and vice versa. As used herein, means-plus-function features may alternatively be represented in terms of their corresponding structures, e.g., as a suitably programmed processor.
Any feature of one aspect of the invention may be applied to other aspects of the invention in any suitable combination. Any, some, and/or all features of one aspect may be applied to any, some, and/or all features of any other aspect in any suitable combination. The particular combinations of the various features described and defined in any aspect of the invention may be implemented and/or provided and/or used independently.
As used throughout, the term "or" may be interpreted in an exclusive and/or inclusive sense unless otherwise indicated.
The present invention extends to a method of operating a telecommunications network, to a method of operating a user equipment, to a method of operating a set of wireless access points, to a user equipment, to a set of wireless access points, and to a telecommunications system as described herein and/or substantially as illustrated with reference to the accompanying drawings. The invention will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an exemplary telecommunications network; and
fig. 2 shows a process for operating a telecommunications network.
Detailed Description
Fig. 1 shows an exemplary telecommunications network 100 comprising: wireless communication device or User Equipment (UE) 110, wireless Access Point (WAP) 120, and wide area network 130.
In one example, the WAP is a wireless router, expander, and/or repeater. The UE may be in the form of any device that contains a WLAN interface, and in particular: personal computers (notebook or desktop), mobile telecommunication devices, internet of things (IoT) devices, wireless repeaters, and/or wireless expanders.
WAP 120 is configured to generate Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 130, and UE 110 may be configured to connect to WLAN 130. In this example, the WLAN may be used to use IEEERTM Any of the 802.11 family of standards.
WAP 120 may be used to provide multiple WLANs, and in the example of fig. 2, WAP provides two separate WLANs: a first WLAN 130-1 and a second WLAN 130-2.
WAP 120 is connected (e.g., via an ethernet connection) to a wide area network 130 (e.g., in the form of a fixed access broadband network). As a result, UE 110 may be operable to connect to wide area network 130 via WLAN 130 provided by WAP 120 and in turn connect to, for example, the internet.
WAP 120 is configured to broadcast a network device identification identifying the WAP to UE 110; the network device identification is in the form of a Basic Service Set Identification (BSSID). Conventionally, the BSSID is or is derived from a data link layer network address of a WAP, and in particular a Network Interface Controller (NIC) of the WAP, such as a Media Access Control (MAC) address. Thus, WAP is identifiable to UEs using BSSID.
WAP 120 is also configured to broadcast a network identification identifying a particular WLAN to UE 110; the network identity is in the form of a Service Set Identity (SSID). By using different SSIDs (which are typically easily configurable) for the first WLAN 130-1 and the second WLAN 130-2, each WLAN can be individually identified by the UE.
UE 110 is located close enough to WAP 120 to be within wireless range of WAP and thus able to communicate with WAP 120.
WAP 120 and UE 110 are configured for "zero-contact connectivity" in which the following processing may be performed without user intervention: the UE identifies the WLAN, retrieves new access credentials for the WLAN, authenticates the UE to the WLAN using the new access credentials, and then connects to the WLAN.
To securely facilitate such a "zero-contact connection," the WAP 120 is equipped with cryptographic routines that include an encryption function and a cryptographic function. Accordingly, UE 110 is equipped with a corresponding cryptographic routine that includes a decryption function and a cryptographic function, the decryption function configured to decrypt ciphertext generated from the encryption function. The cryptographic routine also includes instructions for indicating when, how, and what data to perform encryption, decryption, and cryptographic functions. For example, the encryption function comprises a symmetric or asymmetric algorithm, and in particular according to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
As described in more detail below, the telecommunications network 100 is configured such that a UE 110 that has been secretly passed access credentials for a new WLAN requests a new WLAN connection only after authenticating the access credentials.
Fig. 2 illustrates an exemplary process 200 for authenticating a "zero touch connection" process to automatically establish a WLAN connection with UE 110.
In a first step 210, the WAP generates a first WLAN 130-1, which may be identified by a first SSID created as described below.
The first WLAN 130-1 is a secure WLAN; as a result, the WAP requires access credentials (including at least a password) from UE 110 in order for the UE to connect to the first WLAN.
According to the cryptographic routine, an encryption function (in this example, performed by the WAP) is performed on the access credentials associated with the first WLAN 130-1, thereby generating ciphertext, and the ciphertext is used to form part of the first SSID. As a result, the access credentials of the first WLAN are encoded in the first SSID.
