The conception of international law is a psychological mapping of the mutual construction of the structure of international relations and the state of actors in international relations. It is the result of the combined effects of the international political structure, the international law situation and the actors’ own thoughts and actions. The conception of international law in contemporary China is reflected in the theoretical research and various practical aspects of international law in China, and ultimately forms psychological cognition and judgment. China’s attitude towards international law is respectful but estranged. This is a product of historical superposition. It is the result of the mutual construction of the state of international relations, the features of international law, and the specific environment and concrete issues China has faced since 1840. This conception is determined by the combination of the might of the great powers of the international law itself with the backward economic, political, and cultural environment of China’s modern history. This is not only related to the mainstream thinking of international law and international relations, but also to the encounter and interaction of China and international law, as well as to China’s own culture and psychology. Recalling the history of the development of politics, diplomacy, and culture in modern China, as well as the history of the development of international relations and international law, it is easy to understand that in the mutual construction of such actors and institutions, it is very difficult for China to form support and trust for international law. If expect to enhance China’s position in international law and the positive degree of China’s participation in international legislation, the supervision of international law implementation and international justice, then only on the basis of both parties’ improvement, can mutual positive feedback be formed. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the mentality about international law, by strengthening the accumulation of China’s international legal knowledge and increasing its own legal participation and application capabilities.

1. 1.

   Liu Zhiyun, “‘Conception’ in the Development Process of International Law and Its Approach to Influence”,Modern Law, 2007(4).

2. 2.

   See: Hungdah Chiu, “Communist China’s Attitude Toward International Law”, 60The American Journal of International Law 245 (1966); (also inStudies in Chinese law, vol. 2 Harvard Law School, 1966); Hungdah Chiu, “Chinese Attitude Toward International Law in the Post Mao Era”,Maryland School of Law Occasional Papers, No. 1 (1988).

3. 3.

   Surya P. Shara, “China’s Attitude to International Law: With Special Reference to India-China Border”, 6: 6China Report 68 (Nov. 1970).

4. 4.

   Michael Bennett, “The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute”, 28Stan. J. Int’l L. 425 (1991–1992).

5. 5.

   Ben Saul, “China, Resources, and International Law”,Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11/82 (November 2011).

6. 6.

   Xue Hanqin, “China and International Law: 60 Years in Review”,Chatham House International Law Summary (8 March 2013).

7. 7.

   Xu Chongli, “‘Out-of-system State’ Psychology and Poverty of China’s International Law Theory”,Forum on Political Science and Law, 2006(5).

8. 8.

   Duan Jielong,The Practice and Cases of International Law in China,(Law Press China, 2011), pp. 368–369.

9. 9.

   See Jiang Shibo, “The Complex of Great Power and the Academic Psychology in International Law—From the Negative Mentality of China against International Justice”,Shandong Social Sciences, 2009(2). In the article, the author also mentioned that the complex of large country also made our country’s international jurisprudence pay more attention to short-term pragmatism while ignoring basic theoretical research, resulting in a lack of subjective consciousness, and loss of mild mindset and scientific attitude, which need to be reflected and driven out in future academic research.

10. 10.

    On September 10, 2012, despite repeated negotiations by the Chinese side, the Japanese government still announced that it had “purchased” the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated South Island and North Island and implemented the so-called “nationalization”. On the same day, the Chinese government stated that the so-called “acquisition of the islands” by the Japanese government was completely illegal and ineffective. It did not change the historical facts of Japan’s invasion of Chinese territory, and did not change China’s territorial sovereignty over Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands. The era of the Chinese nation being bullied is gone forever. The Chinese government will not sit idly by regarding the violation of its territorial sovereignty. The Chinese side strongly urges the Japanese side to immediately stop all acts that undermine China’s territorial sovereignty, and return to the consensus and understanding reached by the two sides, and return to the track to resolve disputes through negotiation. If Japan is bent on its own accord, all serious consequences resulting from this will only be borne by Japan.

    On September 20, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei stated at a regular press conference that Chinese law clearly stipulates that Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands belong to China. Japan’s announcement of “acquisition of the islands” violates China’s territorial sovereignty, being illegal under both international law and Chinese domestic law.

    On September 26, Prime Minister Yoshihiko of Japan spoke at the general debate of the 67th United Nations General Assembly held in New York and stated that he will strive to settle peacefully the disputes about the relevant territories and territorial waters in accordance with international law.“There are still disputes about territories and territorial waters in many parts of the world. The common principles of the UN Charter and the international community are the peaceful settlement of disputes under international law. Japan is determined to under any circumstances resolve disputes in this way peacefully in accordance with international law. More emphasis should be placed on the role of the international judicial system in the peaceful resolution of disputes.” At a press conference held after the speech of the UN General Assembly stated that whether based on history or under international law, Diaoyu Islands are Japan’s inherent territory; this issue is not controversial; and the Japanese side will not make any compromise against this position.

    On September 27, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang stated that China expresses strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to Japanese leaders’ stubbornly adhering to the wrong position on the Diaoyu Islands issue. The Diaoyu Islands have been an inherent territory of China since ancient times. The Chinese side has a full historical and legal basis for this. In 1895, Japan used the Sino-Japanese War to illegally steal the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands, and forced the Qing government to sign unequal treaties and cede “Taiwan’s entire island and all its affiliated islands”. After the end of the Second World War, according to international legal documents such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, China reclaimed the Chinese territory occupied by Japan, including Taiwan. The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands have returned to China in international law. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation are the great achievements of the world anti-fascist war and are important cornerstones of the post-war international order, which were expressly accepted by the Japanese surrender book of 1945. The Chinese government resolutely opposed and refused to recognize from the very beginning the practice of privately granting the Diaoyu Islands between the United States and Japan. The Chinese people have made enormous sacrifices and significant contributions to the victory of the world anti-fascist war. A defeated country nevertheless wants to occupy the territory of an victorious nation. Japan’s position and practice on the Diaoyu Islands issue trampled on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Essentially, it cannot thoroughly reflect on and liquidate the history of Japanese militarist aggression in an attempt to negate the victory achievements of the world’s anti-fascist war and challenge the post-war international order. This deserves great vigilance from the international community. History cannot be overturned. The deep disaster brought about by the Second World War must not be forgotten. The peace and security order maintained by the United Nations must not be shaken. International justice and human conscience cannot be provoked! The Japanese government’s so-called “acquisition of the islands” is completely illegal and ineffective. It cannot change the historical facts of Japan’s invasion of Chinese territory. It cannot change China’s territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The will and determination of the Chinese government and people to safeguard the country’s territorial sovereignty are unwavering. Japan’s illegal attempts will never succeed! Whether it is on the basis of history or international law, the Japanese side should stop all actions that damage China’s territorial sovereignty, instead of repeatedly making mistakes and deceiving the world.

