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Commit55d0532

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SSL support for ephemeral DH keys.
As the comment headers in be-secure.c discusses, EPH preservesconfidentiality even if the static private key (which is usuallykept unencrypted) is compromised.Because of the value of this, common default values are hard-codedto protect the confidentiality of the data even if an attackersuccessfully deletes or modifies the external file.Bear Giles
1 parent1957042 commit55d0532

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2 files changed

+476
-5
lines changed

2 files changed

+476
-5
lines changed

‎src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c

Lines changed: 257 additions & 3 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -11,8 +11,34 @@
1111
*
1212
*
1313
* IDENTIFICATION
14-
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.1 2002/06/14 04:23:17 momjian Exp $
15-
*
14+
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.2 2002/06/14 04:31:49 momjian Exp $
15+
*
16+
* Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key)
17+
* will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database
18+
* backend can restart automatically, it is important that
19+
* we select an algorithm that continues to provide confidentiality
20+
* even if the attacker has the server's private key. Empheral
21+
* DH (EDH) keys provide this, and in fact provide Perfect Forward
22+
* Secrecy (PFS) except for situations where the session can
23+
* be hijacked during a periodic handshake/renegotiation.
24+
* Even that backdoor can be closed if client certificates
25+
* are used (since the imposter will be unable to successfully
26+
* complete renegotiation).
27+
*
28+
* N.B., the static private key should still be protected to
29+
* the largest extent possible, to minimize the risk of
30+
* impersonations.
31+
*
32+
* Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and
33+
* clients to use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital
34+
* signatures, not encryption, and are often acceptable in
35+
* jurisdictions where RSA keys are unacceptable.
36+
*
37+
* The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to
38+
* use ssldump(1) if there's a problem establishing an SSL
39+
* session. In this case you'll need to temporarily disable
40+
* EDH by commenting out the callback.
41+
*
1642
* PATCH LEVEL
1743
* milestone 1: fix basic coding errors
1844
* [*] existing SSL code pulled out of existing files.
@@ -25,8 +51,9 @@
2551
*
2652
* milestone 3: improve confidentially, support perfect forward secrecy
2753
* [ ] use 'random' file, read from '/dev/urandom?'
28-
* [] emphermal DH keys, default values
54+
* [*] emphermal DH keys, default values
2955
* [ ] periodic renegotiation
56+
* [ ] private key permissions
3057
*
3158
* milestone 4: provide endpoint authentication (client)
3259
* [ ] server verifies client certificates
@@ -74,6 +101,7 @@
74101
#ifdefUSE_SSL
75102
#include<openssl/ssl.h>
76103
#include<openssl/e_os.h>
104+
#include<openssl/dh.h>
77105
#endif
78106

79107
externvoidExitPostmaster(int);
@@ -87,6 +115,9 @@ ssize_t secure_read(Port *, void *ptr, size_t len);
87115
ssize_tsecure_write(Port*,constvoid*ptr,size_tlen);
88116

89117
#ifdefUSE_SSL
118+
staticDH*load_dh_file(intkeylength);
119+
staticDH*load_dh_buffer(constchar*,size_t);
120+
staticDH*tmp_dh_cb(SSL*s,intis_export,intkeylength);
90121
staticintinitialize_SSL(void);
91122
staticvoiddestroy_SSL(void);
92123
staticintopen_server_SSL(Port*);
@@ -98,6 +129,70 @@ static const char *SSLerrmessage(void);
98129
staticSSL_CTX*SSL_context=NULL;
99130
#endif
100131

