CN110929300A - Trusted computing security chip construction method based on identification password - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention provides a method for constructing a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password, which comprises the following steps: s1: when the safety chip is manufactured, generating and writing a secret key for identity identification; s2: a user applies a key based on identity to a PKG by using a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password, and the applied key is ensured to be obtained only by the security chip; the user can use the key to authenticate data in the device, thereby avoiding issuance and verification of certificates during the authentication process. The identification password is used as the key of the identity identification of the trusted computing security chip, the most natural binding of the identity and the key is completed, the use of a certificate is avoided, and the storage space is saved. The identification password can be protected by the trusted computing security chip constructed by the invention, and any entity cannot obtain the identity-based key stored in the security chip.

Description

Trusted computing security chip construction method based on identification password

Technical Field

The invention relates to the field of trusted computing, in particular to a method for constructing a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password.

Technical Field

With the proliferation of viruses, malicious software and the like, the hacker attack technology and capability are enhanced, and the terminal is more and more threatened. The trusted computing improves the existing platform system structure by taking a trusted computing security chip as a core, and the credibility of the terminal is enhanced. Currently, the international mainstream Trusted Computing technology and specification system is proposed by tcg (Trusted Computing group) organization, wherein a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) security chip specification as a core is proposed for the first time in 2001, and has been developed to TPM2.0 through multiple modifications. By referring to the international trusted computing technology framework and the technical idea, the national trusted computing standard is proposed in 2007, and an autonomous security chip Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM) is successfully developed. The trusted computing security chip is mainly used as a trust root of a computing platform, provides protected cryptography functions and storage space, and further constructs a reliable computing platform together with other software and hardware technologies. Currently, a trusted computing security chip has been widely equipped with various notebooks, personal computers, servers and other types of computing platforms, and becomes a core component of various trusted services and applications.

In 1984, Shamir proposed an Identity Based Cryptosystem (IBC) that directly uses the user's Identity as a public Key without using any certificate, the Private Key being generated by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) and distributed to the user; the IBC solves the problems of certificate generation, issuance, backup, revocation and the like in PKI, obviously reduces the cost and complexity of system establishment and maintenance, and greatly saves the storage space and the network bandwidth; the IBC is well adapted to the development trend of rapid, efficient and miniaturized networks in the future, and the application based on the IBC is more and more extensive.

However, the cryptographic algorithm supported by the existing trusted computing security chip is still the public key cryptosystem (including RSA, ECC and the autonomous cryptosystem SM2 in our country) under PKI, and does not support the identity-based cryptosystem. The trusted computing security chip is used for a secret key (referred to as an endorsement secret key in the TPM and a cryptographic module secret key in the TCM) of the identity identification to uniquely identify the identity of the security chip and the computing platform where the security chip is located, and the credibility of the trusted computing security chip also needs to be guaranteed in the form of a certificate by a manufacturer or a trusted third party, which brings complexity of certificate management and verification.

Aiming at the problems, the invention provides a method for constructing a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password. The identification password is used as the key of the trusted computing security chip for identity identification, so that the complexity problem of certificate management is solved, the storage space is saved, and the certificate verification when the security chip is used for an identity identification function is avoided.

Disclosure of Invention

Aiming at the condition that the existing trusted computing chip lacks support for the identification password, the invention provides a trusted computing security chip construction method based on the identification password, and the identification password is used as a secret key of the identity identification of the security chip, so that the complexity problem of certificate management is solved, the storage space is saved, and the certificate verification when the security chip is used for the identity identification function is avoided, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:

s1: the safety chip generates and writes a secret key for identification when being manufactured by a manufacturer;

s2: a user applies a key based on identity to a PKG by using a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password, and the applied key is ensured to be obtained only by the security chip; the user can use the key to authenticate data in the device, thereby avoiding issuance and verification of certificates during the authentication process.

