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CN103731260B - A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system - Google Patents

A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system
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Publication number
CN103731260B
CN103731260BCN201310741949.2ACN201310741949ACN103731260BCN 103731260 BCN103731260 BCN 103731260BCN 201310741949 ACN201310741949 ACN 201310741949ACN 103731260 BCN103731260 BCN 103731260B
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China
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key
transmission
random number
terminal
module
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CN103731260A (en
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洪逸轩
苏文龙
孟陆强
陈瑞兵
姚承勇
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Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd
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Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd
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Priority claimed from CN2013100843972Aexternal-prioritypatent/CN103237004A/en
Priority claimed from CN2013100846538Aexternal-prioritypatent/CN103237005A/en
Priority claimed from CN2013100846716Aexternal-prioritypatent/CN103220270A/en
Priority claimed from CN2013100846735Aexternal-prioritypatent/CN103220271A/en
Application filed by Fujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co LtdfiledCriticalFujian Landi Commercial Equipment Co Ltd
Priority to CN201310741949.2ApriorityCriticalpatent/CN103731260B/en
Priority to PCT/CN2014/073225prioritypatent/WO2014139412A1/en
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Abstract

The present invention provides a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading, including step: POS terminal produces transmission cipher key T K;Operation terminal gathers TK and is uploaded to MTMS system;MTMS systematic unity manages described TK and TK sends to corresponding KMS system;POS terminal starts remote download terminal master key TMK;POS terminal and KMS system use AUK to carry out two-way authentication, and certification sends TMK to POS terminal by rear KMS system.The invention have the benefit that and realize remote download terminal master key TMK by POS terminal upload transfers cipher key T K, greatly facilitate the management of transmission cipher key T K by MTMS system and upload, it is ensured that transmission cipher key T K is transferred to the KMS system of correspondence.And transmit between POS terminal and KMS between master key and also carried out two-way authentication, further increase the download safety of master key.

Description

A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system
Technical field
The present invention relates to E-Payment field, particularly relate to a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading andSystem.
Background technology
Bank card (BANK Card) is more and more universal as the means of payment, common bank card paying systemSingle system (POSP), code keypad (PIN is received including point of sales terminal (Point Of Sale, POS), POSAnd hardware encryption equipment (Hardware and Security Module, HSM) PAD).Wherein POS terminal energyEnough accept bank card information, there is communication function, and the instruction accepting teller completes financial transaction information and hasThe equipment of pass information exchange;POS receives single system and manages POS terminal concentratedly, downloads including parameter,Key is downloaded, and accepts, processes or forward the transaction request of POS terminal, and to POS terminal loopback transaction knotReally information, is the system of centralized management and trading processing;Code keypad (PIN PAD) is to hand over various financeThe most relevant key carries out safe storage protection, and PIN is encrypted the safety equipment of protection;HardwareEncryption equipment (HSM) is the peripheral hardware devices being encrypted transmission data, and the encryption for PIN is conciliateClose, checking message and the correctness of document source and storage key.Personal identification code (PersonalIdentification Number, PIN), i.e. personal identification number, is to identify that in on-line transaction holder's identity is closedThe data message of method, in cyber-net system, any link does not the most allow to occur in clear text manner;Terminal master key (Terminal Master Key, TMK), during POS terminal work, is carried out working keyThe master key of encryption, encrypting storing is in system database;POS terminal is widely used in bank card and pays fieldClose, such as manufacturer's shopping, hotel accommodations etc., be a kind of indispensable modernization means of payment, meltedEnter the various occasions of people's life.Bank card, particularly debit card, be the most all provided with PIN by holder,In carrying out payment process, POS terminal, in addition to above sending the data such as the magnetic track information of bank card, also to holdPeople inputs the PIN identity legitimacy for issuing bank checking holder, it is ensured that bank card safety of payment, protectionThe property safety of holder.In order to prevent PIN from revealing or being cracked, it is desirable to whole from terminal to issuing bankIn information interactive process, whole process carries out safe encipherment protection to PIN, not in computer network systemAny link, PIN occurs in clear text manner, and the POS terminal therefore accepting input PIN at present is desirable thatIt is equipped with key management system.
The key code system of POS terminal is divided into two grades: terminal master key (TMK) and working key (WK).Wherein TMK is encrypted protection to WK.Every POS terminal has unique TMK, it is necessary to have peaceFull guard, it is ensured that can only write device and participate in calculate, it is impossible to read;TMK is that a root the most crucial is closeKey, if TMK is intercepted, working key is just easier to be cracked, and serious threat bank card is paid peaceEntirely.So TMK can download safely to POS terminal, become the key of whole POS terminal safety.