    On September 27, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei presided over a regular press conference. A reporter asked: Japanese Prime Minister Noda expressed at the UN General Assembly that he would like to solve the territorial dispute through peaceful means. What is China’s response to this? Hong Lei reiterated that the issue of territorial ownership should be resolved according to historical and legal basis. Individual countries, ignoring historical facts and international law, blatantly infringing upon the territorial sovereignty of other countries, openly denying the victory of the world’s anti-fascist war, and seriously challenging the post-war international order, attempted to take the rules of international law as pretense. This practice is self-deceptive. The countries concerned must face history seriously, abide by international legal principles, and stop all acts that harm the territorial sovereignty of other countries. China expresses its strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to the Japanese leaders’ stubbornly adhering to the wrong position on the Diaoyu Islands issue.

11. 11.

    After Philippines asserted its rights over the waters of Huangyan Island, the Chinese side has repeatedly submitted representations to the Philippines side. On April 15 and 18, 2012, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying made two emergency appointments with the Philippine embassy in China to make representations on the tensions surrounding the Huangyan Island waters. Fu Ying pointed out that the incident of the Philippine warships harassing Chinese fishing boats and fishermen on Huangyan Island recently caused the Chinese side to be highly concerned. After bilateral consultations, the situation was initially eased. It is hoped that the Philippine side will keep its promise and withdraw its vessels as soon as possible, so that the sea area of Huangyan Island will restore peaceful and tranquil state.

    On April 18, regarding the statement that the Philippine Foreign Minister declared that he would submit the Huangyan Island issue to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Huangyan Island is an inherent territory of China. There is no issue to submit to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The country concerned has no right to invoke the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to undermine the inherent territorial sovereignty of other countries.

    On April 26, at a regular press conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a reporter asked: The Philippines claimed that Huangyan Island was the “territory” of the Philippines very early. This was also recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China did not exercise effective jurisdiction over Huangyan Island and there is no legal document that proved Huangyan Island belongs to China. What is China’s comment on this? The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin said that there is no international law basis for the Philippine side to claim to have jurisdiction over Huangyan Island just because the island is within the Philippine exclusive economic zone and then to put forward territorial demands. Huangyan Island is China’s inherent territory. China first discovered and named Huangyan Island and included it in the Chinese territory and implemented sovereignty jurisdiction. Before 1997, Philippine had never raised any objection to the Chinese government’s exercise of sovereign jurisdiction over, and exploitation of, Huangyan Island, and repeatedly stated that Huangyan Island was outside the territory of the Philippines. Liu Weimin stated that the Philippine side claimed to have jurisdiction over Huangyan Island just because the island is within the Philippine exclusive economic zone and then put forward territorial demands; there is no international law basis for this, nor did it comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; and the party should earnestly respect China’s territorial sovereignty over Huangyan Island.

    On April 27, the Philippine Foreign Ministry officials said that if China refuses to accept the arbitration of the International Court of Justice regarding Huangyan Island disputes, even without China’s consent, the Philippine government will also forcefully resolve the issue.

    On July 25, the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spoke at the regular press conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is not a legal basis for determining the ownership of the territory of Huangyan Island and cannot change the fact that the sovereignty of the island belongs to China. China’s position on safeguarding the territorial sovereignty is firm. China is also always committed to bilateral consultations for handling the incident. At present, the situation on Huangyan Island has generally tended to be mitigated. We hope that the Philippine side will do more things that are conducive to further relaxation of the situation and conducive to the healthy development of bilateral relations.

    In January 2013, the Philippine Foreign Minister Del Rosario issued a statement saying that Philippines has taken action to initiate arbitration proceedings against China in accordance with Article 287 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Article 7 of the Annex. The statement said that the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs had handed over to the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing a note verbale containing a notice and a statement on the 22nd, and the contents of the note questioned China’s Jiuduan Line claim to the entire South China Sea including the West Philippine Sea (ie. the South China Sea), and required China to stop illegal activities that violate the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Philippines. The statement also said that the arbitration with China on the Jiuduan Line was initiated in order to achieve the peaceful and rule-based settlement of the West Philippines Sea dispute presented by the President of the Philippines, Aquino III, in accordance with international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Philippines Daily Inquirer and other media quoted Del Rosario saying that Philippines had exhausted all political and diplomatic channels to negotiate with China to settle the territorial sea dispute; since 1995, Philippines has exchanged views with China; until today, no solution has yet been reached; we hope that the arbitral process can achieve a permanent solution to the dispute. On the 26th, the Philippine President Aquino said that Chinese ships recently for two times deported the Philippine fishing boats avoiding stormy weather in the sea of Huangyan Island, so Philippines decided to submit the South China Sea dispute to international arbitration. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin stated at the regular press conference on the 27th that Huangyan Island is an inherent territory of China; there is no question of submitting to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; “if a country can wantonly submit the territory of another country to international arbitration, what will this world become?” As early as 2006, China had already submitted a written statement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 298 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stating that, it does not accept any international judicial or arbitral jurisdiction under the Convention on the disputes concerning maritime delimitation, territoriality, military activities, etc. According to this exclusionary statement, the South China Sea issue cannot be resolved through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. On the 28th, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that at present, the situation on Huangyan Island has tended to be stabilized, and China hopes that the relative situation will not become relapsed.

    On February 19, 2013, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Ma Keqing met with the officials of the Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stated that the Chinese side would not accept the note and accompanying notice, and returned it. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China’s sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and the surrounding maritime areas has full historical and legal basis. At the same time, proceeding from the overall situation of maintaining bilateral relations between China and the Philippines and regional peace and stability, China has always been committed to resolving disputes through bilateral negotiations and has made unremitting efforts to maintain stability in the South China Sea and promote regional cooperation. Resolving relevant disputes through negotiations by directly involved sovereign states is also a consensus reached by the ASEAN countries and China in the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”. The Philippine note and the accompanying notice not only violated this consensus, but also made serious mistakes in facts and laws. It also contained many untrue accusations against China, which China firmly opposes. He also expressed the hope that the Philippine side will abide by its commitments and return to the correct track of bilateral negotiations to resolve disputes. “The Chinese side hopes that, the Philippine side will abide by its commitments and will not take any action that will complicate and enlarge the issue, It will actively respond to China’s proposal to establish a consultation mechanism on the China-Philippines maritime issue and to reopen the mechanism for confidence-building measures between the two countries, and return to the right track of bilateral negotiations to resolve disputes.” In spite of this, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea organized a number of judges, including the Japanese president Yanai Jun, the Polish judge Stanilov Pavlac, and the German judge Rudige Wolfrum, participating in the arbitration.

12. 12.

    It is worth noting that in the field of economic and trade, China has a stronger chance and willingness to apply legal means through the WTO system. Therefore, the country is more willing to comply with international law in the low- and middle-level political areas basing on calculations; but in the high-political sphere, it entirely checks the interest of its own country as the basic consideration, hence may be far from international law.

13. 13.

    For a description of related examples, see Qian Qichen,The Journal of Diplomacy (World Knowledge Publishing House, 2003); Wu Jianmin,The Cases of Diplomacy (Renmin University of China Press, 2007).

14. 14.

    Carlos Ramos-mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands”, 29:4U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 903 (2008).

15. 15.

    Jiang Shibo proposed in his “The Great Power Complex and the Academic Psychology of the International Law Study—From the Negative Mentality of China against International Justice” (Shandong Social Science, 2009(2).) that the root cause China is still outside of most international judicial organizations is the great power complex. At the same time, this kind of great power complex has led to China’s international law study since the reform and opening up focusing only on short-term pragmatism and ignoring basic theoretical research, lacking subjective awareness, losing a mild mindset and a scientific attitude, and failing to form the prospect of a hundred schools of thought contending.