As a further improvement of the technology of the invention:

the step S1 includes the steps of:

a1: the security chip initializes system parameters according to the selected identification password system; selecting security parameters, and generating public parameters and a master key of a system; the security chip stores the master key and publishes the public parameters of the system;

a2: the manufacturer checks whether the product meets the criteria and produces itThe security chip of (2) generates an identification ID_ModuleThe identification comprises a product serial number or other information capable of uniquely identifying the product;

a3: manufacturer ID according to security chip_ModuleCalculating a key EK for the identity identification by the master key and the system public parameter; the manufacturer securely writes the identity of the product and its corresponding identification key into the permanent storage of the secure chip.

The manufacturer-selectable identity cryptosystem may include a Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) and Certificateless Public Key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) in addition to the basic IBE scheme (e.g., Boneh-franklin (bf) IBE). If the manufacturer adopts the HIBE cryptosystem, the manufacturer serves as a second-level PKG to generate an identifier and a key for a produced security chip, and a trusted authority serves as a first-level PKG to distribute a private key for the manufacturer. If a CL-PKC password system is adopted, a manufacturer generates and writes the identification of the security chip and a corresponding partial private key when producing the security chip; a complete public and private key pair for identification is generated by the user when using the security chip.

The step S2 includes the steps of:

b1: user selection of a symmetric key K₁By K₁Encrypting the identity information ID of a user_userAnd an identification ID of the security chip_ModuleTo obtain

Then using the public key P of PKG_pubEncryption K₁To obtain

Will be provided with

And

sending the data to a PKG;

b2: PKG uses master key s for decryption

Recovering a session key K₁(ii) a Then using K₁Decryption

Obtaining a user identity ID_userAnd a security chip identification ID_Module；

B3: PKG checks user identification ID_userWhether it is legal;

b4: PKG identifies ID according to user identity_userComputing a public key Q of a user_user＝H₁(ID_user) And a private key S_user＝sQ_user；

B5: PKG uses the identification ID of the security chip_ModuleAnd system public parameter information encryption S published by the manufacturer_userThe encrypted result is sent to the user, and the encrypted result can be decrypted only by a security chip of the user;

b6: user uses security chip to decrypt and obtain private key S_userAnd S is_userOnly in the secure chip.

After the user successfully applies for the key based on the identity, the key is completely held by the security chip; the user can use the key to perform encryption \ decryption, signature \ verification and key negotiation through the security chip, and perform operations such as key caching, key authorization, key destruction and the like. In addition, the user can use the key to authenticate data in the device, thereby avoiding issuance and verification of certificates in the authentication process.

Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages;

1. the identification password is used as the key of the identity identification of the trusted computing security chip, the most natural binding of the identity and the key is completed, the use of a certificate is avoided, and the storage space is saved.

2. The identification password can be protected by the trusted computing security chip constructed by the invention, and any entity cannot obtain the identity-based key stored in the security chip.

3. Data in the device is authenticated using an identity-based key, avoiding issuance and verification of certificates during the authentication process.

Drawings

In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.

FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of a user applying for an identification password using a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password.

Detailed Description

In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the technical solutions of the present invention will be described in detail below. It is to be understood that the described embodiments are merely exemplary of the invention, and not restrictive of the full scope of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the examples given herein without any inventive step, are within the scope of the present invention.

The invention aims to provide a construction method of a credible computing security chip based on an identification password, so that the existing security chip can support the use of the identification password and simultaneously avoid the use of a certificate in the identity of the security chip. The present invention will be described below with reference to specific examples of building support for identification passwords in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). In this example, the manufacturer selects the Boneh-Franklin IBE code system. The method comprises the following steps:

1) when a TPM manufacturer produces a security chip, generating and writing an endorsement key EK for identity identification;

(1.1) TPM manufacturer selects a specific elliptic curve, for example, the elliptic curve is selected as follows: y is²＝x³3x, the points of the selected elliptic curve on the finite field form a q (q is a large prime number) order addition cyclic group G₁Wherein P is the origin of the groupAnd (5) forming elements. Random selection