For taking precautions against Key Exposure risk, the download of terminal master key must control the safe machine room in administrative centerCarry out, concentrate download terminal master key by artificial.Thus bring maintenance centre's machine room workload big;EquipmentNeeding to transport administrative center's safe machine room download key after dispatching from the factory and just can be deployed to trade company, cost of transportation rises;Filling key to concentrate down, need substantial amounts of staff and working time, maintenance cost is big, maintenance period length etc.Problem.
Summary of the invention
For solving above-mentioned technical problem, the technical scheme that the present invention uses is:
A kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading, including step: S1, TK upload flow process;S2、TMK downloads flow process;Wherein, step S1 specifically includes: S11, MTMS system calls the first hardware encryptionMachine produces PKI Pu and private key Pr, sends PKI Pu to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad;S12、MTMS system calls the first hardware encryption equipment, KMS system calls the second hardware encryption equipment, respectively eachHardware encryption equipment in MTMS System Privileges component and KMS authority component synthesized protection key PK andMAC key MAK, and described protection key PK and MAC key MAK is stored in first in the lumpIn hardware encryption equipment and the second hardware encryption equipment;It is close that S13, POS terminal call code keypad generation symmetrical transmissionKey TK, described transmission cipher key T K includes transmitting encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;S14、POS terminal is called code keypad and is used PKI Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K to generate the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu, and the first key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the transmission of terminal serial number SN will be transmitted to MTMS system;S15, MTMS system is by terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu associationBe stored in MTMS system database;S16, MTMS system is called the first hardware encryption equipment and is used privateKey Pr deciphering the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu obtains transmission cipher key T K, then uses protection key PKEncrypted transmission cipher key T K also uses MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generates the second transmission keyCiphertext Ctk_pk, is then sent to KMS by terminal serial number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pkSystem;Terminal serial number SN and the second transmission key that MTMS system is sent by S17, KMS system are closeLiterary composition Ctk_pk is associatedly stored in KMS data base;Step S2 specifically includes: S21, POS terminal willTerminal serial number SN and download master key application send to KMS system;S22, KMS system receivesAfter terminal serial number SN of POS terminal transmission and download master key application, inquiry and terminal serial number SNThe second corresponding transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk;S23, KMS system is called the second hardware encryption equipment and is used MACThe key MAK the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy to inquiring, if verificationPass through, use protection key PK deciphering second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk obtain transmission cipher key T K and byIt is stored in described second hardware encryption equipment;S24, KMS system calls the after obtaining transmission cipher key T KTwo hardware encryption equipments use certification key A UK and POS terminal to carry out two-way authentication;If S25 certificationPassing through, KMS system is called the second hardware encryption equipment and is used transmission encryption key TEK ciphering terminal master keyTMK generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and sends master key ciphertext Ctmk to POS terminal;S26、POSTerminal is called code keypad and is used transmission encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk acquisition terminal master closeTerminal master key TMK is also stored in code keypad by key TMK.
Another technical solution used in the present invention is:
A kind of safe download system of terminal master key TMK, including: the first hardware encryption equipment, the second hardware addMTMS system that close machine, POS terminal communicate to connect with POS terminal and communicating with MTMS systemThe KMS system connected;Described POS terminal includes that transmission module on TK generation module, a TK, master are closeKey downloads request module, two-way authentication A module and TMK receiver module, and described MTMS system includesTransmission module on public and private key generation module, arranging key A module and the 2nd TK, described KMS system includesArranging key B module, TK receiver module, request respond module, two-way authentication B module and TMK send outSend module;Described first hardware encryption equipment is for calling for MTMS system, and described second hardware encryption equipment is usedIn calling for KMS system;Public and private key generation module be used for calling the first hardware encryption equipment produce PKI Pu andPrivate key Pr, sends PKI Pu to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad;Arranging key A module andArranging key B module is used for calling the first hardware encryption equipment and the second hardware encryption equipment, respectively respective firmlyMTMS System Privileges component and KMS authority component are synthesized protection key PK and MAC by part encryption equipmentKey MAK, and described protection key PK and MAC key MAK is stored in the first hardware in the lumpIn encryption equipment and the second hardware encryption equipment;TK generation module is used for calling code keypad and produces symmetrical transmission keyTK, described transmission cipher key T K includes transmitting encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;Oneth TKUpper transmission module is used for calling code keypad and uses PKI Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K to generate the first transmission keyCiphertext Ctk_Pu, and the first key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and the transmission of terminal serial number SN will be transmitted to MTMS systemSystem;On 2nd TK, transmission module is for by terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu is associatedly stored in MTMS system database;On 2nd TK, to be used for calling first hard for transmission modulePart encryption equipment uses private key Pr deciphering the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission cipher key T K, then makesWith protecting key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and using MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, rawBecome the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk, then by terminal serial number SN and the second transmission key ciphertextCtk_pk is sent to KMS system;TK receiver module is for terminal serial number MTMS system sentSN and second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk is associatedly stored in KMS data base;Master key is downloaded pleaseModulus block is for sending terminal serial number SN and download master key application to KMS system;Request responseModule is for receiving, when KMS system, terminal serial number SN and the download master key Shen that POS terminal sendsAfter please, inquire about second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk corresponding with terminal serial number SN;Request respond moduleThe MAC key MAK the second transmission key ciphertext to inquiring is used for calling the second hardware encryption equipmentCtk_pk verifies MAC legitimacy, if verification is passed through, uses protection key PK deciphering the second transmission closeKey ciphertext Ctk_pk obtains transmission cipher key T K and stores it in described second hardware encryption equipment;Two-way recognizeCard A module and two-way authentication B module, after obtaining transmission cipher key T K when KMS system, call secondHardware encryption equipment uses certification key A UK and POS terminal to carry out two-way authentication;TMK sending module is usedIn time passing through when certification, call the second hardware encryption equipment and use transmission encryption key TEK ciphering terminal master keyTMK generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and sends master key ciphertext Ctmk to POS terminal;TMK receivesModule is used for calling code keypad and uses transmission encryption key TEK deciphering master key ciphertext Ctmk to obtain terminalTerminal master key TMK is also stored in code keypad by master key TMK.