16. 16.

    Chen Tiqiang, “The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law”, 8Dalhousie L.J. 3 (1984); Li Zhaojie, “The Impact of International Law on the Transformation of China’s Perception of the World: A Lesson from History”, 27Md. J. Int’l L. 128 (2012).

17. 17.

    The study of the “Pre-Qin International Law” began in 1884 with the American missionary William Alexander Parsons Martin’sA Brief Account of the Chinese Ancient Public Law, in Wang Jian ed.,The West Law Passing to the East—Foreigners and the Modern Reform of Chinese Law (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001). From the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, there emerged a trend of research on the “Pre-Qin International Law” that lasted for half a century. The key to this was the core issue of how to rebuild Chinese people’s “world scene”. Main works include: Hong Junpei,Spring and Autumn International Public Law (Beijing, Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1939); Xu Chuanbao,Relics of Pre-Qin International Law (Commercial Press, 1931) in theRepublic of China Series, III,No. 27 (Shanghai Bookstore Press, 1991); Chen Guyuan:Tracing the Sources of China’s International Law (Commercial Press, 1934) inRepublic of China Series, III, No. 27 (Shanghai Bookstore Press, 1991). For related comments, please refer to Zou Lei, “Research on the ‘Pre-Qin International Law’ and the Reconstruction of China’s ‘World Scene’—from Ding Weiliang to Chen Guyuan,International Observation, 2009(3). For an analysis of this issue after the second half of the 20th century, see Li Jiashan, “Is There an International Law Problem in Ancient China”,Journal of Hainan University (Social Science Edition), 1985(1); Li Hengmei, “A Summary of the International Law of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods”,Journal of Yantai University, 1991(4); Sun Yurong, “On the Existence of Ancient Chinese International Law”,The Political Science and Law Review, 1995(3); Sun Yurong, “On the Existence of Ancient Chinese International Law”,Journal of Law, 1995(4); Sun Yurong,Ancient Chinese International Law Study (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1999) (It is briefly introduced inNanjing University Law Review 1999(1)); Huai Xiaofeng, Sun Yurong,Historical Materials of Ancient Chinese international law (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2000); Wang Qiang, “Discussion and Analysis of the Existence of International Law in Ancient China”,Journal of Shenyang Institute of Engineering (Social Science Edition), 2005(4); Sang Donghui, “Also on Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods’ Vassal States whether Be Sovereign States—Taking Mozi as An Example and Taking International Law as A Perspective”,International Politics Study, 2006 (2).

18. 18.

    Donald Kagan, etc.,The Legacy of the West, translated by Yuan Yongming, etc. (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2009), pp. 485–504.

19. 19.

    John Buckler, etc.:Western Social History (Volume 2), translated by Huo Wenli, etc. (Guangxi Normal University Press, 2005), pp. 402–408.

20. 20.

    In the depiction of people’s lives, especially children’s labor, in the humanist writers Charles Dickens’Oliver Twist and Victor Hugo’sLess Miserables, these were obvious.

21. 21.

    Philip Fernandez-Amesto:The World: A History, translated by Ye Jianjun, etc. (Peking University Press, 2010), pp. 810–832.

22. 22.

    Karl Marx:The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, inThe Anthology of Marx and Engels(Vol. 2) (People’s Publishing House, 2009), pp. 470–471.

23. 23.

    Francis Fukuyama:The Origin of the Political Order: From the Pre-human Age to the French Revolution, Translated by Mao Junjie (Guangxi Normal University Press, 2012), pp. 411–412.

24. 24.

    For a more detailed description of the history of the Middle Ages, see Robert Fossier:Cambridge Illustrated History of the Middle Age, translated by Chen Zhiqiang etc. (Shandong Pictorial Publishing House, 2006, 2008, and 2009); Judith M. Ben Nate, C. Warren Hollister:The Medieval History of Europe (10th ed.), translated by Yang Ning and Li Yun (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2007), pp. 362–369, 404–424.

25. 25.

    Gao Qi:The Process of Civilization, translated by Yuan Yongming, etc. (Shandong Pictorial Publishing House, 2003), pp. 413–441.

26. 26.

    Andrew Clapham,Brierly’s Law of Nations, 7th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 5, 26.

27. 27.

    Kalevi J. Holsti,Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 9–16.

28. 28.

    Karl Polanyi,The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, Beacon Press, 1957), Chap. 1; Sheldon Anderson, “Metternich, Bismarck, and the Myth of the ‘Long Peace’ 1815–1914,”Peace & Change, Vol. 32, No. 3, July 2007, pp. 301–328.

29. 29.

    Arthur Nussbaum,Concise History of International Law, translated by Zhang Xiaoping (Law Press China, 2011), p. 151.

30. 30.

    Malcolm Evans,International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 19–21.

31. 31.

    David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, and Hélène Lambert,International Law and International Relations (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 61–65.

32. 32.

    Karl Polanyi,The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, Beacon Press, 2001, pp. 5–6; Also referred to Chinese version to Huang Shumin’s translation, Social Sciences Literature Press, 2013, p. 54. Sheldon Anderson, “Metternich, Bismarck, and the Myth of the ‘Long Peace’ 1815–1914,”Peace & Change, Vol. 32, No. 3, July 2007, pp. 301–328.

33. 33.

    C.W. Crowley etc.,New Cambridge World’s Modern History 9, translated by Institute of World History (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Social Science Press, 1999), pp. 15–847.

34. 34.

    Pete N. Stearns etc.,The History of Global Civilization, translated by Zhao Yufeng, etc. (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2006), pp. 504–506, 532–539, 588–599, 676–679.

35. 35.

    Malcolm D. Evans (ed.),International Law (3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 12–21.

36. 36.

    Zhou Gengsheng,International Law (Wuhan University Press, 2007) p. 44.

37. 37.

    Yang Zewei,On The History of International Law (Higher Education Press, 2011), pp. 81–82.

38. 38.

    For the former point of view, see Jiang Tingfu,China’s Modern History (Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1999), pp. 5–18; Guo Tingyi,The Changing Pattern of Modern China (Kyushu Press, 2012), pp. 3–20; For the latter viewpoint, see Li Yumin,Modern Chinese Foreign Relations and Politics (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2006), pp. 4–94. For relatively mediate views, see Chen Xulu ed.,China’s Modern History (Higher Education Press, 2010), pp. 2–9; Li Kan, etc.,China’s Modern History 1840–1919 (4th ed., Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1994), pp. 1–8.

39. 39.

    James Crawford,Browlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed., Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 4–5.

40. 40.

    See Wang Jianlang and Luan Jinghe, (eds.),Modern China: Politics and Diplomacy(Former Volume) (Social Science Literature Press, 2010). The related papers it includes by Li Zhaoxiang, Liu Limin, Li Yuming, Fang Hui, Chen Kaike, Liao Minshu and Hou Zhongjun discussed on some specific circumstances of that time.

41. 41.

