©Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32, no. 2, 1995, pp. 213--228
David N. Gibbs
Department of Political Science, University of Arizona
1. Introduction
Whatever its larger consequences, the end of the Cold War has proven beneficial for social scientists andhistorians. Access to previously secret information in the former USSR and other ex-communist countrieshas enriched our understanding of how these countries functioned, both in their domestic and foreignpolicies. In the past several years there has been a much more limited loosening of information access inthe USA, and this access has provided exciting possibilities for research. Social scientists are onlybeginning to sift through the new, previously secret materials, but it is generally believed that they willsignificantly influence our understanding of the Cold War (Alperovitz & Bird, 1994).
The question of access to government information is obviously one of major importance for theresearcher, especially in political science and related disciplines; however the study of information policyhas been somewhat uneven. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was considerable interest in the questionof secrecy, among journalists, policymakers, and scholars. Many of these, to be sure were descriptive oradvocacy oriented. However, there were also serious studies that systematically compared secrecypractices among Western democracies and placed secrecy in the broader perspective of public policyanalysis (see for example essays in Galnoor, 1977; & Franck & Weisband, 1974). Even such prominentfigures as Carl J. Friedrich (1972, 1977) and Theodore Lowi (1977) contributed to this discussion.
However, such studies went out of fashion after 1980, and there has been a distinct decline inresearch on secrecy. Ironically, declining interest in secrecy among scholars coincided with a substantialincrease in the practice of secrecy by governments, especially in the USA.(1) Despite its continuedimportance, there has been no systematic study that seeks to explain the causes of government secrecy. Thepresent essay will analyze the causes of secrecy, especially in the areas of international relations andforeign policy. Specifically, we will consider the following questions: Why does a democraticgovernment fail to release all of its information? Why are some government documents classified andretained as secret, while others are not? Finally, what are the implications of secrecy for methodologies of political research? The article considers thesequestions in the context of an empirical case study of US information policy during the Congo Crisis.
Before embarking on the empirical discussion, I present three separate explanations for governmentsecrecy: The first, the External Threat explanation, suggests that government secrecy is designed to protectsensitive information from foreign powers and other external enemies. The second explanation, theBureaucratic Politics explanation, sees secrecy as a relatively unsystematic process that results from the(collectively) irrational features in any government bureaucracy. The third explanation, the Internal Threatapproach, argues that government officials use secrecy to mislead the populations of their own countries.
2. The External Threat Approach
This approach assumes that state officials are motivated by a concern with the national interest and,especially, national security. In order to maintain and enhance this security, officials must withholdinformation from potential foreign rivals. Certainly a government cannot reveal national defense plans toits enemies, at least not without grave risks. Also, intelligence agencies must protect the their sources andmethods. Moreover, a state must withhold secrets, such as the details of trade negotiation strategies, evenfrom relatively friendly countries with which it is, from time to time, in competition. So it is thegovernments of foreign countries, not members of the public, that are the objects of government secrecy. This External Threat explanation is widely promoted by the government itself, but some academics alsosubscribe to it. In his study of the Central Intelligence Agency, Rodrick Jeffrys-Jones (1989, p. 3) writes:
Deception of the public is an unfortunate yet inevitable side-effect of this process. This is, by far, the mostwidely accepted explanation for government information policy, and it is familiar to students of strategicdecision-making processes.
The methodological implications of this External Threat approach should be somewhat encouragingto the researcher. The approach implies that the government will make no effort to withhold informationif the information is already known by the enemy powers. Moreover, the government will not usuallywithhold documents for very long periods, and as soon as certain practices or strategies are fully obsolete,the government will declassify the relevant documents. Above all, it is assumed that governments will notwithhold information simply because the information might embarrass state officials or generate publicopposition. Thus, the External Threat approach implies that secrecy will necessarily be limited in scopeand circumscribed with regard to the types of information that are useful to the social scientist. Exceptingresearchers who focus on military or intelligence history (especially those who focus on the details ofspecific strategies), the social scientist should not be unduly impeded by government secrecy.
3. Bureaucratic Politics
Most theories assume that foreign policy, whatever its basis, is the result of a coherent strategy that isdesigned to achieve some assigned objectives. The Bureaucratic Politics approach challenges thisassumption and argues that policy-making in all areas -- including information policy -- is rarely quiteso simple. One of the most basic aspects of any bureaucratic entity is adherence to standard operatingprocedures, and this adherence can sometimes result in suboptimal or irrational outcomes (Allison, 1971;see also the critique by Bendor and Hammond, 1992). Bureaucracies are accordingly viewed aslumbering, rule-ridden, mechanisms incapable of decisive, coherent action (Joseph, 1981, p. 25), and theytend to act in particular ways because they have always acted in such ways. Another aspect of bureaucraticfunctioning is competition among various agencies, subagencies, and personalities. In its most extremeform, the Bureaucratic perspective implies that there is no guiding objective in government activity; policyformulation results from inertia and from incoherent maneuvering among diverse agencies.
Let us apply this perspective to secrecy. In certain foreign policy agencies, secrecy is standardoperating procedure. Intelligence agencies, for example, routinely classify a wide range of documentssimply because agency rules call for such classification, even though much of this classified material mustsurely cover mundane subjects of no interest to academics, journalists, members of the public, foreignenemies, or anyone else. Researchers who have used government archives can readily attest that manypreviously classified materials contain little or no important information.