The invention have the benefit that the technology that must concentrate download terminal master key being different from prior artDefect, the present invention passes through POS terminal upload transfers cipher key T K, after TK ciphering terminal master key TMKDownload to POS terminal, it is achieved that remote download terminal master key TMK, it is to avoid POS terminal is by collectionAfter middle download master key, cloth is put into trade company again, decreases logistics cost and concentrates download-maintenance cost, and POSAlso carry out two-way authentication before transmitting master key between terminal and KMS, improve the download safety of master key.Further, TK is unified to gather and upload by the present invention by MTMS system, facilitates TK'sGather and management, meanwhile, carry out TK by MTMS system between POS terminal and KMS system and upload,Avoid every POS terminal directly to communicate with KMS system, alleviate work load and the difficulty of KMS systemDegree, facilitates KMS system identification to communicate with the identification of connecting object, improves the accurate delivery of TKAnd the work efficiency of KMS system.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 is the structured flowchart of an embodiment of the present invention a kind of terminal master key safe download system of TMK;
Fig. 2 is the structured flowchart of two-way authentication A module in Fig. 1;
Fig. 3 is the structured flowchart of two-way authentication B module in Fig. 1;
Fig. 4 is the method main-process stream of an embodiment of the present invention a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloadingFigure;
Fig. 5 is the concrete steps flow chart of step S1 in Fig. 4;
Fig. 6 is the concrete steps flow chart of step S2 in Fig. 4.
Main element symbol description
10:POS terminal;20:MTMS system;30:KMS system;40: the first hardware encryptionsMachine;50: the second hardware encryption equipments;101:TK generation module;Transmission module on 102: the one TK;103:Master key downloads request module;104:TMK receiver module;105: two-way authentication A module;201:Public and private key generation module;202: arranging key A module;Transmission module on 203: the two TK;301:Arranging key B module;302:TK receiver module;303: request respond module;304: two-way authenticationB module;305:TMK sending module;1051: the first random number generation unit;1052: the first dataTransmit-Receive Unit;1053: the first encryption/decryption elements;1054: the first judging units;3041: the second is randomNumber generation unit;3042: the second data transceiving unit;3043: the second encryption/decryption elements;3044: theTwo judging units.
Detailed description of the invention
By describing the technology contents of the present invention, structural feature in detail, being realized purpose and effect, below in conjunction withEmbodiment also coordinates accompanying drawing to be explained in detail.
