Paper 2026/302
Non Interactive MPC, (Quantumly) Revisited
Abstract
Classical non-interactive secure computation, despite being extensively studied, suffers from an inherent barrier: adversaries can learn the entire residual function via resetting attacks. We investigate whether quantum resources can circumvent this barrier and restrict adversarial leakage. Our results are as follows: 1. $\textbf{Definitions}$: We introduce new security definitions for the one-message MPC and 2PC settings that restrict the amount of adversarial leakage compared to prior classical definitions. 2. $\textbf{MPC}$: There exist information-theoretically secure one-message multi-party computation protocols in the oracle model in both the quantum pre-processing and classical pre-processing settings. 3. $\textbf{2PC}$: There exist semi-honest secure one-message two-party computation for (randomized) pseudorandom functionalities in the plain model based on LWE and maliciously secure one-message two-party computation for (randomized) constrained functionalities in the CRS model based on iO. Prior work by [Gupte, Liu, Raizes, Roberts and, Vaikuntanathan STOC 2025] achieved semi-honest security based on iO. Our results demonstrate the power of quantum information to circumvent barriers in classical secure computation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Quantum CryptographyNon-interactive MPCOne Time Programs
- Contact author(s)
- prabhanjan @cs ucsb edu
dbhardwaj @ucsb edu
agupte @mit edu - History
- 2026-02-18: approved
- 2026-02-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/302
- License
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/302, author = {Prabhanjan Ananth and Divyanshu Bhardwaj and Aparna Gupte}, title = {Non Interactive {MPC}, (Quantumly) Revisited}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/302}, year = {2026}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/302}}