技术领域technical field
本发明例如涉及设备认证系统、制造商密钥生成装置、设备密钥生成装置、制造设备、协作认证装置、设备再生密钥生成装置、设备认证方法以及设备认证程序。The present invention relates to, for example, a device authentication system, a manufacturer key generation device, a device key generation device, a manufacturing device, a collaborative authentication device, a device regeneration key generation device, a device authentication method, and a device authentication program.
背景技术Background technique
专利文献1公开如下的现有技术：降低在无线多跳网络中从非法的无线终端发送的分组对无线线路或者合法的无线终端造成的不良影响。Patent Document 1 discloses a prior art for reducing adverse effects of packets transmitted from unauthorized wireless terminals on wireless lines or legitimate wireless terminals in a wireless multi-hop network.
以往技术中的设备认证方式以如下的方式构成。The device authentication method in the conventional technology is configured as follows.
认证站向各设备发行公开密钥证书。各设备使用与公开密钥证书对应的私有密钥而生成签名，将签名与公开密钥证书发送到对方的设备。对方的设备使用公开密钥证书来验证签名从而认证通信对方的设备。The authentication station issues a public key certificate to each device. Each device generates a signature using a private key corresponding to the public key certificate, and transmits the signature and the public key certificate to the other device. The counterpart's device verifies the signature using the public key certificate to authenticate the communication counterpart's device.
由于向各设备分配单独的私有密钥，因此，即使私有密钥泄漏，通过使与泄漏的私有密钥对应的公开密钥证书失效，也能够将损害抑制在最小限度。Since an individual private key is assigned to each device, even if a private key is leaked, damage can be minimized by invalidating a public key certificate corresponding to the leaked private key.
并且，由于多个认证站(包含设备制造者)为分层构造，因此，通过各设备制造者发行公开密钥证书，能够将设备制造分散化。并且，能够在私有密钥的泄漏事故等时明确安全的责任范围。In addition, since a plurality of authentication stations (including device manufacturers) have a hierarchical structure, each device manufacturer can issue a public key certificate to decentralize device manufacturing. In addition, it is possible to clarify the scope of responsibility for security in the event of a leakage accident of a private key or the like.
这样的设备认证方式作为被称作PKI(PublicKeyInfrastructure)的框架工件而普遍使用。Such a device authentication system is commonly used as a framework artifact called PKI (Public Key Infrastructure).
但是，由于这样的设备认证方式使用公开密钥密码算法，处理需要较多的资源。因此，设备的处理量较多，会导致设备的成本增加。However, since such a device authentication method uses a public key cryptographic algorithm, the processing requires a lot of resources. Therefore, the processing amount of the equipment is large, which leads to an increase in the cost of the equipment.
在使用处理量比公开密钥密码算法少的公共密钥密码算法的情况下，各设备需要具有与通信对方公共的密钥。In the case of using a public key cryptographic algorithm with a smaller amount of processing than a public key cryptographic algorithm, each device needs to have a common key with the communication partner.
在该情况下，为了使密钥泄漏时的损害最小化，需要向各设备分配单独的公共密钥。并且，各设备需要按照每个通信对方管理公共密钥。因此，密钥管理变得麻烦。In this case, in order to minimize the damage when the key is leaked, it is necessary to distribute individual common keys to each device. Also, each device needs to manage a common key for each communication partner. Therefore, key management becomes troublesome.
此外，作为密钥泄漏时的对策，使公共密钥失效的机制是必须的。需要如下的机制：密钥泄漏的不良影响不会影响到各设备、设备制造者以及系统整体。用于设备制造的分散化和安全的责任范围的明确化的机制是必须的。In addition, as a countermeasure against leakage of the key, a mechanism to invalidate the public key is essential. A mechanism is required so that adverse effects of key leakage do not affect individual devices, device manufacturers, and the system as a whole. Mechanisms are required for the decentralization of plant production and the clarification of the area of responsibility for safety.
如上所述，取代公开密钥密码算法而使用公共密钥密码算法的设备认证方式存在较多的课题。并且，取代PKI的公共密钥密码算法用的框架工件不存在。As described above, there are many problems in the device authentication method using the public key cryptographic algorithm instead of the public key cryptographic algorithm. Also, there is no framework artifact for public key cryptographic algorithms that replace PKI.
现有技术文献prior art literature
专利文献patent documents
专利文献1：日本特开2003-69581号公报Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2003-69581
发明内容Contents of the invention
发明要解决的课题The problem to be solved by the invention
本发明的目的在于，例如能够使用公共密钥而简便地进行设备认证。An object of the present invention is to enable simple device authentication using, for example, a common key.
用于解决课题的手段means to solve the problem
本发明的设备认证系统具有制造商密钥生成装置、设备密钥生成装置、制造设备、协作认证装置以及设备再生密钥生成装置。The device authentication system of the present invention includes a manufacturer key generation device, a device key generation device, manufacturing equipment, a cooperative authentication device, and a device regeneration key generation device.
所述制造商密钥生成装置具有：制造商密钥生成部，其使用用于生成公共密钥的主密钥以及用于识别制造所述制造设备的设备制造商的制造商标识符，生成制造商密钥作为所述设备制造商用的公共密钥。The manufacturer key generation device includes a manufacturer key generation unit that generates a manufacturing key using a master key for generating a common key and a manufacturer identifier for identifying a device manufacturer that manufactured the manufacturing device. The merchant key is used as the public key for the device manufacturer.
所述设备密钥生成装置具有：制造商密钥存储部，其存储由所述制造商密钥生成部生成的所述制造商密钥；以及设备密钥生成部，其使用存储于所述制造商密钥存储部的所述制造商密钥和用于识别所述制造设备的设备标识符，生成设备密钥作为所述制造设备用的公共密钥。The device key generation device includes: a manufacturer key storage unit storing the manufacturer key generated by the manufacturer key generation unit; and a device key generation unit using the manufacturer key stored in the manufacturer key generation unit. The manufacturer key in the manufacturer key storage unit and the device identifier for identifying the manufacturing device are used to generate a device key as a common key for the manufacturing device.
所述制造设备具有：设备存储部，其存储所述制造商标识符、所述设备标识符和由所述设备密钥生成部生成的所述设备密钥；以及认证数据生成部，其使用存储于所述设备存储部的所述设备标识符和存储于所述设备存储部的所述设备密钥，生成在针对所述制造设备的认证处理中使用的认证数据。The manufacturing device has: a device storage unit that stores the manufacturer identifier, the device identifier, and the device key generated by the device key generation unit; and an authentication data generation unit that uses the stored The device identifier stored in the device storage unit and the device key stored in the device storage unit generate authentication data used in authentication processing for the manufacturing device.
所述协作认证装置具有：标识符数据取得部，其从所述制造设备取得所述制造商标识符和所述设备标识符；认证数据取得部，其从所述制造设备取得由所述认证数据生成部生成的所述认证数据；以及标识符数据发送部，其将由所述标识符数据取得部取得的所述制造商标识符和由所述标识符数据取得部取得的所述设备标识符发送到所述设备再生密钥生成装置。The cooperative authentication device includes: an identifier data acquisition unit that acquires the manufacturer identifier and the equipment identifier from the manufacturing equipment; and an authentication data acquisition unit that acquires the authentication data from the manufacturing equipment. the authentication data generated by the generating unit; and an identifier data transmitting unit that transmits the manufacturer identifier acquired by the identifier data acquiring unit and the device identifier acquired by the identifier data acquiring unit to the device to regenerate the key generation device.
所述设备再生密钥生成装置具有：标识符数据接收部，其从所述协作认证装置接收所述制造商标识符和所述设备标识符；以及设备再生密钥生成部，其使用由所述标识符数据接收部接收到的所述制造商标识符和由所述标识符数据接收部接收到的所述设备标识符，生成设备再生密钥作为所述制造设备用的公共密钥。The device regeneration key generation device includes: an identifier data receiving unit that receives the manufacturer identifier and the device identifier from the cooperative authentication device; and a device regeneration key generation unit that uses The manufacturer identifier received by the identifier data receiving unit and the device identifier received by the identifier data receiving unit generate a device regeneration key as a common key for the manufacturing device.
发明效果Invention effect
根据本发明，例如能够使用公共密钥而简便地进行设备认证。According to the present invention, device authentication can be easily performed using, for example, a public key.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1是实施方式1的设备认证系统100的结构图。FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a device authentication system 100 according to Embodiment 1. As shown in FIG.
图2是实施方式1的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构图。FIG. 2 is a functional configuration diagram of the key management server 200 according to the first embodiment.
图3是实施方式1的设备管理装置300的功能结构图。FIG. 3 is a functional configuration diagram of the equipment management device 300 according to the first embodiment.
图4是实施方式1的制造设备110的功能结构图。FIG. 4 is a functional configuration diagram of manufacturing equipment 110 according to the first embodiment.
图5是实施方式1的通信终端400的功能结构图。FIG. 5 is a functional configuration diagram of communication terminal 400 according to the first embodiment.
