Abstract
\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-based key-exchange protocols lie at the heart of post-quantum public-key cryptography. However, all existing protocols either lack thenon-interactive nature of Diffie–Hellman key exchange orpolynomial\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-modulus, resulting in unwanted efficiency overhead. We study the possibility of designing non-interactive\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-based protocols withpolynomial\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-modulus. To this end, we identify and formalize simple non-interactive and polynomial\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-modulus variants of the existing protocols, where Alice and Bobsimultaneously exchange one or more (ring)\(\mathsf {LWE}\) samples with polynomial\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-modulus and then run individual key reconciliation functions to obtain the shared key. We point out central barriers and show that such non-interactive key-exchange protocols are impossible in either of the following cases: (1) the reconciliation functions first compute the inner product of the received\(\mathsf {LWE}\) sample with their private\(\mathsf {LWE}\) secret. This impossibility is information theoretic. (2) One of the reconciliation functions does not depend on the error of the transmitted\(\mathsf {LWE}\) sample. This impossibility assumes hardness of\(\mathsf {LWE}\). We show that progress toward either a polynomial\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-modulus\(\text {NIKE}\) construction or a general impossibility result has implications to the current understanding of lattice-based cryptographic constructions. Overall, our results show possibilities and challenges in designing simple (ring)\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-based non-interactive key-exchange protocols.
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For simplicity, we only describe the\(\mathsf {LWE}\)-based variant; the ring version is obtained by replacing\({\varvec{A}},{\varvec{x}}_1,{\varvec{x}}_2, {\varvec{e}}_1,{\varvec{e}}_2\) with ring elements from some chosen polynomial ring and using the corresponding polynomial multiplication.
A typical size ofq is\(\approx 2^{13}\) and there are proposals that even use\(q = 257\) [18].
Note that by symmetry and monotonicity of\(\mathcal {D}_\beta \),\(\Pr [ax = 0] \le \Pr [a(|x| -1) = 0] + \Pr [x = 0]\). Combining with the fact that\(\Pr [ax=0]+\Pr [a(|x| -1) = 0]\le 1\) for\(a\ne 0\), and\(\Pr [x = 0]\le 1/(1 + 2e^{-1/\beta ^2})\), we conclude that\(\Pr [ax = 0]\le (1+ \Pr [x = 0])/2\le 9/10\) for\(\beta >10\).
If\({\varvec{w}}= (w^{(1)},w^{(2)}, \dots , w^{(n)})\) such that\(\gcd (w^{(1)},w^{(2)}, \dots , w^{(n)}, q) = 1\) and\(\mathbf {u}\) is uniform in\(\mathbb {Z}_q^n\), then\({\varvec{w}}^T\mathbf {u}\) is also uniform in\(\mathbb {Z}_q\).
The top singular value being 1.
Observe that since\(\xi \) is a probability distribution over\(\mathbb {Z}_q^k\), it follows that\(\mu \) is also a probability distribution.
Because for\(x \in [-\pi /2, \pi /2]\),\(\cos (x) \le 1- x^2/(4\pi ^2)\).
Because for\(x \in [-\pi /2, \pi /2]\),\(\cos (\pi + x) \ge -1+ x^2/(4\pi ^2)\).
In particular, Bogdanov et al. [4] showed that\(\text {RD}_2(1+\mathcal {D}_\sigma ||\mathcal {D}_\sigma ) = \exp (2\pi (1/\sigma )^2)\) which is bounded away from 1 for any discrete Gaussian distribution\(\mathcal {D}_\sigma \) with standard deviation\(\sigma \ge 1\).
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank Martin Albrecht, Jacob Alperin-Sheriff, Prabhanjan Ananth, Leo Ducas, Daniel Wichs and anonymous reviewers of PKC 2020 and Journal of Cryptology for useful comments and advice.