Moreover, the rigors of interagency competition can influence document classification procedures. Government officials (or agencies) will seek to deceive each other, and bureaucratic conflict may be asignificant factor in the process of document classification. Sometimes, officials will withhold documentsin order to gain advantage in inter-bureaucratic competition or, in other cases, because of personal feudsamong officials. Paul Anderson (1981, pp. 745--47) applies the Bureaucratic Politics model to thequestion of government information practices. He notes that, even in private meetings, officials must tailortheir arguments in order appear more persuasive and to be consistent with acceptable standards of policy-making etiquette.
For example, Anderson notes that government officials may be motivated by parochial bureaucraticfactors, interest group pressures, or other political considerations; however, the accepted standard ofbureaucratic discussion does not permit officials to frame their arguments in terms of these things and,instead, demands that the national interest be invoked to justify all foreign policy. Officials will, in thismodel, always face a tension between the reality of political pressures, on the one hand, and the need tosuppress mention of such pressures, on the other. Anderson does not explicitly discuss secrecy, though itis easy to see that secrecy would play a role in the process he describes: Officials will seek to concealinformation that suggests political rather than national interest motivations for the positions that theyadvocate. Thus, the target of secrecy is neither the public nor foreign enemies, but competing governmentofficials or agencies.
Overall, the Bureaucratic explanation suggests that much of the material that is inaccessible toresearchers are classified only because of arcane feuds or operating procedures. And the degree of secrecywill be circumscribed. All states (except, perhaps, those on the verge of disintegration) must have asignificant degree of interagency coordination, and the need for such coordination will constrain thepractice of bureaucratic rivalry, as well as the associated secrecy. The irrationalities of standard operatingprocedures result in a more or less random classification of documents;(2) in the process, some analyticallyimportant materials may, unfortunately be withheld, but there is littlesystematic withholding of historicallyrelevant materials. The methodological implications of the bureaucratic perspective are thereforeencouraging for the researcher.
4. The Internal Threat Approach, Variant I
This explanation of secrecy argues that government officials use secrecy (at least partly) as a device tomislead the public and to ensure elite control over foreign policy. This perspective is often implied inmuch of the realist literature on international relations. To be sure, there is no detailed, deductivelyderived realist theory of government secrecy and, in fact, no writer in the realist tradition has ever evenaddressed the issue of government secrecy in any explicit way; however, a realist perspective on secrecyis, nevertheless, implied in much of the existing literature. For example, Hans Morgenthau (1967, pp.142--43) notes that a conflict between the requirements of good foreign policy and the preferences ofpublic opinion is in the nature of things and continues:
. . .the government must realize that it is not the slave to public opinion; that public opinion is not a static thing to be discovered... it is adynamic, ever changing entity to be continuously created and recreated by informed and responsible leadership; that it is the historic missionof the government to assert that leadership.
Morgenthau suggests the novel weapon of propaganda, which can be used to manipulate public opinion. Secrecy is not directly mentioned here but it is certainly implied; the use of secrecy and the selectivedissemination of one-sided information will help the statesman to assert informed and responsibleleadership, which realists like Morgenthau advocate.
Selective information dissemination, advocated by Morgenthau, may sometimes involve deliberatemisrepresentation.(3) In other instances, misrepresentations will be eschewed and only partial or distorted-- rather than outright false -- information will be disseminated, while any unfavorable information willbe suppressed. The easiest way to suppress information is to mark it secret, to classify it.(4)
What, according to the realist, motivates officials to act secretly? The answer to this question mustbe tentative, given the lack of explicit discussion on this topic. However, the realist literature implies thatofficials seek to advance the national interest and security (see Krasner, 1978);(5) it is this commitment tothe national interest that motivates them to mislead the public and to conceal information. Some writersnote that secrecy and deception can produce positive results. Thomas Bailey, for example, states withapproval that Franklin Delano Roosevelt systematically acted to deceive the US public about his effortsto lead the country into World War II (cited in Novick, 1988, p. 308). Friedrich (1972, p. 179), moreexplicitly, states that secrecy is eminently functional in many government operations, in both the domesticsphere but especially in matters of foreign and military policy.(6) In short, realists insist on the need for elitecontrol of foreign policy, even in a democratic form of government; secrecy is sometimes a necessarymeans for achieving such elite control.
Critics of realism, such as Noam Chomsky (1989, pp. 16--17), challenge these views as elitist andundemocratic. Woodrow Wilson was also critical of government secrecy (at least, this was his view beforehe entered government service). InCongressional Government (quoted in Friedrich, 1972, p. 181), heasserted that there is not any legitimate privacy [i.e. secrecy] about matters of government. Governmentmust... be absolutely public in everything that effects it -- and Wilson made no exception for foreignpolicy. Realists, however, have long contended that such idealistic views, however well intended, are ill-suited to the rigors of international conflict.(7) In short, the realists view secrecy and public deception asvital tools for an effective foreign policy.
The Internal Threat Approach, Variant II
Among the critics of the realist approach, some propose rudimentary explanations for secrecy. DavidSadofsky (1990, pp. 84--85) implies that the national interest is often a subterfuge, a shallowrationalization; government secrecy according to Sadofsky, functions not to protect national security but,rather, to protect the interest of government policy-makers. Sadofsky thus suggests a distinct andapparently competing interpretation of secrecy.
