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• Explainer: Locale Extensions
  • Table of Contents
  • Authors
  • Participate
  • Motivation
  • Overview
  • Summary of Proposed Supported Locale Extension Combinations
  • Fingerprinting and Internationalization
    • Fingerprinting Mitigation
    • Overview of Mitigation Strategies
  • Example tags: Preferred first day of week, preferred clock, preferred temperature measurement unit
    • Commonly Used Locale Defaults
    • Example: People who have traveled from one region to another
      • Revealed Information as Conditioned on Browser Localization
    • Example: People with preferences that differ from all commonly used locale defaultsThe 'nu' tagBest-fit preference strings
  • Mechanisms
    • Agent-Driven Negotiation: JavaScript API
      • IDL
      • Proposed Syntax
    • Proactive Content Negotiation with Client Hints
      • Client Hint Header Fields
      • Usage Example
  • Final Notes on Security and Privacy
  • FAQ

• Ben Allen

• GitHub repository
• Issue tracker

Please post feedback on the issue tracker above or via email to Ben Allen or Shane Carr.

On the Web platform, content localization is dependent only upon a user's language or region. This behavior can result in annoyance, frustration, offense, or even unintelligibility for some users. This proposal addresses common situations where users prefer locale-related tailorings that differ from the locale defaults. Consider the following issues:

1. People who have moved to the United States often prefer temperatures on weather sites be displayed in Celsius rather than Fahrenheit.
2. In some locales multiple numbering systems are in common use. Users seeking content in these locales may find one or the other of these numbering systems not immediately intelligible, and therefore need a way to request content they can read.
3. An English-speaking user from Japan receives non-localized content in 'en-US'. They can read English, but nevertheless prefer seeing a 24-hour clock and calendars that have Monday, rather than Sunday, as the first day of the week.
4. More generally: 'en-US' is currently the typical untranslated language for software, even though 'en-US' has region-specific formatting patterns that differ from those used globally. As a result, often text with untranslated UI strings will be displayed in a language accessible to all users who speak English, but with temperatures and times represented in globally uncommon scales.
5. Users who have emigrated from one country to another may want to set their language dialect to one they can understand, but prefer that dates, times, and numbers be rendered according to local standards.

In the native environment these problems are easily solved, since users can specify their preferences in their system settings. However, offering the full amount of flexibility that the native environment allows is not possible in the often hostile Web environment. This is because when a user's preferences as specified in their OS settings are uncommon, or even just very detailed, revealing them can result in privacy loss. Moreover, because users are likely to set the same localization-related preferences on all of their devices, which means that exposing these settings can potentially be used for cross-device tracking.

This proposal defines a mechanism for web clients to read user preferences from their operating system and then relay what is ideally a safe subset of those preferences to servers, while likewise ideally refraining from sending combinations of preferences that are likely to substantially individuate the user. We aim to allow for significantly more complete — but not necessarily perfect — localization that respects user preferences insofar as possible while only exposing relatively low-surprisal information about users.

Unicode Extensions for BCP 47 can be used to append additional information needed to identify locales to the end of language identifiers. Enabling limited support for a carefully selected subset of BCP tags can help solve problems like the ones above.

The proposal includes two mechanisms for conveying OS settings to servers:

Forclient-side applications,a browser API that fetches this information from the different platform-specific APIs.

Forserver-side applications,a set ofClient Hints request header fields. Servers indicate the specific proactive content negotiation headers they accept in theAccept-CH response header.

The proposed API andClient Hints infrastructure are straightforward: the API provides methods for accessing each individual preference separately, and theClient Hints headers also provide a means to request each individual preference separately. There is no provided way in either mechanism to request all preferences at once — each preference must be explicitly requested. Although this proposal discusses prefered localization tailorings in terms of Unicode Extensions for BCP 47, there is no way for servers to request the entire extension string at once.