图6是示出实施方式1的设备认证系统100的设备认证方法的流程图。FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing a device authentication method in the device authentication system 100 according to the first embodiment.
图7是实施方式1的制造商密钥生成处理(S200)的流程图。FIG. 7 is a flowchart of manufacturer key generation processing (S200) according to the first embodiment.
图8是实施方式1的设备管理处理(S300)的流程图。FIG. 8 is a flowchart of device management processing (S300) according to the first embodiment.
图9是实施方式1的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 9 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the first embodiment.
图10是实施方式1的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 10 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the first embodiment.
图11是示出实施方式1的通信终端400的硬件结构的一例的图。FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration of communication terminal 400 according to the first embodiment.
图12是实施方式2的通信终端400的功能结构图。FIG. 12 is a functional configuration diagram of communication terminal 400 according to the second embodiment.
图13是实施方式2的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构图。FIG. 13 is a functional configuration diagram of the key management server 200 according to the second embodiment.
图14是实施方式2的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 14 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the second embodiment.
图15是实施方式3的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构图。FIG. 15 is a functional configuration diagram of the key management server 200 according to the third embodiment.
图16是实施方式3的通信终端400的功能结构图。FIG. 16 is a functional configuration diagram of communication terminal 400 according to the third embodiment.
图17是实施方式3的制造商密钥生成处理(S200)的流程图。FIG. 17 is a flowchart of manufacturer key generation processing (S200) according to the third embodiment.
图18是实施方式3的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 18 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the third embodiment.
图19是实施方式3的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 19 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the third embodiment.
图20是示出实施方式3的有效列表295的形式的例子的图。FIG. 20 is a diagram showing an example of the format of an effective list 295 according to the third embodiment.
图21是示出实施方式3的无效列表296/491的形式的例子的图。FIG. 21 is a diagram showing an example of the format of an invalidation list 296/491 according to the third embodiment.
图22是实施方式4的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 22 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the fourth embodiment.
图23是实施方式4的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 23 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the fourth embodiment.
具体实施方式detailed description
实施方式1.Implementation mode 1.
对使用公共密钥简便地进行设备认证的方式进行说明。Describes how to easily authenticate devices using public keys.
图1是实施方式1的设备认证系统100的结构图。FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a device authentication system 100 according to Embodiment 1. As shown in FIG.
关于实施方式1的设备认证系统100的结构，根据图1进行说明。The configuration of the device authentication system 100 according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 1 .
设备认证系统100是用于对制造设备110进行认证的系统。The equipment authentication system 100 is a system for authenticating the manufacturing equipment 110 .
设备认证系统100具有运营商120的密钥管理服务器200(制造商密钥生成装置、设备再生密钥生成装置的一例)、设备制造商130的设备管理装置300(设备密钥生成装置的一例)、设置住宅140的通信终端400(协作认证装置的一例)。The device authentication system 100 includes a key management server 200 of a carrier 120 (an example of a manufacturer key generation device and a device regeneration key generation device), and a device management device 300 of a device manufacturer 130 (an example of a device key generation device). . The communication terminal 400 (an example of a cooperative authentication device) installed in the house 140 .
密钥管理服务器200、设备管理装置300以及通信终端400经由网络101进行通信。The key management server 200 , the equipment management device 300 , and the communication terminal 400 communicate via the network 101 .
运营商120进行使用制造设备110的业务，电力公司是运营商120的一例。运营商120具有密钥管理服务器200。The carrier 120 conducts business using the manufacturing facility 110 , and an electric power company is an example of the carrier 120 . The operator 120 has a key management server 200 .
设备制造商130制造制造设备110。设备制造商130具有设备管理装置300。The equipment manufacturer 130 manufactures the manufacturing equipment 110 . The device manufacturer 130 has a device management device 300 .
设置住宅140是设置有制造设备110的家。并且，设置住宅140中设置有通信终端400，通信终端400管理制造设备110。智能电表(smartmeter)是制造设备110的一例。The installed house 140 is a house where the manufacturing facility 110 is installed. Furthermore, a communication terminal 400 is installed in the installation house 140 , and the communication terminal 400 manages the manufacturing equipment 110 . A smart meter is an example of the manufacturing equipment 110 .
图2是实施方式1的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构图。FIG. 2 is a functional configuration diagram of the key management server 200 according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构，根据图2进行说明。The functional configuration of the key management server 200 according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 2 .
密钥管理服务器200是按照每个设备制造商生成设备制造商130用的公共密钥的装置。以下，将设备制造商130用的公共密钥称作“制造商密钥292”。The key management server 200 is a device that generates a common key for the device manufacturer 130 for each device manufacturer. Hereinafter, the common key used by the device manufacturer 130 is referred to as "manufacturer key 292".
密钥管理服务器200具有主密钥生成部210和制造商密钥生成部220。The key management server 200 has a master key generation unit 210 and a manufacturer key generation unit 220 .
主密钥生成部210使用用于识别运营商120的运营商ID121，生成用于生成制造商密钥292的主密钥291。另外，管理者进行严格的管理，使得主密钥291不会向外部泄漏。Master key generation unit 210 generates master key 291 for generating manufacturer key 292 using carrier ID 121 for identifying carrier 120 . In addition, the administrator performs strict management so that the master key 291 will not be leaked to the outside.
制造商密钥生成部220使用主密钥291、制造商ID131以及世代编号132来生成制造商密钥292。Manufacturer key generation unit 220 generates manufacturer key 292 using master key 291 , manufacturer ID 131 , and generation number 132 .
制造商ID131是用于识别设备制造商130的标识符。The manufacturer ID 131 is an identifier for identifying the device manufacturer 130 .
世代编号132是用于识别制造商密钥292的世代的标识符。The generation number 132 is an identifier for identifying the generation of the manufacturer key 292 .
制造商密钥292的世代交替是在制造商密钥292的泄漏时或者制造商密钥292的更新时进行。在制造商密钥292的世代交替时，制造商密钥生成部220更新世代编号132，使用更新后的世代编号132生成新的制造商密钥292。The generation change of the manufacturer key 292 is performed when the manufacturer key 292 is leaked or when the manufacturer key 292 is updated. When the generation of the manufacturer key 292 is changed, the manufacturer key generation unit 220 updates the generation number 132 and generates a new manufacturer key 292 using the updated generation number 132 .
运营商ID121、制造商ID131、世代编号132以及制造商密钥292按照安全的方法分发给设备制造商130，存储于设备管理装置300。The operator ID 121 , manufacturer ID 131 , generation number 132 , and manufacturer key 292 are distributed to the device manufacturer 130 in a secure manner and stored in the device management device 300 .
这些数据可以通过密钥管理服务器200与设备管理装置300之间的通信而存储在设备管理装置300中，也可以使用存储介质手动地存储于设备管理装置300。These data may be stored in the equipment management apparatus 300 through communication between the key management server 200 and the equipment management apparatus 300, or may be manually stored in the equipment management apparatus 300 using a storage medium.
密钥管理服务器200具有设备认证密钥提供部230(标识符数据接收部、设备再生密钥发送部的一例)和设备认证密钥再生部240(设备再生密钥生成部的一例)。The key management server 200 includes a device authentication key providing unit 230 (an example of an identifier data receiving unit and a device regeneration key transmitting unit) and a device authentication key regeneration unit 240 (an example of a device regeneration key generating unit).
设备认证密钥提供部230从通信终端400接收制造设备110的ID数据391，向通信终端400发送由设备认证密钥再生部240生成的设备认证密钥293。Device authentication key provision unit 230 receives ID data 391 of manufacturing device 110 from communication terminal 400 , and transmits device authentication key 293 generated by device authentication key regeneration unit 240 to communication terminal 400 .
设备认证密钥再生部240使用制造商密钥292和ID数据391生成设备形式密钥294，使用设备形式密钥294和ID数据391生成设备认证密钥293。The device authentication key reproduction unit 240 generates a device type key 294 using the manufacturer key 292 and the ID data 391 , and generates a device authentication key 293 using the device type key 294 and the ID data 391 .
设备认证密钥再生部240具有生成设备形式密钥294的设备形式密钥再生部241。The device authentication key regeneration unit 240 has a device-type key regeneration unit 241 that generates a device-type key 294 .
设备形式密钥294是设备形式(以及批次编号)相同的制造设备110的每个组的公共密钥。The device type key 294 is a common key for each group of manufacturing devices 110 having the same device type (and lot number).
设备认证密钥293是每个制造设备110的公共密钥。The device authentication key 293 is a common key for each manufacturing device 110 .
关于ID数据391，在后面进行说明。The ID data 391 will be described later.
密钥管理服务器200具有密钥管理存储部290。The key management server 200 has a key management storage unit 290 .
密钥管理存储部290存储密钥管理服务器200使用的数据。The key management storage unit 290 stores data used by the key management server 200 .
例如，密钥管理存储部290存储如下这样的数据。For example, the key management storage unit 290 stores the following data.
密钥管理存储部290对应地存储运营商ID121和主密钥291。The key management storage unit 290 stores the carrier ID 121 and the master key 291 in association with each other.