As master key, calculate P_pubsP. According to group G₁Constructing a bilinear mapping e by using a weil pair or a Tate pair on an elliptic curve, so that e: G₁×G₁→G₂，G₂Are q factorial groups. Finally, a relevant hash function H is selected₁:{0,1}^*→G₁，H₂:G₂×G₁×G₂→{0,1}ⁿAnd n is the key length. After initialization is completed, a manufacturer stores a master key s, and other organizations cannot know the master key s; and publishes a system public parameter list:<q,G₁,G₂,P,P_pub,H₁,H₂,e,n>。

and (2.2) after the TPM is manufactured, the manufacturer checks whether the TPM meets the functions and the standards. Then generates the identification ID of the TPM_TPMTPM Specification TPM Model Serial Number; wherein, the TPM Specification identifies the version of the TPM Specification corresponding to the TPM realization; the TPM Model identifies specific production information of the TPM, which may include information of TPM manufacturers, TPM models, version numbers and the like; serial Number identifies the Serial Number of the product;

(2.3) manufacturer ID according to the Security chip_TPMA master key s and a public key Q of a system public parameter calculation endorsement key_TPM＝H₁(ID_TPM) And the private key EK ═ sQ_TPM(ii) a The manufacturer securely writes the identification of the TPM and the generated endorsement key into the non-volatile memory of the TPM.

The manufacturer-selectable identity cryptosystem may include a Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) and Certificateless Public Key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) in addition to the basic IBE scheme (e.g., Boneh-franklin (bf) IBE). If the manufacturer adopts the HIBE cryptosystem, the manufacturer serves as a second-level PKG to generate an identifier and a key for a produced security chip, and a trusted authority serves as a first-level PKG to distribute a private key for the manufacturer. If a CL-PKC password system is adopted, a manufacturer generates and writes the identification of the security chip and a corresponding partial private key when producing the security chip; a complete public and private key pair for identification is generated by the user when using the security chip.

2) User A uses identification password-based TPM for his identity information ID_AAnd applying for a corresponding private key from the PKG to ensure that the applied private key can be obtained only by the TPM.

As shown in fig. 1, the process of applying for an identity-based key is as follows:

(2.1) user A selects a symmetric key K₁By K₁Encrypting the identity information ID of a user_AAnd identification ID of TPM_TPMTo obtain

Then using the public key P of PKG_pubEncryption K₁To obtain

Will be provided with

And

sending the data to a PKG;

(2.2) PKG uses Master Key s for decryption

Recovering a session key K₁(ii) a Then using K₁Decryption

Obtaining a user identity ID_AAnd a security chip identification ID_TPM；

(2.3) PKG check A ID_AWhether it is legal;

(2.4) PKG identifies ID according to A_AComputing a public key Q of a user_A＝H₁(ID_A) And a private key S_A＝sQ_A；

(2.5) PKG uses the identification ID of TPM_TPMAnd factorySystem public parameter information encryption S published by merchants_AThe encrypted result is sent to A, which can be decrypted only by TPM of A;

(2.6) user uses TPM to decrypt and obtain private key S_AAnd S is_AHeld only by the TPM.

After the user successfully applies for the key based on the identity, the key is completely held by the security chip; the user can use the key to perform encryption \ decryption, signature \ verification and key negotiation through the security chip, and perform operations such as key caching, key authorization, key destruction and the like. In addition, the user can use the key to authenticate data in the device, thereby avoiding issuance and verification of certificates in the authentication process.

The foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention in any way. Although the invention has been described with reference to preferred embodiments, it is not intended to be limited thereto. Those skilled in the art can make numerous possible variations and modifications to the present invention, or modify equivalent embodiments to equivalent variations, without departing from the scope of the invention, using the teachings disclosed above. Therefore, any simple modification, equivalent change and modification made to the above embodiments according to the technical spirit of the present invention should fall within the protection scope of the technical scheme of the present invention, unless the technical spirit of the present invention departs from the content of the technical scheme of the present invention.