Below is an incomplete list of preferences that could be included:

1. Preferred numbering system (Devanāgari, Bengali, Eastern Arabic, etc.). This option corresponds to thenu Unicode Extensions for BCP 47 tag.
2. Preferred hour cycle (12-hour clock or 24-hour clock). This option corresponds to thehc tag
3. Preferred temperature measurement unit (Celsius or Fahrenheit). This option corresponds to themu tag.
4. Preferred calendar (Gregorian, Islamic, Buddhist Solar, etc.). This option corresponds to theca tag.
5. Preferred first day of week for calendars. This option corresponds to thefw tag

As stated previously, both of themechanisms for conveying locale preferences to servers are straightforward. Most of the complexity involved in actualizing this proposal pertains to determining in advance what combinations of preferences can be safely exposed to servers without impacting user privacy, or what combinations of preferences are worth exposing to servers despite their impacts on user privacy.

Our goal is to offer users to request the following types of content tailorings:

• Any combination of values for the supported extension tags that matches the default settings in any one of the locale or locales sent in the client'sAccept-Language header.
• Between one and ten alternate options for each browser localization, taken from the alternate OS settings most
• Values for thenu tag that, if not honored, would result in users receiving unintelligible content.

A top priority is allowing users to specify alternate numbering systems in languages where multiple commonly used numbering systems exist. Another key priority is ensuring that whatever level of flexibility is extended to users of commonly spoken languages is also extended to users from smaller cultural/linguistic communities.

The standard practice in explainers is to put a section on security and privacy toward the end. In this explainer we have moved it up to nearly the start. This is because the proposal could potentially expose sensitive user data that is not exposed elsewhere in the Web stack. Unless great care is taken in constructing the list of available options, this revealed data can result in users being easily fingerprinted.

Fingerprinting allows sites to track users without their knowledge or consent, thereby meaningfully violating user privacy, and mitigating fingerprinting risk is our top concern. Data gathered by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) for Peter Eckersley's 2010 paperHow Unique is your Browser? estimated that 83.6% of browsers visiting the EFF's "Panopticlick" site bore a unique fingerprint. Some improvements have been made in the intervening years. Notably, the end of Adobe Flash and Java applets as Web technologies has foreclosed a number of potential fingerprinting attacks, and substantial measures have been taken to mitigate the risk of font-based fingerprinting. Nevertheless, browsers today are nearly as fingerprintable as browsers in 2010 were. The process of reducing the potential for fingerprinting on the Web platform is necessarily a long and slow one — a process measured in decades rather than years — involving the gradual replacement of technologies that expose more user information with technologies that expose less.

Fingerprinting is a particularly diabolical problem in the context of internationalization. The most straightforward way to prevent fingerprinting is to either send less information, or to make it impossible to send rare combinations of settings. However, equitable internationalization requires providing access to content in less commonly used locales, with this content appropriately tailored for all communities of users regardless of the size of that community -- which is to say, it requires accommodating many types of rare request.

To further complicate the problem, there can be security implications even when the number of bits of information revealed through requesting properly localized content is relatively low. This is because the information we reveal could give strong indicators of the identity categories the user falls into, even when the overall entropy reduction is not sufficient for trackers to fully individuate the user, and because the information we reveal is specifically about the user rather than their device, and so can be used for cross-device tracking.

TheMitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications WICG Interest Group Note, the best practices from which were used as a primary framework in the design of this proposal, observes that there exists no plausible way to eliminate fingerprinting. We can at mostmitigate fingerprinting, either by reducing the available surface for fingerprinting by revealing less identifying information, or by ensuring that whatever fingerprinting occurs is in some way observable ("active fingerprinting") instead of invisible to the user ("passive fingerprinting"). By ensuring that the only fingerprinting opportunities made available require action taken by the server, it becomes more possible to control fingerprinting through regulatory means. It is worth noting that use of browser fingerprints to track users without permission isonly questionably legal in the European Union.

Our primary strategies for mitigating fingerprinting risk are as follows:

• Ensuring that the only fingerprinting surfaces we reveal are active fingerprinting surfaces.

We accomplish this by ensuring that servers wishing to make use of user OS preferences must request those preferences one-by-one, rather than receiving all of them at once. Servers requesting more preference-related information than they actually need in order to attempt to fingerprint the client will at least be doing so in a detectable way.