132+
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
133+
/* Hardcoded values */
134+
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
135+
136+
/*
137+
*Hardcoded DH parameters, used in empheral DH keying.
138+
*As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
139+
*sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
140+
*so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
141+
*EDH even if the DBA... or an attacker... deletes the
142+
*$DataDir/dh*.pem files.
143+
*
144+
*We could refuse SSL connections unless a good DH parameter
145+
*file exists, but some clients may quietly renegotiate an
146+
*unsecured connection without fully informing the user.
147+
*Very uncool.
148+
*
149+
*Alternately, the backend could attempt to load these files
150+
*on startup if SSL is enabled - and refuse to start if any
151+
*do not exist - but this would tend to piss off DBAs.
152+
*
153+
*If you want to create your own hardcoded DH parameters
154+
*for fun and profit, review "Assigned Number for SKIP
155+
*Protocols" (http://www.skip-vpn.org/spec/numbers.html)
156+
*for suggestions.
157+
*/
158+
staticconstcharfile_dh512[]=
159+
"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
160+
MEYCQQD1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWak\n\
161+
XUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpKgVfAgEC\n\
162+
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
163+
164+
staticconstcharfile_dh1024[]=
165+
"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
166+
MIGHAoGBAPSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY7288kjwEPwpVsY\n\
167+
jY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6\n\
168+
ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpL3jHAgEC\n\
169+
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
170+
171+
staticconstcharfile_dh2048[]=
172+
"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
173+
MIIBCAKCAQEA9kJXtwh/CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTpj0BV\n\
174+
89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39uK50\n\
175+
T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1YTknb\n\
176+
zSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUdD3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9fBdX\n\
177+
Q6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGxKUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCbAkbT\n\
178+
CD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwIBAg==\n\
179+
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
180+
181+
staticconstcharfile_dh4096[]=
182+
"-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
183+
MIICCAKCAgEA+hRyUsFN4VpJ1O8JLcCo/VWr19k3BCgJ4uk+d+KhehjdRqNDNyOQ\n\
184+
l/MOyQNQfWXPeGKmOmIig6Ev/nm6Nf9Z2B1h3R4hExf+zTiHnvVPeRBhjdQi81rt\n\
185+
Xeoh6TNrSBIKIHfUJWBh3va0TxxjQIs6IZOLeVNRLMqzeylWqMf49HsIXqbcokUS\n\
186+
Vt1BkvLdW48j8PPv5DsKRN3tloTxqDJGo9tKvj1Fuk74A+Xda1kNhB7KFlqMyN98\n\
187+
VETEJ6c7KpfOo30mnK30wqw3S8OtaIR/maYX72tGOno2ehFDkq3pnPtEbD2CScxc\n\
188+
alJC+EL7RPk5c/tgeTvCngvc1KZn92Y//EI7G9tPZtylj2b56sHtMftIoYJ9+ODM\n\
189+
sccD5Piz/rejE3Ome8EOOceUSCYAhXn8b3qvxVI1ddd1pED6FHRhFvLrZxFvBEM9\n\
190+
ERRMp5QqOaHJkM+Dxv8Cj6MqrCbfC4u+ZErxodzuusgDgvZiLF22uxMZbobFWyte\n\
191+
OvOzKGtwcTqO/1wV5gKkzu1ZVswVUQd5Gg8lJicwqRWyyNRczDDoG9jVDxmogKTH\n\
192+
AaqLulO7R8Ifa1SwF2DteSGVtgWEN8gDpN3RBmmPTDngyF2DHb5qmpnznwtFKdTL\n\
193+
KWbuHn491xNO25CQWMtem80uKw+pTnisBRF/454n1Jnhub144YRBoN8CAQI=\n\
194+
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
195+
101196
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
102197
/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
103198
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -245,6 +340,161 @@ secure_write (Port *port, const void *ptr, size_t len)
245340
/* SSL specific code */
246341
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
247342
#ifdefUSE_SSL
343+
/*
344+
*Load precomputed DH parameters.
345+
*
346+
*To prevent "downgrade" attacks, we perform a number of checks
347+
*to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
348+
*what we expect it to contain.
349+
*/
350+
staticDH*
351+
load_dh_file (intkeylength)
352+
{
353+
FILE*fp;
354+
charfnbuf[2048];
355+
DH*dh=NULL;
356+
intcodes;
357+
358+
