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CN111756539A - A Re-random Identification Encryption and Decryption Method - Google Patents

A Re-random Identification Encryption and Decryption Method
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CN111756539A
CN111756539ACN202010672997.0ACN202010672997ACN111756539ACN 111756539 ACN111756539 ACN 111756539ACN 202010672997 ACN202010672997 ACN 202010672997ACN 111756539 ACN111756539 ACN 111756539A
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陈荣茂
王小峰
王毅
彭伟
邢倩倩
陈锦榕
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National University of Defense Technology
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Abstract

The invention discloses a re-random identification encryption and decryption method, aiming at solving the security defect of the existing re-random identification encryption and decryption method. The technical scheme is as follows: constructing an encryption and decryption system consisting of an initialization module, a key extraction module, an encryption module, a decryption module and a re-random module; the key generation center runs an initialization module to generate public parameters and a main private key and disclose the public parameters; the key generation center runs a key extraction module and generates a private key for the receiver by adopting the identification id of the receiver; the sender runs the encryption module, generates a ciphertext C by adopting the identification id of the receiver and sends the C to the public server; the public server runs a re-randomization module to re-randomize the C and send a new ciphertext C' to a receiver; the receiver operates the decryption module to decrypt C'. The invention can resist the attack of the reproducible selection ciphertext based on the identification, and the operation of the re-random module does not need the identification of the receiver, thereby avoiding the distribution of the identification.

Description

Translated fromChinese
一种可重随机的标识加解密方法A Re-random Identification Encryption and Decryption Method

技术领域technical field

本发明属于信息安全技术领域,涉及一种标识加解密方法,具体涉及一种具有高安全性的可重随机的标识加解密方法。The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and relates to an identification encryption and decryption method, in particular to a re-random identification encryption and decryption method with high security.

背景技术Background technique

目前在密码领域具有代表性的可重随机的标识加解密方法有BB04方法、Waters05方法和Gentry06方法。然而,这三种方法均只能实现抗基于标识的选择明文安全(ID-CPA安全)。在实际应用中,某些具有更强能力的攻击者能够破解ID-CPA安全的加解密方法。下面将以Gentry06方法为例进行阐述。At present, the representative re-random identification encryption and decryption methods in the cryptographic field include the BB04 method, the Waters05 method and the Gentry06 method. However, all these three methods can only achieve identity-resistant chosen-plaintext security (ID-CPA security). In practical applications, some more capable attackers can crack the ID-CPA security encryption and decryption method. The following will take the Gentry06 method as an example to illustrate.

Gentry06方法:由Gentry在2006年EuroCrypt会议中提出。具体包括以下步骤:Gentry06 method: Presented by Gentry at the 2006 EuroCrypt conference. Specifically include the following steps:

第一步,密钥生成中心(指负责生成私钥的服务器)运行初始化模块生成公共参数和主密钥,并将公共参数公开。具体包括以下步骤:In the first step, the key generation center (referring to the server responsible for generating the private key) runs the initialization module to generate public parameters and the master key, and discloses the public parameters. Specifically include the following steps:

1.1初始化模块生成对称双线性群四元组

Figure BDA0002583018880000011
其中p为素数,根据国际通用的美国国家标准与技术研究院(NIST)标准,当p的数量级约为2160时,加解密方法的安全性等级为80比特,即攻击者至少需要进行280次运算才能破解该方法,
Figure BDA0002583018880000012
中的元素个数均为p,
Figure BDA0002583018880000013
中的元素均为椭圆曲线上点的坐标,可表示为两个整数,
Figure BDA0002583018880000014
中的元素为有限域
Figure BDA0002583018880000015
中的元素,可表示为k维整数数组,
Figure BDA0002583018880000016
Figure BDA0002583018880000017
为一个可有效计算的非退化的双线性映射;1.1 The initialization module generates a symmetric bilinear group quaternion
Figure BDA0002583018880000011
Among them, p is a prime number. According to the international standard of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), when the magnitude of p is about 2160 , the security level of the encryption and decryption method is 80 bits, that is, the attacker needs to perform at least 280 It takes several operations to break the method,
Figure BDA0002583018880000012
The number of elements in is p,
Figure BDA0002583018880000013
The elements in are the coordinates of points on the elliptic curve, which can be expressed as two integers,
Figure BDA0002583018880000014
The elements in are finite fields
Figure BDA0002583018880000015
The elements in , which can be represented as a k-dimensional integer array,
Figure BDA0002583018880000016
Figure BDA0002583018880000017
is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map;

1.2初始化模块生成元素个数为q的加法整数群

Figure BDA0002583018880000018
其元素为0到p-1的整数;1.2 The initialization module generates an additive integer group with the number of elements q
Figure BDA0002583018880000018
Its elements are integers from 0 to p-1;

1.3从

Figure BDA0002583018880000019
中随机选取2个元素g,h;从
Figure BDA00025830188800000110
中随机选取元素α;1.3 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000019
Randomly select 2 elements g, h from
Figure BDA00025830188800000110
Randomly select element α in ;

1.4计算公共参数元素g1=gα,为方便起见,椭圆曲线坐标与标量的乘法运算统一用指数运算的形式进行表示,具体的椭圆曲线坐标与标量的乘法运算步骤可以视为对椭圆曲线坐标进行多次加法运算;1.4 Calculate the common parameter element g1 =gα . For the sake of convenience, the multiplication of elliptic curve coordinates and scalars is uniformly expressed in the form of exponential operations. perform multiple addition operations;

1.5将g,g1,h组成公共参数,将α视为主私钥。1.5 Form g, g1 , h into public parameters, and regard α as the master private key.

第二步,密钥生成中心根据接收者的标识id,运行密钥提取模块为接收者生成私钥,其中接收者的标识id为

Figure BDA0002583018880000021
中的元素。私钥生成具体包括以下步骤:In the second step, the key generation center runs the key extraction module to generate a private key for the recipient according to the recipient's ID, where the recipient's ID is
Figure BDA0002583018880000021
elements in . Private key generation includes the following steps:

2.1检查id是否等于α。若相等,则标识非法,终止运行;2.1 Check if id is equal to α. If they are equal, the identification is illegal and the operation is terminated;

2.2从

Figure BDA0002583018880000022
中随机选取私钥第一元素rid;2.2 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000022
Randomly select the first element rid of the private key;

2.3计算私钥第二元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000023
2.3 Calculate the second element of the private key
Figure BDA0002583018880000023

2.4将rid,hid组成接收者的私钥。2.4 Make rid and hid the recipient's private key.

第三步,发送者(即发送者所在服务器)运行加密模块生成密文,并将密文发送给公共服务器。需要加密的明文m为

Figure BDA0002583018880000024
中的元素,具体步骤如下:In the third step, the sender (that is, the server where the sender is located) runs the encryption module to generate the ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to the public server. The plaintext m to be encrypted is
Figure BDA0002583018880000024
elements, the specific steps are as follows:

3.1从

Figure BDA0002583018880000025
中随机选取元素s;3.1 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000025
Randomly select element s in ;

3.2构建密文C,

Figure BDA0002583018880000026
3.2 Construct ciphertext C,
Figure BDA0002583018880000026

第四步,公共服务器运行重随机模块,将得到的新密文发送给接收者。具体步骤如下:In the fourth step, the public server runs the re-random module and sends the obtained new ciphertext to the receiver. Specific steps are as follows:

4.1将密文C解析成三元组(u,v,w);4.1 Parse the ciphertext C into triples (u, v, w);

4.2从

Figure BDA0002583018880000027
中随机选取元素t;4.2 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000027
Randomly select an element t in ;

4.3构建新密文C′,

Figure BDA0002583018880000028
4.3 Construct a new ciphertext C′,
Figure BDA0002583018880000028

第五步,接收者(即接收者所在服务器)运行解密模块,对收到的密文进行解密。具体步骤如下:In the fifth step, the receiver (that is, the server where the receiver is located) runs the decryption module to decrypt the received ciphertext. Specific steps are as follows:

5.1将密文C′解析成三元组(u′,v′,w′);5.1 Parse the ciphertext C' into triples (u', v', w');

5.2构建明文m,

Figure BDA0002583018880000029
5.2 Construct the plaintext m,
Figure BDA0002583018880000029

考虑如下攻击场景:密钥生成中心运行初始化模块生成公共参数和主私钥,并公开公共参数。然后,密钥生成中心运行密钥提取模块为接收者生成私钥,并通过安全信道发送给接收者。攻击者选择两个明文m0和m1,并诱使发送者从m0和m1中随机挑选一个明文进行加密。攻击者可以获得发送者生成的密文。同时,攻击者还可以向密钥生成中心发起一系列解密询问。解密询问以标识和密文为输入,返回密文在该标识对应密钥下的解密结果。当解密结果等于m0或m1时,则不回答该询问。最终,攻击者的目标是猜测发送者是对m0还是m1进行了加密。Consider the following attack scenario: the key generation center runs the initialization module to generate public parameters and the master private key, and discloses the public parameters. Then, the key generation center runs the key extraction module to generate a private key for the receiver, and sends it to the receiver through a secure channel. The attacker chooses two plaintexts m0 and m1 , and induces the sender to randomly pick a plain text from m0 and m1 to encrypt. An attacker can obtain the ciphertext generated by the sender. At the same time, the attacker can also initiate a series of decryption challenges to the key generation center. The decryption query takes the identifier and the ciphertext as input, and returns the decryption result of the ciphertext under the key corresponding to the identifier. When the decryption result is equal to m0 or m1 , the query is not answered. Ultimately, the attacker's goal is to guess whether the sender encryptedm0 orm1 .

下面将解释Gentry06方法为何不能抵挡上述攻击。攻击者在获得发送者生成的密文后,可以将其解析为三元组(u,v,w)。从

Figure BDA00025830188800000210
中随机选择元素m′,计算新密文C*=(u,v,m′·w)。假设以接收者的标识id和新密文C*发起解密询问得到的结果为m*,那么计算m*/m′即可得知发送者是对m0还是m1进行了加密。The following will explain why the Gentry06 method cannot withstand the above attacks. After obtaining the ciphertext generated by the sender, the attacker can parse it into a triple (u, v, w). from
Figure BDA00025830188800000210
Randomly select the element m' in , and calculate the new ciphertext C* =(u, v, m'·w). Assuming that the result obtained by initiating a decryption query with the receiver's identification id and the new ciphertext C* is m* , then calculating m* /m' can know whether the sender has encrypted m0 or m1 .

目前为止,还没有公开文献涉及能够抵抗上述攻击(又称为基于标识的可重放的选择密文攻击)的可重随机的标识加解密方法。So far, there is no open document related to a re-random identifier encryption/decryption method that can resist the above attack (also known as an identifier-based replayable chosen ciphertext attack).

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明要解决的技术问题是针对现有可重随机的标识加解密方法存在的安全性缺陷,提供一种更高安全性的可重随机的标识加解密方法。The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a re-random re-random identification encryption and decryption method with higher security for the security defects existing in the existing re-random identification encryption and decryption methods.

本发明技术方案如下:The technical scheme of the present invention is as follows:

第一步:构建加解密系统。该系统中有四个角色,分别为密钥生成中心、发送者、接收者和公共服务器。加解密系统由五个模块组成,分别为初始化模块、密钥提取模块、加密模块、解密模块和重随机模块。其中初始化模块和密钥提取模块部署在密钥生成中心,加密模块部署在发送者,解密模块部署在接收者,重随机模块部署在公共服务器。Step 1: Build an encryption and decryption system. There are four roles in the system, namely, the key generation center, the sender, the receiver, and the public server. The encryption and decryption system consists of five modules, namely initialization module, key extraction module, encryption module, decryption module and re-random module. The initialization module and the key extraction module are deployed in the key generation center, the encryption module is deployed in the sender, the decryption module is deployed in the receiver, and the re-random module is deployed in the public server.

第二步:密钥生成中心运行初始化模块,生成公共参数和主私钥,并将公共参数公开。具体步骤如下:Step 2: The key generation center runs the initialization module, generates public parameters and the master private key, and exposes the public parameters. Specific steps are as follows:

2.1初始化模块生成对称双线性群四元组

Figure BDA0002583018880000031
其中p为素数,其大小与加解密方法的安全性等级相关。p的数量级约为2160
Figure BDA0002583018880000032
中的元素个数均为p,
Figure BDA0002583018880000033
中的元素为椭圆曲线上点的坐标,可表示为两个整数,
Figure BDA0002583018880000034
中的元素为有限域
Figure BDA0002583018880000035
中的元素,可表示为k维整数数组,e(g1,g2)为一个可有效计算的非退化的双线性映射,即
Figure BDA0002583018880000036
g1,g2均为
Figure BDA0002583018880000037
中的元素;2.1 The initialization module generates a symmetric bilinear group quaternion
Figure BDA0002583018880000031
Among them, p is a prime number, and its size is related to the security level of the encryption and decryption method. The magnitude of p is about 2160 ,
Figure BDA0002583018880000032
The number of elements in is p,
Figure BDA0002583018880000033
The elements in are the coordinates of the points on the elliptic curve, which can be expressed as two integers,
Figure BDA0002583018880000034
The elements in are finite fields
Figure BDA0002583018880000035
The elements in can be represented as a k-dimensional integer array, e(g1 , g2 ) is a non-degenerate bilinear map that can be efficiently calculated, namely
Figure BDA0002583018880000036
g1 and g2 are both
Figure BDA0002583018880000037
elements in;

2.2初始化模块生成元素个数为p的加法整数群

Figure BDA0002583018880000038
其元素为0到p-1的整数;2.2 The initialization module generates an additive integer group with the number of elements p
Figure BDA0002583018880000038
Its elements are integers from 0 to p-1;

2.3构造哈希函数H(m),其输入m为

Figure BDA0002583018880000039
中的元素,输出为
Figure BDA00025830188800000310
中的元素。H(m)采用了美国国家标准与技术研究院发布的SHA-1函数,具体为将m划分成512比特的片段,将每一段运算SHA-1函数的结果进行异或运算得到160比特长的输出,即
Figure BDA00025830188800000311
中的元素;2.3 Construct a hash function H(m) whose input m is
Figure BDA0002583018880000039
elements in , the output is
Figure BDA00025830188800000310
elements in . H(m) adopts the SHA-1 function issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States. Specifically, m is divided into 512-bit segments, and the result of each segment of the SHA-1 function is XORed to obtain a 160-bit long output, i.e.
Figure BDA00025830188800000311
elements in;

2.4从

Figure BDA00025830188800000312
中随机选取8个元素g,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7;2.4 From
Figure BDA00025830188800000312
8 elements g, h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 are randomly selected from the

2.5从

Figure BDA0002583018880000041
中随机选取3个元素α,z0,z1,其中z0≠z1;2.5 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000041
Randomly select 3 elements α, z0 , z1 in , where z0 ≠z1 ;

2.6计算公共参数元素g1=gα。该指数运算代表椭圆曲线坐标元素g与从

Figure BDA0002583018880000042
中随机选取的标量元素α的乘法运算,椭圆曲线坐标g与标量的乘法运算步骤可以视为对椭圆曲线坐标g进行α-1次加法运算,方法是:2.6 Calculate the common parameter element g1 =gα . The exponential operation represents the elliptic curve coordinate element g with the
Figure BDA0002583018880000042
The multiplication operation of the randomly selected scalar element α, the multiplication operation step of the elliptic curve coordinate g and the scalar can be regarded as α-1 addition operation on the elliptic curve coordinate g, the method is:

2.6.1令椭圆曲线y2=x3+ax+b上的坐标元素g=(gx,gy),令变量i=2,令坐标元素h=(hx,hy)=g;2.6.1 Let the coordinate element g=(gx , gy ) on the elliptic curve y2 =x3 +ax+b, let the variable i=2, let the coordinate element h=(hx ,hy )=g;

2.6.2计算g和h之间的斜率λ。若g=h,则

Figure BDA0002583018880000046
为经点g与椭圆曲线相切的切线的斜率;若g≠h,则λ=(gy-hy)/(gx-hx);2.6.2 Calculate the slope λ between g and h. If g=h, then
Figure BDA0002583018880000046
is the slope of the tangent line tangent to the elliptic curve through point g; if g≠h, then λ=(gy -hy )/(gx -hx );

2.6.3计算g和h相加后的横坐标rx=λ2-gx-hx和g和h相加后的纵坐标ry=λ(gx-rx)-gy。r=(rx,ry)即为g与h相加的结果。2.6.3 Calculate the abscissa rx2 -gx -hx after adding g and h and the ordinate ry= λ(gx -rx )-gy after adding g and h. r= (rx , ry ) is the result of adding g and h.