It is interesting to note that Sadofsky's hunch -- that governmental self interest motivates secrecy-- is quite consistent with the extensive literature on rational action in government (see Bartlett, 1973;Buchanan, 1975; Downs, 1967; and Niskanen, 1975). There is a wide consensus among major studies ofthe subject, that government officials are motivated at least partly (though not, for most analysts,exclusively) by the desire to advance their own interests and their respective agencies. From the standpointof rational action, the significance of secrecy can be easily established: Rational officials will classifyinformation if such classification advances the officials' interests. However, bureaucrats will notnecessarily pursue their interests in a consciously cynical fashion; it is well established that individuals andgroups tend to allow their conceptions of the public good to be influenced by their own interests. KarlMannheim (1936) has convincingly shown that human beings or even whole social groups rationalizebehavior and assume that their own interests are really universal interests, while George Orwell (1954) hasargued that language can obfuscate this process of rationalization. The present discussion mayappropriately be considered in ideological terms, and bureaucrats may be expected to rationalize selfinterested behavior in all areas, including the use of secrecy and deception.
According to the rational action perspective, secrecy is intertwined with considerations of selfinterest. Rational policymakers will selectively release information that reflects favorably upon themselvesand their bureaux, and will withhold damaging information. If an official acts incompetently or illegally,or if the official acts in ways that are inconsistent with accepted standards of conduct, such information willprobably be withheld. As Anthony Downs (1967, p. 77) notes: . . .all types of officials tend to exaggeratedata that reflect favorably on themselves and to minimize those that reveal their own shortcomings.
It seems reasonable to assume that self interested bureaucratic behavior must at least sometimesconflict with the interests of the public (and this would hold true for any definition of public interest). Government officials have a major advantage in such conflicts: they control much or nearly all the relevantinformation (Niskanen, 1971, pp. 29--30, 39--40). Government officials can pursue questionable actionsthat would be difficult to justify in public and can then classify the relevant documentation. Officials canplausibly assert that classification advances the public interest, and since members of the public cannot seethe classified documents they cannot contradict the officials' assertions. The classification system is, by itsvery nature, well suited to official self interest.
6. The Internal Threat Approach: A Synthesis
The rational action perspective on secrecy is, in many obvious ways, contrary to the realist approach. Thetwo perspectives have very different views of the motivations of policy-makers. The realists assume thatpolicy-makers generally act to further the national interest, while the rational action perspective assumes,in contrast, that policy-makers often act to further their own interests. The difference between the rationalaction and realist approaches to secrecy may be illustrated with a recently declassified document, whichmakes reference to radiation experiments conducted by the US government during the early period of theCold War (see US Atomic Energy Commission, 1947). The document in question is a memorandumwritten in 1947 and declassified in 1994, and it directed government employees as follows: It is desiredthat no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse effects onpublic opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified "secret."' The document also authorized the release of any information pertaining to radiation research that couldbebeneficial to human disorders and diseases (emphasis added).
The rational action approach would view classification in this case as an effort by governmentofficials to protect themselves and their agencies against public embarrassment, budget cuts, or evencriminal prosecutions. The realist approach, in contrast, would interpret these events somewhat differently. Realists would argue that such classification was intended to serve the national interest, since the radiationexperiments being described were vital to national security and -- in the context of the Cold War -- it wassometimes necessary to undertake actions that conflicted with ordinary conceptions of morality. As DavidCharters notes (1985, p. 334): The dark underside of international affairs is inherently untidy andunpleasant. It leaves little room for comfortable moral, political, or operational positions.
Despite all of these differences, the realist and rational action perspectives have a crucial featurein common: They both agree that government officials withhold information in order to deceive the public. The two perspectives differ with regard to why secrecy takes place and, concomitantly, they differ in theway they analyze the motivations of policy-makers; but they agree that the public is the target of secrecypolicies.(8)
For the remainder of this article I will combine Variants I and II and term this hybrid simply theInternal Threat approach. The defining feature of the Internal Threat approach is that the general publicis considered the principal target of government secrecy. The practical implications of this perspective aredisturbing for the researcher. First, the perspective implies that the range of classified information wouldbe broad; even information that is known to enemy powers may remain classified -- since it is the public,not enemy powers, that is the principal target according to this explanation. Secondly, we would expectclassification periods to be of long duration. Documents pertaining to events that had long ceased to beactive foreign policy concerns may remain classified, since exposures can discredit government activitiesin general. Finally, the Internal Threat perspective assumes that governments will often withholdinformation that may be of great interest to researchers. By its very nature, the Internal Threat perspectiveassumes that officials make special efforts to conceal information on controversial actions -- such as theradiation tests cited above -- and such controversial material is often historically important. Thusgovernments do not randomly suppress information; on the contrary, they systematically suppress some ofthe most historically relevant information. If the Internal Threat approach is correct, then much of ourresearch is and must be conducted without important or even vital information.
Comparison of Theories
At this point, several qualifications are needed. It should be apparent that there is significant overlapamong these various theories and that the above three categories are not mutually exclusive. Many realistswould no doubt subscribe to aspects of both the External Threat and the Internal Threat explanations, whileadvocates of rational action might concur simultaneously with the Internal Threat approach and theBureaucratic Politics approach. However, this discussion will treat the three perspectives separately, inorder to simplify our analysis. This article will consider each theory as a mutually exclusive ideal type,which has been deliberately exaggerated in order to facilitate effective comparison.(9)
Overall, these three theories present a range of different analyses about the causes and the effectsof secrecy. For convenience, the main points of each perspective are presented in outline form (see Table1). The most significant differences among the theories may be summarized as follows: The InternalThreat approach argues that the general public is the principal target of government secrecy. Thisapproach, if substantiated, would pose serious methodological questions for researchers, since it impliesthat the scope of secrecy would be broad and that governments have a systematic tendency to classifyinformation that is relevant to researchers. The External Threat and Bureaucratic Politics approaches, incontrast, suggest that the scope of secrecy would be considerably more circumscribed and that much of thesecret information is somewhat less relevant to researchers. Now that we have outlined the threeperspectives, I turn to the case study of the Congo Crisis, where the theories will be applied.