密钥管理存储部290对应地存储制造商ID131(制造商标识符的一例)、世代编号132(世代标识符的一例)、制造商密钥292。The key management storage unit 290 stores a manufacturer ID 131 (an example of a manufacturer identifier), a generation number 132 (an example of a generation identifier), and a manufacturer key 292 in association with each other.
密钥管理存储部290对应地存储ID数据391、设备形式密钥294、设备认证密钥293(设备再生密钥的一例)。The key management storage unit 290 stores ID data 391 , device type key 294 , and device authentication key 293 (an example of a device regeneration key) in association with each other.
图3是实施方式1的设备管理装置300的功能结构图。FIG. 3 is a functional configuration diagram of the equipment management device 300 according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的设备管理装置300的功能结构，根据图3进行说明。The functional configuration of the equipment management device 300 according to Embodiment 1 will be described based on FIG. 3 .
设备管理装置300具有ID数据生成部310、设备认证密钥生成部320(设备密钥生成部的一例)、设备认证密钥写入部340以及设备管理存储部390(制造商密钥存储部的一例)。The device management device 300 has an ID data generation unit 310, a device authentication key generation unit 320 (an example of a device key generation unit), a device authentication key writing unit 340, and a device management storage unit 390 (an example of a manufacturer key storage unit). one example).
ID数据生成部310生成ID数据391。The ID data generating unit 310 generates ID data 391 .
ID数据391具有运营商ID121、制造商ID131、世代编号132、设备形式ID133、批次编号134以及设备ID135。The ID data 391 has a carrier ID 121 , a manufacturer ID 131 , a generation number 132 , a device type ID 133 , a lot number 134 , and a device ID 135 .
设备形式ID133是用于识别制造设备110的形式的标识符。The equipment type ID 133 is an identifier for identifying the type of the manufacturing equipment 110 .
批次编号134是用于识别制造设备110的批次的标识符。Lot number 134 is an identifier for identifying a lot of manufacturing equipment 110 .
设备ID135是用于识别制造设备110的标识符。The equipment ID 135 is an identifier for identifying the manufacturing equipment 110 .
设备认证密钥生成部320使用制造商密钥292、设备形式ID133以及批次编号134生成设备形式密钥294，使用设备形式密钥294和设备ID135生成设备认证密钥293。The device authentication key generation unit 320 generates a device type key 294 using the manufacturer key 292 , the device type ID 133 , and the lot number 134 , and generates a device authentication key 293 using the device type key 294 and the device ID 135 .
设备认证密钥生成部320具有生成设备形式密钥294的设备形式密钥生成部330。The device authentication key generation unit 320 has a device-type key generation unit 330 that generates the device-type key 294 .
设备认证密钥写入部340将ID数据391和设备认证密钥392写入制造设备110。The device authentication key writing unit 340 writes the ID data 391 and the device authentication key 392 into the manufacturing device 110 .
并且，制造设备110设置于设置住宅140。Furthermore, the manufacturing facility 110 is installed in an installation house 140 .
设备管理存储部390存储设备管理装置300使用的数据。The equipment management storage unit 390 stores data used by the equipment management apparatus 300 .
例如，设备管理存储部390存储制造商密钥292、ID数据391、设备形式密钥393以及设备认证密钥392。For example, the device management storage unit 390 stores a manufacturer key 292 , ID data 391 , a device type key 393 , and a device authentication key 392 .
图4是实施方式1的制造设备110的功能结构图。FIG. 4 is a functional configuration diagram of manufacturing equipment 110 according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的制造设备110的功能结构，根据图4进行说明。The functional configuration of manufacturing facility 110 according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 4 .
制造设备110具有认证数据生成部111和设备存储部119。The manufacturing device 110 has an authentication data generation unit 111 and a device storage unit 119 .
认证数据生成部111从通信终端400接收询问数据421，使用询问数据421、ID数据391和设备认证密钥392生成认证数据112，将认证数据112发送到通信终端400。Authentication data generator 111 receives challenge data 421 from communication terminal 400 , generates authentication data 112 using challenge data 421 , ID data 391 , and device authentication key 392 , and transmits authentication data 112 to communication terminal 400 .
询问数据421是用于生成认证数据112的数据。The challenge data 421 is data for generating the authentication data 112 .
认证数据112是用于针对制造设备110的认证处理的数据。The authentication data 112 is data used for authentication processing of the manufacturing equipment 110 .
设备存储部119存储制造设备110使用的数据。The equipment storage unit 119 stores data used by the manufacturing equipment 110 .
例如，设备存储部119存储ID数据391和设备认证密钥392。ID数据391和设备认证密钥392被设备管理装置300写入设备存储部119中。For example, the device storage unit 119 stores ID data 391 and a device authentication key 392 . The ID data 391 and the device authentication key 392 are written into the device storage unit 119 by the device management device 300 .
图5是实施方式1的通信终端400的功能结构图。FIG. 5 is a functional configuration diagram of communication terminal 400 according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的通信终端400的功能结构，根据图5进行说明。The functional configuration of communication terminal 400 according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 5 .
通信终端400具有ID数据取得部410(标识符数据取得部的一例)、认证数据取得部420、设备认证密钥取得部430(标识符数据发送部、设备再生密钥接收部的一例)、认证数据验证部440(认证处理部的一例)。The communication terminal 400 has an ID data acquisition unit 410 (an example of an identifier data acquisition unit), an authentication data acquisition unit 420, a device authentication key acquisition unit 430 (an example of an identifier data transmission unit and a device regeneration key reception unit), an authentication Data verification unit 440 (an example of an authentication processing unit).
通信终端400具有设备管理部480和终端存储部490。Communication terminal 400 has a device management unit 480 and a terminal storage unit 490 .
ID数据取得部410从制造设备110取得ID数据391。The ID data acquisition unit 410 acquires the ID data 391 from the manufacturing equipment 110 .
认证数据取得部420使用ID数据391生成询问数据421，将询问数据421发送到制造设备110，从制造设备110接收使用询问数据421而生成的认证数据112。The authentication data acquisition unit 420 generates challenge data 421 using the ID data 391 , transmits the challenge data 421 to the manufacturing facility 110 , and receives the authentication data 112 generated using the challenge data 421 from the manufacturing facility 110 .
设备认证密钥取得部430将ID数据391发送给密钥管理服务器200，从密钥管理服务器200接收使用ID数据391而生成的设备认证密钥293。The device authentication key acquisition unit 430 transmits the ID data 391 to the key management server 200 , and receives the device authentication key 293 generated using the ID data 391 from the key management server 200 .
认证数据验证部440使用ID数据391和设备认证密钥293对认证数据112进行验证。The authentication data verification unit 440 verifies the authentication data 112 using the ID data 391 and the device authentication key 293 .
在认证数据112是正确的数据的情况下，制造设备110被认证。When the authentication data 112 is correct data, the manufacturing equipment 110 is authenticated.
在认证数据112是错误的数据的情况下，制造设备110不被认证。If the authentication data 112 is wrong data, the manufacturing equipment 110 is not authenticated.
设备管理部480与所认证的制造设备110进行通信，管理制造设备110。The equipment management unit 480 communicates with the authenticated manufacturing equipment 110 and manages the manufacturing equipment 110 .
终端存储部490存储通信终端400使用的数据。Terminal storage unit 490 stores data used by communication terminal 400 .
例如，终端存储部490存储ID数据391、认证数据112、设备认证密钥293。For example, the terminal storage unit 490 stores ID data 391 , authentication data 112 , and device authentication key 293 .
图6是示出实施方式1的设备认证系统100的设备认证方法的流程图。FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing a device authentication method in the device authentication system 100 according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的设备认证系统100的设备认证方法，根据图6进行说明。The device authentication method of the device authentication system 100 according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 6 .
在S200中，密钥管理服务器200使用运营商ID121生成主密钥291，使用主密钥291、制造商ID131和世代编号132生成制造商密钥292。In S200 , key management server 200 generates master key 291 using carrier ID 121 , and generates manufacturer key 292 using master key 291 , manufacturer ID 131 , and generation number 132 .
由密钥管理服务器200生成的制造商密钥292存储在设备管理装置300中。The manufacturer key 292 generated by the key management server 200 is stored in the device management apparatus 300 .
在S200之后，处理进入S300。After S200, the process proceeds to S300.
在S300中，设备管理装置300生成设备认证密钥293和ID数据391，将设备认证密钥293和ID数据391写入制造设备110。In S300 , the equipment management apparatus 300 generates the equipment authentication key 293 and the ID data 391 , and writes the equipment authentication key 293 and the ID data 391 into the manufacturing equipment 110 .
然后，将制造设备110设置于设置住宅140。Then, the manufacturing equipment 110 is installed in the installation house 140 .
但是，设备认证密钥392和ID数据391也可以手动地设定于制造设备110。However, the device authentication key 392 and the ID data 391 may be manually set in the manufacturing device 110 .
在S300之后，处理进入S400。After S300, the process proceeds to S400.