First, abbreviation and Key Term to the present invention relates to are defined and illustrate:
The abbreviation of AUK:Authentication Key, authentication authorization and accounting key, for PINPAD and key managementTwo-way authentication between system KMS;
CA center: so-called CA(Certificate Authority) center, it is to use PKI(Public KeyInfrastructure) public key infrastructure technology, special offer network ID authentication service, it is responsible for signing and issuingAnd managing digital certificate, and there is authoritative and third party's trust authority of fairness, it act like meThe company of issue certificates in actual life, as mechanism handled by passport;
The abbreviation of HSM:High Security Machine, high safety equipment, encrypt for hardware within the systemMachine;
KMS system: Key Management System, key management system, is used for managing terminal master keyTMK;
The abbreviation of MAK:Mac Key, i.e. MAC computation key, consult to determine 24 bytes pair with clientClaim key, calculate for the MAC value of TK between MTMS system and KMS system;
MTMS: full name Material Tracking Management System, Tracing Material management system,The main use when plant produced;
The abbreviation of PIK:Pin Key, i.e. Pin encryption key, is the one of working key;
PINPAD: code keypad;
The abbreviation of PK:Protect Key, i.e. protects key, consults to determine with client, 24 byte symmetric keys.The encrypted transmission of TK between MTMS/TCS and KMS;
The abbreviation of POS:Point Of Sale, i.e. point-of-sale terminal
The serial number of SNpinpad: code keypad, when PINPAD is built-in, and POS terminal serial number SNposUnanimously;
The serial number of SN: payment terminal;
The abbreviation of TEK:Transmission Encrypt Key, i.e. transmits encryption key, and 24 byte symmetries are closeKey, for the encrypted transmission of TMK between PINPAD and key management system KMS;
The abbreviation of TK:Transmission Key, i.e. transmits key.Transmission key is by transmission encryption keyTEK and two-way authentication key A UK form;
The abbreviation of TMS:Terminal Management System, i.e. terminal management system, it is used for propping upPay end message management, software and parameter configuration, remote download, the management of terminal running state information,The functions such as long-range diagnosis;
The abbreviation of TMK:Terminal Master Key, i.e. terminal master key, for payment terminal and paymentReceive the encrypted transmission of working key between single system;
Safe house: having higher security level other, for the room of service device, this room needs identity to recognizeJust can enter after card.
Intellective IC card: for CPU card, the integrated circuit in card include central processor CPU, able to programmeRead memorizer EEPROM, random access memory ram and be solidificated in the card in read only memory ROM Nei operationSystem COS (Chip Operating System), in card, data are divided into outside reading and inter-process part.
Symmetric key: send and receive the both sides of data identical double secret key must be used to be encrypted in plain text andDeciphering computing.Symmetric key encryption algorithm specifically includes that DES, 3DES, IDEA, FEAL, BLOWFISHDeng.
Unsymmetrical key: rivest, shamir, adelman two keys of needs: public-key cryptography (private key Public key)With private cipher key (PKI Private key).Public-key cryptography and private cipher key are a pair, if using public-key cryptographyData are encrypted, only could decipher with corresponding private cipher key;If data are entered with private cipher keyRow encryption, then only could decipher with corresponding public-key cryptography.Because encryption and deciphering use twoDifferent keys, so this algorithm is called rivest, shamir, adelman.Rivest, shamir, adelman realizes secret letterBreath exchange basic process be: Party A generate pair of secret keys and using therein one as Public key to otherFang Gongkai;The Party B obtaining this Public key uses this double secret key confidential information to be then forwarded to first after being encryptedSide;Information after encryption is decrypted by Party A again with another private key oneself preserved.Party A is permissibleThe PKI using Party B is then forwarded to Party B after being encrypted confidential information;Party B is right with the private spoon of oneself againInformation after encryption is decrypted.Main algorithm have RSA, Elgamal, knapsack algorithm, Rabin, D-H,ECC(elliptic curve encryption algorithm).
RSA: a kind of asymmetric key algorithm.RSA public key encryption algorithm be 1977 by Ron Rivest,Adi Shamirh and Len Adleman develops in (Massachusetts Institute Technology).RSA be named fromDevelop the name of they three.RSA is the most influential current public key encryption algorithm, and it can be resistedKnown all cryptographic attacks, are recommended as public key data encryption standard by ISO so far.RSA calculatesMethod is true based on a foolproof number theory: be multiplied by two Big prime the easiest.RSA Algorithm isOne algorithm that can be simultaneously used for encrypted and digitally signed, is also easy to understand and operation.RSA is to be studiedWidest public key algorithm, from three ten years proposed till now, experienced by the test of various attack, byGradually accept for people, be widely considered to be one of current classic public key scheme.
TDES Triple-DES:DES is a kind of symmetric encipherment algorithm, and key is 8 bytes.TDES is baseIn the AES of DES, its key is 16 bytes or 24 bytes.TDES/3DES is EnglishThe abbreviated expression (i.e. triple DES) of TripleDES, DES is then English Data EncryptionStandard(number encryption standard) abbreviated expression.DES is a kind of symmetric key encryption algorithm, i.e. data encryptionThe AES that key is identical with decruption key.DES is developed also at 20 century 70s by IBM CorporationOpen, use for U.S. government subsequently, and by NBS and ANSI (ANSI)Recognize.TDES/3DES is a kind of pattern of des encryption algorithm, and it uses the double secret key of 3 64Data carry out Tertiary infilling.It it is a safer deformation of DES.
For solving technical problem present in background technology, the present invention uses a kind of new master key download scenarios,Randomly generate TK(Transmission Key by POS terminal, transmit key), the TK after producing protectsIt is stored in the code keypad of POS terminal, and TK is passed by transmission means required under various application scenariosDeliver to KMS(Key Management System, key management system, be used for managing terminal master key TMK)In.