    See Zhao Jiaying,China’s Modern Diplomacy History (World Knowledge Press, 2008), pp. 106–118; Mao Haijian,The Collapse of the Celestial Kingdom: Re-study of the Opium Wars (2nd ed., Life, Reading, and New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2005), pp. 482–545.

42. 42.

    For details, see Mao Haijian,Modern Criteria: Military and Diplomacy in the Two Opium Wars, Life (Reading, and New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2011), pp. 113–139.

43. 43.

    For the Second Opium War and related treaties, see Zhao Jiaying,China’s Modern Diplomatic History (World Knowledge Press, 2008), pp. 166–183.

44. 44.

    For details, see Zong Zeya,The Qing Dynasty-Japanese War 1894–1895 (World Book Publishing Company, 2012), pp. 388–398.

45. 45.

    Chen Xulu, ed.,China’s Modern History (Higher Education Press, 2010), pp. 35–38, 85–97, 185–191, 204–206, 251–252.

46. 46.

    Arthur Nussbaum,Concise History of International Law, translated by Zhang Xiaoping (Law Press China, 2011), pp. 148–149.

47. 47.

    When the West withdrew its troops after invading Beijing, the Chinese people were still not accustomed to it; and when China killed prisoners in the war, the West condemned it: China thereby also gradually understood the law of war, but the overall effect is not great.

48. 48.

    Li Yumin,Modern Chinese and Foreign Treaty Relationships (Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2011), pp. 97–168.

49. 49.

    Li Yumin,Treaty System of Modern China (Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2010), pp. 13–233.

50. 50.

    Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts,Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Vol. 1, p. 89.

51. 51.

    See J. Lorimer,The Institutes of the Law of Nations, Blackwood and Sons, 1883, Vol. 1, p. 101; L. Oppenheim,International law: a Treatise (Vol. I, Peace) (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 33.

52. 52.

    See H. Lauterpacht,Oppenheim’s International Law (8th ed, Longmans Green, 1955), p. 49.

53. 53.

    Kawashima,The Formation of China’s Modern Diplomacy, translated by Tian Jianguo (Peking University Press, 2012), pp. 74–106.

54. 54.

    For analysis of an earlier relationship between China and international law, see Cheng Peng, “Discussion on the Introduction of Western International Law to China for the First Time”,Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 1989(5); author of this article was suspicious of the historical facts that around 1648 the missionary Martin Martini translated Suarez’s work on international law. He conservatively concluded that “Chinese officials at the time did not see the Chinese version of Martini’s translation of international law written by Suarez”. See also Zeng Tao, “The Encounter of Modern China and International Law”,Journal of China University of Political Science and Law, 2008(5). He believes that in the process of exchanges between China and the West in the Ming and Qing dynasties, Western international law began its journey of enlightenment in China. There were two landmark events: Western missionaries translated the early works of international law in the West; in the Sino-Russian Treaty negotiations in which Western missionaries participated, international law was used.

55. 55.

    See Lin Xuezhong,From Public Law of All Nations to Public Law Diplomacy: Introduction, Interpretation and Application of International Law in the Late Qing Dynasty (Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009), pp. 249–253.

56. 56.

    See Leiyi,Towards Revolution: To Tell in Detail Seventy Years of Late Qing Dynasty (Shanxi People’s Publishing House, 2011), pp. 86–91.

57. 57.

    For a simplified typographical version of the book, seeModern Literature Series: The Public Law of All Nations (Shanghai Bookstore Press, 2002).

58. 58.

    Lin Xuezhong,From Public Law of All Nations to Public Law Diplomacy: Introduction, Interpretation and Application of International Law in the Late Qing Dynasty (Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009), pp. 253–256.

59. 59.

    The Qing government’s handling of the Prussian envoy’s detention of Danish merchant ships in China was the beginning of China’s active application of international law. In 1861 and 1863, the Qing government signed the “Treaty of Commerce” and the “Customs Tariff” with Prussia and Denmark respectively. The contents of the treaties are basically the same. Therefore, China has basically the same rights and obligations to Prussia and Denmark. In 1864, Prussia joined Austria to fight Denmark. In April 1864, von Rehfues, Prussian Minister to China, met three Danish merchant ships when he arrived in Dagu Port, Tianjin, China on board the warship “Antelope”. Due to the state of war between the two countries at that time, Prussian warships captured three Danish ships. The Qing government then negotiated with the Prussian minister according to the rules of territorial sea sovereignty contained in the newly translated works of international law. In particular, Whitton’s Law of Nations, Volume II, Chap. 4, Sect. 6, was quoted as saying, “The sea areas under the jurisdiction of various countries, and the sea held by the Australian port of Changji, in addition to the coastal areas, which are ten miles offshore, are also under its jurisdiction according to normal regulations. As for the place where the shells were built, the kingdom was also in the balance. All this belonged to its jurisdiction and other countries did not agree with it.” Prussia was protested that its warships captured Danish ships in Chinese waters obviously usurped China’s rights, because Bohai Bay was China’s “closed sea”. Prussia finally released two Danish merchant ships and paid for the third. The Qing government adopted the relevant principles of international law contained in the “Universal Public Law” and disposed of the 1864 Prussian Minister von Rehfues’ detention of Danish merchant ships in China’s inland sea at Dagu Port. This is the first time that the Chinese government has consciously adopted the principles of international law to handle Sino—foreign negotiations since the introduction of western international law into China. It has special significance in the history of modern Sino—foreign relations. See Wang Weijian, “Prussia-Denmark Dagukou Ships Incident and Western International Law Introducing into China”,Academic Research, 1985(5).

60. 60.

    Qiu Hongda:Modern International Law (Sanmin Book Bureau, 2006), pp. 53–55.

61. 61.

    William A.P. Martin, an American missionary in China, can be regarded as the first person to translate international law in modern China, both in terms of the time to translate international law completely and in terms of the quantity of international law translated. See Gao Liping, “The First Person in the Translation of International Law in Modern China: Ding Weiliang”,Journal of Yan’an University (Social Science Edition), 2005(2); Li Shengyu, “An Exploration of Source of Modern Chinese International Law”,Journal of Sichuan Institute of Education, 2001 (7); Zhang Jingcao and Qiu Zaiyu, “On the Introduction of International Law into China”,Journal of Hebei University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 1984(2); Liu Bin, “The Importation of International Law and the Beginning of China’s Diplomatic Modernization”,Tianjin Social Sciences, 2001(1).

62. 62.

    See Liu He,The Discourse Politics of the Empire: View the Formation of Modern World Order from Modern Sino-Western Conflicts, translated by Yang Lihua et al. (Life, Reading, New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2009), pp. 146–186; Luna, Shi Qingxi, “To Change China’s International Positioning Conception: the Importance of International Law Introduction in the Late Qing Dynasty”,Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities, and Social Science Edition), 2009(4); Zheng Wenju, Wang Meili, “International Law Conception and Modern Transformation of Chinese Law”,Tianfu New Theory, 1999(1); Wang Meili, “The Conception of International Law and the Reform of Modern Chinese Law”,Journal of Zhengzhou University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2003(4).

63. 63.