/* attempt to open file. It's not an error if it doesn't exist. */
359+
snprintf(fnbuf,sizeoffnbuf,"%s/dh%d.pem",DataDir,keylength);
360+
if ((fp=fopen(fnbuf,"r"))==NULL)
361+
returnNULL;
362+
363+
/*flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_SH); */
364+
dh=PEM_read_DHparams(fp,NULL,NULL,NULL);
365+
/*flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_UN); */
366+
fclose(fp);
367+
368+
/* is the prime the correct size? */
369+
if (dh!=NULL&&8*DH_size(dh)<keylength)
370+
{
371+
elog(DEBUG,"DH errors (%s): %d bits expected, %d bits found",
372+
fnbuf,keylength,8*DH_size(dh));
373+
dh=NULL;
374+
}
375+
376+
/* make sure the DH parameters are usable */
377+
if (dh!=NULL)
378+
{
379+
if (DH_check(dh,&codes))
380+
{
381+
elog(DEBUG,"DH_check error (%s): %s",fnbuf,SSLerrmessage());
382+
returnNULL;
383+
}
384+
if (codes&DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
385+
{
386+
elog(DEBUG,"DH error (%s): p is not prime",fnbuf);
387+
returnNULL;
388+
}
389+
if ((codes&DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR)&&
390+
(codes&DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME))
391+
{
392+
elog(DEBUG,
393+
"DH error (%s): neither suitable generator or safe prime",
394+
fnbuf);
395+
returnNULL;
396+
}
397+
}
398+
399+
returndh;
400+
}
401+
402+
/*
403+
*Load hardcoded DH parameters.
404+
*
405+
*To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
406+
*exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
407+
*/
408+
staticDH*
409+
load_dh_buffer (constchar*buffer,size_tlen)
410+
{
411+
BIO*bio;
412+
DH*dh=NULL;
413+
414+
bio=BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)buffer,len);
415+
if (bio==NULL)
416+
returnNULL;
417+
dh=PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
418+
if (dh==NULL)
419+
elog(DEBUG,"DH load buffer: %s",SSLerrmessage());
420+
BIO_free(bio);
421+
422+
returndh;
423+
}
424+
425+
/*
426+
*Generate an empheral DH key. Because this can take a long
427+
*time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
428+
*common key sizes.
429+
*
430+
*Since few sites will bother to precompute these parameter
431+
*files, we also provide a fallback to the parameters provided
432+
*by the OpenSSL project.
433+
*
434+
*These values can be static (once loaded or computed) since
435+
*the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
436+
*the information provided.
437+
*/
438+
staticDH*
439+
tmp_dh_cb (SSL*s,intis_export,intkeylength)
440+
{
441+
DH*r=NULL;
442+
staticDH*dh=NULL;
443+
staticDH*dh512=NULL;
444+
staticDH*dh1024=NULL;
445+
staticDH*dh2048=NULL;
446+
staticDH*dh4096=NULL;
447+
448+
switch (keylength)
449+
{
450+
case512:
451+
if (dh512==NULL)
452+
dh512=load_dh_file(keylength);
453+
if (dh512==NULL)
454+
dh512=load_dh_buffer(file_dh512,sizeoffile_dh512);
455+
r=dh512;
456+
break;
457+
458+
case1024:
459+
if (dh1024==NULL)
460+
dh1024=load_dh_file(keylength);
461+
if (dh1024==NULL)
462+
dh1024=load_dh_buffer(file_dh1024,sizeoffile_dh1024);
463+
r=dh1024;
464+
break;
465+
466+
case2048:
467+
if (dh2048==NULL)
468+
dh2048=load_dh_file(keylength);
469+
if (dh2048==NULL)
470+
dh2048=load_dh_buffer(file_dh2048,sizeoffile_dh2048);
471+
r=dh2048;
472+
break;
473+
474+
case4096:
475+
if (dh4096==NULL)
476+
dh4096=load_dh_file(keylength);
477+
if (dh4096==NULL)
478+
dh4096=load_dh_buffer(file_dh4096,sizeoffile_dh4096);
479+
r=dh4096;
480+
break;
481+
482+
default:
483+
if (dh==NULL)
484+
dh=load_dh_file(keylength);
485+
r=dh;
486+
}
487+
488+
/* this may take a long time, but it may be necessary... */
489+
if (r==NULL||8*DH_size(r)<keylength)
490+
{
491+
elog(DEBUG,"DH: generating parameters (%d bits)....",keylength);
492+
r=DH_generate_parameters(keylength,DH_GENERATOR_2,NULL,NULL);
493+
}
494+
495+
returnr;
496+
}
497+
248498
/*
249499
*Initialize global SSL context.
250500
*/
@@ -290,6 +540,10 @@ initialize_SSL (void)
290540
}
291541
}
292542

543+
/* set up empheral DH keys */
544+
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context,tmp_dh_cb);
545+
SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context,SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
546+
293547
return0;
294548
}
295549

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