| Issue | External Threat | BureaucraticPolitics | Internal Threat |
| Main target ofsecrecy | Foreign powers | Competinggovernmentofficials or agencies | The general public |
| Main causal factor insecrecy | Competition amongcountries | Collectivelyirrationalfunctioning ofbureaucratic organizations | The need to protectnational interests or (inVariant II) the need toprotect the interests ofstate officials |
| Degree of randomness in secrecy | Little or none; governments systematicallyclassify information that mightbenefit enemy powers | Significantrandomness; result of standardoperatingprocedures | Little or none;governmentssystematically classifyinformation that mightgenerate public opposition |
| Scope of secrecy | Relatively narrow; secrecy will beconfined to itemsthat are not known to foreign powers | Relatively narrow; secrecy will belimited by the need for interagencycoordination | Broad; secrecy would apply to potentially widerange of items that might arouse controversy |
| Degree to which secrecy will impederesearch | Moderate due to limited scopeof secrecy | Moderate due to limited scope ofsecrecy | High; assumes thatcontroversialgovernment actions that are potentiallyimportant to researcherswill be systemmatically concealed |
| Normative view of secrecy | Generally positive view implied | No normativejudgment | Varies; some realists in this category imply a positive view of secrecy |
8. The Congo Case
The Congo Crisis of 1960--1 is well suited for this analysis of secrecy for two reasons. First, it was oneof the major conflicts of the Cold War. In the USA, it received regular attention from two presidents(Eisenhower and Kennedy) and, if one looks at the index from theNew York Times, it is apparent that theCongo received more attention during the period 1960--1 than any other Third World crisis area(including even Vietnam). Second, there is now substantial information pertaining to covert operationsduring the Congo Crisis by the USA and other countries that has been culled by academic researchers andUS Senate investigators (see especially Gibbs, 1991; Kalb, 1982; Mahoney, 1983; US Senate, 1975; andWeissman, 1974. These studies are based, in part, on a large volume of US and UN documents that havebeen declassified over time. Although many documents pertaining to the Congo remain classified, theredoes exist a significant quantity of declassified materials. With these new materials it is possible to analyzethe type of information that was classified and the type of information that was publicly disseminated. Byexamining this data, we can evaluate, at least tentatively, the three approaches to government secrecydescribed above.
The crisis began when the Congo (now called Zaire) gained independence from Belgium in June1960. The Belgians had made few efforts to prepare the country for self-government and, at the time ofindependence, there were no more than thirty Congolese university graduates. The new country almostimmediately was beset by random violence and civil war. The province of Katanga, a major producer ofcopper, cobalt, and other basic minerals, seceded from the Congo within days and formed a separate state. Later, the diamond-producing region of South Kasai also seceded. The Congolese National Army was incomplete disarray throughout this period, and the central government proved powerless to contain thedisorder. The Congo was also the object of intervention by several foreign countries. The USA, theUSSR, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom all intervened extensively during the confusion of theCongo Crisis. A UN peace-keeping force -- one of the largest in history --patrolled the country and playeda large role in its politics of the Congo during the period 1960-4.
A major issue throughout the early period of the Congo Crisis was the role of Patrice Lumumba,the head of the largest political party and also the country's first prime minister. Western officials weregenerally quite hostile toward Lumumba, and they regarded him as excessively nationalistic and unreliablein the East--west conflict. Lumumba's decision, in August 1960, to accept Soviet military aid, wasespecially contentious. Early scholarly accounts of Lumumba were highly negative, presenting him asauthoritarian, emotionally unstable, and procommunist (see, for example, Lefever, 1965, pp. 38--42). More recent analyses, however, have been considerably more favorable and have noted that Lumumba wasthe only democratically elected leader in the history of the Congo, and that many of his actions seem muchmore reasonable in light of what is now known about the extent and nature of foreign intervention in thecrisis (see especially Minter, 1984, pp. 28-35).
Whatever the specifics, US officials detested Lumumba and were determined to overthrow him,and this became the principal objective of US policy during the first six months of the Congo Crisis. Theefforts to remove Lumumba triggered what became one of the largest and most important operations in thehistory of the Central Intelligence Agency. Many years later, in 1984, former CIA Director William Colbycommented: Of the covert operations undertaken [since the 1950s]... I would say some have been verysuccessful and some have been disasters... The Bay of Pigs was certainly a disaster. But consider ourprogram in the Congo (Colby, 1984, p. 36).
The covert operation plans were outlined by CIA Director Allen Dulles during August 1960, andthey emphasized building opposition against Premier Lumumba among Congolese parliamentarians, withthe objective of bringing about a no-confidence vote against the prime minister. President Eisenhowerreportedly reviewed the plans and expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for verystraightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient toaccomplish this.(10) The president's statement appears to have encouraged the CIA to expand the scope ofits operational plans. Dulles then cabled the CIA station in the Congo and authorized actions aimed atreplacing Lumumba; also, Dulles vaguely suggested even more aggressive action if it can remain covert(US Senate, 1975, p. 16).
Although the USA considered sending American troops to the Congo, this option was rejected byPresident Eisenhower as excessively risky. Instead, the Eisenhower administration sought to project USpower through proxy forces recruited by the CIA. The CIA made a special effort to gain influence in theCongolese National Army, through a young and politically-connected officer, Joseph Desire Mobutu.(11) Recent studies of the Congo Crisis generally agree that CIA funding supported Mobutu's activities. Madeleine Kalb (1982, p. 96) concluded that It was money provided by the CIA and the other westernembassies that kept him [Colonel Mobutu] in business during the Congo Crisis, while Stephen Weissman(1974, p. 95) cites evidence that Mobutu was paid by the CIA. Even former CIA Director Colby (1984,p. 36) now agrees that the Agency helped Joseph Mobutu during the Congo Crisis.