    In order to solve the national crisis, the people of the late Qing Dynasty tried every possible means to integrate with the West, and modern international law played a role as a bridge. See Yang Zewei, “Importation into China of Modern International Law and Its Impact”,Jurisprudence Study, 1999(3); Shi Jianxing, “International Law Importation and Beginning of China’s Modern National Sovereignty Conception”,Journal of Nanping Teachers College, 2003(1); Chen Yue, “Analyzing the Late Qing Dynasty China and Modern International Law”,Lanzhou Academic Journal, 2004(4). After two Opium Wars, following the translation and dissemination of international law and the need for diplomatic negotiation, the Chinese traditional international conception had undergone profound changes. The conception of international law in the modern sense had begun to sprout. On this basis, the modern liberal scholar-official gentry formed a relatively clear national sovereignty consciousness and an equal national sovereignty conception. And on the basis of international law carried out foreign negotiation, creating a modern diplomatic mechanism. See Guan Wei, “On the Beginning of modern Chinese conception of international law”,Political Science and Law Review, 2004(3).

64. 64.

    Liu Wei, “The Evolution and Influence of the Late Qing Dynasty’s Diplomatic Institutions”, Sang Bing and Zhao Libin ed.,Modern China in Transition (Social Science Literature Press, 2010), pp. 536–550.

65. 65.

    Tian Tao believes that in the special international environment of the 19th century, the cruel reality of national survival had plagued the intellectual world for a long time to be haunted by the reliability of international law, and their conception of international law had always been in a state of contradiction, preventing them from making a final affirmative judgment on international law. (“The conception of international law in China’s intellectual world in the second half of the 19th century”,Research in Modern History, 2000(2).) The author believes that it is not only the reality of national survival and the conception contradictions in the intellectuals that made the Chinese intellectuals in the late Qing Dynasty could not do a positive judgment on international law, but also the selectivity of international law itself which did not regard China as an equal “civilized country”.

66. 66.

    Yang Zewei,On the History of International Law (Higher Education Press, 2011), pp. 346–349.

67. 67.

    See Zheng Guanying,Golden Age Alarmist Talk: Public Law, concluded inZheng Guanying Collection (volume 1), Xia Dongyuan ed. (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1982), p. 389; Cui Guoyin,The Diary of American and Hispania and Peru as Envoy (Volume 2) (Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1995).

68. 68.

    See Xue Fucheng,On Funding the Ocean (Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 1994), pp. 156–157.

69. 69.

    For a brief review of Guo Songtao’s experience, see Leiyi,Towards Revolution: To Tell in Detail Seventy Years of Late Qing Dynasty (Shanxi People’s Publishing House, 2011), pp. 75–84.

70. 70.

    SeeThe Diaries of London and Paris by Guo Yan, Zhong Shuhe ed. (Yuelu Publishing House, 1984), pp. 706–707;Zeng Jize’s Diary of England and France in Russia as envoy, Yang Xiangquan etc. ed. (Yuelu Publishing House, 1985), pp. 164–165;Zeng Ji Ze’s Legatorial Collection (Yuelu Publishing House, 1983), pp. 182–183.

71. 71.

    For an analysis of the impact of international law on Chinese society during this period, see Tian Tao,Importation of International Law and China in the Late Qing Dynasty (Jinan Press, 2001). For this book, there are comments by Wu Jinghua inthe Journal of Shandong Police College in 2009(6), Zhang Feifeng inWuhan University International Law Review, Xiamen University Law Review both in 2003, and Zheng Xin inHistory Teaching in 2002(5).

72. 72.

    “Modern international law has little beneficial effect on China. In a certain sense, it is a legal weapon for imperialist powers to invade and enslave China.” Xiu Zhijun, “The Spread and Influence of Modern International Law in China”,Journal of Teachers College of Qingdao University, 2006 (3).

73. 73.

    Zhang Lili,Diplomacy Policy-making (World Knowledge Press, 2007), pp. 260–275.

74. 74.

    For example,The Analects of Confucius· in charge of politics: “To guide the people with politics, and to constrain the people with punishment, the people will just be saved from punishment but still remain shameless; to guide the people with morals, and to constrain the people with courtesies, the people will not only be shameful but also be observant”;Mencius, Lilou, First Half: “Just being good is not enough to conduct politics, and just having laws is not enough to make them implemented automatically”.

75. 75.

    For a detailed analysis of this issue, please refer to Dang Jiangzhou,The Culture of Chinese Pettifoggers: An Interpretation of Ancient Lawyers Phenomenon (Peking University Press, 2005).

76. 76.

    Regarding the traditional attitude of despising and disregarding pettifoggers, see the dozens of stories of famous pettifoggers in the Qing Dynasty included inClassified Unofficial History of Qing Dynasty· Prison Litigations Category. They were described as wicked people who were crafty, blackmailed, unobservant, disorderly, colluding with bureaucrats and monopolizing lawsuits.

77. 77.

    For example, Lao Tzu advocated that “only disciplines of the Heaven need to be followed”; in the international system, he tended to “small countries and rare people”, and “make the people not to use various instruments, and make the people love life and not to migrate. Although there are boats, nobody takes; Although there are armored soldiers, nowhere to be displayed. And make them keep records by tying knots once again. Make them feel their foods are delicious, their coats are beautiful, their homes are comfortable, and their customs are enjoyable. Neighboring countries look each other across boundaries, the voice of chickens and dogs can be heard, but the people don’t contact each other till dying old”. Towards the law he held a critical attitude: “When laws and statutes breed and multiply, robbers and thieves are numerous”; and “the people are not afraid of death, how to make them fear with death”. He looked forward to a quiet country and individual living status: “Great accomplishments seem to have some deficiencies, but their effects are never out of time; Huge plenty seem like absence, but its use will never be exhausted”; “Administering a big country is like cooking a small delicious food”; “If tolerant and magnanimous politics are implemented, the people will be kind and honest; if sharp-sighted and rigorous politics are implemented, the people will be shameless and resistant”; “The people being hungry, because on them too many taxes are collected, so they are hungry; the people being difficult to rule, because their rulers have too many accomplishments, so they are difficult to rule; the people despising death, because the classes upper than them too extravagantly pursue living, so they despise death”.

78. 78.

    Chuang Tzu had many criticisms against effortful administration: “governance, is the lead of chaos”; and he also held a critical attitude towards unjust laws: “So let me try to discuss it here, is there any so-called wisdom of the secular world that is not accumulating for bandits? Is there any so-called saintdom of the secular world that is not safeguarding for bandits……If saints are not dead, bandits will not disappear……One who steels a hook is sentenced to death while one who steels a country becomes prince, and in prince’s family benevolence and righteousness survive, then isn’t it steeling benevolence, righteousness, saintdom and wisdom!”.

79. 79.

    For a different perspective, see William A. P. Martin:A Brief Account of the Chinese Ancient Public Law (1884), Wang Jian ed.,The West Law Passing to the East -Foreigners and the Modern Reform of Chinese Law (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2001), pp. 31–39.

80. 80.

    William A. P. Martin,A Brief Account of the Chinese Ancient Public Law (1884), Wang Jian (ed.),The West Law Passing to the East—Foreigners and the Modern Reform of Chinese Law (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001), p. 32.

81. 81.