2.6.4若i=α,此时r即为元素g1,转2.7;否则,更新i=i+1,令h=r,转2.6.2。2.6.4 If i=α, then r is the element g1 , go to 2.7; otherwise, update i=i+1, set h=r, go to 2.6.2.

2.7将g,g1,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,z0,z1,H(m)组成公共参数,α组成主私钥。h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7中的任意一个记为hi,i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}。2.7 Form g, g1 , h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 , z0 , z1 , H(m) as public parameters, and α as the master private key. Any one of h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 is denoted as hi , i∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.

第三步,密钥生成中心运行密钥提取模块,采用接收者的标识id为接收者生成私钥。接收者的标识id为接收者已有的身份标识在

Figure BDA0002583018880000043
中对应的元素,私钥生成方法是:In the third step, the key generation center runs a key extraction module, and generates a private key for the recipient by using the recipient's identification id. The receiver's identification id is the receiver's existing identification.
Figure BDA0002583018880000043
The corresponding element in , the private key generation method is:

3.1判断id是否等于α,若相等,则标识非法,转第七步;若不相等,转3.2;3.1 Judging whether the id is equal to α, if it is equal, the identification is illegal, go to the seventh step; if not, go to 3.2;

3.2令变量i=1;3.2 Let the variable i=1;

3.3从

Figure BDA0002583018880000044
中随机选取一个元素,作为接收者的私钥中的第i个元素rid,i;3.3 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000044
Randomly select an element in the receiver's private key as the i-th element rid,i in the receiver's private key;

3.4计算私钥元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000045
更新i=i+1;;3.4 Calculate private key elements
Figure BDA0002583018880000045
update i = i+1;;

3.5若i≤7,转3.3;否则,将{rid.i,hid.i|i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}}组成私钥。3.5 If i≤7, go to 3.3; otherwise, combine {rid.i , hid.i |i∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}} to form the private key.

第四步,发送者运行加密模块,采用接收者的标识id生成密文,并将密文发送给公共服务器。需要加密的明文M为转化为十进制数后不大于p的二进制数,具体步骤如下:In the fourth step, the sender runs the encryption module, uses the receiver's identification id to generate the ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to the public server. The plaintext M that needs to be encrypted is a binary number that is not greater than p after being converted into a decimal number. The specific steps are as follows:

4.1将明文M按照二进制转十进制的方法,转化为整数M′。令中间明文m=(0,…,0,M′),其中前k-1维元素均为0,第k维元素为M′。那么m即

Figure BDA0002583018880000051
中的元素;k为
Figure BDA0002583018880000052
中元素表示为整数数组时的维数;4.1 Convert the plaintext M into an integer M' according to the method of converting from binary to decimal. Let the intermediate plaintext m=(0, . . . , 0, M'), wherein the first k-1 dimension elements are all 0, and the kth dimension element is M'. Then m is
Figure BDA0002583018880000051
elements in ; k is
Figure BDA0002583018880000052
The number of dimensions when the elements in are represented as integer arrays;

4.2从

Figure BDA0002583018880000053
中随机选取4个元素s,t,
Figure BDA0002583018880000054
4.2 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000053
Randomly select 4 elements s, t,
Figure BDA0002583018880000054

4.3从

Figure BDA0002583018880000055
中随机选取元素u;4.3 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000055
Randomly select element u in ;

4.4计算第一哈希值θ=H(m),计算第二哈希值σ=H(u);4.4 Calculate the first hash value θ=H(m), and calculate the second hash value σ=H(u);

4.5计算密文第一元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000056
密文第二元素x2=e(gs,g),密文第三元素x3=m·e(g-s,h1),密文第四元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000057
密文第五元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000058
密文第六元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000059
密文第七元素y2=e(gt,g),密文第八元素y3=e(g-t,h1),密文第九元素y4=(e(g,h2)e(gθ,h3))σt,密文第十元素y5=(e(g,h4)e(gθ,h5))σt,密文第十一元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000510
密文第十二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000511
密文第十三元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000512
Figure BDA00025830188800000513
密文第十四元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000514
密文第十五元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000515
密文第十六元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000516
密文第十七元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000517
密文第十八元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000518
令元素β1,β2为从
Figure BDA00025830188800000519
中随机选取的元素,元素γ为从
Figure BDA00025830188800000520
中随机选取的元素,β1β2表示β1和β2进行有限域
Figure BDA00025830188800000521
上的乘法运算,
Figure BDA00025830188800000522
表示β1和γ进行有限域
Figure BDA00025830188800000523
上的指数运算。例如:当β1=e(g,h2),β2=e(gθ,h3)时,
Figure BDA00025830188800000524
表示β1和β2进行有限域
Figure BDA00025830188800000525
上的乘法运算后的结果,再和σ(s+z0)进行有限域
Figure BDA00025830188800000526
上的指数运算。4.5 Calculate the first element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000056
The second element of the ciphertext x2 =e(gs , g), the third element of the ciphertext x3 =m·e(g-s , h1 ), the fourth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000057
The fifth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000058
The sixth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000059
The seventh element of ciphertext y2 =e(gt , g), the eighth element of ciphertext y3 =e(g-t , h1 ), the ninth element of ciphertext y4 =(e(g, h2 ) e(gθ , h3 ))σt , the tenth element of the ciphertext y5 =(e(g, h4 )e(gθ , h5 ))σt , the eleventh element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000510
The twelfth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000511
Thirteenth element of ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000512
Figure BDA00025830188800000513
The fourteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000514
The fifteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000515
The sixteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000516
The seventeenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000517
The eighteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000518
Let the elements β1 , β2 be from
Figure BDA00025830188800000519
A randomly selected element in , the element γ is from
Figure BDA00025830188800000520
Randomlyselectedelementsin
Figure BDA00025830188800000521
multiplication on ,
Figure BDA00025830188800000522
Represents β1 and γ for a finite field
Figure BDA00025830188800000523
exponentiation on . For example: when β1 =e(g, h2 ), β2 =e(gθ , h3 ),
Figure BDA00025830188800000524
Represents β1 and β2 for finite field
Figure BDA00025830188800000525
The result of the multiplication operation on , and then perform a finite field with σ(s+z0 )
Figure BDA00025830188800000526
exponentiation on .

4.6将x1,x2,x3,x4,x5组成第一五元组X,将y1,y2,y3,y4,y5组成第二五元组Y,将u1,u2,u3,u4组成第一四元组U,将v1,v2,v3,v4组成第二四元组V;4.6 Form x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 into the first quintuple X, y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 , y5 form the second quintuple Y, and u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 form the first quadruple U, and v1 , v2 , v3 , and v4 form the second quadruple V;

4.7将X,Y,U,V组成密文C,将C发送给公共服务器。4.7 Form X, Y, U, V into ciphertext C, and send C to the public server.

