Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962
87. Operation Order From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)0
[Here follows the text of Operation Order 25-61, Annex A, and Appendix I to Annex A. The operation order outlines the units involved in the operation, the overall situation and intent of the operation, the type of friendly and unfriendly forces involved, and the tasks to be undertaken. Annex A briefly outlines the Concept of Operations, including the stipulation that “U.S. Naval vessels and aircraft will not enter Cuban Territorial Waters or airspace (three mile limit).” Appendix I to Annex A presents, in outline form, with scheduled times listed, a detailed Table of Events from the point at which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was scheduled to embark to the transfer to landing craft off the coast of Cuba.]
[Page 204]Appendix II to Annex A
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- 1.
- DDʼs assigned to provide area coverage of theCEF will avoid overt association with theCEF ships1 as follows:
- (a)
- During daylight hours. Maintain maximum practicable range ahead ofCEF ships and use patrol courses and speeds to provide protection but not appear to be screening theCEF.
- (b)
- During hours of darkness. DDʼs may take station with respect to theCEF ships to provide adequate protection.
- (c)
- DDʼs will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area. After withdrawal ofTG 81.8.4 from Point Oldsmobile2 all DDʼs will proceed to joinCTG 81.8.
- 2.
- Surface and sub-surface rules of engagement as follows:
- (a)
- Prior to rendezvous ofCEF ships at Point Zulu:3
- (1)
- If intervention by US forces is required to protect theCEF ships from surface attack or to prevent their capture, US forces will intervene as necessary to protect theCEF ship(s).
- (2)
- This intervention will cancel the landing operation andTG 81.8 ships will take measures short of firing onCEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by theJCS upon receipt of the report of intervention.
- (3)
- Subsequent to intervention and withdrawal,TG 81.8 DDʼs will maintain close escort of theCEF ships to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order.
- (4)
- US forces will open fire only ifCEF ship(s) is attacked.
- (b)
- After rendezvous ofCEF ships at Point Zulu on D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will:
- (1)
- Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious orCastro surface craft sighted.
- (2)
- Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.
- (3)
- If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect theCEF ships, then follow the instructions set forth in paragraph 2 (a) (2) and (3) above.
- (c)
- Intervention byTG 81.8 DDʼs after theCEF convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist CTU 81.8.4 at his request.
- 3.
- TheCAP pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:
- (a)
- CAP will be stationed so that it will not appear to be covering theCEF ships.
- (b)
- Air rules of engagement are as follows:
- (1)
- Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range ofCEF ships and closing will be investigated.
- (2)
- If investigation reveals the aircraft to beCastroʼs, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that theCastro aircraft is aware of his presence.
- (3)
- IfCastro aircraft maintains course to closeCEF ship(s),CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.
- (4)
- IfCastro aircraft commences firing on theCEF ship(s) or opens its bomb bays and commences a bomb run,CAP will open fire.
[Here follow Appendix III to Annex A, which outlines reference points; Annex B, which deals with communications; and Annex C, which briefly summarizes intelligence relating to the operation.]
- Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; CO Eyes Only/By Hand. The order was signed forDennison by Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee. Special Task Group 81.8 was commanded by Rear Admiral JohnE. Clark. The Task Group was composed of: Carrier Unit 81.8.1,USSEssex (CVS-9); Destroyer Unit 81.8.2, commanded by Captain G. M. Slonim, composed ofUSSWaller (DDE-466),USSConway (DDE-507),USSCony (DDE-508),USSEaton (DDE-510),USSBache (DDE-470),USSBeale (DDE-471), andUSSMurray (DDE-576); Convoy Escort Unit 81.8.3, commanded by Captain R. P. Crutchfield, composed ofUSSEaton (DDE-510) andUSSMurray (DDE-576); Amphibious Support Unit 81.8.4, commanded by Commander R. Cousins, composed ofUSSSan Marcos (LSD-25); and Replenishment Unit 81.8.8, com-manded by Captain P.K. Blesh, composed ofUSSElokomin (AO-55).↩
- The ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force were identified in Operation Order 25-61 asBlagar andBarbara J, which were described as ex-U.S. NavyLCIs, SSCaribe, SSAtlantico, SSHouston, and SSRio Escondido, identified as WW II Liberty hulls, but it was subsequently established that they were not. TheLCIs would be flying Nicaraguan ensigns and the merchant ships would be flying Liberian ensigns.↩
- Appendix III to Annex A gives the coordinates for the codeworded reference points listed in the operation order. Point Oldsmobile is 22-01.5N, 81-02W.↩
- The coordinates for Point Zulu are not given in the operation order.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