• The locale or locales revealed through theAccept-Language header and throughnavigator.languages

Calculating the entropy lost through exposing content tailoring preferences is not straightforward, as the distribution of preferences is highly unequal, As such, determining the specific combinations of valid options will require extensive user research data.

The Unicode Locale Extension tagsfw,hc, andmu can be used to request a preferred first day of week, hour cycle, and temperature measurement unit. These three tags are useful to consider together. This is because there is a limited set of commonly used options for each of these tags:

• No locale has as its default clock anything buth12 (hours from 1 to 12) orh23 (hours from 0 to 23).
• No locale defaults to anything butcelsius orfahrenhe formu.
• No locale defaults to anything butmon,fri,sat, orsun as its first day, with only one region (the Maldives) defaulting tofri.

As such, for most users their combination of preferred settings for these three options will be shared with hundreds of millions or even billions of other people. Note, though, that the combination chosen may be rare for the user's browser localization, and so therefore might not be shareable.

CLDR's supplemental data provides information on the default settings for these options for each region, alongside information on the population of the region, the languages spoken in the region, and the literary rate of the region. To get avery rough estimate — any real estimate would require user research — of the number of people in the world who would have the same settings forfw,hc, andmu, we've multiplied the population of each region by the literacy rate of that region, and summed the literate populations of the regions which by default use those settings.

The three strings that rarely appear in region defaults reflect, in order, the default preferences in the Maldives, the default preferences in Belize, and the default preferences in both the Cayman Islands and Palau. All of the regions other than the United States that are listed as using a string indicating a preference for the Fahrenheit scale only use Fahrenheit for referring to weather.

Although the likelihood of a user's browser locale defaults matching one or another of the particular strings is not equal, the total entropy lost through revealing one of these strings is relatively low. Provided we disallow use of the three rare strings at the bottom of the table, we find that this distribution has 2.18 bits of entropy, only a little bit below the 2.58 bits of entropy obtained through rolling a balanced six-sided die. Exposing the preference string you've selected appears relatively safe — but only when taken in isolation, since the likelihood of selecting a particular preference string is statistically dependent upon other pieces of already-known locale-related information.

Consider the case of a student from the Netherlands who is spending a year at a university in Chicago. This student could avoid annoyance (and possibly error) if the university's course catalog displayed times on a 24 hour cycle instead of using the 12 hour clock common in the United States, and for the same reason would likewise prefer if calendars were displayed with Monday, rather than Sunday, as the first day of the week. Additionally, they are not acclimated to the region's extreme winters, and sometimes use the weather display on a local news site to help determine how many layers of clothes to wear. They would very much like to avoid the frustration and potential for mishap involved in converting temperatures from the unfamiliar Fahrenheit scale to the immediately comprehensible Celsius scale.

Native applications can directly read the OS settings for preferred clock, first day of week, and temperature measurement system. However, it is not safe to directly expose this information to potentially hostile Web servers, since if our user's settings were idiosyncratic those idiosyncratic settings could easily be used to track them. It's safe to set your OS to display temperatures in Kelvin, but dangerous to tell arbitrary Web servers about it.

The student's preferences can be expressed by the locale extension string-u-fw-mon-hc-h23-mu-celsius. Revealing this low-suprisal set of preferences would not by itself dramatically reduce the size of the student's anonymity set. However, we cannot consider the raw number of people expected to have this set of preferences in isolation, because the surprisal of a particular setting conditioned on other known pieces of information about the user can be quite high.

Every commonly used combination offw andhc can be used in combination with the valuecelsius formu. However, since the only sizable locale that defaults tofahrenhe is 'en-US', combinations of preferences involvingfahrenhe that otherwise differ from the 'en-US' defaults are not guaranteed to be commonly used. Nevertheless, there are a number of people likely to use a browser locale of 'en-US' with preferences that differ from the United States defaults:

• People working with organizations that use a 24 hour clock.
• People with social, familial, and cultural ties to regions that use Saturday as the first day of the workweek.
• People who for reasons of simple personal preference like their calendar to have the first day of the workweek at the left-hand side of their calendars.
• People not from or in the United States who are nevertheless using 'en-US' as their browser locale.