    Li Dazhao commented on Wilson in the following words: “It is not very long ago that Mr. Wilson’s speech on peace just loudly publicized the House of Representatives, and Germany’s relentless dynamite bombs had sunk the merchant ships of the United States. So we know that the situation of peace is not something that words or speeches can guarantee.”The Complete Works of Li Dazhao, vol. I (People’s Publishing House, 2006), p. 268; see also vol. II, p. 337, about comments on Wilson’s claim after World War I. Chen Duxiu said: “The fourteen articles of President Wilson’s peace proposal is now also mostly unreliable ideal.”Chen Duxiu Selected Works Volume II, 1919–1922 (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2010), p. 37.

82. 82.

    Malcolm D. Evans (ed.),International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 22–24.

83. 83.

    Yang Zewei,On the History of International Law (Higher Education Press, 2011), pp. 151–154.

84. 84.

    Wang Shengzu (ed.),The History of International Relations· Volume IV (1917–1929) (World Knowledge Press, 1995), pp. 56–58.

85. 85.

    Wang Shengzu (ed.),The History of International Relations· Volume IV (1917–1929) (World Knowledge Press, 1995), pp. 468–469.

86. 86.

    Luo Ergang,The History of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1991, pp. 8–11; Wang Qingcheng:The History and Thought of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (China Renmin University Press, 2010), pp. 467–469.

87. 87.

    Immanuel Chung-Yueh Hsü (Xu Zhongyue),The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed., (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 232–253.

88. 88.

    Jiang Tingfu,China’s Modern History (Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1999), p. 16.

89. 89.

    For a related comparison, also see Pete N. Stearns (et al.),History of Global Civilization, translated by Zhao Yifeng, et al., (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2006), pp. 753–760.

90. 90.

    Li kan, et al.,China’s Modern History: 1840–1919 (4th ed.), (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1994), pp. 121–161, 227–261, 369–392.

91. 91.

    John Fitzgerald,Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Classes in the National Revolution, (Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 103–146.

92. 92.

    For the research on the historical restoration of the Reform Movement of 1898, see Mao Haijian:The Historical Research of the Reform Movement of 1898·First Episode (Life • Reading • New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2012) (formerlyThe Historical Research of the Reform Movement of 1898, Life • Reading • New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2005); Mao Haijian,The Historical Research of the Reform Movement of 1898·Second Episode (Life • Reading • New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2011); Mao Haijian,From Jiawu to Wuxu: Notes on Kang Youwei’s My History (Life • Reading • New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2009).

93. 93.

    [United States] R.R. Palmer, Joe Colton, Lloyd Kramer amendmented:Modern World History (10th ed.), translated by Sun Fusheng, Chen Dunquan, Zhou Honglin, et al. (World Book Publishing Company, 2009), pp. 657–660.

94. 94.

    Ma Shi and Mi Henry:The History of International Relations in the Far East, (Shanghai Bookstore Press, 1998), pp. 531–541, 553–559.

95. 95.

    James Lorimer,The Institutes of the Law of Nations: a treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities (Blackwood and Sons, 1883), vol. 1, p. 101; Lassa Oppenheim,International Law: A Treatise (Vol. I, Peace), (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 33.

96. 96.

    Hearsch Lauterpacht,Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th ed., (Longmans Green, 1955), p. 49.

97. 97.

    Zhao Jiaying,China’s Modern Diplomatic History (World Knowledge Press, 2008), pp. 509–517.

98. 98.

    Gu Weijun,Memoirs of Gu Weijun· 1 (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1983), pp. 180–186; Han Xinfu and Jiang Kefu (eds.),The History of the Republic of China · Memorabilia (2) (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2011), p. 1047.

99. 99.

    Gu Weijun,Memoirs of Gu Weijun· 1 (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1983), pp. 196–200.

100. 100.

     Gu Weijun,Memoirs of Gu Weijun· 1 (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1983), p. 205.

101. 101.

     Yang Tianshi,Seeking the Real Chiang Kai-shek: An Interpretation of Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary (Shanxi People’s Publishing House, 2008), p. 200; regarding Zhang Xueliang’s insistence on non-resistance and the affirmation of Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government in this period, see Yang Tianshi,Seeking the Real Chiang Kai-shek: An Interpretation of Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary· II, (Chinese Language Press, 2010), pp. 45–58.

102. 102.

     Gu Weijun,Memoirs of Gu Weijun· 1 (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1983), pp. 14–15.

103. 103.

     Yang Tianshi,Seeking the Real Chiang Kai-shek: An Interpretation of Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary, (Shanxi People’s Publishing House, 2008), p. 204.

104. 104.

     Han Xinfu and Jiang Kefu, (eds.),The History of the Republic of China · Memorabilia (6), (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2011), p. 3921, 4241.

105. 105.

     For example, Lu Xun expressed in many essays his slim hopes for resorting to the League of Nations. See:Complete Works of Lu Xun (People’s Literature Publishing House, 2005), Vol. 4, p. 362, 431, Vol. 5, p. 32, 355, Vol. 6, p. 121.

106. 106.

     Tang Qihua,The History of Beiyang Revising Contracts Covered by Abolishing Unequal Treaties (1912–1928) (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2010), pp. 23–26.

107. 107.

     Wang Yunsheng,China and Japan in the Past 60 Years (Vol. 6) (Life • Reading • New Knowledge Three-joint Bookstore, 2005), pp. 312–313.

108. 108.

     Tang Qihua,The History of Beiyang Revising Contracts Covered by Abolishing Unequal Treaties (1912–1928) (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2010), pp. 174–296.

109. 109.

     Tang Qihua,The History of Beiyang Revising Contracts Covered by Abolishing Unequal Treaties (1912–1928) (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2010), pp. 374–384.

110. 110.

     For a detailed catalog of Chinese international law books and manuscripts from 1839 to 1911, see: Lin Xuezhong,From Public Law of All Nations to Public Law Diplomacy: Introduction, Interpretation and Application of International Law in the Late Qing Dynasty (Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009), pp. 113–122.

111. 111.

     For the relevant discussion, see:Complete Works of Li Dazhao (People’s Publishing House, 2006), vol. 1, pp. 95–106, 111–119, 120–121, 125–135, 251, 308–309; Vol. II, pp. 106–108. 123–139, 302, 337–339, etc.

112. 112.

     Wang Dong,The Unequal Treaties of China: Narration of National Shame and National History, translated by Wang Dong and Gong Zhiwei, (Fudan University Press, 2011), p. 135.

113. 113.

     He Qinhua, “On the theory and practice of China’s transplantation of international law during the period of the Republic of China”,Law and Business Research, 2001(4).

114. 114.

     For the basic elaboration and analysis of the anti-Japanese war situation, see Zhang Xianwen et al.,The History of the Republic of China (Nanjing University Press, 2006), pp. 1–227, pp. 319–378. For a more detailed analysis, see: Wang Jianlang and Zeng Jingzhong,China’s Modern General History • Volume 9: War of Resistance Against Japan, (Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2007), pp. 1–113, 216–276, 365–430.

115. 115.

     Arnold Toynbee, edited:Overview of International Affairs • The Second World War (Vol. 8: Far East in 1942–1946), translated by the English Teaching and Research Section of the Department of Foreign Languages, Fudan University, (Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2007), pp. 198–228.