第五步,公共服务器运行重随机模块,对从发送者接收的密文C进行重随机,将得到的新密文C′发送给接收者。具体步骤如下:In the fifth step, the public server runs the re-random module, re-randomizes the ciphertext C received from the sender, and sends the new ciphertext C' obtained to the receiver. Specific steps are as follows:

5.1重随机模块从发送者接收密文C,将密文C解析成(X,Y,U,V),其中第一五元组X=(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5),第二五元组Y=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y5),第一四元组U=(u1,u2,u3,u4)以及第二四元组V=(v1,v2,v3,v4);5.1 The re-random module receives the ciphertext C from the sender, and parses the ciphertext C into (X, Y, U, V), where the first five-tuple X=(x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 ), the second quintuple Y=(y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 , y5 ), the first quintuple U=(u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 ) and the second quaternion V=(v1 , v2 , v3 , v4 );

5.2从

Figure BDA0002583018880000061
中随机选取4个元素s′,t′,
Figure BDA0002583018880000062
5.2 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000061
Randomly select 4 elements s', t',
Figure BDA0002583018880000062

5.3计算新密文第一元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000063
新密文第二元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000064
新密文第二元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000065
新密文第四元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000066
新密文第五元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000067
新密文第六元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000068
新密文第七元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000069
新密文第八元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000610
新密文第九元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000611
新密文第十元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000612
新密文第十一元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000613
新密文第十二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000614
新密文第十三元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000615
新密文第十四元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000616
新密文第十五元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000617
新密文第十六元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000618
新密文第十七元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000619
新密文第十八元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000620
5.3 Calculate the first element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000063
The second element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000064
The second element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000065
The fourth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000066
The fifth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000067
The sixth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000068
The seventh element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000069
The eighth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000610
The ninth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000611
The tenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000612
The eleventh element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000613
The twelfth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000614
The thirteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000615
The fourteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000616
The fifteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000617
The sixteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000618
The seventeenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000619
The eighteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800000620

5.4将x′1,x′2,x′3,x′4,x′5组成第三五元组X′,将y′1,y′2,y′3,y′4,y′5组成第四五元组Y′,将u′1,u′2,u′3,u′4组成第三四元组U′,将v′1,v′2,v′3,v′4组成第四四元组V′;5.4 Form x′1 , x′2 , x′3 , x′4 , x′5 into the third quintuple X′, and combine y′1 , y′2 , y′3 , y′4 , y′5 The fourth quintuple Y' is formed, u'1 , u'2 , u'3 , u'4 are formed into the third quaternary U', v'1 , v'2 , v'3 , v'4 Form the fourth quadruple V';

5.5将X′,Y′,U′,V′组成新密文C′,将C′发送给接收者。5.5 Combine X', Y', U', V' to form a new ciphertext C', and send C' to the receiver.

第六步,接收者运行解密模块,对从公共服务器收到的新密文C′进行解密。具体步骤如下:In the sixth step, the receiver runs the decryption module to decrypt the new ciphertext C' received from the public server. Specific steps are as follows:

6.1将密文C′解析成(X′,Y′,U′,V′),其中第三五元组X′=(x′1,x′2,x′3,x′4,x′5),第四五元组Y′=(y′1,y′2,y′3,y′4,y′5),第三四元组U′=(u′1,u′2,u′3,u′4)以及第四四元组V′=(v′1,v′2,v′3,v′4);6.1 Parse the ciphertext C' into (X', Y', U', V'), where the third quintuple X'=(x'1 , x'2 , x'3 , x'4 , x'5 ), the fourth quintuple Y′=(y′1 , y′2 , y′3 , y′4 , y′5 ), the third quintuple U′=(u′1 , u′2 , u′3 , u′4 ) and the fourth quadruple V′=(v′1 , v′2 , v′3 , v′4 );

6.2还原中间明文

Figure BDA00025830188800000621
和元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000622
Figure BDA00025830188800000623
若m不能表示为k维数组(0,…,0,M′)或者整数M′大于p,转第七步;否则,将M′按照十进制转二进制的方法,计算得到明文M。此时还不能直接输出明文M,需要进一步确定密文C′是否合法;6.2 Restoring the intermediate plaintext
Figure BDA00025830188800000621
and elements
Figure BDA00025830188800000622
Figure BDA00025830188800000623
If m cannot be represented as a k-dimensional array (0, . . . , 0, M') or the integer M' is greater than p, go to step 7; At this time, the plaintext M cannot be directly output, and it is necessary to further determine whether the ciphertext C' is legal;

6.3计算第一哈希值θ=H(m)和第二哈希值σ=H(u);6.3 Calculate the first hash value θ=H(m) and the second hash value σ=H(u);

6.4计算临时第一元素

Figure BDA00025830188800000624
临时第二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000625
Figure BDA00025830188800000626
临时第三元素
Figure BDA00025830188800000627
6.4 Computing the temporary first element
Figure BDA00025830188800000624
temporary second element
Figure BDA00025830188800000625
Figure BDA00025830188800000626
temporary third element
Figure BDA00025830188800000627

6.5判断第一三元组

Figure BDA00025830188800000628
是否等于第二三元组(u′4,v′3,v′4),若不等于,则密文C′不合法,转第七步;若相等,转6.6;6.5 Judging the first triple
Figure BDA00025830188800000628
Is it equal to the second triplet (u′4 , v′3 , v′4 ), if not, then the ciphertext C′ is invalid, go to step 7; if it is equal, go to 6.6;

6.6计算临时第四元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000071
Figure BDA0002583018880000072
临时第五元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000073
Figure BDA0002583018880000074
临时第六元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000075
Figure BDA0002583018880000076
临时第七元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000077
临时第八元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000078
6.6 Calculating the Temporary Fourth Element
Figure BDA0002583018880000071
Figure BDA0002583018880000072
temporary fifth element
Figure BDA0002583018880000073
Figure BDA0002583018880000074
temporary sixth element
Figure BDA0002583018880000075
Figure BDA0002583018880000076
temporary seventh element
Figure BDA0002583018880000077
temporary eighth element
Figure BDA0002583018880000078

6.7判断第五五元组

Figure BDA0002583018880000079
是否等于第六五元组(x′4,x′5,y′3,y′4,y′5),若不等于,则密文不合法,转第七步;若相等,则解密结果为M。6.7 Judging the fifth quintuple
Figure BDA0002583018880000079
Is it equal to the sixth quintuple (x′4 , x′5 , y′3 , y′4 , y′5 ), if not equal, the ciphertext is invalid, go to the seventh step; if it is equal, the decryption result for M.

第七步,加解密系统结束运行。In the seventh step, the encryption and decryption system ends operation.

采用本发明可以得到如下效果:The following effects can be obtained by adopting the present invention:

1.本发明由于第四步的4.4,保证了抗可重放的选择密文攻击安全。具体来说,在4.4中,x4,x5,y4,y5的计算使用了第一哈希值θ,即明文m的哈希值。当攻击者尝试对通过修改本发明中的现有密文C得到具有不同底层明文的新密文C*时,攻击者需要重新计算出对应的

Figure BDA00025830188800000710
然而严谨的数学规约可以证明攻击者无法计算正确的
Figure BDA00025830188800000711
因此,攻击者不能通过修改密文C得到具有不同底层明文的新密文C*,本发明可以抵抗基于标识的可重放的选择密文攻击,解决了背景技术所述的攻击以及Gentry06方法存在的安全缺陷。1. Due to 4.4 of the fourth step, the present invention ensures the security against replayable selected ciphertext attacks. Specifically, in 4.4, the calculation of x4 , x5 , y4 , and y5 uses the first hash value θ, that is, the hash value of the plaintext m. When an attacker tries to obtain a new ciphertext C* with a different underlying plaintext by modifying the existing ciphertext C in the present invention, the attacker needs to recalculate the corresponding
Figure BDA00025830188800000710
However, a rigorous mathematical specification can prove that the attacker cannot calculate the correct
Figure BDA00025830188800000711
Therefore, an attacker cannot obtain a new ciphertext C* with a different underlying plaintext by modifying the ciphertext C. The present invention can resist the replayable selected ciphertext attack based on the identification, and solves the attack described in the background art and the existence of the Gentry06 method. security flaws.

