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CVE-2021-28363

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Using default SSLContext for HTTPS requests in an HTTPS proxy doesn't verify certificate hostname for proxy connection

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed PublishedMar 15, 2021 in urllib3/urllib3 • UpdatedNov 18, 2024

Package

pipurllib3 (pip)

Affected versions

>= 1.26.0, < 1.26.4

Patched versions

1.26.4

Description

Impact

Users who are using an HTTPS proxy to issue HTTPS requests and haven't configured their own SSLContext viaproxy_config.
Only the default SSLContext is impacted.

Patches

urllib3 >=1.26.4 has the issue resolved. urllib3<1.26 is not impacted due to not supporting HTTPS requests via HTTPS proxies.

Workarounds

Upgrading is recommended as this is a minor release and not likely to break current usage.

Configuring anSSLContext withcheck_hostname=True and passing viaproxy_config instead of relying on the defaultSSLContext

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

References

@sethmlarsonsethmlarson published to urllib3/urllib3Mar 15, 2021
Published by theNational Vulnerability DatabaseMar 15, 2021
ReviewedMar 19, 2021
Published to the GitHub Advisory DatabaseMar 19, 2021
Last updatedNov 18, 2024

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Attack RequirementsNone
Privileges RequiredNone
User interactionNone
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
ConfidentialityLow
IntegrityLow
AvailabilityNone
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
ConfidentialityNone
IntegrityNone
AvailabilityNone

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector:This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity:This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements:This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required:This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction:This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality:This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity:This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability:This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality:This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity:This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability:This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided byFIRST.
(29th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Certificate Validation

The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2021-28363

GHSA ID

GHSA-5phf-pp7p-vc2r

Source code

Credits

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