For example, the access credentials of the first WLAN include a password in the form of a text string "ztc sisdone" (i.e., a plaintext password), and the encryption function includes a shift (or "Caesar") password configured to apply a single forward shift by english letters. In this example, the ciphertext is thus "AUDTTJEFOF"; the ciphertext is used as the first SSID.
The first WLAN is made public so the WAP broadcasts a first SSID (e.g., "AUDTTJEPOF") and a BSSID (e.g., "1111111111111111111111111111") of the WAP 120.
In a next step 220, the WAP 120 generates the second WLAN 130-2.
According to the cryptographic routine, a cryptographic function (in this example, performed by the WAP) is performed on both the first SSID and the BSSID of WAP 120, resulting in a cryptographic output. The cryptographic output is then assigned to form part of the SSID of the second WLAN (i.e., the second SSID), and based thereon the second WLAN is generated.
For example, the cryptographic function is a hash function applied to a concatenation of a first SSID and then BSSID, consistent with the specific example provided above, the cryptographic function is an MD2 hash applied to "AUDTTJEPOF 1111111111111111111111111111"; and thus the cryptographic output and the second SSID is "3dd7240572c594ae2e510259c872557d".
The second WLAN 130-2 is configured to hide the WLAN (and thus the second WLAN may also be referred to as a "hidden WLAN"). Thus, the second SSID is not publicly broadcast by the WAP and is therefore unrecognizable to UEs (including UE 110 (at least until step 220)) that do not have a priori knowledge about the second WLAN.
At next step 230, ue 110 begins a search for available WLANs. Thus, the UE detects the first WLAN 130-1 as part of which the UE retrieves the first SSID and BSSID of the WAP 120. Since the second WLAN 130-2 is hidden and since the UE does not have a priori knowledge about the second WLAN, the UE cannot identify the second WLAN (although within range).
The UE is instructed to connect to the first WLAN 130-1 (thus, the first WLAN may also be referred to as a "target WLAN"); however, before attempting such a connection, in a next step 240, in response to retrieving the first SSID and BSSID, UE 110 performs a cryptographic routine such that the UE:
1. performing a decryption function on the first SSID (or only on the portion encoded with the encrypted access credentials) to derive access credentials for the first WLAN 130-1; and
2. the cryptographic function is performed on the first SSID and the BSSID, outputting a cryptographic output, and thus the second SSID.
Next 250, the UE searches for WLAN based on the output from UE 110 generated in previous step 240.
To this end, UE 110 sends a probe request for a WLAN having an SSID that matches the output by the UE (i.e., the second SSID) of the cryptographic functions acting on the first SSID and the BSSID.
The UE then monitors 260 for the presence of a response from a WLAN with such a matching SSID and thus monitors for the presence of a second WLAN.
If such a WLAN is present, the second WLAN 130-2 identifies itself to the UE in response to a probe request from the UE, and the UE discovers the presence of the second WLAN. In this way, the UE is able to verify that the entity (i.e., the first WLAN) is authentic (or cryptographically the same party) and that the first WLAN is therefore unlikely to be the adversary of the UE, due to the presence of the intended hidden information (i.e., the second WLAN with the cryptographically derived second SSID), which the UE is the entity from which the UE derives secret information (i.e., access credentials) that will be used to affect the operation of the UE (i.e., attempt to connect to the first WLAN).
In a next step 270, after confirming the presence of the second WLAN 130-2 based on the cryptographically derived information, the UE 110 attempts to connect to the first WLAN 130-1. Since the first WLAN is a private WLAN, the WAP requests access credentials from the UE and the UE submits the access credentials accordingly, which the UE derives at step 240. Thus, the UE may be configured to connect to the first WLAN 130-1.
Thus, UE 110 is prevented from being forced to attempt to connect to first WLAN 130-1 until the authenticity of the first WLAN is verified.
It should be appreciated that the UE can only efficiently derive access credentials for the first WLAN and cryptographic output forming part of the second SSID, since the UE and WAP are applying corresponding cryptographic routines.
Thus, if at step 260 the UE does not detect the presence of a WLAN having an SSID that matches the output by the UE of the cryptographic functions acting on the first SSID and BSSID, the UE prevents itself 280 from requesting a connection with the first WLAN 130-1, or more generally prevents itself 280 from requesting a connection with the WAP 120. This may occur if UE 110 detects a rogue WAP of the counterfeit (duplicate) first WLAN instead of WAP 120. Since the malicious WAP is an adversary that is not configured to generate a hidden (or the) second WLAN, the UE cannot verify the malicious WAP and thus prevent the UE from attempting to connect to a counterfeit WLAN, or more generally to the malicious WAP.