2.相比于一般的可重随机的标识加解密方案,本发明第五步重随机模块的运行不需要接收者的标识,因此可以免去标识的分发,使得任意角色可以对密文直接进行重随机化,而不需要事先获取密文所对应的标识,这样使得公共服务器的部署和运行更加简洁和高效。2. Compared with the general re-random identification encryption and decryption scheme, the operation of the fifth step of the re-random module of the present invention does not require the identification of the receiver, so the distribution of the identification can be omitted, so that any role can directly perform the encryption on the ciphertext. Re-randomization without the need to obtain the identifier corresponding to the ciphertext in advance, which makes the deployment and operation of the public server more concise and efficient.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1是本发明的加解密以及重随机逻辑结构图;Fig. 1 is the encryption and decryption of the present invention and the re-random logic structure diagram;

图2是本发明的流程图。Figure 2 is a flow chart of the present invention.

具体实施方式:Detailed ways:

以下结合说明书附图和具体实施例对本发明作进一步描述。The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

如图2所示,本发明包括以下步骤:As shown in Figure 2, the present invention comprises the following steps:

第一步:构建加解密系统。如图1所示,加解密系统中有四个角色,分别为密钥生成中心、发送者、接收者和公共服务器。加解密系统由五个模块组成,分别为初始化模块、密钥提取模块、加密模块、解密模块和重随机模块。其中初始化模块和密钥提取模块部署在密钥生成中心,加密模块部署在发送者,解密模块部署在接收者,重随机模块部署在公共服务器。Step 1: Build an encryption and decryption system. As shown in Figure 1, there are four roles in the encryption and decryption system, namely the key generation center, the sender, the receiver and the public server. The encryption and decryption system consists of five modules, namely initialization module, key extraction module, encryption module, decryption module and re-random module. The initialization module and the key extraction module are deployed in the key generation center, the encryption module is deployed in the sender, the decryption module is deployed in the receiver, and the re-random module is deployed in the public server.

第二步:密钥生成中心运行初始化模块,生成公共参数和主私钥,并将公共参数公开。具体步骤如下:Step 2: The key generation center runs the initialization module, generates public parameters and the master private key, and exposes the public parameters. Specific steps are as follows:

2.1初始化模块生成对称双线性群四元组

Figure BDA0002583018880000081
其中p为素数,其大小与加解密方法的安全性等级相关。p的数量级约为2160
Figure BDA0002583018880000082
中的元素个数均为p,
Figure BDA0002583018880000083
和的元素为椭圆曲线上点的坐标,可表示为两个整数,
Figure BDA0002583018880000084
中的元素为有限域
Figure BDA0002583018880000085
中的元素,可表示为k维整数数组,e(g1,g2)为一个可有效计算的非退化的双线性映射,即
Figure BDA0002583018880000086
g1,g2均为
Figure BDA0002583018880000087
中的元素;2.1 The initialization module generates a symmetric bilinear group quaternion
Figure BDA0002583018880000081
Among them, p is a prime number, and its size is related to the security level of the encryption and decryption method. The magnitude of p is about 2160 ,
Figure BDA0002583018880000082
The number of elements in is p,
Figure BDA0002583018880000083
The elements of and are the coordinates of points on the elliptic curve, which can be expressed as two integers,
Figure BDA0002583018880000084
The elements in are finite fields
Figure BDA0002583018880000085
The elements in can be represented as a k-dimensional integer array, e(g1 , g2 ) is a non-degenerate bilinear map that can be efficiently calculated, namely
Figure BDA0002583018880000086
g1 and g2 are both
Figure BDA0002583018880000087
elements in;

2.2初始化模块生成元素个数为p的加法整数群

Figure BDA0002583018880000088
其元素为0到p-1的整数;2.2 The initialization module generates an additive integer group with the number of elements p
Figure BDA0002583018880000088
Its elements are integers from 0 to p-1;

2.3构造哈希函数H(m),其输入m为

Figure BDA0002583018880000089
中的元素,输出为
Figure BDA00025830188800000810
中的元素。H(m)采用了美国国家标准与技术研究院发布的SHA-1函数,具体为将m划分成512比特的片段,将每一段运算SHA-1函数的结果进行异或运算得到160比特长的输出,即
Figure BDA00025830188800000811
中的元素;2.3 Construct a hash function H(m) whose input m is
Figure BDA0002583018880000089
elements in , the output is
Figure BDA00025830188800000810
elements in . H(m) adopts the SHA-1 function issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States. Specifically, m is divided into 512-bit segments, and the result of each segment of the SHA-1 function is XORed to obtain a 160-bit long output, i.e.
Figure BDA00025830188800000811
elements in;

2.4从

Figure BDA00025830188800000812
中随机选取8个元素g,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7;2.4 From
Figure BDA00025830188800000812
8 elements g, h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 are randomly selected from the

2.5从

Figure BDA00025830188800000813
中随机选取3个元素α,z0,z1,其中z0≠z1;2.5 From
Figure BDA00025830188800000813
Randomly select 3 elements α, z0 , z1 in , where z0 ≠z1 ;

2.6计算公共参数元素g1=gα。该指数运算代表椭圆曲线坐标元素g与从

Figure BDA00025830188800000814
中随机选取的标量元素α的乘法运算,椭圆曲线坐标g与标量的乘法运算步骤可以视为对椭圆曲线坐标g进行α-1次加法运算,方法是:2.6 Calculate the common parameter element g1 =gα . The exponential operation represents the elliptic curve coordinate element g with the
Figure BDA00025830188800000814
The multiplication operation of the randomly selected scalar element α, the multiplication operation step of the elliptic curve coordinate g and the scalar can be regarded as α-1 addition operation on the elliptic curve coordinate g, the method is:

2.6.1令椭圆曲线y2=x3+ax+b上的坐标元素g=(gx,gy),令变量i=2,令坐标元素h=(hx,hy)=g;2.6.1 Let the coordinate element g=(gx , gy ) on the elliptic curve y2 =x3 +ax+b, let the variable i=2, let the coordinate element h=(hx ,hy )=g;

2.6.2计算g和h之间的斜率λ。若g=h,则

Figure BDA0002583018880000091
为经点g与椭圆曲线相切的切线的斜率;若g≠h,则λ=(gy-hy)/(gx-hx);2.6.2 Calculate the slope λ between g and h. If g=h, then
Figure BDA0002583018880000091
is the slope of the tangent line tangent to the elliptic curve through point g; if g≠h, then λ=(gy -hy )/(gx -hx );

2.6.3计算g和h相加后的横坐标rx=λ2-gx-hx和g和h相加后的纵坐标ry=λ(gx-rx)-gy。r=(rx,ry)即为g与h相加的结果。2.6.3 Calculate the abscissa rx2 -gx -hx after adding g and h and the ordinate ry= λ(gx -rx )-gy after adding g and h. r= (rx , ry ) is the result of adding g and h.

2.6.4若i=α,此时r即为元素g1,转2.7;否则,更新i=i+1,令h=r,转2.6.2。2.6.4 If i=α, then r is the element g1 , go to 2.7; otherwise, update i=i+1, set h=r, go to 2.6.2.

2.7将g,g1,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,z0,z1,H(m)组成公共参数,α组成主私钥。h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7中的任意一个记为hi,i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}。2.7 Form g, g1 , h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 , z0 , z1 , H(m) as public parameters, and α as the master private key. Any one of h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , h7 is denoted as hi , i∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.

第三步,密钥生成中心运行密钥提取模块,采用接收者的标识id为接收者生成私钥。接收者的标识id为接收者已有的身份标识在

Figure BDA0002583018880000092
中对应的元素,私钥生成方法是:In the third step, the key generation center runs a key extraction module, and generates a private key for the recipient by using the recipient's identification id. The receiver's identification id is the receiver's existing identification.
Figure BDA0002583018880000092
The corresponding element in , the private key generation method is:

3.1判断id是否等于α,若相等,则标识非法,转第七步;若不相等,转3.2;3.1 Judging whether the id is equal to α, if it is equal, the identification is illegal, go to the seventh step; if not, go to 3.2;

3.2令变量i=1;3.2 Let the variable i=1;

3.3从

Figure BDA0002583018880000093
中随机选取一个元素,作为接收者的私钥中的第i个元素rid,i;3.3 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000093
Randomly select an element in the receiver's private key as the i-th element rid,i in the receiver's private key;

3.4计算私钥元素

Figure BDA00025830188800000910
更新i=i+1;;3.4 Calculate private key elements
Figure BDA00025830188800000910
update i = i+1;;

3.5若i≤7,转3.3;否则,将{rid.i,hid.i|i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6,7}}组成私钥。3.5 If i≤7, go to 3.3; otherwise, combine {rid.i , hid.i |i∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}} to form the private key.