Amply supplied by the USA (and possibly other Western powers), Mobutu distributed largeamounts of money to the officers and men under his command; through this arrangement he was able toestablish bonds of loyalty among his soldiers. Mobutu's military unit probably numbered only a fewhundred soldiers, but his troops were paid exceptionally well (by Congolese standards), and this unit wasvirtually the only really functioning element of the Congolese National Army. Also, Mobutu and his menwere strategically located in Leopoldville, the capital city, and were thus well placed to influence events. This force was a major conduit of influence for American foreign policy. Another source of USgovernment influence was the UN peace-keeping force. The USA provided a disproportionate share ofthe funding for the UN force (about 40% of total funding for the duration of the operation) and several ofthe UN officials in charge of the Congo operation, notably Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold andSpecial Representative Andrew Cordier, secretly collaborated with US officials (see Gibbs, 1993; andCollins, 1992). The USA thus had formidable capabilities to inject its power into the Congo.
The first (documented) effort to overthrow Lumumba came in September 1960 during aconstitutional dispute. Technically, the prime minister of the Congo was appointed by the president who,at the time was Joseph Kasavubu. On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu announced that he wasdismissing Lumumba and appointing a new prime minister. There is significant evidence that both US andUN officials influenced Kasavubu's action. The British ambassador to the Congo later wrote that '"at onetime" Kasavubu sent for Cordier to "ask how a coup d'etat should be organized"' (quoted from Weissman,1974, p. 90, n.84). Both Cordier and Hammarskjold coordinated their activities with the StateDepartment. On the day of Lumumba's dismissal, Cordier sent an
'urgent recommendation' to the US government via Hammarskjold suggesting that it send an official to [the capital city]Leopoldville -- 'not too high-level, not too junior -- who could observe the local scene, see what the Russians were up to, andmake a firsthand report to Washington (Kalb, 1982, pp. 74-75).
Cordier also consulted with the US ambassador to the Congo and the next day, September 6, he arrangedfor UN troops to close the airport -- to preclude any airlift of loyal troops to the capital by Lumumba.(12) Cordier then ordered UN forces to close the radio station as well, which prevented Lumumba frombroadcasting an appeal for support. In short the UN, in cooperation with the USA, encouraged Kasavubuto act against Lumumba and then attempted to bloc Lumumba's return to power. While the UN supportfor President Kasavubu was publicly known at the time -- Hammarskjold openly defended the president'saction -- the collaboration with US officials was completely secret.
The close association between the USA and the UN deteriorated to some extent after this incident. Cordier was recalled as the director of the Congo operation, while Hammarskjold appears to have becomeconcerned that the UN was leaning too far in the direction of the USA and that such close identificationwith a single power was weakening the credibility of the U.N. For the next several months, the policiesof the USA and the UN diverged to some extent (for details, see Gibbs, 1991, pp. 96--98). Moreover,the effort to dismiss Lumumba was unsuccessful. Lumumba argued his case before the Congoleselegislature and received an overwhelming vote of confidence, while Kasavubu's dismissal of the primeminister was countermanded.
The CIA, apparently out-maneuvered, remained determined to remove Lumumba. The USA nowadvocated a military coup d'etat by Colonel Mobutu and his men. On 14 September, Mobutu deposedLumumba, closed the parliament, and established himself as dictator. He organized a council of Congoleseuniversity students to advise him, called the College of Commissioners, and established a rudimentary defacto government. There is clear evidence that the CIA played a role in this coup. Weissman (1974, p.95) writes:
The main point -- that the CIA was heavily involved in the. . . emergence of Col. Joseph Mobutu and his College of Commissioners --has been confirmed by a former official of the American Embassy who observed the events in question. Further substantiation was providedby two former government officials who spoke directly to the CIA station Chief in [the Congolese capital] Leopoldville, Lawrence Devlin.
Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti (1988) also confirms that the Agency was involved in Mobutu's coup.
Let us pause here and focus on the significance of these events for the topic of this article, i.e.information policy. During these events, the US government released no information pertaining to itsintervention in the Congo; at the same time, information was selectively released which suggested that theUSA was not intervening at all and was, on the contrary, seeking to protect the Congo from potentialintervention by other powers. The basic position was publicly stated by the US representative to theUnited Nations, James Wadsworth (1960, p. 530): . . .the Security Council should make it unmistakablyclear once more that no one -- and I repeat no one -- should be permitted to intervene unilaterally in [theCongo]. The information on US intervention in the Crisis, such as the subversion of the Lumumbagovernment or the support for Colonel Mobutu's coup, was suppressed.
In any case, US officials continued to fear Lumumba, even after the coup removed him from power. Lumumba sought refuge in his residence in the capital, but it was widely believed that he would attempta comeback. US officials urged Mobutu to arrest Lumumba; however, UN forces, now showing someindependence from US foreign policy, guarded Lumumba's house and prevented the arrest. A stalematereigned for several months, until Lumumba left his home in November and fled north where, en route, hewas arrested by Mobutu's troops. Lumumba was then imprisoned at a military installation not far from thecapital city.
