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safe mode to disable executing any external programs except git#2029
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119 changes: 111 additions & 8 deletionsgit/cmd.py
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Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
---|---|---|
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ | ||
CommandError, | ||
GitCommandError, | ||
GitCommandNotFound, | ||
UnsafeExecutionError, | ||
UnsafeOptionError, | ||
UnsafeProtocolError, | ||
) | ||
@@ -627,6 +628,7 @@ class Git(metaclass=_GitMeta): | ||
__slots__ = ( | ||
"_working_dir", | ||
"_safe", | ||
"cat_file_all", | ||
"cat_file_header", | ||
"_version_info", | ||
@@ -961,17 +963,56 @@ def check_unsafe_options(cls, options: List[str], unsafe_options: List[str]) -> | ||
CatFileContentStream: TypeAlias = _CatFileContentStream | ||
def __init__(self, working_dir: Union[None, PathLike] = None, safe: bool = False) -> None: | ||
"""Initialize this instance with: | ||
:param working_dir: | ||
Git directory we should work in. If ``None``, we always work in the current | ||
directory as returned by :func:`os.getcwd`. | ||
This is meant to be the working tree directory if available, or the | ||
``.git`` directory in case of bare repositories. | ||
:param safe: | ||
Lock down the configuration to make it as safe as possible | ||
when working with publicly accessible, untrusted | ||
repositories. This disables all known options that can run | ||
external programs and limits networking to the HTTP protocol | ||
via ``https://`` URLs. This might not cover Git config | ||
options that were added since this was implemented, or | ||
options that have unknown exploit vectors. It is a best | ||
effort defense rather than an exhaustive protection measure. | ||
In order to make this more likely to work with submodules, | ||
some attempts are made to rewrite remote URLs to ``https://`` | ||
using `insteadOf` in the config. This might not work on all | ||
projects, so submodules should always use ``https://`` URLs. | ||
:envvar:`GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT` is set to `false` and these | ||
environment variables are forced to `/bin/true`: | ||
:envvar:`GIT_ASKPASS`, :envvar:`GIT_EDITOR`, | ||
:envvar:`GIT_PAGER`, :envvar:`GIT_SSH`, | ||
:envvar:`GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, and :envvar:`SSH_ASKPASS`. | ||
Git config options are supplied via the command line to set | ||
up key parts of safe mode. | ||
- Direct options for executing external commands are set to ``/bin/true``: | ||
``core.askpass``, ``core.sshCommand`` and ``credential.helper``. | ||
- External password prompts are disabled by skipping authentication using | ||
``http.emptyAuth=true``. | ||
- Any use of an fsmonitor daemon is disabled using ``core.fsmonitor=false``. | ||
- Hook scripts are disabled using ``core.hooksPath=/dev/null``. | ||
It was not possible to cover all config items that might execute an external | ||
command, for example, ``receive.procReceiveRefs``, | ||
``uploadpack.packObjectsHook`` and ``remote.<name>.vcs``. | ||
""" | ||
super().__init__() | ||
self._working_dir = expand_path(working_dir) | ||
self._safe = safe | ||
self._git_options: Union[List[str], Tuple[str, ...]] = () | ||
self._persistent_git_options: List[str] = [] | ||
@@ -1218,6 +1259,8 @@ def execute( | ||
:raise git.exc.GitCommandError: | ||
:raise git.exc.UnsafeExecutionError: | ||
:note: | ||
If you add additional keyword arguments to the signature of this method, you | ||
must update the ``execute_kwargs`` variable housed in this module. | ||
@@ -1227,6 +1270,64 @@ def execute( | ||
if self.GIT_PYTHON_TRACE and (self.GIT_PYTHON_TRACE != "full" or as_process): | ||
_logger.info(" ".join(redacted_command)) | ||
if shell is None: | ||
# Get the value of USE_SHELL with no deprecation warning. Do this without | ||
# warnings.catch_warnings, to avoid a race condition with application code | ||
# configuring warnings. The value could be looked up in type(self).__dict__ | ||
# or Git.__dict__, but those can break under some circumstances. This works | ||
# the same as self.USE_SHELL in more situations; see Git.__getattribute__. | ||
shell = super().__getattribute__("USE_SHELL") | ||
if self._safe: | ||
if shell: | ||
raise UnsafeExecutionError( | ||
redacted_command, | ||
"Command cannot be executed in a shell when in safe mode.", | ||
) | ||
if not isinstance(command, Sequence): | ||
raise UnsafeExecutionError( | ||
redacted_command, | ||
"Command must be a Sequence to be executed in safe mode.", | ||
) | ||
if command[0] != self.GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE: | ||
raise UnsafeExecutionError( | ||
redacted_command, | ||
f'Only "{self.GIT_PYTHON_GIT_EXECUTABLE}" can be executed when in safe mode.', | ||
) | ||
config_args = [ | ||
eighthave marked this conversation as resolved. Show resolvedHide resolvedUh oh!There was an error while loading.Please reload this page. | ||
"-c", | ||
"core.askpass=/bin/true", | ||
"-c", | ||
"core.fsmonitor=false", | ||
"-c", | ||
"core.hooksPath=/dev/null", | ||
"-c", | ||
"core.sshCommand=/bin/true", | ||
"-c", | ||
"credential.helper=/bin/true", | ||
"-c", | ||
"http.emptyAuth=true", | ||
"-c", | ||
"protocol.allow=never", | ||
"-c", | ||
"protocol.https.allow=always", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://bitbucket.org/.insteadOf=git@bitbucket.org:", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://codeberg.org/.insteadOf=git@codeberg.org:", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://github.com/.insteadOf=git@github.com:", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://gitlab.com/.insteadOf=git@gitlab.com:", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://.insteadOf=git://", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://.insteadOf=http://", | ||
"-c", | ||
"url.https://.insteadOf=ssh://", | ||
] | ||
command = [command.pop(0)] + config_args + command | ||
# Allow the user to have the command executed in their working dir. | ||
try: | ||
cwd = self._working_dir or os.getcwd() # type: Union[None, str] | ||
@@ -1244,6 +1345,15 @@ def execute( | ||
# just to be sure. | ||
env["LANGUAGE"] = "C" | ||
env["LC_ALL"] = "C" | ||
# Globally disable things that can execute commands, including password prompts. | ||
if self._safe: | ||
env["GIT_ASKPASS"] = "/bin/true" | ||
env["GIT_EDITOR"] = "/bin/true" | ||
env["GIT_PAGER"] = "/bin/true" | ||
env["GIT_SSH"] = "/bin/true" | ||
env["GIT_SSH_COMMAND"] = "/bin/true" | ||
env["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "false" | ||
env["SSH_ASKPASS"] = "/bin/true" | ||
env.update(self._environment) | ||
if inline_env is not None: | ||
env.update(inline_env) | ||
@@ -1260,13 +1370,6 @@ def execute( | ||
# END handle | ||
stdout_sink = PIPE if with_stdout else getattr(subprocess, "DEVNULL", None) or open(os.devnull, "wb") | ||
_logger.debug( | ||
"Popen(%s, cwd=%s, stdin=%s, shell=%s, universal_newlines=%s)", | ||
redacted_command, | ||
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletionsgit/exc.py
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