第四步,发送者运行加密模块,采用接收者的标识id生成密文,并将密文发送给公共服务器。需要加密的明文M为转化为十进制数后不大于p的二进制数,具体步骤如下:In the fourth step, the sender runs the encryption module, uses the receiver's identification id to generate the ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to the public server. The plaintext M that needs to be encrypted is a binary number that is not greater than p after being converted into a decimal number. The specific steps are as follows:

4.1将明文M按照二进制转十进制的方法,转化为整数M′。令中间明文m=(0,…,0,M′),其中前k-1维元素均为0,第k维元素为M′。那么m即

Figure BDA0002583018880000094
中的元素;k为
Figure BDA0002583018880000095
中元素表示为整数数组时的维数;4.1 Convert the plaintext M into an integer M' according to the method of converting from binary to decimal. Let the intermediate plaintext m=(0, . . . , 0, M'), wherein the first k-1 dimension elements are all 0, and the kth dimension element is M'. Then m is
Figure BDA0002583018880000094
elements in ; k is
Figure BDA0002583018880000095
The number of dimensions when the elements in are represented as integer arrays;

4.2从

Figure BDA0002583018880000096
中随机选取4个元素s,t,
Figure BDA0002583018880000097
4.2 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000096
Randomly select 4 elements s, t,
Figure BDA0002583018880000097

4.3从

Figure BDA0002583018880000098
中随机选取元素u;4.3 From
Figure BDA0002583018880000098
Randomly select element u in ;

4.4计算第一哈希值θ=H(m),计算第二哈希值σ=H(u);4.4 Calculate the first hash value θ=H(m), and calculate the second hash value σ=H(u);

4.5计算密文第一元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000099
密文第二元素x2=e(gs,g),密文第三元素x3=m·e(g-s,h1),密文第四元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000101
密文第五元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000102
密文第六元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000103
密文第七元素y2=e(gt,g),密文第八元素y3=e(g-t,h1),密文第九元素y4=(e(g,h2)e(gθ,h3))σt,密文第十元素y5=(e(g,h4)e(gθ,h5))σt,密文第十一元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000104
密文第十二元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000105
密文第十三元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000106
Figure BDA0002583018880000107
密文第十四元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000108
密文第十五元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000109
密文第十六元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001010
密文第十七元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001011
密文第十八元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001012
令元素β1,β2为从
Figure BDA00025830188800001013
中随机选取的元素,元素y为从
Figure BDA00025830188800001014
中随机选取的元素,β1β2表示β1和β2进行有限域
Figure BDA00025830188800001015
上的乘法运算,
Figure BDA00025830188800001016
表示β1和γ进行有限域
Figure BDA00025830188800001017
上的指数运算。4.5 Calculate the first element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000099
The second element of the ciphertext x2 =e(gs , g), the third element of the ciphertext x3 =m·e(g-s , h1 ), the fourth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000101
The fifth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000102
The sixth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000103
The seventh element of ciphertext y2 =e(gt , g), the eighth element of ciphertext y3 =e(g-t , h1 ), the ninth element of ciphertext y4 =(e(g, h2 ) e(gθ , h3 ))σt , the tenth element of the ciphertext y5 =(e(g, h4 )e(gθ , h5 ))σt , the eleventh element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000104
The twelfth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000105
Thirteenth element of ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000106
Figure BDA0002583018880000107
The fourteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000108
The fifteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000109
The sixteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001010
The seventeenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001011
The eighteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001012
Let the elements β1 , β2 be from
Figure BDA00025830188800001013
Randomly selected elements in , element y is from
Figure BDA00025830188800001014
Randomlyselectedelementsin
Figure BDA00025830188800001015
multiplication on ,
Figure BDA00025830188800001016
Represents β1 and γ for a finite field
Figure BDA00025830188800001017
exponentiation on .

4.6将x1,x2,x3,x4,x5组成第一五元组X,将y1,y2,y3,y4,y5组成第二五元组Y,将u1,u2,u3,u4组成第一四元组U,将v1,v2,v3,v4组成第二四元组V;4.6 Form x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 into the first quintuple X, y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 , y5 form the second quintuple Y, and u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 form the first quadruple U, and v1 , v2 , v3 , and v4 form the second quadruple V;

4.7将X,Y,U,V组成密文C,将C发送给公共服务器。4.7 Form X, Y, U, V into ciphertext C, and send C to the public server.

第五步,公共服务器运行重随机模块,对从发送者接收的密文C进行重随机,将得到的新密文C′发送给接收者。具体步骤如下:In the fifth step, the public server runs the re-random module, re-randomizes the ciphertext C received from the sender, and sends the new ciphertext C' obtained to the receiver. Specific steps are as follows:

5.1重随机模块从发送者接收密文C,将密文C解析成(X,Y,U,V),其中第一五元组X=(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5),第二五元组Y=(y1,y2,y3,y4,y5),第一四元组U=(u1,u2,u3,u4)以及第二四元组V=(v1,v2,v3,v4);5.1 The re-random module receives the ciphertext C from the sender, and parses the ciphertext C into (X, Y, U, V), where the first five-tuple X=(x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 ), the second quintuple Y=(y1 , y2 , y3 , y4 , y5 ), the first quintuple U=(u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 ) and the second quaternion V=(v1 , v2 , v3 , v4 );

5.2从

Figure BDA00025830188800001018
中随机选取4个元素s′,t′,
Figure BDA00025830188800001019
5.2 From
Figure BDA00025830188800001018
Randomly select 4 elements s', t',
Figure BDA00025830188800001019

5.3计算新密文第一元素

Figure BDA00025830188800001020
新密文第二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001021
新密文第二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001022
新密文第四元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001023
新密文第五元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001024
新密文第六元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001025
新密文第七元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001026
新密文第八元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001027
新密文第九元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001028
新密文第十元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001029
新密文第十一元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001030
新密文第十二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001031
新密文第十三元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001032
新密文第十四元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000111
新密文第十五元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000112
新密文第十六元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000113
新密文第十七元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000114
新密文第十八元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000115
5.3 Calculate the first element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001020
The second element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001021
The second element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001022
The fourth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001023
The fifth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001024
The sixth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001025
The seventh element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001026
The eighth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001027
The ninth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001028
The tenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001029
The eleventh element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001030
The twelfth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001031
The thirteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA00025830188800001032
The fourteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000111
The fifteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000112
The sixteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000113
The seventeenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000114
The eighteenth element of the new ciphertext
Figure BDA0002583018880000115

5.4将x′1,x′2,x′3,x′4,x′5组成第三五元组X′,将y′1,y′2,y′3,y′4,y′5组成第四五元组Y′,将u′1,u′2,u′3,u′4组成第三四元组U′,将v′1,v′2,v′3,v′4组成第四四元组V′;5.4 Form x′1 , x′2 , x′3 , x′4 , x′5 into the third quintuple X′, and combine y′1 , y′2 , y′3 , y′4 , y′5 The fourth quintuple Y' is formed, u'1 , u'2 , u'3 , u'4 are formed into the third quaternary U', v'1 , v'2 , v'3 , v'4 Form the fourth quadruple V';

5.5将X′,Y′,U′,V′组成新密文C′,将C′发送给接收者。5.5 Combine X', Y', U', V' to form a new ciphertext C', and send C' to the receiver.