Lumumba was subsequently removed from prison and, on 17 January, 1961, he was assassinated. A full discussion of the assassination would go beyond the scope of this article, but we will focus on thepossible role of the United States. Throughout the events described above, the CIA was considering avariety of plans to kill Lumumba, especially with poisons, and these assassination plots have beenexhaustively documented in an investigation by the US Senate (1975, ch. 3). The assassination plots wereauthorized by top level officials, including the CIA Director, Allen Dulles, the Agency Deputy Directorfor Operations, Richard Bissell, and the Africa Division Chief, Bronson Tweedy.
The obvious question is: Did the CIA assassinate Lumumba? It should be noted that the Senateinvestigation only acknowledges that the CIA hadplotted to kill Lumumba, but emphasizes that these plotswere all unsuccessful. Crucially, the report concludes: there is no evidence that the United States wasin any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies (US Senate, 1975, p.256).(13) Other investigations, however, draw different conclusions. Richard Mahoney (1983, p. 71) states,there can be little doubt that the CIA -- though not the actual assassin -- was a moving force behind themurder, while Madeleine Kalb (1982, p. 189) notes little doubt that US officials encouraged Lumumba'sCongolese opponents to eliminate him. According to John Stockwell (1978, p. 237), a former CIA officerwith long experience in Africa, Lumumba was beaten to death by henchmen of Congolese politicians whohad close relationships with the CIA. Whatever the CIA's role in the eventual killing, there is generalagreement among all sources that the Agency certainly plotted to kill Lumumba.
9. Analysis
It should be apparent that a significant amount of information pertaining to US intervention in the Congowas suppressed; at the same time the US government disseminated information that misleadingly suggestedthat the USA was not intervening. Now, let us consider the significance of these facts for the three theoriesof government secrecy. First, the External Threat approach suggests that the USA withheld informationin order to deceive competing foreign powers, especially the Soviet Union, about US activity in the Congo. Such secrecy was necessary and, without it, the Soviet Union might have sabotaged US operations. It iseasy to think of certain types of information that might have been withheld for reasons that seem consistentwith the External Threat approach. Certainly, the US could not have released the operational details ofits covert action in the Congo, without jeopardizing the outcome.
However, there emerges a major problem with this approach: Much of the information on UScovert action was already known to the Soviet Union, at least in its principal features. The collaborationbetween the USA and the UN command, for example, was openly discussed in Soviet press coverage (seeIzvestia, 1960). US support for Mobutu also appears to have been common knowledge. An article inPravda (1960a) noted that 'American imperialists supply Mobutu and his bandits with enormous sums ofmoney for the struggle against Lumumba,' while another article (Pravda, 1960b) characterized Mobutuas a 'puppet colonel' and a creation of the NATO powers. These are fairly accurate assessments of thesituation, at least insofar as Mobutu was indeed dependent on foreign support. (Other countries wereaware of these facts as well: In 1961, a Yugoslav diplomat told his US counterpart, We know you haveinfluence with Mobutu [Kalb, 1982, p. 278].) Even the US efforts to assassinate Lumumba were notaltogether secret. At one point,Pravda (quoted in Kalb, 1982, p. 189) reported that the Americans andthe Belgians were "preparing to do away with" Lumumba. If the Soviet press was aware of these factsthen, surely, they were well known throughout much of the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy; the USfailed to release information pertaining to events that the USSR already knew about. The External Threatapproach may explain some details of US information policy but as a general explanation it is seriouslyinadequate.
The Bureaucratic Politics perspective helps to explain other features of the information process inthe Congo case. It is certainly true that much of the secret information must have been classified due tostandard operating procedures or for idiosyncratic reasons. The present author can attest that thepresidential libraries contain (among other things) significant amounts of information on the Congo Crisisthat would be of no interest to anyone. Some of the classified information seems so trivial that it is difficult(for the layperson) to understand why officials bothered to classify it.
On further consideration, however, Bureaucratic Politics fails to provide an adequate account ofinformation policy. First, random classification, due to standard operating procedures, fails to account formuch of the secrecy in this case. On the contrary, there seems to have been a systematic effort to suppressvirtually all information pertaining to US intervention in the internal politics of the Congo -- none of thisinformation was released until long after the end of the Congo Crisis. (Indeed much of the informationdiscussed above was only released under pressure from Congress during special hearings, in 1975, oncovert operations.) And there is little evidence that interbureaucratic differences influenced informationpolicy to any great extent. Although the CIA did withhold some information from the State Department,(14)the two agencies seemed to be in general agreement with regard to intervention in the Congo.(15) StateDepartment officials were usually well informed with regard to CIA activities in the Congo and, accordingto one account, there was a policy consensus in Washington about the need for the removal of Lumumba(US Senate, 1975, p. 16).(16)
The Internal Threat approach -- which emphasizes government efforts to hide information fromthe public -- is strongly supported by the Congo case. According to this approach, governments seek toconceal potentially controversial activities or ones that could generate public opposition. In the Congocase, secrecy successfully concealed government activities (such as the efforts to assassinate Lumumba) thatwere potentially very controversial. Other covert operations, such as the coaching of President Kasavubu,the efforts to undermine Lumumba's position in the military, the support for Mobutu's coup would all havebeen very difficult to justify in public. Moreover, the Internal Threat approach correctly predicts thatgovernments often obscure information that is historically relevant. Decisive events of the Congo Crisis-- e.g. the dismissal of Lumumba or the coup by Mobutu -- were influenced by foreign intervention, yetthis intervention was withheld from public knowledge.