Because of the large number and wide range of people using 'en-US' as their browser locale, it may be safe to offer most of these combinations of preferences despite them not being commonly used locale defaults. User research will be required.

In certain regions, most notably the regions in which both Western Arabic and Eastern Arabic numerals are in common use, failing to support both of those numbering systems results in the delivery of content that is unintelligible to some users. Not being able to express a desire for a particular numbering system causes precisely the same problems that would be caused if users in locales where multiple scripts for text weren't able to select a script that's legible to them. In these cases, supporting thenu tag is a top priority — as much of a priority as the language tag itself — even if supporting that tag means not supporting any of the other locale preferences tags.

If a given user's preference string is relatively similar to one of the allowed strings, the user can be allowed to transmit the set of admissible preferences that best fit the user's full preferences. When determining these best-fit strings, precedence must be given for those tags which directly affect content intelligibility — most notably, 'nu'.

The practicalities of implementation for this proposal are relatively straightforward, once the set of safe combinations of settings has been determined.

We expose the preferred options for these extensions in a JavaScript API vianavigator.locales or by creating a newnavigator.localeExtensions property. Note that the API does not expose what locale extension string was selected, and requests for preferences must be made one-by-one. This constraint is in place as an additional fingerprinting mitigation measure — if scripts were allowed to fetch all preferences at once, it would be more difficult to detect active fingerprinting attempts. By requiring options be requested one-by-one, sites that (for example) ask for an alternate numbering system when delivering content in a locale for which there is no commonly used alternate numbering system would be immediately identifiable as bad actors.

We expose the preferred options for these extensions in a JavaScript API via 'navigator.locales' or by creating a new 'navigator.localeExtensions' property:

Browsers carry out the following steps the first time they request content in a specific locale:

1. The browser reads OS settings.
2. The browser compares these settings to the list of available locale extension strings, determines (by whatever means) which most closely resembles the user's preferences, and discards all other settings.
3. Scripts can then request the retained settings, but only one-by-one.

interface LocaleExtensions localeExtensions {  readonly attribute DOMString calendar;  readonly attribute DOMString firstDayOfWeek;  readonly attribute DOMString hourCycle;  readonly attribute DOMString temperatureUnit;  readonly attribute DOMString numberingSystem;};interface mixin NavigatorLocaleExtensions {  readonly attribute LocaleExtensions localeExtensions;};Navigator includes NavigatorLocaleExtensions;WorkerNavigator includes NavigatorLocaleExtensions;

navigator.localeExtensions['numberingSystem'];navigator.localeExtensions.numberingSystem;self.navigator.numberingSystem;// "deva"navigator.localeExtensions['hourCycle'];navigator.localeExtensions.hourCycle;self.navigator.hourCycle;// "h23"

AnHTTP Client Hint is a request header field that is sent by HTTP clients and used by servers to optimize content served to those clients. TheClient Hints infrastructure defines anAccept-CH response header that servers can use to advertise their use of specific request headers for proactive content negotiation. This opt-in mechanism enables clients to send content adaptation data selectively, instead of appending all such data to every outgoing request.

Because servers must specify the set of headers they are interested in receiving, theClient Hint mechanism eliminates many of the opportunities for hostile passive fingerprinting that arise when using other means for proactive content negotiation (for example, theUser-Agent string).

Each supported extension gets its ownClient Hint, which ensures that servers must advertise which locale-related preferences they request. This is analogous to the strategy used in the JavaScript API. Much like the API only allows requests for one preference at a time, thereby making it visible when a script attempts to access irrelevant preferences as part of a fingerprinting attempt,Client Hints as used here ensure that servers that ask for irrelevant locale-related preferences are forced to be obvious about it.

Servers cannot passively receive information about locale extension-related settings. Servers instead announce their ability to use extensions, allowing clients the option to respond with their preferred content tailorings.

To accomplish this, browsers should introduce newClient Hint header fields as part of a structured header as defined inStructured Field Values for HTTP.

TheSec- prefix used on these headers prevents scripts and other application content from setting them in user agents, and demarcates them as browser-controlled client hints so that they can be documented and included in requests without triggering CORS preflights. SeeHTTP Client Hints Section 4.2, Deployment and Security Risks for more information.