Claims (3)

Translated fromChinese

1.一种基于标识密码的可信计算安全芯片构建方法，其特征在于；包括以下步骤：1. a method for constructing a trusted computing security chip based on identification password, is characterized in that; comprises the following steps:S1：安全芯片在制造时，生成和写入用于身份标识的密钥；S1: When the security chip is manufactured, a key for identity identification is generated and written;S2：用户使用基于标识密码的可信计算安全芯片向PKG申请基于身份的密钥，保证申请的密钥只有安全芯片能够获取；用户可使用该密钥认证设备中的数据，进而避免在认证过程中证书的签发和验证。S2: The user uses the trusted computing security chip based on the identification password to apply for an identity-based key from PKG, ensuring that the applied key can only be obtained by the security chip; the user can use the key to authenticate the data in the device, thereby avoiding the authentication process. Issuance and verification of certificates.2.根据权利要求1所述的基于标识密码的可信计算安全芯片构建方法，其特征在于；所述步骤S1包括以下步骤：2. The method for constructing a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password according to claim 1, wherein the step S1 comprises the following steps:A1：安全芯片根据选择的标识密码系统进行系统参数初始化；选择安全参数，生成系统的公共参数和主密钥；安全芯片保存主密钥，并公布系统的公共参数；A1: The security chip initializes the system parameters according to the selected identification cryptosystem; selects the security parameters, generates the public parameters and master key of the system; the security chip saves the master key and publishes the public parameters of the system;A2：安全芯片生成标识ID_Module，标识包括产品序列号或其他能唯一标识产品的信息；A2: The security chip generates the ID_Module , which includes the product serial number or other information that can uniquely identify the product;A3：根据安全芯片的标识ID_Module、主密钥以及系统公共参数计算用于身份标识的密钥EK；生产商安全地将产品的标识及其对应的身份标识密钥写入安全芯片的永久性存储中。A3: Calculate the key EK used for identification according to the identification ID_Module of the security chip, the master key and the public parameters of the system; the manufacturer securely writes the identification of the product and its corresponding identification key into the permanent identification key of the security chip in storage.3.根据权利要求2所述的基于标识密码的可信计算安全芯片构建方法，其特征在于；所述步骤S2包括以下步骤：3. The method for constructing a trusted computing security chip based on an identification password according to claim 2, wherein the step S2 comprises the following steps:B1：用户选择一个对称密钥K₁，用K₁加密用户的身份信息ID_user以及安全芯片的标识ID_Module得到

然后用PKG的公钥P_pub加密K₁得到

将

和

发送给PKG；B1: The user selects a symmetric key K₁ , and encrypts the user's identity information ID_user and the ID_Module of the security chip with K₁ to obtain

Then encrypt K₁ with PKG's public key P_pub to get

Will

and

send to PKG;B2：PKG使用主密钥s解密

恢复会话秘钥K₁；然后用K₁解密

得到用户身份标识ID_user和安全芯片标识ID_Module；B2: PKG decrypts with master key s

Recover session key K1_; then decrypt with_K1

Obtain user identification ID_user and security chip identification ID_Module ;B3：PKG检查用户身份标识ID_user是否合法；B3: PKG checks whether the user ID_user is legal;B4：PKG根据用户身份标识ID_user计算用户的公钥Q_user＝H₁(ID_user)及私钥S_user＝sQ_user；B4: PKG calculates the user's public key Q_user =H₁ (ID_user ) and private key S_user =sQ_{user according to the user identity ID user;}B5：PKG使用安全芯片的标识ID_Module以及生厂商公开的系统公共参数信息加密S_user，将加密后的结果发送给用户，它只能由用户的安全芯片才能解密；B5: PKG encrypts S_user using the ID_Module of the security chip and the public system parameter information disclosed by the manufacturer, and sends the encrypted result to the user, which can only be decrypted by the user's security chip;B6：用户使用安全芯片解密获取私钥S_user，且S_user只保存在安全芯片中。B6: The user uses the security chip to decrypt to obtain the private key S_user , and S_user is only stored in the security chip.

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