As POS terminal application download terminal master key TMK, KMS system uses TK ciphering terminal masterCipher key T MK, and the terminal master key ciphertext after encryption is sent to POS terminal, POS terminal is used after receivingMaster key ciphertext is decrypted by TK, obtains terminal master key TMK, and is preserved by terminal master key TMKIn code keypad.
So, by TK ciphering terminal master key TMK, TMK is enable to carry out remote transmission, convenientThe safety of TMK is downloaded.
Above by sending to bank's end after POS terminal collection transmission cipher key T K, TMK is encrypted, thenThe transmission safety of TMK is can ensure that by the method for POS terminal remote download TMK after TK encrypts.But, TK uploads by POS terminal is scattered, and every POS terminal all must be built with KMS systemVertical communication connection, therefore considerably increases work load and the difficulty of KMS system, it could be also difficult to rightTK uploads and is managed and security management and control.
The present invention the most just overcome the technical scheme of the problems referred to above be described in detail.
As it is shown in figure 1, be the structured flowchart of present embodiment a kind of terminal master key safe download system of TMK,This terminal master key TMK is safe, and download system includes: first hardware encryption equipment the 40, second hardware encryption equipment50, POS terminal 10 and POS terminal 10 communication connection MTMS system 20 and with MTMS systemThe KMS system 30 of system 20 communication connection;Described POS terminal 10 includes TK generation module 101, firstThe upper transmission module of TK 102, master key download request module 103, two-way authentication A module 105 and TMKReceiver module 104,
Described MTMS system 20 includes public and private key generation module 201, arranging key A module 202 andTransmission module 203 on two TK,
Described KMS system 30 includes arranging key B module 301, TK receiver module 302, request responseModule 303, two-way authentication B module 304 and TMK sending module 305;
Described first hardware encryption equipment 40 is used for calling for MTMS system 20, described second hardware encryption equipment50 for calling for KMS system 30;
Public and private key generation module 201 is used for calling the first hardware encryption equipment 40 and produces PKI Pu and private key Pr,PKI Pu is sent to POS terminal 10 and is stored in code keypad;
Arranging key A module 202 and arranging key B module 301 are used for calling the first hardware encryption equipment 40With the second hardware encryption equipment 50, respectively by MTMS system 20 authority component in respective hardware encryption equipmentAnd KMS authority component synthesis protection key PK and MAC key MAK, and by described protection keyPK and MAC key MAK is stored in the first hardware encryption equipment 40 and the second hardware encryption equipment 50 in the lump;
TK generation module 101 is used for calling code keypad and produces symmetrical transmission cipher key T K, described transmission keyTK includes transmitting encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;
On oneth TK, transmission module 102 is used for calling code keypad use PKI Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K lifeBecome the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and will transmission the first key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SNSend to MTMS system 20;
On 2nd TK, transmission module 203 is for by terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu is associatedly stored in MTMS system database;
On 2nd TK, transmission module 203 is used for calling first hardware encryption equipment use private key Pr deciphering the first transmissionKey ciphertext Ctk_Pu obtains transmission cipher key T K, then uses protection key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K alsoUse MAC key MAK to calculate MAC value, generate the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk, then willTerminal serial number SN and the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk are sent to KMS system 30;
TK receiver module 302 is for terminal serial number SN MTMS system 20 sent and the second transmissionKey ciphertext Ctk_pk is associatedly stored in KMS data base;
Master key downloads request module 103 for terminal serial number SN and download master key application being sent extremelyKMS system 30;
Request respond module 303 is for receiving, when KMS system 30, the terminal sequence that POS terminal 10 sendsAfter row SN and download master key application, inquire about the second transmission key ciphertext corresponding with terminal serial number SNCtk_pk;
Request respond module 303 is used for calling the second hardware encryption equipment 50 and uses MAC key MAK to looking intoAsk the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy arrived, if verification is passed through, use protectionKey PK deciphering the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk obtains transmission cipher key T K and stores it in described theIn two hardware encryption equipments 50;
Two-way authentication A module 105 and two-way authentication B module 304 are for obtaining transmission when KMS system 30After cipher key T K, call the second hardware encryption equipment 50 and use certification key A UK to carry out two-way with POS terminalCertification;
TMK sending module 305, for when certification is passed through, calls the second hardware encryption equipment 50 and uses transmissionEncryption key TEK ciphering terminal master key TMK generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and by master key ciphertextCtmk sends to POS terminal 10;
TMK receiver module 104 is used for calling code keypad and uses transmission encryption key TEK deciphering master key closeLiterary composition Ctmk obtains terminal master key TMK and is stored in code keypad by terminal master key TMK.
Wherein, described MTMS system 20 also includes digital digest module.