在S400中，设置住宅140的通信终端400与密钥管理服务器200协作地对制造设备110进行认证。In S400 , communication terminal 400 where house 140 is installed cooperates with key management server 200 to authenticate manufacturing equipment 110 .
在S400之后，设备认证方法的处理结束。After S400, the processing of the device authentication method ends.
图7是实施方式1的制造商密钥生成处理(S200)的流程图。FIG. 7 is a flowchart of manufacturer key generation processing (S200) according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的制造商密钥生成处理(S200)，根据图7进行说明。The manufacturer key generation process (S200) in Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 7 .
在S210中，密钥管理服务器200的主密钥生成部210使用运营商ID121来执行公共密钥加密方式的主密钥生成算法(也称为密钥导出算法)，由此，生成主密钥291。In S210, the master key generation unit 210 of the key management server 200 uses the operator ID 121 to execute a master key generation algorithm (also referred to as a key derivation algorithm) of a common key encryption method, thereby generating a master key 291.
在S210之后，处理进入S220。After S210, the process proceeds to S220.
在S220中，密钥管理服务器200的制造商密钥生成部220使用主密钥291、制造商ID131和世代编号132来执行公共密钥加密方式的公共密钥生成算法(也称为密钥导出算法)，由此，生成设备制造商130用的公共密钥(制造商密钥292)。In S220, the manufacturer key generation unit 220 of the key management server 200 uses the master key 291, the manufacturer ID 131, and the generation number 132 to execute a public key generation algorithm (also referred to as key derivation) of the public key encryption method. algorithm), thereby generating a public key (manufacturer key 292) for the device manufacturer 130.
在S220之后，制造商密钥生成处理(S200)结束。After S220, the manufacturer key generation process (S200) ends.
图8是实施方式1的设备管理处理(S300)的流程图。FIG. 8 is a flowchart of device management processing (S300) according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的设备管理处理(S300)，根据图8进行说明。The device management process (S300) according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 8 .
在S310中，设备管理装置300的ID数据生成部310生成ID数据391。In S310 , the ID data generation unit 310 of the equipment management device 300 generates ID data 391 .
ID数据391是包含运营商ID121、制造商ID131、世代编号132、设备形式ID133、批次编号134和设备ID135的数据。ID data 391 is data including carrier ID 121 , manufacturer ID 131 , generation number 132 , device type ID 133 , lot number 134 , and device ID 135 .
在S310之后，处理进入S320。After S310, the process proceeds to S320.
在S320中，设备管理装置300的设备形式密钥生成部330使用设备形式ID133、批次编号134和制造商密钥292来执行公共密钥加密方式的公共密钥生成算法(也称为密钥导出算法)，由此，生成制造设备110的群组用的公共密钥(设备形式密钥393)。In S320, the device type key generation unit 330 of the device management device 300 uses the device type ID 133, the batch number 134, and the manufacturer key 292 to execute a common key generation algorithm (also referred to as a key encryption method) of a common key encryption method. derivation algorithm) to generate a common key (equipment type key 393) for the group of manufacturing equipment 110.
在S320之后，处理进入S330。After S320, the process proceeds to S330.
在S330中，设备管理装置300的设备认证密钥生成部320使用设备ID135和设备形式密钥393来执行公共密钥加密方式的公共密钥生成算法(也称为密钥导出算法)，由此，生成制造设备110用的公共密钥(设备认证密钥392)。In S330, the device authentication key generation unit 320 of the device management device 300 uses the device ID 135 and the device type key 393 to execute a common key generation algorithm (also referred to as a key derivation algorithm) of a common key encryption method, thereby , to generate a common key (device authentication key 392) for manufacturing equipment 110.
在S330之后，处理进入S340。After S330, the process proceeds to S340.
在S340中，设备管理装置300的设备认证密钥写入部340将设备认证密钥392和ID数据391写入制造设备110。In S340 , the device authentication key writing unit 340 of the device management device 300 writes the device authentication key 392 and the ID data 391 into the manufacturing device 110 .
在S340之后，设备管理处理(S300)结束。After S340, the device management process (S300) ends.
图9和图10是实施方式1的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。9 and 10 are flowcharts of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的协作认证处理(S400)，根据图9和图10进行说明。The cooperative authentication process (S400) of Embodiment 1 is demonstrated based on FIG.9 and FIG.10.
在S410(参照图9)中，通信终端400的ID数据取得部410与制造设备110进行通信，从制造设备110取得ID数据391。In S410 (see FIG. 9 ), ID data acquisition unit 410 of communication terminal 400 communicates with manufacturing equipment 110 and acquires ID data 391 from manufacturing equipment 110 .
在S410之后，处理进入S421。After S410, the process proceeds to S421.
在S421中，通信终端400的认证数据取得部420生成询问数据421。询问数据421是任意的数据(例如随机数)。In S421 , the authentication data acquisition unit 420 of the communication terminal 400 generates challenge data 421 . The query data 421 is arbitrary data (for example, a random number).
在S421之后，处理进入S422。After S421, the process proceeds to S422.
在S422中，通信终端400的认证数据取得部420将询问数据421发送到制造设备110。In S422 , authentication data acquisition unit 420 of communication terminal 400 transmits inquiry data 421 to manufacturing equipment 110 .
在S422之后，处理进入S423。After S422, the process proceeds to S423.
在S423中，制造设备110的认证数据生成部111从通信终端400接收询问数据421。In S423 , the authentication data generation unit 111 of the manufacturing facility 110 receives the inquiry data 421 from the communication terminal 400 .
认证数据生成部111使用询问数据421和ID数据391(或者ID数据391的一部分)，以询问/响应认证方式生成认证数据112(响应)。The authentication data generating unit 111 generates the authentication data 112 (response) by the challenge/response authentication method using the challenge data 421 and the ID data 391 (or a part of the ID data 391).
然后，认证数据生成部111将认证数据112发送到通信终端400。Then, authentication data generation unit 111 transmits authentication data 112 to communication terminal 400 .
例如，认证数据生成部111将询问数据421和ID数据391输入到响应生成用的散列函数，执行散列函数。散列函数的输出值是认证数据112。For example, the authentication data generation unit 111 inputs the challenge data 421 and the ID data 391 to a hash function for response generation, and executes the hash function. The output value of the hash function is authentication data 112 .
在S423之后，处理进入S424。After S423, the process proceeds to S424.
在S424中，通信终端400的认证数据取得部420从制造设备110接收认证数据112。In S424 , the authentication data acquisition unit 420 of the communication terminal 400 receives the authentication data 112 from the manufacturing equipment 110 .
在S424之后，处理进入S431(参照图10)。After S424, the process proceeds to S431 (see FIG. 10 ).
在S431(参照图10)中，通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430将制造设备110的ID数据391发送到密钥管理服务器200。In S431 (see FIG. 10 ), device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of communication terminal 400 transmits ID data 391 of manufacturing device 110 to key management server 200 .
在S431之后，处理进入S432。After S431, the process proceeds to S432.
在S432中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥提供部230从通信终端400接收ID数据391。In S432 , device authentication key providing unit 230 of key management server 200 receives ID data 391 from communication terminal 400 .
在S432之后，处理进入S433。After S432, the process proceeds to S433.
在S433中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥再生部240从ID数据391取得制造商ID131和世代编号132，从设备管理存储部390取得与制造商ID131以及世代编号132对应的制造商密钥292。In S433, the device authentication key reproduction unit 240 of the key management server 200 obtains the manufacturer ID 131 and the generation number 132 from the ID data 391, and obtains the manufacturer key corresponding to the manufacturer ID 131 and the generation number 132 from the device management storage unit 390. Key 292.
设备认证密钥再生部240从ID数据391取得设备形式ID133和批次编号134。The device authentication key reproduction unit 240 acquires the device type ID 133 and the lot number 134 from the ID data 391 .
然后，设备认证密钥再生部240使用设备形式ID133、批次编号134和制造商密钥292生成设备形式密钥294(与图8的S320相同)。Then, the device authentication key reproduction unit 240 generates a device type key 294 using the device type ID 133, the lot number 134, and the manufacturer key 292 (same as S320 in FIG. 8 ).
在S433之后，处理进入S434。After S433, the process proceeds to S434.
在S434中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥再生部240从ID数据391取得设备ID135。In S434 , the device authentication key regeneration unit 240 of the key management server 200 acquires the device ID 135 from the ID data 391 .
然后，设备认证密钥再生部240使用设备ID135和设备形式密钥294生成设备认证密钥293(与图8的S330相同)。Then, the device authentication key regeneration unit 240 generates the device authentication key 293 using the device ID 135 and the device type key 294 (same as S330 in FIG. 8 ).
在S434之后，处理进入S435。After S434, the process proceeds to S435.
在S435中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥提供部230将设备认证密钥293发送到通信终端400。In S435 , device authentication key providing unit 230 of key management server 200 transmits device authentication key 293 to communication terminal 400 .
在S435之后，处理进入S436。After S435, the process proceeds to S436.
在S436中，通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430从密钥管理服务器200接收设备认证密钥293。In S436 , the device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of the communication terminal 400 receives the device authentication key 293 from the key management server 200 .