In one example, to increase security, after step 270 (and particularly after termination of the connection between UE 110 or all UEs and first WLAN 130-1), the WAP is configured to generate a new first SSID and/or BSSID that is different from the SSID and/or BSSID used by the WAP in (or any) previous steps of process 200 (including any previous iterations). In particular, the BSSID may be changed as frequently as every message between the UE and the WAP. The UE is configured to block any attempt to connect to the previously used first SSID and/or BSSID (and thus also block access to step 280).
Alternatives and modifications
In the foregoing, the second SSID comprises a cryptographic output generated based on performing a cryptographic function on both the first SSID and the BSSID; the use of these two identifiers helps to increase the security of the system. However, in one example, for simplicity, a cryptographic function is performed on the first SSID or BSSID to generate a second SSID by UE 110 and WAP 120. Alternatively, cryptographic functions may be performed on other identifications in addition to the first SSID and BSSID.
In an alternative example, to increase security, the second WLAN is also a private WLAN that requires access credentials from the UE to connect to the second WLAN, and the UE proceeds to step 270 only after the UE has connected to (and then disconnected from) the second WLAN. In one example, the access credentials for the second WLAN are: a static password known in advance by WAP and UE; or a password derived by the UE from the first SSID and/or BSSID using the encryption function or another encryption function.
In one example, the access credentials for the first WLAN 130-1 (and/or the second WLAN 130-2) are generated by a server accessible via the wide area network 130 that includes the cryptographic routine rather than at the WAP 120. Thus, the WAP communicates with the server to receive the access credentials. In one example, the server is in the form of a cloud-based management system for the WAP 120.
In another alternative, the access credentials instead allow access to the third WLAN (instead of the first WLAN 130-1), and the UE is configured to connect to the third WLAN using access credentials derived from a process corresponding to the process described above. The third WLAN may be provided by the WAP or another WAP (in the latter case both WAPs are in communication to share access credentials for the third WLAN).
In yet another example, the first WLAN, the second WLAN, and/or the third WLAN are public, and therefore no access credentials are needed when the UE establishes a connection with them. However, a forward connection from the UE to the wide area network requires authentication of the UE, so the access credentials are instead used to access the wide area network, e.g. via a captive portal. In this example, the UE is configured to request a connection to the wide area network only if the presence of the second WLAN is identified.
In another alternative, the first WLAN 130-1 and the second WLAN 130-2 are provided by two WAPs, respectively, wherein each WAP is accessible to the UE, connects to the wide area network 130, and communicates with the other WAP. Accordingly, in the case where a third WLAN is present, the third WLAN may be available to be provided by either WAP, or by a similarly configured further WAP.
In one example, the UE is instructed to connect to the first WLAN based on a pre-configured instruction provided to the UE, such as by default to attempt to connect to the first WLAN, or to attempt to connect to any WLAN from which the UE retrieves the SSID and BSSID.
Alternatively, the identity (i.e., SSID) of the target WLAN to which the UE is instructed to connect is communicated to the UE through the SSID; the target WLAN may be a first WLAN, a second WLAN, or a third WLAN. In this way, the access credentials encoded in the first SSID are associated with the target WLAN. For example, the SSID of the target WLAN is also provided as part of the first SSID, and in one example is provided in plaintext, and in another example is provided in ciphertext (also encoded using the encryption function or another encryption function). The UE is then configured to decode the first WLAN to derive (and differentiate) both the target WLAN and the access credentials.
It should be appreciated that the above-described method may be applied to other forms of WLAN and/or wireless personal area networks, such as Bluetooth-basedRTM 、ZigbeeRTM And WiMAXRTM 。
In an alternative example, the UE performs the cryptographic function only in response to identifying the first SSID and/or BSSID in a predefined format (i.e., step 240). For example, where a predefined format means that the SSID and/or BSSID starts and/or ends with a predefined character set.
In alternative examples, the UE performs encryption and/or cryptographic functions on only a portion of the first SSID and/or BSSID, wherein the portion is identifiable by the UE by a predefined prefix and/or suffix.
It should be appreciated that the second WLAN need not carry user traffic, nor does the first WLAN need to carry user traffic in the case where a third WLAN is provided to which the UE is ultimately connected.
Each feature disclosed herein and (where appropriate) as part of the claims and drawings may be provided independently or in any appropriate combination.
Any reference signs appearing in the claims are for illustrative purposes only and shall not limit the scope of the claims.