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Abstract
A class of noncooperative games (of interest in certain applications) is described. Each game in the class is shown to possess at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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References
Charnes, A., andW. Cooper: Management Models and Industrial Applications of Linear Programming vol. II, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1961, pp. 785–797.
Rosenthal, R.: “The Network Equilibrium Problem in Integers”, forthcoming in Networks.
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Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences, Northwestern University Evanston, 60201, Illinois
Robert W. Rosenthal
- Robert W. Rosenthal
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Rosenthal, R.W. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria.Int J Game Theory2, 65–67 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
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