Described digital digest module is for by terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu carries out packing and generate the first digital digest, by described terminal serial number SN and the first transmission keyCiphertext Ctk_Pu and described first digital digest are stored separately in MTMS system database;
And terminal serial number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu for extracting described packing generatesSecond digital digest, it is judged that described second digital digest and the first digital digest are the most equal, and described numeral is pluckedModule is wanted to be additionally operable to, when the first digital digest and the second digital digest are equal, call the first hardware encryption equipment and makeTransmission cipher key T K is obtained by private key Pr deciphering the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu.
May determine that whether TK is modified described in MTMS system 20 by described digital digest module,Thus ensure that the TK uploaded from MTMS system 20 is consistent with the TK that POS terminal 10 is uploaded.
Referring to the structured flowchart that Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, Fig. 2 are described two-way authentication A module, Fig. 3 is describedThe structured flowchart of two-way authentication B module.Wherein, described two-way authentication A module 105 includes the first random numberGeneration unit the 1051, first data transceiving unit the 1052, first encryption/decryption element 1053 and first judgesUnit 1054, described two-way authentication B module 304 includes second random number generation unit the 3041, second dataTransmit-Receive Unit the 3042, second encryption/decryption element 3043 and the second judging unit 3044.
First random number generation unit 1051 is for producing the first random number R nd1;First data transceiving unit is usedSend to KMS system in the first random number R nd1 that will produce;Second data transceiving unit 3042 is used for connecingReceive the first random number R nd1;Second random number generation unit 3041 is for receiving the first random number R nd1Time, produce random number the 2nd Rnd2;Second encryption/decryption element 3043 is for receiving the first random number R nd1Time, call the second hardware encryption equipment 50 and use certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 acquisitionFirst random number ciphertext Crnd1;Second data transceiving unit is for by the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and secondRandom number R nd2 is sent to POS terminal;
First encryption/decryption element 1053 is for receiving the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random numberDuring Rnd2, the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 using the deciphering of certified transmission key A UK to receive obtains theThree random number R nd1 ';First judging unit 1054 is for judging the 3rd random number R nd1 ' and the first random numberRnd1 is the most consistent;
First encryption/decryption element 1053 is for judging the 3rd random number R nd1 when described first judging unit ' and theWhen one random number R nd1 is consistent, uses certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the second random number R nd2 and generate theTwo random number ciphertexts Crnd2;First data transceiving unit 1052 is for sending out the second random number ciphertext Crnd2Give KMS system 30;
Second encryption/decryption element 3043, for when receiving the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, calls hardware and addsIt is random that the second random number ciphertext Crnd2 that close machine uses the deciphering of certified transmission key A UK to receive obtains the 4thNumber Rnd2 ', the second judging unit 3043 is for judging the 4th random number R nd2 ' and the second random number R nd2Whether consistent, and when judging the 4th random number R nd2 ' consistent with the second random number R nd2 time, confirmation KMSTwo-way authentication between system 30 and POS terminal 10 is passed through.
Refer to Fig. 4, for the general flow chart of present embodiment a kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading,This terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading includes:
S1, TK upload flow process;
S2, TMK download flow process;
Referring to Fig. 5, for the particular flow sheet of step S1, this step specifically includes:
S11, MTMS system is called the first hardware encryption equipment and is produced PKI Pu and private key Pr, by PKI PuSend to POS terminal and be stored in code keypad;
S12, MTMS system calls the first hardware encryption equipment, KMS system calls the second hardware encryption equipment,In respective hardware encryption equipment, MTMS System Privileges component and KMS authority component are synthesized protection respectivelyKey PK and MAC key MAK, and by described protection key PK and MAC key MAK mono-And be stored in the first hardware encryption equipment and the second hardware encryption equipment;
S13, POS terminal are called code keypad and are produced symmetrical transmission cipher key T K, described transmission cipher key T K bagInclude transmission encryption key TEK and certified transmission key A UK;
S14, POS terminal are called code keypad and are used PKI Pu encrypted transmission cipher key T K to generate the first transmissionKey ciphertext Ctk_Pu, and transmission the first key ciphertext Ctk_Pu and terminal serial number SN are sent extremelyMTMS system;
S15, MTMS system is by terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_PuAssociatedly it is stored in MTMS system database;
S16, MTMS system is called the first hardware encryption equipment and is used private key Pr deciphering the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu obtains transmission cipher key T K, then uses protection key PK encrypted transmission cipher key T K and uses MACKey MAK calculates MAC value, generates the second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk, then by terminal serial numberSN and second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk is sent to KMS system;
Terminal serial number SN and second that MTMS system is sent by S17, KMS system transmits key ciphertextCtk_pk is associatedly stored in KMS data base;
Referring to Fig. 6, for the particular flow sheet of step S2, this step specifically includes:
S21, POS terminal are by terminal serial number SN and download master key application transmission to KMS system;
S22, KMS system receives terminal serial number SN and the download master key application that POS terminal sendsAfter, inquire about second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk corresponding with terminal serial number SN;
S23, KMS system is called the second hardware encryption equipment and is used MAC key MAK second to inquiringTransmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk verification MAC legitimacy, if verification is passed through, uses protection key PK to solveClose second transmission key ciphertext Ctk_pk obtains transmission cipher key T K and stores it in described second hardware encryptionIn machine;
S24, KMS system is called the second hardware encryption equipment after obtaining transmission cipher key T K and is used certification keyAUK and POS terminal carry out two-way authentication;
If S25 certification is passed through, KMS system is called the second hardware encryption equipment and is used transmission encryption key TEKCiphering terminal master key TMK generates master key ciphertext Ctmk and sends master key ciphertext Ctmk to POSTerminal;
S26, POS terminal are called code keypad and are used transmission encryption key TEK to decipher master key ciphertext CtmkObtain terminal master key TMK and terminal master key TMK is stored in code keypad.