116. 116.

     John King Fairbank et al. (eds.),Cambridge History of the Republic of China (the Last Volume), translated by Liu Jingkun, etc., (China Social Science Press, 1994), pp. 516–528.

117. 117.

     Gong Shuduo (ed.),China’s Modern History 1919–1949 (Zhonghua Book Bureau 2010), pp. 375–379.

118. 118.

     Henry Kissinger,On China, translated by Hu Liping, et al., (CITIC Press, 2012), p. 83.

119. 119.

     Xie Yixian (ed.),History of China’s Contemporary Diplomacy 1949–2009 (China Youth Press, 2009), pp. 149–201.

120. 120.

     Qi Pengfei and Yang Fengcheng (eds.),The Chronicle of Contemporary China 1949.10–2004.10 (People’s Publishing House, 2007), pp. 322–339.

121. 121.

     Liao Gailong, Zhuang Puming (ed.),The Chronicle of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–2009 (People’s Publishing House, 2010), p. 285.

122. 122.

     Tang Qihua,The History of Beiyang Revising Contracts Covered by Abolishing Unequal Treaties (1912–1928) (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2010), pp. 8–10.

123. 123.

     Li Bin,The Abolishing Treaties Campaign and the Politics of the Republic of China (Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2011), pp. 2–3.

124. 124.

     Charles Summer Lobingier, “Shall China Have a Uniform Legal System?” 6China Law Review 327 (1933); Bao Dao, “The Extinction of Siam’s Extraterritoriality”, Imai: “The Problem of Extraterritoriality in China”, contained in Wang Jian (ed.),The West Law Passing to the East—Foreigners and the Modern Reform of Chinese Law (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001), pp. 273, 285. With regard to the situation of extraterritoriality at that time, see Willow Bay, Foreign Courts in China and its Application of Law, contained in Wang Jian (ed.),The West Law Passing to the East—Foreigners and the Modern Reform of Chinese Law (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001), pp. 289–331.

125. 125.

     Li Yumin,The History of China Abolishing treaties (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2005), pp. 638–936; Wang Jianlang, Zeng Jingzhong:China’s Modern General History • Volume 9: War of Resistance Against Japan (Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2007), pp. 509–519.

126. 126.

     See Shi Yuanhua, Jin Guangyao, and Shi Jianguo,The History of the Republic of China· Volume 10 (1941–1945) (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2011), pp. 479–503; Wang Jianlang and Zeng Jingzhong,China’s Modern General History • Volume 9: War of Resistance Against Japan, (Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2007), pp. 519–537.

127. 127.

     Li Yumin,The History of China Abolishing treaties, (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2005), pp. 949–970.

128. 128.

     Su Yixiong,Peacetime International Law (Revised 4th ed.) (Sanmin Book Bureau, 2007), pp. 9–10.

129. 129.

     John W. Young and John Kent,International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 214–241.

130. 130.

     Huang Yao, “Rethinking Kelsen’s Theory of Priority of International Law at the Turn of the Century”,Jurisprudence Review, 2000(4).

131. 131.

     Gu Zuxue, “Re-understanding of the Legal Nature of International Law: A Review of Hart’s Thoughts of International Law”,Jurisprudence Review, 1998(1).

132. 132.

     With regard to the efforts to demand a new international economic order in the UN system, see Yi Minghai (ed.),Special Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, (World Knowledge Press, 2009), pp. 43–61.

133. 133.

     An obvious example is that Song Meiling visited the United States twice during the Sino-Japanese War and during the Chinese Civil War, and she was treated quite differently. The former time she was generally welcomed, and the United States gave China a lot of aid; the latter time she suffered a cold attitude, and did not receive the expected military assistance.

134. 134.

     For specific historical facts, see Shen Zhihua,The Choice of Helplessness: The Cold War and the Destiny of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (1945–1959) (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2013), pp. 87–97.

135. 135.

     See Yang Kuisong,Research on the History of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China· 2 (Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2009), pp. 48–77.

136. 136.

     See Tao Wenzhao (ed.),History of Sino-US Relations· Middle Volume (1949–1972) (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2004), pp. 1–269.

137. 137.

     For the macro background and specific situation of Soviet dispatching and recalling experts, see Shen Zhihua,Soviet experts in China (1948–1960), (Xinhua Press, 2009).

138. 138.

     Between 1949 and 1958, China and the Soviet Union initially formed a “comrade plus brother” relationship. See Shen Zhihua (ed.),Outline History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1917–1991) (Revised Version), (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2011), pp. 111–189; Shen Zhihua and Li Bin (eds.),Vulnerable Alliance: Cold War and Sino-Soviet Relations (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2010), pp. 206–244.

139. 139.

     See Shen Zhihua (eds.),Outline History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1917–1991) (Revised Version), (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2011), pp. 334–447; Shen Zhihua,Helpless Choice: The Cold War and the Destiny of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (1945–1959) (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2013), pp. 626–750.

140. 140.

     See Zhang Lili,History of Relations between New China and Japan, 1949–2010 (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2011), pp. 151–153.

141. 141.

     Yang Zewei,On the History of International Law (Higher Education Press, 2011), pp. 373–374.

142. 142.

     For comments see Zhang Wenbin, “International Law: Western Traditions and Chinese Characteristics: Thoughts on Reinterpreting Zhou Gengsheng’s International Law”,Comparative Law Studies, 1993(2).

143. 143.

     For related discussion, see Zhou Gengsheng,International Law (Wuhan University Press, 2007), pp. 627–633.

144. 144.

     See Liang Xi (revised by Yang Zewei),Liang Written International Organization Law (Wuhan University Press, 2011), p. 42; Zhang Shude,Reports on China’s Return to the United Nations (Heilongjiang People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 183–330.

145. 145.

     See Shen Zhihua,Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War (Revised 3rd ed.) (Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2013), pp. 114–145.

146. 146.

     See Yang Kuisong,Research on the history of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China· 2 (Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2009), pp. 94–143; Shen Zhihua,Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War (Revised 3rd ed.) (Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2013), pp. 183–330.

147. 147.

     See Zhang Shude,Reports on China’s Return to the United Nations (Heilongjiang People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 158–175.

148. 148.

     The author maintains that in the relation with North Korea, it is necessary to draw a clear line against historical issues, correct the orientation of interests, establish basic positions, ensure national security, and maintain regional and world peace. One-sided ideology cannot be used as a criterion for judgment.

149. 149.

     Zhou Gengsheng,International Law (Wuhan University Press, 2007), p. 633.

150. 150.

     See Xu Chongli, “‘Out-of-system State’ Psychology and Poverty of China’s International Law Theory”,Forum on Political Science and Law, 2006(5).

151. 151.

     Zheng Qian and Zhang Hua,History of the People’s Republic of China 1966–1976 (People’s Publishing House, 2010), pp. 368–373; Liu Jianping,Post-war Sino-Japanese Relations: The Process and Structure of “an Unusual History” (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2010), pp. 142–247.

152. 152.

     Xie Yixian (ed.),History of China’s Contemporary Diplomacy, 1949–2009 (3rd ed.) (China Youth Press, 2009), pp. 1–287.

153. 153.

