OnApril 17, 1961, over 1400 armed Cuban exiles landed at the Bay ofPigs in Cuba in the United States-supported effort to spark theoverthrow of Fidel Castro’s regime. The invasion was an infamousdisaster: the Cuban government, forewarned, defended with a force ofmore than 20,000, and 1202 of the exiles were captured and 114 killedin action.

Historiansgenerally accept the assertion that Dwight Eisenhower planned thisinvasion and left it for his successor, John F. Kennedy, to execute. The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum website, forinstance, tells us that “before his inauguration, . . .Kennedy wasbriefed on a plan by the Central Intelligence Agency . . . developedduring the Eisenhower administration to train Cuban exiles for aninvasion of their homeland,” that “President Eisenhower approvedthe program in March 1960,” and that by November, “the operationhad trained a small army for an assault landing and guerillawarfare.” Just days into his presidency, in February 1961, Kennedyauthorized the invasion that he had inherited from Eisenhower.

The KennedyLibrary’s account does not differ from those offered by ArthurSchlesinger Jr. inA Thousand Days and Theodore Sorensen inKennedy, both books published in 1965. More recently,Howard Jones of the University of Alabama publishedThe Bay ofPigs (2008) in the Oxford University Press series “PivotalMoments in American History.” In offering essentially the standardnarrative, Jones cites only documents at the Kennedy Library and nonefrom the Eisenhower Library. One can sympathize with—if not quiteexcuse—Schlesinger and Sorensen’s attempt to deflect blame from aslain leader whom they had both worked for, but Jones’s refusal toexamine critical documents at the Eisenhower Library four decadeslater is troubling, especially since those records tell a verydifferent story.

Documentsat the Eisenhower Library show that the president allocatedapproximately $13,000,000 to the CIA in March 1960 to explore optionsto remove Castro from power. He also approved the training of around500 Cuban exiles in Guatemala. But as I have shown inThePresident and the Apprentice, he never ordered, or approvedplans for, an amphibious assault on Cuba. Kennedy did not inheritthe Bay of Pigs from Eisenhower; the idea and the planning came fromwithin his own administration.

Lastmonth I obtained an oral history that Eisenhower speechwriter MalcolmMoos conducted with the former president on November 8, 1966, butwhich had never been released. Ike points out in this interview thatbecause he “didn’t want any resentment” due to the closeness ofthe election, he had instructed his Cabinet secretaries to help inthe transition from his administration to Kennedy’s. He wanted hissuccessor and his staff to be “as well informed in advance as theypossibly could be.” The president had meetings with Kennedy onDecember 6, 1960, and January 19, 1961, in which they discussed manytopics. In the oral history, Ike comments that Kennedy was primarilyinterested in the organization of the White House, the Cabinet, theNational Security Council and staff and “had no idea of thecomplexity of the job.”

They also talked about Cuba. Eisenhower informed his guest thatsince March the United States had been training Cuban exiles “insmall units, but we had done nothing else”: “some hundreds ofrefugees” in Guatemala, “a few in Panama, and some in Florida.”Before it would move any further, Ike says, the United States waswaiting for the exiles to agree on a leader who was opposed to bothCastro and the dictator Castro had overthrown, Fulgencio Batista, andwho could unite a provisional government.

Eisenhower andKennedy did not meet again until April 22, 1961, five days after theBay of Pigs fiasco. President Kennedy sent a helicopter to Ike’sGettysburg farm to fly him to Camp David, where they met for secrettalks. The president, Ike recalls, never intimated that he hadinherited any plans from the previous administration. He toldEisenhower that he had followed the advice of the CIA and the JointChiefs of Staff, and “everybody . . . had approved” of theinvasion. Ike asked Kennedy if he had had open debates with everyoneon the pros and cons, and whether he had explored the subject withthe NSC. Kennedy smiled and replied that he had “a meeting of thepeople involved.”

As they walkedaround the compound, Ike recalls, he thought Kennedy seemed “morethan a little bewildered.” Kennedy conceded: “You really don’tknow what the complexities [are] and how tough this job is until youhave it.” He added that the state department “thought that weshould be very careful that our hand not show in this operation.”If the United States airplanes carried out airstrikes, the diplomatsargued, there would be no question of American involvement. Theypersuaded him to cancel a second bombing run in support of the exilesbecause “the Soviets would be very apt to cause trouble in Berlin.”

Ike was astoundedby this reasoning. Everyone would know that the United States beencomplicit. Where else would the invaders have gotten their ships,arms and communications? He also disagreed with the assumption thatif the United States were known to be involved in the invasion, thiswould “embolden the Soviets to do something that they would nototherwise do.”

Ike says he toldKennedy that there was “only one thing to do when you go into thiskind of thing. It must be a success.” The president replied: “Well, I assure you that hereafter if we get in anything like this,it is going to be a success.” Ike answered: “Well, I am glad tohear that.”

Having the benefitof hindsight, of course, Ike could have constructed a self-servingdescription of these meetings to deflect the blame for a disastrousmission—except that his version fits the documentary record muchbetter than the standard account. It is also more plausible foranother reason. In World War II, Eisenhower had directed the largestand most complex amphibious invasion in world history. He knew howto do “this kind of thing.” To think that he would have approvedsuch a sloppily planned operation as the Bay of Pigs attack is, onits face, absurd. The time has come for everyone—even the KennedyLibrary—to acknowledge that this debacle belongs solely to JFK.