10. Conclusion
I hope you recognize how obvious is the inference that it is just the shocking nature of these passages which has led to their suppression.-- Sigmund Freud (1975, p. 146), The Dream Censorship
The most significant finding in the Congo case was that government information policysystematically distorted the public record and created the misleading impression that the USA was not, infact, intervening. Indeed, early scholarly accounts of the Congo Crisis (e.g., Young, 1965; also Lefever,1965) relied overwhelmingly on public information and, as a result, they missed the significance of USintervention. It is also interesting to note that the Congo case is inconsistent with some basic assumptionsabout international relations. Hans Morgenthau (1967, p. 226), for example, wrote of politicalassassination as follows:
According to its official records, the Republic of Venice, from 1415 to 1525, planned or attempted about two hundred assassinations forpurposes of its foreign policy... The documents record virtually no offer of assassination to have been rejected by the Venetian government...In the same period, the cardinals brought their own butlers and wine to papal coronation dinners for fear they might otherwise be poisoned;this custom is reported to have been general in Rome, without the host's taking offense at it. . . . Obviously, such methods to attain politicalends are no longer practiced today.
Our discussion of the Congo suggests that Morgenthau was mistaken; contemporary international relationsdoes indeed entail assassination plots. Morgenthau (writing in 1967) found no evidence of assassinationin the public records and, mistakenly, assumed that it no longer occurred. In short, government secrecysuccessfully misled many researchers.
Although further research is needed on this topic, our (tentative) findings in this case raisesignificant methodological issues. Much of the literature in international relations is based on public --and possibly unreliable -- sources of information. Studies on the causes of war (Maoz & Abolali, 1989;and Weede, 1984), for example, focus almost exclusively on publicly available information. Such studiessystematically miss the significance of covert war (see critique by Forsythe, 1992), and how such wars caninfluence theories of war in general. Recent discussions of such diverse issues as the Gulf War, theBosnia--Hercegovina conflict, and international democratization usually fail to mention that much of theinformation on these subjects remains unavailable. Classified documents pertaining to these events willprobably remain closed to researchers for several decades (if, indeed, they are released at all). Suchmethodological complications, which are rarely addressed in the literature, require augmentedconsideration.
Our findings on the Congo case (if confirmed by further studies) would also have implications fordemocratic theory. Recent analyses often assume that democratic political systems -- with regularelections and freedom of expression -- ensure public control of the government (see Diamond, et al.,1988). Our discussion raises serious questions about this assumption. The public could not have effectivelycontrolled foreign policy in the Congo case, since the specifics of that policy were not known to the public. Governmental information policy can be seen as a means of social control. It is not a perfect one --occasionally documents will be leaked -- but it can be effective in maintaining bureaucratic power andmanipulating public opinion in ways that seem incompatible with existing theories of democraticgovernment. Our findings in the Congo case imply that discussion of international issues is sometimesbased on perceptions that are artificially constructed by government information policy (on theconstructed nature of political discussion in general, see Edelman, 1988; and Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Theorists of democracy might consider the significance of information policy and how it can affectdemocratic control of governments, especially in the area of foreign policy.
Before closing, I consider one final point: It may be objected that this discussion is anachronisticand that, after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, secrecy was effectively curtailed in the USA. Indeed, there is a widespread view that the Freedom of Information Act and other reforms created a farmore open foreign policy in the USA and, as a result, the public scrutinizes policies in great detail. Thus,Robert Keohane (1984, pp. 94--95) writes American officials often lament that the US government leaksinformation "like a sieve. . . ,"' while Alden and Schurmann (1990, p. 66) claim that US foreign policyis formulated in a floodlit society, where secrecy is impractical.
Such views are mistaken; in fact, US foreign policy became far more secretive during the 1980s,as legislative and administrative actions considerably narrowed the range of information supplied by thefederal government.(17) Document sets declassified by the government during this period were consideredunreliable. For example, documents published by the State Department in the seriesForeign Relationsof the United States (FRUS), generated controversy in the history profession, with Roger Dingman notingunmistakable evidence of dramatic and devastating changes in the editorial policies and processes whichgovern the publication of documents on American foreign policy (paraphrased inWashington Post, 1990). A diplomatic historian, Bruce R. Kuniholm, reviewed a FRUS volume on US policy toward Iran andcommented that certain sections constitute a gross misrepresentation of the historical record, sufficient todeserve the label of fraud (quoted inWashington Post, 1990), while Warren I. Cohen (1990) stated thatthe Iran volume was a fraud, a gross distortion of American activity there. Criticism in the historyprofession culminated in a resolution by the Organization of American Historians, which criticized anappalling increase in the amount of incomplete and deleted documentary material (quoted inWashingtonPost, 1990). Other professional organizations also noted increased restrictiveness. The American LibraryAssociation (1988) issued a pamphlet entitledLess Access to Less Information by and about the USGovernment. Military doctrine increasingly emphasized the need for propaganda and public deception,while specific military actions in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf entailed exceptionally high levelsof secrecy (Sharkey, 1991).
With the demise of the Cold War and, in 1993, the inauguration of a new presidentialadministration, there is a general expectation that government information policies will become somewhatless restrictive in the US. However, only modest changes in information policy have been undertaken bythe Clinton administration, and there is every indication that government secrecy will continue long afterthe end of the Cold War (seeSecrecy and Government Bulletin 1993 and 1994; and Twentieth CenturyFund, 1992, p. 15). The notion that US foreign policy is conducted under floodlit conditions isinaccurate.
Classification of documents contributes to an atmosphere of deception in politics, and suchdeception will be present, to some extent, in all political systems. It is also worth noting that USinformation policy is relatively unrestrictive -- at least when compared with other countries such as the(now former) USSR or even Western European democracies (see for example, Gleditsch & Hogetveit,1984). Our conclusions here would apply with even greater force to other countries, where secrecy is morewidely practiced. Information policy thus has significant implications for the practice and the study ofdemocratic politics. It is a subject that deserves increased attention from researchers.