第六步,接收者运行解密模块,对从公共服务器收到的新密文C′进行解密。具体步骤如下:In the sixth step, the receiver runs the decryption module to decrypt the new ciphertext C' received from the public server. Specific steps are as follows:

6.1将密文C′解析成(X′,Y′,U′,V′),其中第三五元组X′=(x′1,x′2,x′3,x′4,x′5),第四五元组Y′=(y′1,y′2,y′3,y′4,y′5),第三四元组U′=(u′1,u′2,u′3,u′4)以及第四四元组V′=(v′1,v′2,v′3,v′4);6.1 Parse the ciphertext C' into (X', Y', U', V'), where the third quintuple X'=(x'1 , x'2 , x'3 , x'4 , x'5 ), the fourth quintuple Y′=(y′1 , y′2 , y′3 , y′4 , y′5 ), the third quintuple U′=(u′1 , u′2 , u′3 , u′4 ) and the fourth quadruple V′=(v′1 , v′2 , v′3 , v′4 );

6.2还原中间明文

Figure BDA0002583018880000116
和元素
Figure BDA0002583018880000117
Figure BDA0002583018880000118
若m不能表示为k维数组(0,…,0,M′)或者整数M′大于p,转第七步;否则,将M′按照十进制转二进制的方法,计算得到明文M。此时还不能直接输出明文M,需要进一步确定密文C′是否合法;6.2 Restoring the intermediate plaintext
Figure BDA0002583018880000116
and elements
Figure BDA0002583018880000117
Figure BDA0002583018880000118
If m cannot be represented as a k-dimensional array (0, . . . , 0, M') or the integer M' is greater than p, go to step 7; At this time, the plaintext M cannot be directly output, and it is necessary to further determine whether the ciphertext C' is legal;

6.3计算第一哈希值θ=H(m)和第二哈希值σ=H(u);6.3 Calculate the first hash value θ=H(m) and the second hash value σ=H(u);

6.4计算临时第一元素

Figure BDA0002583018880000119
临时第二元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001110
Figure BDA00025830188800001111
临时第三元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001112
6.4 Computing the temporary first element
Figure BDA0002583018880000119
temporary second element
Figure BDA00025830188800001110
Figure BDA00025830188800001111
temporary third element
Figure BDA00025830188800001112

6.5判断第一三元组

Figure BDA00025830188800001113
是否等于第二三元组(u′4,v′3,v′4),若不等于,则密文C′不合法,转第七步;若相等,转6.6;6.5 Judging the first triple
Figure BDA00025830188800001113
Is it equal to the second triplet (u′4 , v′3 , v′4 ), if not, then the ciphertext C′ is invalid, go to step 7; if it is equal, go to 6.6;

6.6计算临时第四元素

Figure BDA00025830188800001114
Figure BDA00025830188800001115
临时第五元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001116
Figure BDA00025830188800001117
临时第六元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001118
Figure BDA00025830188800001119
临时第七元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001120
临时第八元素
Figure BDA00025830188800001121
6.6 Calculating the Temporary Fourth Element
Figure BDA00025830188800001114
Figure BDA00025830188800001115
temporary fifth element
Figure BDA00025830188800001116
Figure BDA00025830188800001117
temporary sixth element
Figure BDA00025830188800001118
Figure BDA00025830188800001119
temporary seventh element
Figure BDA00025830188800001120
temporary eighth element
Figure BDA00025830188800001121

6.7判断第五五元组

Figure BDA00025830188800001122
是否等于第六五元组(x′4,x′5,y′3,y′4,y′5),若不等于,则密文不合法,转第七步;若相等,则解密结果为M。6.7 Judging the fifth quintuple
Figure BDA00025830188800001122
Is it equal to the sixth quintuple (x′4 , x′5 , y′3 , y′4 , y′5 ), if not equal, the ciphertext is invalid, go to the seventh step; if it is equal, the decryption result for M.

第七步,加解密系统结束运行。In the seventh step, the encryption and decryption system ends operation.

最后说明的是,以上仅是本发明的优选实施例,并非对本发明作任何形式上的限制。虽然本发明已以优选实施例揭露如上,然而并非用以限定本发明。任何熟悉本领域的技术人员,在不脱离本发明技术方案范围的情况下,都可利用上述揭示的技术内容对本发明技术方案做出许多可能的变动和修饰,或修改为等同变化的等效实施例。因此,凡是未脱离本发明技术方案的内容,依据本发明技术实质对以上实施例所做的任何简单修改、等同变化及修饰,均应落在本发明技术方案保护的范围内。Finally, it should be noted that the above are only preferred embodiments of the present invention, and do not limit the present invention in any form. Although the present invention has been disclosed above with preferred embodiments, it is not intended to limit the present invention. Any person skilled in the art, without departing from the scope of the technical solution of the present invention, can make many possible changes and modifications to the technical solution of the present invention by using the technical content disclosed above, or modify it into an equivalent implementation of equivalent changes. example. Therefore, any simple modifications, equivalent changes and modifications made to the above embodiments according to the technical essence of the present invention without departing from the content of the technical solutions of the present invention should fall within the protection scope of the technical solutions of the present invention.

Claims (5)

