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ThePersistedGrant.Data field contains sensitive authorization code information that gets serialized to Redis. While the PR description mentions "all information encrypted in protected payload," I don't see explicit encryption handling in the code:

• DistributedCachePersistedGrantStore.cs:96-98 stores the grant directly via_cache.SetAsync(grant.Key, grant, ...)
• FusionCache usesFusionCacheSystemTextJsonSerializer by default

Questions:

1. Does Duende IdentityServer pre-encrypt theData field before passing it toIPersistedGrantStore.StoreAsync()?
2. Is Redis configured with TLS/encryption in transit?
3. Should we add an additional encryption layer at the cache boundary?

Given Bitwarden's zero-knowledge principles and the security-critical nature of authorization codes, explicit documentation or verification of the encryption strategy would strengthen confidence.

Codecov reports 2 lines missing coverage inServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:86 andServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:90:

services.AddExtendedCache("sso-grants",globalSettings);// ...services.AddSingleton<IPersistedGrantStore,DistributedCachePersistedGrantStore>();

While these are simple registration calls, integration tests verifying:

1. The keyed service resolves correctly with[FromKeyedServices("sso-grants")]
2. The cache key prefix is applied properly (sso-grants:)
3. Graceful fallback to in-memory when Redis is unavailable

would provide confidence in the DI wiring, especially given the keyed services pattern.

InDistributedCachePersistedGrantStore.cs:43-46:

if(grant.Expiration.HasValue&&grant.Expiration.Value<DateTime.UtcNow){awaitRemoveAsync(key);returnnull;}

The condition uses< (strictly less than), meaning a grant expiring at the exact current UTC moment would be considered valid. While this is likely acceptable given the sub-second execution time, using<= would be more conservative and align with typical expiration semantics where "expired at time T" means "invalid at time T."

Similarly inStoreAsync (line 89), the check is<= TimeSpan.Zero. Consider whether grants expiring exactly now should be stored.

ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs:1-2 has nullable reference types disabled:

// FIXME: Update this file to be null safe and then delete the line below#nullable disable

This conflicts with ADR-0024 which mandates nullable reference types. While this PR doesn't introduce the issue, adding new code to a file marked for nullable compliance would be a good opportunity to address the FIXME, or at minimum, add a TODO comment acknowledging this tech debt.

The PR description includes excellent video demonstrations but could strengthen the "Test plan" section in the checklist. Consider adding:

Test Plan:

• ✅ Unit tests cover all store operations (257 lines of tests)
• ✅ Manual testing: In-memory cache verified (video)
• ✅ Manual testing: Redis cache verified with TTL expiration (video)
• ✅ Verified cache key scoping prevents conflicts (sso-grant* namespace)
• ⏱️ Load testing: Horizontal scaling validation (if applicable)
• 🔒 Security: Verified grant data encryption in Redis (if applicable)