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NYU, Shanghai, China
Siyao Guo
TTIC, Chicago, USA
Pritish Kamath
IDC, Herzliya, Israel
Alon Rosen
UC, Berkeley, USA
Katerina Sotiraki
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Supported by Shanghai Eastern Young Scholar Program SMEC-0920000169 and the NYU Shanghai Boost Fund.
Work done while at MIT, supported by NSF awards CCF-1733808, IIS-1741137 and MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab and Research Collaboration Agreement No. W1771646.
Supported by ISF Grant No. 1399/17 and via Project PROMETHEUS (Grant 780701).
Work done while at MIT, research supported in part by NSF/BSF Grant #1350619, an MIT-IBM grant, a DARPA Young Faculty Award, MIT Lincoln Laboratories and Analog Devices
A Self-contained Proof of Theorem 1
A Self-contained Proof of Theorem1
In Sect.4, we use two Lemmas2 and4 in order to bound the key agreement probability by\(\max _{c\in \mathbb {Z}_q{\setminus }\{0\}}|{\mathbb {E}}_{e \leftarrow \xi }[\chi _c(e)]\). In this section, we give a self-contained proof for Lemma3 without explicitly using the notion of maximal correlation. However, this proof is essentially an unrolling of the proof using maximal correlation.
Claim 3
For any\(m\ge 1\), balanced\(f,g:\mathbb {Z}^m_q\rightarrow \{0,1\}\), and\(\mu _\mathcal {X}\) as in Theorem1, it holds that
where for any\(z \in \mathbb {Z}_q\),\(\xi (z)=\Pr [{\varvec{x}}_1^T{\varvec{e}}_2 - {\varvec{e}}_1^T{\varvec{x}}_2 = z]\).
Combining the above claim with the fact that\(\max _{c\in \mathbb {Z}_q{\setminus }\{0\}} |{\mathbb {E}}_{e \leftarrow \xi }[\chi _c(e)]|\le 1-\Omega (1/q^2)\) (see Claims1 and2), Theorem1 follows.
Proof
Let\(F({\varvec{x}})=(-1)^{f({\varvec{x}})}\) and\(G({\varvec{x}})=(-1)^{g({\varvec{x}})}\). Then, for any\({\varvec{c}}\in \mathbb {Z}_q^m\), let\(\hat{F}({\varvec{c}})={\mathbb {E}}_{{\varvec{x}}\leftarrow \mathcal {U}(\mathbb {Z}_q^m)} [F({\varvec{x}})\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}(-{\varvec{x}})]\) and\(\hat{G}({\varvec{c}})= {\mathbb {E}}_{{\varvec{x}}\leftarrow \mathcal {U}(\mathbb {Z}_q^m)}[G({\varvec{x}})\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}(-{\varvec{x}})]\). Note that for any\({\varvec{x}}\in \mathbb {Z}_q^m\),\(F({\varvec{x}})=\sum _{{\varvec{c}}\in \mathbb {Z}_q^m}\hat{F}({\varvec{c}})\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}({\varvec{x}})\) and\(G({\varvec{x}})=\sum _{{\varvec{c}}\in \mathbb {Z}_q^m}\hat{G}({\varvec{c}})\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}({\varvec{x}})\). Observe that\({\varvec{X}}\) is distributed uniformly and\({\varvec{Y}}={\varvec{X}}+{\varvec{e}}\), where\({\varvec{e}}\leftarrow \xi ^{\otimes m}\).