     Liang Xi (ed.), Zeng Lingliang (rev. ed.),International Law (3rd ed.) (Wuhan University Press, 2011), p. 31.

154. 154.

     John Rourke,International Politics on the World Stage, translated by Bai Yunzhen and Lei Jianfeng (World Book Publishing Company, 2012), pp. 148, 217–225, 407, 463–465, 513–514, 557–716.

155. 155.

     Louis Henkin,How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 1. It is worth noting that Henkin made such an assertion at the time of the overwhelming cloud of cold war, his courage being commendable.

156. 156.

     For example, Huang Zhixiong believes that the lack of a unified definition and identification standard for developing countries will undermine the impartiality of international law, especially of international development law. Huang Zhixiong: “Reviewing the Definition and Recognition Standards of Developing Countries from the Perspective of International Law Practice—Reflections from China’s WTO Accession Negotiations”,Jurisprudence Review, 2000(2).

157. 157.

     Shirley V. Scott,International Law in World Politics: An Introduction (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 297–302.

158. 158.

     Li Wanqiang, “On the new development of international law under the trend of globalization”,Jurisprudence Review, 2006(6).

159. 159.

     Ian Brownlie,Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed., (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 746.

160. 160.

     He Li,Vertical and Horizontal International Law—Balance of Power and Conception of Empire (Lixin Accounting Publishing House, 2013), pp. 20–21.

161. 161.

     See He Zhipeng, “Responsibility of Protection: Dawn of the Rule of Law or Recurrence of Tyranny?”,Contemporary Law Review, 2013(1); Li Shouping, “‘The Responsibility of Protection’ and the Modern International Legal Order’,Political Science and Law Forum, 2006(3).

162. 162.

     Zeng Lingliang, “Harmonious World in the Perspective of Contemporary International Law”,Jurisprudence Review, 2008(2).

163. 163.

     See Wu Guoyou,The History of the People’s Republic of China· 1977–1991 (People’s Publishing House, 2010), pp. 26–276.

164. 164.

     Zhang Lili,Diplomacy Policy-making (World Knowledge Press, 2007), pp. 308–314.

165. 165.

     Yu Minyou and Liu Heng pointed out that, on the whole, the gap between China’s international law and world international law has not been narrowed, not only is it incompatible with the needs of China’s peaceful development for international law, but also poses a major challenge to the practicing of the concept of a harmonious world. It is a historical task that the related parties and workers in the field of international law in China should undertake in the 21st century to solidly promote the process of domestic rule of law and international rule of law, creating a sound legal environment for a harmonious society and a harmonious world; and to promote the sinicization of international law in the interaction between Chinese law and international law, so that the world’s international law truly embodies the essence of the world’s major civilizations, and becomes a legal resource for safeguarding the long-term stability, fairness and justice, and harmonious development of the global community. See: Yu Minyou and Liu Heng, “On the Development Trend of International Law in China”,Journal of Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2010(5).

166. 166.

     See Yu Minyou and Liu Heng, “On the Development Trend of International Law in China”,Journal of Wuhan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2010(5); Yang Zewei, “Retrospect and Prospect of China’s International Law Studies in the 30 Years since Reform and Opening Up”,Diplomatic Review, 2008(3); Mo Shijian, “On the Internationalization of International Law: Review of China’s Construction of the Rule of Law for 30 Years”,http://www.china-review.com/sbao.asp?id=4423&aid=25311; He Zhipeng, “30 Years of China’s International Law Studies: Achievements and Experiences”,Contemporary Law Review, 2009(1). In response to the problems existing in the theoretical research of International Law, the author proposed in previous papers that various aspects such as the academic institutes, the academic atmosphere, the academic team, and the academic foundation should be promoted, and that the development of international law should be promoted through method consciousness, targeting practices, in-depth digging and other ways, so that it is in line with China’s position in the international community and the trend of China becoming a world power. He Zhipeng, “Reflections on China’s Studies of International Law”,Political Science and Jurisprudence Forum, 2010(4).

167. 167.

     Liang Xi (revised by Yang Zewei),Liang Written International Organization Law (Wuhan University Press, 2011), pp. 42–43.

168. 168.

     James V. Feinerman, “Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?”, 141The China Quarterly 186 (1995).

169. 169.

     Liang Xi, edited by Zeng Lingliang,International Law (3rd ed.) (Wuhan University Press, 2011), p. 32.

170. 170.

     Qin Yaqing et al.International System and China’s Diplomacy (World Knowledge Press, 2009), pp. 74–92; Qin Yaqing (editor in chief),Great Power Relations and China’s Diplomacy (World Knowledge Press, 2011), pp. 74–81, 133–142 page.

171. 171.

     For the practice of China’s international law, see Duan Jielong (ed.),China’s International Law Practice and Cases (Law Press China, 2011); Hou Fang et al.,60 Years of New China’s International Law (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2009).

172. 172.

     Xie Yixian (ed.),History of China’s Contemporary Diplomacy (1949–2009) (3rd ed.) (China Youth Press, 2009), pp. 288–558.

173. 173.

     See: Wang Tieya,Introduction to International Law (Peking University Press, 1998), pp. 375–400;Wang Tieya’s Selected Works (China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003), pp. 237–263; Xu Chongli, “‘Out-of-system State’ Psychology and Poverty of China’s International Law Theory”,Forum on Political Science and Law, 2006(5); Yang Zewei,Analysis of International Law (2nd ed.) (Renmin University of China Press, 2007), pp. 530–537.

174. 174.

     The era of change has provided China with new opportunities to fully play its role in the field of international law. It has also proposed new topics for China’s international law community and Chinese international law scholars on how to deal with the challenges of the times. See: Shao Shaping and Huang Ying, “The Mission of China’s International Law in the New Multilateral Era”,Journal of Jinan (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 2011(1).

175. 175.

     Some scholars questioned the lack of international law in the legal system of socialism with Chinese characteristics proposed by China in the early 20th century. See Xu Chongli, “The establishment of a socialist legal system and jurisprudence system with Chinese characteristics: Vacate the seat of international law to Wait?”Legal Institute and Social Development, 2009(6); some scholars have pointed out that our country’s constitution should clearly stipulate the relationship between international law and China’s domestic law. First of all, it should clarify China’s principled position on international law, and then clarify the way of application of international law in China. See Dong Guolu, “Application of International Law in China”,Journal of Wuhan University (Social Sciences Edition), 2002(3).

176. 176.

     Xu Chongli proposed that China should actively participate in the “law-making” activities of the WTO and strive to play the role of advocates and organizers in it; to the appeal for international “distributive justice” in the WTO, China should pay attention to alleviating the tension between “ought” goals and “real” states; China should use its own unique identity and attach importance to acting as a “bridge” between North and South countries in the WTO. See Xu Chongli, “China’s National Positioning and Basic Strategy of Responding to the WTO: An Analysis of the Subjects Intersection of International Relations Theory and International Law”,Modern Jurisprudence, 2006(6).

Authors and Affiliations

1. Research Center of Legal Theory, School of Law, Collaborative Innovation Center of Judicial Civilization, Jilin University, Changchun, China

   Zhipeng He

2. Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, Changchun, China

   Lu Sun

Corresponding author

Correspondence toZhipeng He.

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