It is wherein, described that " MTMS system is called the first hardware encryption equipment and is produced PKI Pu and private key Pr, willPKI Pu sends to POS terminal and is stored in code keypad " specifically include:
MTMS system is called the first hardware encryption equipment and is produced PKI Pu and private key Pr, and PKI Pu is issued CACenter;
MTMS system obtains the work certificate HsmWCRT of generation and is saved in data base from CA center,And work certificate HsmWCRT is sent to POS terminal, work certificate HsmWCRT is to use root certificatePKI Pu signature is generated by HsmRCRT;
POS terminal uses the conjunction of the root certificate HsmRCRT checking work certificate HsmWCRT burning sheet prepackageMethod, and POS terminal is extracted PKI Pu from work certificate HsmWCRT and is stored in after being verifiedIn code keypad.
It is wherein, described that " MTMS system is by terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu is associatedly stored in MTMS system database " specifically include:
Terminal serial number SN received and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu are carried out beating by MTMS systemWrap and generate the first digital digest, by described terminal serial number SN and first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu withDescribed first digital digest is stored separately in MTMS system database;
It is described that " MTMS system is called the first hardware encryption equipment and is used private key Pr deciphering the first transmission key ciphertextCtk_Pu obtains transmission cipher key T K " specifically include:
MTMS system extracts terminal serial number SN and the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu life of described packingBecome the second digital digest;
Judge that described second digital digest and the first digital digest are the most equal, if equal, call first hardPart encryption equipment uses private key Pr deciphering the first transmission key ciphertext Ctk_Pu to obtain transmission cipher key T K.
It is wherein, described that " KMS system is called the second hardware encryption equipment after obtaining transmission cipher key T K and is used certificationKey A UK carries out two-way authentication with POS terminal " specifically include:
POS terminal produces the first random number R nd1 and sends the first random number R nd1 to KMS system;
KMS system produces random number the 2nd Rnd2 after receiving the first random number R nd1, calls the second hardware and addsClose machine uses certification key A UK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 and obtains the first random number ciphertext Crnd1, willFirst random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2 are sent to POS terminal;
The first random number ciphertext Crnd1 that POS terminal uses the deciphering of certification key A UK to receive obtains the 3rdRandom number R nd1 ', it is judged that the 3rd random number R nd1 ' the most consistent with the first random number R nd1:
If the 3rd random number R nd1 ' consistent with the first random number R nd1, POS terminal uses certification keyAUK encrypts the second random number R nd2 and generates the second random number ciphertext Crnd2, and by the second random number ciphertextCrnd2 is sent to KMS system;
It is second random that KMS system calls that the second hardware encryption equipment uses that the deciphering of certification key A UK receivesNumber ciphertext Crnd2 obtains the 4th random number R nd2 ', it is judged that the 4th random number R nd2 ' and the second random number R nd2The most consistent;
If the 4th random number R nd2 ' consistent with the second random number R nd2, KMS system is recognized with POS terminalCard passes through.
In the present invention, transmission cipher key T K calculates the original uncommon Kazakhstan value of TK when producing, when storage every time, passDefeated or first verify the uncommon Kazakhstan value of TK when using TK, after upchecking, just can use TK.By verificationThe uncommon Kazakhstan value of TK is possible to prevent the abnormal error in data causing storage of storage device, determines that key is the most correct.