在S436之后，处理进入S440。After S436, the process proceeds to S440.
在S440中，通信终端400的认证数据验证部440使用设备认证密钥293和ID数据391(或者ID数据391的一部分)以询问/响应认证方式对认证数据112进行验证。In S440, the authentication data verification unit 440 of the communication terminal 400 verifies the authentication data 112 by the challenge/response authentication method using the device authentication key 293 and the ID data 391 (or a part of the ID data 391).
例如，认证数据生成部111以如下的方式对认证数据112进行验证。For example, the authentication data generating unit 111 verifies the authentication data 112 as follows.
认证数据生成部111使用询问数据421(在S422中发送给制造设备110的数据)和ID数据391，以与制造设备110相同的方法生成认证数据。以下，将由认证数据生成部111生成的认证数据称为“比较数据”。The authentication data generating unit 111 generates authentication data by the same method as the manufacturing equipment 110 using the challenge data 421 (data transmitted to the manufacturing equipment 110 in S422 ) and the ID data 391 . Hereinafter, the authentication data generated by the authentication data generating unit 111 is referred to as "comparison data".
认证数据生成部111对比较数据与认证数据112(在S424中从制造设备110接收的数据)进行比较。The authentication data generating unit 111 compares the comparison data with the authentication data 112 (data received from the manufacturing equipment 110 in S424 ).
在比较数据与认证数据112一致的情况下，认证数据112是正确的数据，制造设备110被认证为合法的设备。When the comparison data matches the authentication data 112, the authentication data 112 is correct data, and the manufacturing equipment 110 is authenticated as a legitimate equipment.
在比较数据与认证数据112不一致的情况下，认证数据112是错误的数据，制造设备110不被认证为合法的设备。When the comparison data and the authentication data 112 do not match, the authentication data 112 is wrong data, and the manufacturing equipment 110 is not authenticated as a legitimate equipment.
在S440之后，协作认证处理(S400)结束。After S440, the collaborative authentication process (S400) ends.
图11是示出实施方式1的通信终端400的硬件结构的一例的图。FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration of communication terminal 400 according to the first embodiment.
关于实施方式1的通信终端400的硬件结构的一例，根据图11进行说明。An example of the hardware configuration of communication terminal 400 according to Embodiment 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 11 .
另外，密钥管理服务器200和设备管理装置300还具有与通信终端400相同的硬件结构。In addition, key management server 200 and device management device 300 also have the same hardware configuration as communication terminal 400 .
通信终端400具有：与总线909连接的运算装置901、辅助存储装置902、主存储装置903、通信装置904以及输入输出装置905。Communication terminal 400 has computing device 901 connected to bus 909 , auxiliary storage device 902 , main storage device 903 , communication device 904 , and input/output device 905 .
运算装置901是执行程序的CPU(CentralProcessingUnit：中央处理单元)。The computing device 901 is a CPU (Central Processing Unit: Central Processing Unit) that executes programs.
辅助存储装置902例如是ROM(ReadOnlyMemory：只读存储器)、闪速存储器或者硬盘装置。The auxiliary storage device 902 is, for example, a ROM (Read Only Memory), a flash memory, or a hard disk device.
主存储装置903例如是RAM(RandomAccessMemory：随机访问存储器)。The main storage device 903 is, for example, RAM (Random Access Memory: Random Access Memory).
通信装置904以有线或者无线的形式经由互联网、LAN(局域网)、电话线路网或者其它网络进行通信。The communication device 904 communicates via the Internet, a LAN (Local Area Network), a telephone line network, or other networks in a wired or wireless manner.
输入输出装置905例如是鼠标、键盘、显示装置。The input/output device 905 is, for example, a mouse, a keyboard, or a display device.
程序通常存储于辅助存储装置902，加载到主存储装置903中并被读入运算装置901，由运算装置901执行。The program is usually stored in the auxiliary storage device 902 , loaded into the main storage device 903 , read into the computing device 901 , and executed by the computing device 901 .
例如，操作系统(OS)存储在辅助存储装置902中。并且，实现作为“～部”进行说明的功能的程序(设备认证用程序的一例)存储在辅助存储装置902中。并且，OS和实现作为“～部”进行说明的功能的程序加载到主存储装置903中，由运算装置901执行。For example, an operating system (OS) is stored in the auxiliary storage device 902 . In addition, a program (an example of a program for device authentication) that realizes the function described as “—part” is stored in the auxiliary storage device 902 . In addition, the OS and programs for realizing the functions described as "-part" are loaded into the main storage device 903 and executed by the computing device 901 .
表示“～的判断”、“～的判定”、“～的提取”、“～的检测”、“～的设定”、“～的登记”、“～的选择”、“～的生成”、“～的输入”、“～的输出”等处理的结果的信息、数据、信号值或者变量值作为文件存储在主存储装置903或者辅助存储装置902中。并且，通信终端400所使用的其它数据存储在主存储装置903或者辅助存储装置902中。Indicates "judgment of ~", "judgment of ~", "extraction of ~", "detection of ~", "setting of ~", "registration of ~", "selection of ~", "generation of ~", Information, data, signal values, or variable values of processing results such as "input to" and "output to" are stored in the main storage device 903 or the auxiliary storage device 902 as files. Also, other data used by the communication terminal 400 is stored in the main storage device 903 or the auxiliary storage device 902 .
并且，图11示出实施方式1的通信终端400的硬件结构的一例，通信终端400的硬件结构也可以是与图11所示的结构不同的结构。Furthermore, FIG. 11 shows an example of the hardware configuration of communication terminal 400 according to Embodiment 1, and the hardware configuration of communication terminal 400 may be a configuration different from the configuration shown in FIG. 11 .
另外，实施方式1的方法(协作认证方法的一例)能够通过使用流程图等说明的步骤或者与其一部分不同的步骤来实现。In addition, the method according to Embodiment 1 (an example of a cooperative authentication method) can be realized by steps described using a flowchart or the like, or by steps different from a part thereof.
实施方式1也可以采用如下这样的方式。Embodiment 1 may also employ the following forms.
制造商密钥生成部220也可以不使用世代编号132生成制造商密钥292。The manufacturer key generation unit 220 may generate the manufacturer key 292 without using the generation number 132 .
设备形式密钥生成部330也可以使用设备形式ID133和批次编号134中的任意一方生成设备形式密钥294。The device type key generating unit 330 may generate the device type key 294 using either one of the device type ID 133 and the lot number 134 .
设备认证密钥生成部320也可以取代设备形式密钥294而使用制造商密钥292生成设备认证密钥293。The device authentication key generation unit 320 may generate the device authentication key 293 using the manufacturer key 292 instead of the device type key 294 .
密钥管理服务器200也可以由具有主密钥生成部210和制造商密钥生成部220各自的功能的装置(制造商密钥生成装置的一例)、以及具有设备认证密钥提供部230和设备认证密钥再生部240各自的功能的装置(设备再生密钥生成装置的一例)这两个装置构成。The key management server 200 may include a device having the respective functions of the master key generation unit 210 and the manufacturer key generation unit 220 (an example of a manufacturer key generation device), and a device authentication key providing unit 230 and a device Devices (an example of a device regeneration key generation device) that authenticate the respective functions of the key regeneration unit 240 are constituted by two devices.
设置住宅140也可以替换成人、动物、车辆、铁路、飞机或者机器人等移动体。The house 140 may be installed instead of a mobile body such as an adult, an animal, a vehicle, a railway, an airplane, or a robot.
以下，关于实施方式1的处理进行补充说明。Hereinafter, a supplementary explanation will be given on the processing of Embodiment 1. FIG.
询问数据421的生成处理(S421)、认证数据112的生成处理(S423)以及认证数据112的验证处理(S440)能够按照ISO/IEC使用作为国际标准技术的认证机制9798-2或者其它认证协议而执行。The generation processing (S421) of the challenge data 421, the generation processing (S423) of the authentication data 112, and the verification processing (S440) of the authentication data 112 can be performed in accordance with ISO/IEC using the authentication mechanism 9798-2 which is an international standard technology or other authentication protocols. implement.
密钥导出算法是使用伪随机数生成函数(PRF)、消息认证码生成函数(MAC函数)或者带密钥的散列函数(HMAC)等密钥导出函数的算法。The key derivation algorithm is an algorithm using a key derivation function such as a pseudo-random number generating function (PRF), a message authentication code generating function (MAC function), or a keyed hash function (HMAC).
通过实施方式1例如实现这样的效果。Such an effect is achieved by Embodiment 1, for example.
可以使用处理负担比公开密钥密码算法小的公共密钥密码算法。A public key cryptographic algorithm with a smaller processing burden than a public key cryptographic algorithm can be used.
由于对每个制造设备分配设备认证密钥作为单独的公共密钥，因此，即使在设备认证密钥从任意的制造设备泄漏的情况下也可以将损害抑制在最小限度。即，能够使得因设备认证密钥的泄漏导致的不良影响不会波及到其它制造设备、设备制造商以及系统整体。Since the device authentication key is assigned as an individual common key for each manufacturing device, damage can be minimized even if the device authentication key leaks from any manufacturing device. That is, it is possible to prevent adverse effects caused by leakage of the device authentication key from spreading to other manufacturing devices, device manufacturers, and the entire system.