1. A method for encrypting and decrypting identification capable of being re-randomized is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the first step is as follows: the encryption and decryption system is constructed and comprises five modules, namely an initialization module, a key extraction module, an encryption module, a decryption module and a re-randomization module, wherein the initialization module and the key extraction module are deployed in a key generation center, namely a server responsible for generating a private key, the encryption module is deployed in a sender, namely a sender, server, the decryption module is deployed in a receiver, namely a receiver, server, and the re-randomization module is deployed in a public server;
the second step is that: the key generation center runs an initialization module to generate public parameters and a master private key and discloses the public parameters, and the specific steps are as follows:
2.1 Generation of symmetric bilinear group quadruplets by initialization Module
Figure FDA0002583018870000011
Wherein p is a prime number;
Figure FDA0002583018870000012
the number of the elements in the formula (I) is p,
Figure FDA0002583018870000013
the element in (1) is the coordinate of a point on an elliptic curve, expressed as two integers,
Figure FDA0002583018870000014
the element in (A) is a finite field
Figure FDA0002583018870000015
Element(s) in (1), expressed as an array of k-dimensional integers, e (g)1,g2) For an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map, i.e.
Figure FDA0002583018870000016
g1,g2Are all made of
Figure FDA0002583018870000017
The elements of (1);
2.2 initialization Module Generation of additive integer groups with element number p
Figure FDA0002583018870000018
The elements are integers from 0 to p-1;
2.3 constructing a hash function H (m) with m as an input
Figure FDA0002583018870000019
Is output as
Figure FDA00025830188700000110
The elements of (1);
2.4 from
Figure FDA00025830188700000111
Randomly selecting 8 elements g, h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7
2.5 from
Figure FDA00025830188700000112
In the method, 3 elements α, z are randomly selected0,z1Wherein z is0≠z1
2.6 calculating the common parameter element g1=gαThe exponential operation represents the coordinate element g and the slave on the elliptic curve
Figure FDA00025830188700000113
The multiplication operation of the randomly selected scalar element α shows that α -1 times of addition operation is carried out on the elliptic curve coordinate g;
2.7 g, g1,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,z0,z1H (m) constitutes the public parameter, α constitutes the master private key h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7Is denoted as hi,i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6,7};
Thirdly, the key generation center runs a key extraction module, and generates a private key for the receiver by adopting the identification id of the receiver, wherein the identification id of the receiver is the existing identification of the receiver
Figure FDA00025830188700000114
The private key generation method comprises the following corresponding elements:
3.1 judging whether id is equal to alpha or not, if so, identifying illegally, and turning to the seventh step; if not, rotating by 3.2;
3.2 let variable i be 1;
3.3 from
Figure FDA0002583018870000021
Randomly selects an element as the ith element r in the private key of the receiverid,i
3.4 computing private Key elements
Figure FDA0002583018870000022
Updating i to i + 1; (ii) a
If i is less than or equal to 7, rotating to 3.3; otherwise, will { rid.i,hid.iI ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} } constitutes a private key;
and fourthly, the sender runs the encryption module, generates a ciphertext by adopting the identification id of the receiver and sends the ciphertext to the public server, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
4.1 converting the plaintext M into an integer M' according to a binary decimal conversion method; let M be (0, …,0, M '), where the first k-1 dimensional elements are all 0, the k-th dimensional element is M', M is
Figure FDA0002583018870000023
Wherein k is
Figure FDA0002583018870000024
The dimension of the middle element when the middle element is expressed as an integer array;
4.2 from
Figure FDA0002583018870000025
Wherein 4 elements s, t,
Figure FDA0002583018870000026
4.3 from
Figure FDA0002583018870000027
Randomly selecting an element u;
4.4 calculate the first hash value θ ═ h (m), calculate the second hash value σ ═ h (u);
4.5 computing the first element of the ciphertext
Figure FDA0002583018870000028
Ciphertext second element x2=e(gsG), third element x of ciphertext3=m·e(g-s,h1) Fourth element of ciphertext
Figure FDA0002583018870000029
Fifth element of cipher text
Figure FDA00025830188700000210
Ciphertext sixth element
Figure FDA00025830188700000211
Seventh element y of ciphertext2=e(gtG), ciphertext eighth element y3=e(g-t,h1) Ninth element of ciphertext y4=(e(g,h2)e(gθ,h3))σtThe tenth element y of the ciphertext5=(e(g,h4)e(gθ,h5))σtEleventh element of ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000212
Twelfth element of ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000213
The thirteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000214
Figure FDA00025830188700000215
The fourteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000216
The fifteenth element of the ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000217
Sixteenth element of ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000218
Seventeenth element of ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000219
Eighteenth element of ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000220
Let element β12To be driven from
Figure FDA00025830188700000221
Wherein the element is randomly selected from the group consisting of
Figure FDA00025830188700000222
Of a randomly selected element, β1β2Representation β1And β2Performing a finite field
Figure FDA00025830188700000223
The multiplication operation of (a) above (b),
Figure FDA00025830188700000224
representation β1And gamma to perform finite field
Figure FDA00025830188700000225
The above exponential operation;
4.6 mixing of x1,x2,x3,x4,x5Form a first quintuple X of y1,y2,y3,y4,y5Form a second quintuple Y, add u1,u2,u3,u4Form a first quadruple U of v1,v2,v3,v4Forming a second quadruple V;
4.7, forming a ciphertext C by the X, the Y, the U and the V, and sending the C to a public server;
fifthly, the public server operates a re-randomizing module to re-randomize the ciphertext C received from the sender and send the obtained new ciphertext C' to the receiver, and the specific steps are as follows:
5.1 the re-randomizing module receives the ciphertext C from the sender, parses the ciphertext C into (X, Y, U, V), where the first quintuple X is (X, Y, U, V)1,x2,x3,x4,x5) The second pentad Y ═ Y1,y2,y3,y4,y5) The first quadruple U ═ U (U)1,u2,u3,u4) And a second quadruple V ═ V (V)1,v2,v3,v4);
5.2 from
Figure FDA0002583018870000031
In the method, 4 elements s ', t' are randomly selected,
Figure FDA0002583018870000032
5.3 computing the first element of the New ciphertext
Figure FDA0002583018870000033
Second element of new cipher text
Figure FDA0002583018870000034
Third element of new cipher text
Figure FDA0002583018870000035
Fourth element of new cryptograph
Figure FDA0002583018870000036
Fifth element of new cipher text
Figure FDA0002583018870000037
Sixth element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA0002583018870000038
Seventh element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA0002583018870000039
Eighth element of new cipher text
Figure FDA00025830188700000310
Ninth element of new cipher text
Figure FDA00025830188700000311
Tenth element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000312
Eleventh element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000313
Twelfth element of new cipher text
Figure FDA00025830188700000314
Thirteenth element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000315
Fourteenth element of new cipher text
Figure FDA00025830188700000316
Fifteenth element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000317
Sixteenth element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000318
Seventeenth element of new ciphertext
Figure FDA00025830188700000319
Eighteenth element of new cipher text
Figure FDA00025830188700000320
5.4 will be x'1,x′2,x′3,x′4,x′5To form a third pentad X ', y'1,y′2,y′3,y′4,y′5To form a fourth pentad Y ', u'1,u′2,u′3,u′4Constitute a third quadruple U ', will v'1,v′2,v′3,v′4Forming a fourth quadruple V';
5.5, forming a new ciphertext C 'from the X', Y ', U' and V ', and sending the C' to a receiver;
and sixthly, the receiver operates a decryption module to decrypt the new ciphertext C' received from the public server, and the specific steps are as follows:
6.1 parse ciphertext C ' into (X ', Y ', U ', V '), where the third quintuple X ' is (X '1,x′2,x′3,x′4,x′5) Fourth pentad Y '═ Y'1,y′2,y′3,y′4,y′5) Third quadruple U '═ U'1,u′2,u′3,u′4) And a fourth quadruple V '═ V'1,v′2,v′3,v′4);
6.2 recovery of intermediate plaintext
Figure FDA00025830188700000321
And elements
Figure FDA00025830188700000322
Figure FDA00025830188700000323
If M cannot be represented as a k-dimensional array (0, …,0, M ') or the integer M' is larger than p, turning to the seventh step; otherwise, calculating the M' according to a method of converting decimal system into binary system to obtain a plaintext M;
6.3 calculating a first hash value θ ═ h (m) and a second hash value σ ═ h (u);
6.4 calculating the provisional first element
Figure FDA00025830188700000324
Temporary second element
Figure FDA00025830188700000325
Figure FDA0002583018870000041
Temporary third element
Figure FDA0002583018870000042
6.5 judging the first triplet
Figure FDA0002583018870000043
Whether equal to the second triplet (u'4,v′3,v′4) If not, the ciphertext C' is illegal, and the seventh step is carried out; if equal, turning to 6.6;
6.6 computing the provisional fourth element
Figure FDA0002583018870000044
Figure FDA0002583018870000045
Temporary fifth element
Figure FDA0002583018870000046
Figure FDA0002583018870000047
Temporary sixth element
Figure FDA0002583018870000048
Figure FDA0002583018870000049
Temporary seventh element
Figure FDA00025830188700000410
Temporary eighth element
Figure FDA00025830188700000411
6.7 judging the fifth quintuple
Figure FDA00025830188700000412
Whether or not equal to a sixth quinary group (x'4,x′5,y′3,y′4,y′5) If not, the cipher text is illegal, and the seventh step is carried out; if the two are equal, the decryption result is M.
And seventhly, finishing the operation of the encryption and decryption system.
2. A method of re-randomizing identity encryption and decryption as claimed in claim 1, wherein p is on the order of 2160
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the step 2.3 of constructing the hash function h (m) is: m is divided into 512-bit segments, and the result of each segment operation SHA-1 function is subjected to XOR operation to obtain 160-bit long output, namely
Figure FDA00025830188700000413
Of (1).
4. A method of re-randomizing identity encryption and decryption as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step of 2.6 computing the common parameter element g1=gαThe method comprises the following steps: ,
2.6.1 order elliptic curve y2=x3Coordinate element g ═ g on + ax + bx,gy) Let variable i equal to 2 and coordinate element h equal to (h)x,hy)=g;
2.6.2 calculate the slope λ between g and h: if g is h, then
Figure FDA00025830188700000414
The slope of a tangent line tangent to the elliptic curve via point g; if g ≠ h, λ ═ gy-hy)/(gx-hx);
2.6.3 calculating the abscissa r of the sum of g and hx=λ2-gx-hxOrdinate r after addition of g and hy=λ(gx-rx)-gy,r=(rx,ry) I.e. the result of the addition of g to h.
2.6.4 if i is α, then r is the element g1Turning to 2.7; otherwise, update i to i +1, let h to r, and go to 2.6.2.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the plaintext M to be encrypted in step 2.5 is a binary number not greater than p after being converted into a decimal number.
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