Notes
1. Some useful descriptions of recent information policy can be found in Bennet (1988), Feinberg (1989), and Guida(1989).
2. However, these standard operating procedures could be interpreted in different ways. It may be objected thatintelligence agenciesdo systematically withhold information, since entire categories of documents are routinelyclassified. However, there is no systematic tendency to withhold information that is particularly important (to anyaudience); whether the classified information is important or mundane is the result of random processes.
3. With regard to misrepresentation, see analysis by Sissela Bok (1978). It should be noted that the existence ofmisrepresentation has been disputed by Arthur S. Hulnick (1992, p. 92) who writes: "The CIA does not lie to the pressor to Congress."
4. Of course, classification is not the only way to withhold information. Other methods include destroying informationor simply not mentioning sensitive issues in writing. Telecommunications obviously contribute to the latter form ofsuppressing information. A former CIA officer notes, in his memoirs, that the CIA does not record all of its activitieswith regard to highly sensitive operations, such as assassination plots (Stockwell 1979, p. 160n).
5. It should be noted that Rosenau (1968) provocatively argues that the term "national interest" is so vague that it is notvery useful as a social science concept. However, for purposes of argument this essay will accept the contention ofKrasner (1978), who argues that the national interest remains a valid concept.
6. However, Friedrich (1977, p. xiv) acknowledges that, in many cases, secrecy can also be dysfunctional and can exceedlegitimate boundaries.
7. Also, it may be argued that the public does not even want to know government secrets, since many of these might bedisturbing. I thank Gordon Tullock for suggesting this possibility.
8. It is interesting to note that a recent report on covert action by the Twentieth Century Fund (1992, p. 14)acknowledges that the public can be a target of secrecy: "Sometimes, covert action has been hidden only from Americans,not from our adversaries." The report does not elaborate on this observation and implies that such occurrences areunusual. Overall, the report endorses continued covert action, even after the end of the Cold War.
9. Max Weber (1949) notes that ideal types are, by definition, one-sided and exaggerated models. He argues that suchexaggeration is a valid and even vital component of social scientific inquiry, provided that the exaggeration is recognizedby the researcher.
10. This was reported by National Security advisor Gordon Gray, who paraphrased the president's views (US Senate,1975, p. 15).
11. Note that Mobutu (now called Mobutu Sese Seko) has been the president of Zaire since his coup d'etat in 1965. At the time of this writing, he is still in power.
12. Stephen Weissman (1974, p. 91) writes that "According to a member of the American Embassy, Cordier consultedAmbassador Timberlake before taking this step [closing the airport]." Note that Gendebien (1967, p. 76) providesinformation on possible direct CIA involvement in this incident.
13. John Ranelagh (1987, p. 344) defends the Senate report conclusions. Though he acknowledges that the CIAundoubtedly plotted an assassination, Ranelagh adds:
14. At one point CIA headquarters sent a cable to the field, noting that the Agency was considering sending arms andsupplies to anti-Lumumba factions; the cable specifically stated the State Department representatives should not beinformed of these plans (US Senate, 1975, p. 18, n.1).
15. CIA Director Dulles sent a cable to the field authorizing action "to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group" andnoted that this policy had been '"seen and approved at competent level," by the State Department' (US Senate, 1975, p.16). Weissman (1974, p. 89) also presents evidence that the US ambassador was involved in the covert operations.
16. The quote is from CIA officer Bronson Tweedy. It should be noted that the Senate investigation found someevidence that President Eisenhower ordered or at least knew about the assassination efforts, but this evidence isconflicting and inconclusive (US Senate, 1975, chap. 3).
17. It should be noted that the CIA was never especially forthcoming, even during the high point of government opennessduring the 1970s. Madeleine Kalb (1982, p. xv) writes of her research on the Congo Crisis: "The CIA... was highlyobstructive. Appeals for additional information... produced interminable delays -- and in the end all the cables werewithheld. The few documents that were released contained no information that could not have been found inThe NewYork Times; and there were an astonishing number of completely blank pages." It should be noted that these remarkspertained to research Kalb conducted during the mid 1970s. Similarly Peter Wyden wrote of his experiences researchingthe Bay of Pigs incident: "The CIA bureaucracy... stonewalled and confirmed suspicion about itself by refusing to admitthe time off the clock on the wall." This research was also conducted during the 1970s -- when government opennesswas at a historic high point (Wyden, 1979, p. 331).
Also note that the CIA has long maintained unofficial files for especially sensitive operations, that do notofficially exist and are thus permanently exempted from disclosure. According to former CIA officer John Stockwell(1978, p. 228n), "Since the Freedom of Information Act, the agency increasingly uses a system of 'soft,' 'unofficial,' or'convenience' files for sensitive subjects... Such files are not registered in the agency's officials records system and hencecan never be disclosed under FOIA [Freedom of Information Act]."
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DAVID N. GIBBS, b. 1958, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona and the author ofThe Political Economyof Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 1991). He is currentlyworking on a revisionist account of UN peace-keeping operations.
*The author thanks the following persons for their comments: Thomas Ferguson, David Wilkins, Michael Sullivan, Diana Rix, Gordon Tullock, MichaelSchaller, Thomas Chrisiano, Randolph Siverson, Edward Muller, Allen Whiting, William Dixon, Tim McKeown, Cary Nederman, and KathleenSchwartzman.