The first equality follows by linearity of expectation and the fact that\({\varvec{X}}\) is uniform over\(\mathbb {Z}^m_q\). For the next inequality, we use triangle inequality and that\(|{\mathbb {E}}[\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}({\varvec{e}})]|\) is real, since\(\xi \) is symmetric. The next two inequalities follow by Cauchy–Schwarz and Parseval’s identity, which states that\(\sum _{\varvec{c}}{\left|\hat{F}({\varvec{c}}) \right|}^2 = {\mathbb {E}}\left[ {\left|F({\varvec{X}}) \right|}^2\right] = 1\). The desired conclusion follows from the fact that\(\Pr [f({\varvec{X}})=g({\varvec{Y}})]=\frac{1+{\mathbb {E}}[\overline{F({\varvec{X}})}G({\varvec{Y}})]}{2}\).\(\square \)
Ring-LWE case. We get a similar result for the Ring-LWE case. In this case, we say that\({\varvec{w}}\) is drawn from\((\mathcal {X}^n)^{*}\) if its coefficients are drawn from\(\mathcal {X}^n\) conditioned on\({\varvec{w}}\) being a unit of\(R_q\).
Theorem 5
Let\(n,q\ge 1\) be integers and\(R_q\) be as above. Assume that the distribution\(\mathcal {X}\) over\(\mathbb {Z}_q\) is symmetric and for any\(a\in \mathbb {Z}_q{\setminus }\{0\}\),\(\Pr [az= 0]\le 9/10\) and\(\Pr [az= q/2]\le 9/10\) and\((\mathcal {X}^n)^*\) as above. Let\(\mu _{\text {RLWE},\mathcal {X}}({\varvec{X}},{\varvec{Y}})\) be the joint distribution of
where\(\cdot \) is polynomial multiplication,\({\varvec{a}}\leftarrow \mathcal {U}(R_q)\),\({\varvec{e}}_1,{\varvec{e}}_2\leftarrow \mathcal {X}^n\) and\({\varvec{x}}_1,{\varvec{x}}_2\leftarrow (\mathcal {X}^n)^{*}\). Then for any\(m\ge 1\), and any balanced functions\(\text {Rec}_1,\text {Rec}_2:R^m\rightarrow \{0,1\}\) with respect to the marginal distributions of\(\mu _{\text {RLWE},\mathcal {X}}^{\otimes m}\), it holds that
Proof
We proceed as in the LWE case by proving claims similar to Claims1,2 and3. For\({\varvec{c}}\in R_q\), we define\(\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}:R_q\rightarrow \mathbb {C}\) as\(\chi _{{\varvec{c}}}({\varvec{x}}) = e^{-2\pi i \cdot \left\langle {\varvec{c}}, {\varvec{x}} \right\rangle /q}\), where\(\left\langle {\varvec{c}}, {\varvec{x}} \right\rangle \) is the inner product of the coefficient vectors of\({\varvec{c}}\) and\({\varvec{x}}\) over\(\mathbb {Z}_q\). Then, the following claims hold.
Claim 4
For any\(m\ge 1\) and balanced\(f,g:R^m_q\rightarrow \{0,1\}\), it holds that
where for any\({\varvec{z}}\in R_q\),\(\xi ({\varvec{z}})=\Pr [{\varvec{x}}_1\cdot {\varvec{e}}_2 - {\varvec{e}}_1\cdot {\varvec{x}}_2 = {\varvec{z}}]\).
Claim 5
\(|{\mathbb {E}}_{{\varvec{e}}\leftarrow \xi }[\chi _{\varvec{a}}({\varvec{e}})]|\le \max _{{\varvec{c}}\in R_q{\setminus } \{\varvec{0}^n\}} {\mathbb {E}}_{{\varvec{e}}\leftarrow \mathcal {X}^n}[\chi _{\varvec{c}}({\varvec{e}})]|\).
Claim 6
For any\({\varvec{c}}\in R_q{\setminus }\{\varvec{0}^n\}\),\(|{\mathbb {E}}_{{\varvec{e}}\leftarrow \mathcal {X}^n}[\chi _{\varvec{c}}({\varvec{e}})]|\le 1-\Omega (1/q^2)\).
The proofs are almost identical to the corresponding proofs of Claims1,2 and3, so we omit them.\(\square \)
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Guo, S., Kamath, P., Rosen, A.et al. Limits on the Efficiency of (Ring) LWE-Based Non-interactive Key Exchange.J Cryptol35, 1 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-021-09406-y
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