能够使用单独的ID数据将密钥管理简化。Key management can be simplified using separate ID data.
能够实现设备制造的分散化。并且，能够将安全的责任范围明确化。It can realize the decentralization of equipment manufacturing. In addition, the scope of responsibility for security can be clarified.
制造设备的处理负担较小，能够以较少的资源使制造设备进行动作。The processing load on the manufacturing equipment is small, and the manufacturing equipment can be operated with less resources.
实施方式2.Implementation mode 2.
说明密钥管理服务器200取代通信终端400而进行认证数据112的验证的方式。A mode in which the key management server 200 verifies the authentication data 112 instead of the communication terminal 400 will be described.
以下，主要说明与实施方式1不同的事项。关于省略说明的事项，与实施方式1相同。Hereinafter, matters different from Embodiment 1 will be mainly described. Matters whose description is omitted are the same as in Embodiment 1. FIG.
图12是实施方式2的通信终端400的功能结构图。FIG. 12 is a functional configuration diagram of communication terminal 400 according to the second embodiment.
关于实施方式2的通信终端400的功能结构，根据图12进行说明。The functional configuration of communication terminal 400 according to Embodiment 2 will be described with reference to FIG. 12 .
通信终端400具有验证请求部431(标识符数据发送部、认证数据发送部的一例)，来取代在实施方式1(参照图5)中说明的设备认证密钥取得部430。Communication terminal 400 includes verification request unit 431 (an example of an identifier data transmission unit and an authentication data transmission unit) instead of device authentication key acquisition unit 430 described in Embodiment 1 (see FIG. 5 ).
关于验证请求部431的动作，在后面进行说明。The operation of the verification request unit 431 will be described later.
图13是实施方式2的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构图。FIG. 13 is a functional configuration diagram of the key management server 200 according to the second embodiment.
关于实施方式2的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构，根据图13进行说明。The functional configuration of the key management server 200 according to Embodiment 2 will be described with reference to FIG. 13 .
密钥管理服务器200具有验证请求受理部231(标识符数据接收部、认证数据接收部的一例)和认证数据验证部232(认证处理部的一例)，来取代在实施方式1(参照图2)中说明的设备认证密钥提供部230。The key management server 200 includes a verification request accepting unit 231 (an example of an identifier data receiving unit and an authentication data receiving unit) and an authentication data verifying unit 232 (an example of an authentication processing unit), instead of the first embodiment (see FIG. 2 ). The device authentication key providing unit 230 described in .
关于验证请求受理部231和认证数据验证部232的动作，在后面进行说明。The operations of the verification request accepting unit 231 and the authentication data verifying unit 232 will be described later.
图14是实施方式2的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。FIG. 14 is a flowchart of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the second embodiment.
关于实施方式2的协作认证处理(S400)，根据图14进行说明。The cooperative authentication process (S400) of Embodiment 2 will be described based on FIG. 14 .
协作认证处理(S400)取代实施方式1(参照图9、图10)中说明的S431至S440，而执行S431B至S440B(其中，除了S433和S434之外)。The cooperative authentication process ( S400 ) replaces S431 to S440 described in Embodiment 1 (see FIG. 9 and FIG. 10 ), and executes S431B to S440B (except for S433 and S434 ).
在S410中，通信终端400的ID数据取得部410从制造设备110取得ID数据391(与实施方式1相同)。In S410, ID data acquisition part 410 of communication terminal 400 acquires ID data 391 from manufacturing equipment 110 (same as Embodiment 1).
在S421至S424中，通信终端400的认证数据取得部420从制造设备110取得认证数据112(与实施方式1相同)。In S421 to S424, the authentication data acquisition part 420 of the communication terminal 400 acquires the authentication data 112 from the manufacturing equipment 110 (it is the same as Embodiment 1).
在S424之后，处理进入S431B。After S424, the process proceeds to S431B.
在S431B中，通信终端400的验证请求部431将ID数据391、认证数据112和询问数据421发送到密钥管理服务器200。In S431B, verification request unit 431 of communication terminal 400 transmits ID data 391 , authentication data 112 , and challenge data 421 to key management server 200 .
在S431B之后，处理进入S432B。After S431B, the process proceeds to S432B.
在S432B中，密钥管理服务器200的验证请求受理部231从通信终端400接收ID数据391、认证数据112和询问数据421。In S432B, verification request accepting unit 231 of key management server 200 receives ID data 391 , authentication data 112 , and inquiry data 421 from communication terminal 400 .
在S432B之后，处理进入S433。After S432B, the process proceeds to S433.
在S433和S434中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥再生部240生成设备认证密钥293(与实施方式1相同)。In S433 and S434, the device authentication key regeneration unit 240 of the key management server 200 generates the device authentication key 293 (same as in Embodiment 1).
在S434之后，处理进入S435B。After S434, the process proceeds to S435B.
在S435B中，密钥管理服务器200的认证数据验证部232使用设备认证密钥293、ID数据391和询问数据421来对认证数据112进行验证。In S435B, the authentication data verification unit 232 of the key management server 200 verifies the authentication data 112 using the device authentication key 293 , the ID data 391 , and the challenge data 421 .
验证方法与实施方式1(图10的S440)相同。The verification method is the same as that in Embodiment 1 (S440 in FIG. 10 ).
在S435B之后，处理进入S436B。After S435B, the process proceeds to S436B.
在S436B中，密钥管理服务器200的验证请求受理部231将认证数据112的验证结果发送到通信终端400。In S436B, verification request accepting unit 231 of key management server 200 transmits the verification result of authentication data 112 to communication terminal 400 .
在S436B之后，处理进入S440B。After S436B, the process proceeds to S440B.
在S440B中，通信终端400的验证请求部431从密钥管理服务器200接收认证数据112的验证结果。In S440B, the verification request unit 431 of the communication terminal 400 receives the verification result of the authentication data 112 from the key management server 200 .
在S440B之后，协作认证处理(S400)结束。After S440B, the collaborative authentication process (S400) ends.
根据实施方式2，密钥管理服务器200可以取代通信终端400进行认证数据112的验证。According to the second embodiment, the key management server 200 can replace the communication terminal 400 to verify the authentication data 112 .
即使是实施方式2，也能够实现与实施方式1相同的效果。Even in the second embodiment, the same effects as those in the first embodiment can be achieved.
实施方式3.Implementation mode 3.
说明使用与合法的制造设备110或者非法的制造设备110相关的列表的方式。A method of using a list related to legitimate manufacturing facilities 110 or illegal manufacturing facilities 110 will be described.
以下，主要对与实施方式1不同的事项进行说明。关于省略说明的事项，与实施方式1相同。Hereinafter, matters different from Embodiment 1 will be mainly described. Matters whose description is omitted are the same as in Embodiment 1. FIG.
图15是实施方式3的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构图。FIG. 15 is a functional configuration diagram of the key management server 200 according to the third embodiment.
关于实施方式3的密钥管理服务器200的功能结构，根据图15进行说明。The functional configuration of the key management server 200 according to Embodiment 3 will be described with reference to FIG. 15 .
密钥管理服务器200具有参照有效列表295和无效列表296的列表参照部250。The key management server 200 has a list reference unit 250 that refers to the valid list 295 and the invalid list 296 .
密钥管理服务器200的密钥管理存储部290存储有效列表295和无效列表296。但是，密钥管理服务器200也可以仅存储有效列表295和无效列表296中的任意一方。The key management storage unit 290 of the key management server 200 stores a valid list 295 and an invalid list 296 . However, the key management server 200 may store only either one of the valid list 295 and the invalid list 296 .
有效列表295是与合法的制造设备110相关的列表。有效列表295由制造商密钥生成部220生成。但是，有效列表295也可以由管理者生成。Valid list 295 is a list associated with legitimate manufacturing devices 110 . The valid list 295 is generated by the manufacturer key generation unit 220 . However, active list 295 can also be generated by an administrator.
无效列表296是与非法的制造设备110相关的列表。无效列表296由管理者生成。The invalid list 296 is a list related to illegal manufacturing equipment 110 . Invalid list 296 is generated by the administrator.
有效列表295和无效列表296表示制造商ID、或者世代编号、设备形式ID、批次编号、设备ID中的至少任意一个与制造商ID的组合。The valid list 295 and the invalid list 296 indicate a manufacturer ID, or a combination of at least any one of a manufacturer ID, a generation number, a device model ID, a lot number, and a device ID.
关于有效列表295和无效列表296的使用方法，在后面进行说明。How to use the valid list 295 and the invalid list 296 will be described later.
图16是实施方式3的通信终端400的功能结构图。FIG. 16 is a functional configuration diagram of communication terminal 400 according to the third embodiment.
关于实施方式3的通信终端400的功能结构，根据图16进行说明。The functional configuration of communication terminal 400 according to Embodiment 3 will be described with reference to FIG. 16 .