Designing theClient Hints header fields requires a tradeoff between fingerprinting mitigation and using a parsimonious set of headers. The approach that best prevents fingerprinting is to give each separate tag its ownClient Hint header. Since servers must advertise their use of each header, fully separating the tags makes fingerprinting attempts more obvious — a server that requests a large number ofClient Hints without need is broadcasting its potential intent to use the extra information gathered from the client for fingerprinting. However, if header bloat becomes a primary concern, some of these headers can be grouped. For example,hc,fw andca could be grouped together as preferences related to date and time, orfw,hc, andmu could be grouped due not to conceptual similarity but instead to how they are strongly correlated with each other, since users following United States regional standards are likely to want-u-fw-sun-hc-h12-mu-fahrenhe, while users in much of the rest of the world are likely to want-u-fw-mon-hc-h23-mu-celsius.

Should the ability to customize settings beyond those expressible through BCP 47 tags become incorporated into this proposal, grouping will necessarily become a more pressing concern. For example, should additional preferences related to number formatting become part of the proposal, these could be grouped together withnu.

GET / HTTP/1.1Host: example.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OKContent-Type: text/htmlAccept-CH: Sec-CH-Locale-Extensions-NumberingSystem

GET / HTTP/1.1Host: example.comSec-CH-Locale-Extensions-NumberingSystem: "deva"

Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications identifies the following key elements for fingerprint mitigation:

1. Decreasing the fingerprinting surface
2. Increasing the anonymity set
3. Making fingerprinting detectable (i.e. replacing passive fingerprinting methods with active ones)
4. Clearable local state

The preservation of a relatively large anonymity set for all users is our central strategy for mitigating fingerprinting risk as much as possible while also ensuring a substantial improvement in the localization experience for a wide range of users.

As noted in theSecurity Considerations section of the HTTP Client Hints RFC, a key benefit of the Client Hints architecture is that it allows for proactive content negotiation without exposing passive fingerprinting vectors, because servers must actively advertise their use of specific Client Hints headers. This makes it possible to remove preexisting passive fingerprinting vectors and replace them with relatively easily detectable active vectors. The Detectability section ofMitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications describes instituting requirements for servers to advertise their use of particular data as a best practice, and mentions Client Hints as a tool for implementing this practice. In the absence of Client Hints, use of the JavaScript API can at least be detected by clients. In no case does this proposal allow for any new passive fingerprinting vectors. A site that attempts to (for example) request numbering system preferences while delivering content that supports no alternates is immediately visible as a bad actor: upon encountering this behavior from servers, browsers could issue warnings to users.

The use of the 'Sec-' prefix forbids access to headers containing 'Locale Extensions' information from JavaScript, and demarcates them as browser-controlled client hints so that they can be documented and included in requests without triggering CORS preflights.

The JavaScript's API's constraint against retrieving multiple preferences with one call serves to make fingerprinting detection easier.

As in all uses of Client Hints, user agents must clear opt-in Client Hints settings when site data, browser caches, and cookies are cleared.

There exist other localization-related customizations that would be useful for site intelligibility - most notably, number separators and number patterns. Support for a commonly used subset of these options could be possible, particularly in cases where they strongly correlate with a particular combination of valid lcale extension strings.

A conservative approach should be taken in adding and especially in removing available locale extension strings. This is in order to avoid situations wherein (for example) users are unsure what scale a given temperature is in, or situations where a user who had previously been allowed to use their preferred numbering system no longer have access to it.

Answering this question responsibly will require user research. Browser localizations with fewer users will in most cases have fewer available preference strings, since the number of bits of surprisal required to identify users of uncommon browsers will be lower when using rarer localizations.

1. Fingerprinting mitigation is in general a best practice
2. The specific data we reveal through this mechanism could be sensitive, since it may indicate that the user is a member of a marginalized or threatened identity category
3. The specific data we reveal through this mechanism is specifically about the user, rather than their device, and so could be used for cross-device tracking
4. Because the data is read from OS settings, it is possible for users to not realize they're sending it