The invention have the benefit that the technology that must concentrate download terminal master key being different from prior artDefect, the present invention passes through POS terminal upload transfers cipher key T K, after TK ciphering terminal master key TMKDownload to POS terminal, it is achieved that POS terminal remote download terminal master key TMK, it is to avoid POS is eventuallyHold and download after master key cloth again and be put into trade company by concentrating, decrease logistics cost and concentrate download-maintenance cost,And also carry out two-way authentication before transmitting master key between POS terminal and KMS, improve master keyDownload safety.Further, master key TMK of the present invention is generated by KMS system, therefore facilitatesKMS system is to the follow-up maintenance of master key TMK and management.Further, the present invention passes through MTMSTK is unified to gather and upload by system, facilitates collection and the management of TK, meanwhile, POS terminal andCarry out TK by MTMS system between KMS system uploading, it is to avoid every POS terminal and KMS systemSystem directly communication, alleviates work load and the difficulty of KMS system, is also convenient for KMS system identification simultaneouslyThe identity communicating with connecting object and the verity of TK uploaded, improve TK accurate delivery andThe work efficiency of KMS system.
The foregoing is only embodiments of the invention, not thereby limit the scope of the claims of the present invention, every profitThe equivalent structure made by description of the invention and accompanying drawing content or equivalence flow process conversion, or directly or indirectly transportIt is used in other relevant technical fields, is the most in like manner included in the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims (7)

First random number generation unit is for producing the first random number R nd1;First data transceiving unit sends to KMS system for the first random number R nd1 that will produce;Second data transceiving unit is for receiving the first random number R nd1;Second random number generation unit, for when receiving the first random number R nd1, produces random number the 2nd Rnd2;Second encryption/decryption element for when receiving the first random number R nd1, calls the second hardware encryption equipment and uses certified transmission key A UK to encrypt the first random number R nd1 to obtain the first random number ciphertext Crnd1;Second data transceiving unit is for being sent to POS terminal by the first random number ciphertext Crnd1 and the second random number R nd2;
CN201310741949.2A2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systemActiveCN103731260B (en)

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CN201310741949.2ACN103731260B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system
PCT/CN2014/073225WO2014139412A1 (en)2013-03-152014-03-11Method and system for secured download of terminal master key (tmk)

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CN20131008467162013-03-15
CN201310084673.52013-03-15
CN201310084397.22013-03-15
CN20131008467352013-03-15
CN20131008439722013-03-15
CN2013100843972ACN103237004A (en)2013-03-152013-03-15Key download method, key management method, method, device and system for download management
CN201310084671.62013-03-15
CN2013100846538ACN103237005A (en)2013-03-152013-03-15Method and system for key management
CN20131008465382013-03-15
CN2013100846716ACN103220270A (en)2013-03-152013-03-15Downloading method, management method, downloading management method, downloading management device and downloading management system for secret key
CN201310084653.82013-03-15
CN2013100846735ACN103220271A (en)2013-03-152013-03-15Downloading method, management method, downloading management method, downloading management device and downloading management system for secret key
CN201310741949.2ACN103731260B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and system

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CN103731260Btrue CN103731260B (en)2016-09-28

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CN201310740644.XAActiveCN103714638B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method and system of quick position terminal master key failed download
CN201310740158.8AActiveCN103716320B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems
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CN201310740574.8AActiveCN103729945B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method and system of secure download terminal master key
CN201310740430.2AActiveCN103729943B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method and system transmission security key being imported KMS system
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CN201310742713.0AActiveCN103701610B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of acquisition method and system for transmitting cipher key T K
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CN201310742648.1AActiveCN103716155B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method of automated maintenance POS terminal and operation terminal
CN201310742681.4AActiveCN103714640B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of sending method of transmission security key and system
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CN201310740188.9AActiveCN103716153B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27Terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems
CN201310740537.7AActiveCN103746800B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27TMK (terminal master key) safe downloading method and system
CN201310740410.5AActiveCN103729942B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27Transmission security key is transferred to the method and system of key server from terminal server
CN201310742686.7AActiveCN103745351B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of acquisition method and system for transmitting cipher key T K
CN201310740642.0AActiveCN103731259B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems
CN201310741948.8AActiveCN103714639B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method and system that realize the operation of POS terminal security

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CN201310742991.6AActiveCN103714641B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK method for safely downloading and system
CN201310740380.8AActiveCN103714637B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of transmission security key sending method and system, operating terminal
CN201310742886.2AActiveCN103716321B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of terminal master key TMK safety downloading method and systems
CN201310740264.6AActiveCN103701812B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27TMK (Terminal Master Key) secure downloading method and system
CN201310740226.0AActiveCN103714634B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method of main key of secure download terminal and system
CN201310740244.9AActiveCN103701609B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of server and the method and system operating terminal two-way authentication
CN201310740308.5AActiveCN103729941B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of main cipher key T MK method for safely downloading of terminal and system
CN201310740100.3AActiveCN103714633B (en)2013-03-152013-12-27A kind of method of safe generating transmission key and POS terminal

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