通信终端400的终端存储部490(无效列表存储部的一例)存储无效列表491。The terminal storage unit 490 (an example of a revocation list storage unit) of the communication terminal 400 stores a revocation list 491 .
无效列表491是与非法的制造设备110相关的列表。无效列表491由设备认证密钥取得部430生成。但是，无效列表491也可以由管理者生成。The invalid list 491 is a list related to illegal manufacturing equipment 110 . The revocation list 491 is generated by the device authentication key acquisition unit 430 . However, invalidation list 491 may also be generated by a manager.
无效列表491表示制造商ID、或者世代编号、设备形式ID、批次编号、设备ID中的任意一个与制造商ID的组合。The invalid list 491 indicates a manufacturer ID, or a combination of any one of a generation number, a device model ID, a lot number, and a device ID, and a manufacturer ID.
关于无效列表491的使用方法，在后面进行说明。How to use the invalidation list 491 will be described later.
图17是实施方式3的制造商密钥生成处理(S200)的流程图。FIG. 17 is a flowchart of manufacturer key generation processing (S200) according to the third embodiment.
关于实施方式3的制造商密钥生成处理(S200)，根据图17进行说明。The manufacturer key generation process (S200) according to Embodiment 3 will be described with reference to FIG. 17 .
制造商密钥生成处理(S200)除了实施方式1(参照图7)中说明的处理还包含S221。The manufacturer key generation process ( S200 ) includes S221 in addition to the process described in Embodiment 1 (see FIG. 7 ).
在S221中，制造商密钥生成部220将制造商ID131与世代编号132对应地设定在有效列表295中。In S221 , the manufacturer key generation unit 220 sets the manufacturer ID 131 and the generation number 132 in the valid list 295 in association with each other.
在S221之后，制造商密钥生成处理(S200)结束。After S221, the manufacturer key generation process (S200) ends.
图18和图19是实施方式3的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。18 and 19 are flowcharts of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the third embodiment.
关于实施方式3的协作认证处理(S400)，根据图18和图19进行说明。The cooperative authentication process (S400) of Embodiment 3 is demonstrated based on FIG.18 and FIG.19.
协作认证处理(S400)除了在实施方式1(图9、图10)中说明的处理，还包含S420、S432-1以及S432-2。The cooperative authentication processing (S400) includes S420, S432-1, and S432-2 in addition to the processing described in Embodiment 1 (FIG. 9, FIG. 10).
在S420(参照图18)中，通信终端400的认证数据取得部420对ID数据391与无效列表491进行比较，判定包含在ID数据391中的信息(设备ID135等)是否设定在无效列表491中。In S420 (see FIG. 18 ), the authentication data acquisition unit 420 of the communication terminal 400 compares the ID data 391 with the invalidation list 491, and determines whether the information (device ID 135, etc.) included in the ID data 391 is set in the invalidation list 491. middle.
在ID数据391的信息设定在无效列表491中的情况下(是)，制造设备110是非法的设备，协作认证处理(S400)结束。即，制造设备110不被认证。When the information of the ID data 391 is set in the invalidation list 491 (Yes), the manufacturing equipment 110 is an illegal equipment, and the collaboration authentication process (S400) ends. That is, manufacturing equipment 110 is not authenticated.
在ID数据391的信息未设定在无效列表491中的情况下(否)，处理进入S421。When the information of the ID data 391 is not set in the invalidation list 491 (No), the process proceeds to S421.
在S432-1(参照图19)中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥提供部230将ID数据391与有效列表295以及无效列表296进行比较，判定包含在ID数据391中的信息(设备ID135等)是否设定在有效列表295或者无效列表296中。但是，设备认证密钥提供部230也可以将ID数据391与有效列表295和无效列表296中的任意一方进行比较。In S432-1 (see FIG. 19 ), the device authentication key providing unit 230 of the key management server 200 compares the ID data 391 with the valid list 295 and the invalid list 296, and determines the information (device ID135, etc.) is set in the valid list 295 or the invalid list 296. However, the device authentication key providing unit 230 may compare the ID data 391 with either the valid list 295 or the invalid list 296 .
在ID数据391的信息仅设定在无效列表296的情况下(是)，制造设备110是非法的设备，处理进入S432-2。When the information of the ID data 391 is set only in the invalidation list 296 (Yes), the manufacturing equipment 110 is an illegal equipment, and the process proceeds to S432-2.
在ID数据391的信息仅设定在有效列表295的情况下(否)，处理进入S433。When the information of the ID data 391 is set only in the effective list 295 (No), the process proceeds to S433.
在ID数据391的信息设定在有效列表295和无效列表296双方的情况下(是)，制造设备110是非法的设备，处理进入S432-2。但是，在未判断为制造设备110是非法的设备的情况下，处理也可以进入S433。When the information of the ID data 391 is set in both the valid list 295 and the invalid list 296 (Yes), the manufacturing facility 110 is an illegal facility, and the process proceeds to S432-2. However, when it is not determined that the manufacturing facility 110 is an illegal facility, the process may proceed to S433.
在S432-2中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥提供部230将表示ID数据391是无效的数据的无效消息发送到通信终端400。通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430接收无效消息。In S432-2, device authentication key providing unit 230 of key management server 200 transmits an invalidation message indicating that ID data 391 is invalid data to communication terminal 400 . The device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of the communication terminal 400 receives the invalidation message.
然后，通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430通过将ID数据391的信息添加到无效列表491来更新无效列表491。Then, device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of communication terminal 400 updates revocation list 491 by adding information of ID data 391 to revocation list 491 .
在S432-2之后，制造设备110不被认证，协作认证处理(S400)结束。After S432-2, the manufacturing equipment 110 is not authenticated, and the cooperation authentication process (S400) ends.
图20是表示实施方式3的有效列表295的形式的例子的图。FIG. 20 is a diagram showing an example of the format of an effective list 295 according to the third embodiment.
图21是表示实施方式3的无效列表296/491的形式的例子的图。FIG. 21 is a diagram showing an example of the format of an invalidation list 296/491 according to the third embodiment.
关于实施方式3的有效列表295和无效列表296/491的形式的例子，根据图20和图21进行说明。An example of the format of the valid list 295 and the invalid list 296/491 according to the third embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 20 and 21 .
设定在有效列表295(参照图20)的信息对应地包含制造商ID和世代编号。但是，有效列表295也可以像无效列表296/491(参照图21)那样是其它形式。The information set in the valid list 295 (see FIG. 20 ) includes a maker ID and a generation number correspondingly. However, the valid list 295 may be in another form like the invalid lists 296/491 (see FIG. 21 ).
设定在无效列表296/491(参照图21)的信息像(5)所示那样表示制造商ID。The information set in the invalidation list 296/491 (refer to FIG. 21 ) indicates a manufacturer ID as shown in (5).
但是，设定在无效列表296/491的信息也可以像(1)至(4)所示那样是世代编号、设备形式ID、批次编号、设备ID中的至少一个与制造商ID的组合。However, the information set in the invalid list 296/491 may be a combination of at least one of a generation number, a device type ID, a lot number, and a device ID, and a manufacturer ID as shown in (1) to (4).
在实施方式3中，关于使用有效列表或者无效列表来判定是否对制造设备110进行认证的方式进行了说明。In Embodiment 3, the method of determining whether to authenticate the manufacturing equipment 110 using the valid list or the invalid list has been described.
根据实施方式3，能够减轻针对与无效列表相应的非法的制造设备110(或者不与有效列表相应的非法的制造设备110)的协作认证处理(S400)的负担。According to Embodiment 3, the burden of the cooperation authentication process (S400) for the illegal manufacturing equipment 110 corresponding to the invalid list (or the illegal manufacturing equipment 110 not corresponding to the valid list) can be reduced.
作为密钥泄漏时的对策，能够提供使用无效列表而使密钥失效的机制。As a countermeasure against leakage of the key, it is possible to provide a mechanism for invalidating the key using an invalidation list.
实施方式4.Implementation mode 4.
说明重新利用过去生成的设备形式密钥294和设备认证密钥293的方式。A method of reusing the device type key 294 and the device authentication key 293 generated in the past will be described.
以下，主要说明与实施方式1不同的事项。关于省略说明的事项，与实施方式1相同。Hereinafter, matters different from Embodiment 1 will be mainly described. Matters whose description is omitted are the same as in Embodiment 1. FIG.
图22和图23是实施方式4的协作认证处理(S400)的流程图。22 and 23 are flowcharts of the cooperative authentication process (S400) according to the fourth embodiment.
关于实施方式4的协作认证处理(S400)，根据图22和图23进行说明。The cooperative authentication process (S400) of Embodiment 4 is demonstrated based on FIG.22 and FIG.23.
协作认证处理(S400)除了在实施方式1(参照图9、图10)中说明的处理之外还包含S430和S432-1。The cooperative authentication processing (S400) includes S430 and S432-1 in addition to the processing described in Embodiment 1 (see FIG. 9 and FIG. 10).
