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Commitb1993a6

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committed
Minor editorialization for be-secure.c: fix comments and some formatting
infelicities.
1 parentc3bf3bf commitb1993a6

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1 file changed

+25
-27
lines changed

1 file changed

+25
-27
lines changed

‎src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c‎

Lines changed: 25 additions & 27 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -11,13 +11,13 @@
1111
*
1212
*
1313
* IDENTIFICATION
14-
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.100 2010/05/26 15:52:37 tgl Exp $
14+
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.101 2010/05/2616:15:57 tgl Exp $
1515
*
1616
* Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key)
1717
* will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database
1818
* backend can restart automatically, it is important that
1919
* we select an algorithm that continues to provide confidentiality
20-
* even if the attacker has the server's private key.Empheral
20+
* even if the attacker has the server's private key.Ephemeral
2121
* DH (EDH) keys provide this, and in fact provide Perfect Forward
2222
* Secrecy (PFS) except for situations where the session can
2323
* be hijacked during a periodic handshake/renegotiation.
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
113113
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
114114

115115
/*
116-
*Hardcoded DH parameters, used inempheral DH keying.
116+
*Hardcoded DH parameters, used inephemeral DH keying.
117117
*As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
118118
*sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
119119
*so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
@@ -411,7 +411,6 @@ secure_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
411411
* directly so it gets passed through the socket/signals layer on Win32.
412412
*
413413
* They are closely modelled on the original socket implementations in OpenSSL.
414-
*
415414
*/
416415

417416
staticboolmy_bio_initialized= false;
@@ -501,7 +500,7 @@ my_SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
501500
*to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
502501
*what we expect it to contain.
503502
*/
504-
staticDH*
503+
staticDH*
505504
load_dh_file(intkeylength)
506505
{
507506
FILE*fp;
@@ -559,7 +558,7 @@ load_dh_file(int keylength)
559558
*To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
560559
*exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
561560
*/
562-
staticDH*
561+
staticDH*
563562
load_dh_buffer(constchar*buffer,size_tlen)
564563
{
565564
BIO*bio;
@@ -579,7 +578,7 @@ load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
579578
}
580579

581580
/*
582-
*Generate anempheral DH key. Because this can take a long
581+
*Generate anephemeral DH key. Because this can take a long
583582
*time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
584583
*common key sizes.
585584
*
@@ -591,7 +590,7 @@ load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
591590
*the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
592591
*the information provided.
593592
*/
594-
staticDH*
593+
staticDH*
595594
tmp_dh_cb(SSL*s,intis_export,intkeylength)
596595
{
597596
DH*r=NULL;
@@ -737,7 +736,7 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
737736
SSLerrmessage())));
738737

739738
/*
740-
* Load and verify certificate and private key
739+
* Load and verifyserver'scertificate and private key
741740
*/
742741
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_context,
743742
SERVER_CERT_FILE)!=1)
@@ -782,62 +781,59 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
782781
SSLerrmessage())));
783782
}
784783

785-
/* set upempheral DH keys */
784+
/* set upephemeral DH keys, and disallow SSL v2 while at it */
786785
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context,tmp_dh_cb);
787786
SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context,SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE |SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
788787

789-
/*setup the allowed cipher list */
788+
/*set up the allowed cipher list */
790789
if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_context,SSLCipherSuites)!=1)
791790
elog(FATAL,"could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");
792791

793792
/*
794793
* Attempt to load CA store, so we can verify client certificates if
795794
* needed.
796795
*/
797-
if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE,R_OK))
798-
{
799-
ssl_loaded_verify_locations= false;
796+
ssl_loaded_verify_locations= false;
800797

798+
if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE,R_OK)!=0)
799+
{
801800
/*
802-
* If root certificate file simply not found. Don't log an error here,
801+
* If root certificate file simply not found, don't log an error here,
803802
* because it's quite likely the user isn't planning on using client
804803
* certificates. If we can't access it for other reasons, it is an
805804
* error.
806805
*/
807806
if (errno!=ENOENT)
808-
{
809807
ereport(FATAL,
810808
(errmsg("could not access root certificate file \"%s\": %m",
811809
ROOT_CERT_FILE)));
812-
}
813810
}
814811
elseif (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context,ROOT_CERT_FILE,NULL)!=1||
815812
(root_cert_list=SSL_load_client_CA_file(ROOT_CERT_FILE))==NULL)
816813
{
817814
/*
818815
* File was there, but we could not load it. This means the file is
819-
* somehow broken, and we cannot do verification at all - so abort
820-
* here.
816+
* somehow broken, and we cannot do verification at all - so fail.
821817
*/
822-
ssl_loaded_verify_locations= false;
823818
ereport(FATAL,
824819
(errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
825820
ROOT_CERT_FILE,SSLerrmessage())));
826821
}
827822
else
828823
{
829-
/*
830-
*Check the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) if file exists.
831-
* http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci803160,
832-
* 00.html
824+
/*----------
825+
*Load the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) if file exists.
826+
* http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci803160,00.html
827+
*----------
833828
*/
834829
X509_STORE*cvstore=SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_context);
835830

836831
if (cvstore)
837832
{
838833
/* Set the flags to check against the complete CRL chain */
839834
if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore,ROOT_CRL_FILE,NULL)==1)
840-
/* OpenSSL 0.96 does not support X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK */
835+
{
836+
/* OpenSSL 0.96 does not support X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK */
841837
#ifdefX509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
842838
X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
843839
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
@@ -847,6 +843,7 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
847843
ROOT_CRL_FILE),
848844
errdetail("SSL library does not support certificate revocation lists.")));
849845
#endif
846+
}
850847
else
851848
{
852849
/* Not fatal - we do not require CRL */
@@ -858,14 +855,15 @@ initialize_SSL(void)
858855

859856
/*
860857
* Always ask for SSL client cert, but don't fail if it's not
861-
* presented.We'llfaillater in this case, based on what we find
862-
* in pg_hba.conf.
858+
* presented. We mightfailsuch connections later, depending on
859+
*what we findin pg_hba.conf.
863860
*/
864861
SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
865862
(SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
866863
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
867864
verify_cb);
868865

866+
/* Set flag to remember CA store is successfully loaded */
869867
ssl_loaded_verify_locations= true;
870868
}
871869

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