并且，协作认证处理(S400)取代在实施方式1中说明的S433和S436，包含S433C和S436C。Furthermore, the cooperative authentication process ( S400 ) includes S433C and S436C instead of S433 and S436 described in the first embodiment.
在S410至S424(参照图22)中，通信终端400的ID数据取得部410取得ID数据391，通信终端400的认证数据取得部420取得认证数据112(与实施方式1相同)。In S410 to S424 (see FIG. 22 ), ID data acquisition unit 410 of communication terminal 400 acquires ID data 391 , and authentication data acquisition unit 420 of communication terminal 400 acquires authentication data 112 (same as Embodiment 1).
在S424之后，处理进入S430。After S424, the process proceeds to S430.
在S430中，通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430判定对应于与ID数据391(或者ID数据391的一部分)相同的ID数据的设备认证密钥293是否存储在终端存储部490(设备再生密钥存储部的一例)中。In S430, the device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of the communication terminal 400 judges whether or not the device authentication key 293 corresponding to the same ID data as the ID data 391 (or a part of the ID data 391) is stored in the terminal storage unit 490 (device regeneration). An example of the key storage unit).
在相应的设备认证密钥293存储在终端存储部490中的情况下(是)，设备认证密钥取得部430从终端存储部490取得相应的设备认证密钥293，处理进入S440(参照图23)。When the corresponding device authentication key 293 is stored in the terminal storage unit 490 (Yes), the device authentication key acquisition unit 430 acquires the corresponding device authentication key 293 from the terminal storage unit 490, and the process proceeds to S440 (see FIG. 23 ). ).
在相应的设备认证密钥293未存储在终端存储部490中的情况下(否)，处理进入S431。When the corresponding device authentication key 293 is not stored in the terminal storage unit 490 (NO), the process proceeds to S431.
在S431和S432中，通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430将ID数据391发送到密钥管理服务器200，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥提供部230接收ID数据391(与实施方式1相同)。In S431 and S432, the device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of the communication terminal 400 transmits the ID data 391 to the key management server 200, and the device authentication key provision unit 230 of the key management server 200 receives the ID data 391 (the same as in the embodiment) 1 the same).
在S432之后，处理进入S432-1。After S432, the process proceeds to S432-1.
在S432-1中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥再生部240判定对应于与ID数据391(其中，除了设备ID135以外)相同的ID数据的设备形式密钥294是否存储在密钥管理存储部290(设备形式密钥存储部的一例)中。In S432-1, the device authentication key reproduction unit 240 of the key management server 200 determines whether or not the device type key 294 corresponding to the same ID data as the ID data 391 (except for the device ID 135) is stored in the key management in the storage unit 290 (an example of a device-type key storage unit).
在相应的设备形式密钥294存储在密钥管理存储部290中的情况下(是)，设备认证密钥再生部240从密钥管理存储部290取得相应的设备形式密钥294，处理进入S434。When the corresponding device-type key 294 is stored in the key management storage unit 290 (Yes), the device authentication key regeneration unit 240 acquires the corresponding device-type key 294 from the key management storage unit 290, and the process proceeds to S434. .
在相应的设备形式密钥294未存储在密钥管理存储部290中的情况下(否)，处理进入S433C。When the corresponding device format key 294 is not stored in the key management storage unit 290 (No), the process proceeds to S433C.
在S433C中，设备认证密钥再生部240使用ID数据391和制造商密钥292生成设备形式密钥294(与实施方式1相同)。In S433C, the device authentication key regeneration unit 240 generates the device type key 294 using the ID data 391 and the manufacturer key 292 (same as in the first embodiment).
然后，设备认证密钥再生部240将ID数据391(其中，除了设备ID135之外)和设备形式密钥294对应地存储于密钥管理存储部290。由此，能够重新利用设备形式密钥294。Then, the device authentication key reproduction unit 240 stores the ID data 391 (except for the device ID 135 ) and the device type key 294 in the key management storage unit 290 in association with each other. Thereby, the device type key 294 can be reused.
在S433C之后，处理进入S434。After S433C, the process proceeds to S434.
在S434和S435中，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥再生部240生成设备认证密钥293，密钥管理服务器200的设备认证密钥提供部230发送设备认证密钥293。In S434 and S435 , the device authentication key regeneration unit 240 of the key management server 200 generates the device authentication key 293 , and the device authentication key provision unit 230 of the key management server 200 transmits the device authentication key 293 .
在S435之后，处理进入S436C。After S435, the process proceeds to S436C.
在S436C中，通信终端400的设备认证密钥取得部430接收设备认证密钥293(与实施方式1相同)。In S436C, device authentication key acquisition unit 430 of communication terminal 400 receives device authentication key 293 (same as in Embodiment 1).
然后，设备认证密钥取得部430与在S431中发送的ID数据391对应地将设备认证密钥293存储到密钥管理存储部290中。由此，能够重新利用设备认证密钥293。Then, the device authentication key acquisition unit 430 stores the device authentication key 293 in the key management storage unit 290 in association with the ID data 391 transmitted in S431. Thereby, the device authentication key 293 can be reused.
在S436C之后，处理进入S440。After S436C, the process proceeds to S440.
在S440中，通信终端400的认证数据验证部440使用设备认证密钥293和ID数据391来对认证数据112进行验证(与实施方式1相同)。In S440, authentication data verification unit 440 of communication terminal 400 verifies authentication data 112 using device authentication key 293 and ID data 391 (same as in Embodiment 1).
在S440之后，协作认证处理(S400)结束。After S440, the collaborative authentication process (S400) ends.
在实施方式4中，关于重新利用过去生成的设备形式密钥294和设备认证密钥293的方式进行了说明。In Embodiment 4, the method of reusing the device type key 294 and the device authentication key 293 generated in the past has been described.
根据实施方式4，能够减轻协作认证处理(S400)的负担。According to Embodiment 4, the burden of the cooperative authentication process (S400) can be reduced.
各实施方式是设备认证系统100的方式的一例。Each embodiment is an example of the form of the device authentication system 100 .
即，设备认证系统100也可以不具有各实施方式中说明的功能或者结构的一部分。That is, the device authentication system 100 may not have a part of the functions or configurations described in the respective embodiments.
并且，设备认证系统100也可以具有各实施方式中未说明的功能或者结构。Furthermore, the device authentication system 100 may have functions or structures not described in the respective embodiments.
此外，各实施方式也可以在不产生矛盾的范围中组合一部分或者全部。In addition, some or all of the respective embodiments may be combined within a range that does not conflict.
标号说明Label description
100：设备认证系统；101：网络；110：制造设备；111：认证数据生成部；112：认证数据；119：设备存储部；120：运营商；121：运营商ID；130：设备制造商；131：制造商ID；132：世代编号；133：设备形式ID；134：批次编号；135：设备ID；140：设置住宅；200：密钥管理服务器；210：主密钥生成部；220：制造商密钥生成部；230：设备认证密钥提供部；231：验证请求受理部；232：认证数据验证部；240：设备认证密钥再生部；241：设备形式密钥再生部；250：列表参照部；290：密钥管理存储部；291：主密钥；292：制造商密钥；293：设备认证密钥；294：设备形式密钥；295：有效列表；296：无效列表；300：设备管理装置；310：ID数据生成部；320：设备认证密钥生成部；330：设备形式密钥生成部；340：设备认证密钥写入部；390：设备管理存储部；391：ID数据；392：设备认证密钥；393：设备形式密钥；400：通信终端；410：ID数据取得部；420：认证数据取得部；421：询问数据；430：设备认证密钥取得部；431：验证请求部；440：认证数据验证部；480：设备管理部；490：终端存储部；491：无效列表；901：运算装置；902：辅助存储装置；903：主存储装置；904：通信装置；905：输入输出装置；909：总线。100: equipment authentication system; 101: network; 110: manufacturing equipment; 111: authentication data generation department; 112: authentication data; 119: equipment storage department; 120: operator; 121: operator ID; 130: equipment manufacturer; 131: manufacturer ID; 132: generation number; 133: device type ID; 134: lot number; 135: device ID; 140: installation house; 200: key management server; Manufacturer key generation unit; 230: Device authentication key provision unit; 231: Verification request acceptance unit; 232: Authentication data verification unit; 240: Device authentication key regeneration unit; 241: Device format key regeneration unit; 250: List reference part; 290: key management storage part; 291: master key; 292: manufacturer key; 293: device authentication key; 294: device form key; 295: valid list; 296: invalid list; 300 310: ID data generation unit; 320: device authentication key generation unit; 330: device format key generation unit; 340: device authentication key writing unit; 390: device management storage unit; 391: ID Data; 392: Device authentication key; 393: Device format key; 400: Communication terminal; 410: ID data acquisition unit; 420: Authentication data acquisition unit; 421: Inquiry data; 430: Device authentication key acquisition unit; 431 : verification request unit; 440: authentication data verification unit; 480: equipment management unit; 490: terminal storage unit; 491: invalid list; 901: computing device; 902: auxiliary storage device; 903: main storage device; 904: communication device ; 905: input and output device; 909: bus.
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