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Zhang Youxia (Chinese:张又侠; born July 1950) is a Chinese general in thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) and first-rankedvice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Born in Beijing, Zhang is the son of GeneralZhang Zongxun. Joining the army in 1968, Zhang fought in theSino-Vietnamese War of 1979, and theBattle of Laoshan in 1984, making him one of the few serving generals in China with war experience. In 2000, he became commander of the13th Group Army. In 2005, he became the vice commander of theBeijing Military Region. He was promoted to commander of theShenyang Military Region in 2007, and became a member of theCentral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
In 2011, Zhang was promoted to General. In 2012, he was appointed as head of thePLA General Armaments Department. In 2016, he became the head of its successor, the CMCEquipment Development Department. In 2017, as member of theCCP Politburo, he became the second-ranked CMC vice chairman. In 2022, he became the first-ranked CMC vice chairman. In January 2026, Zhang was detained and became one of the highest-ranking military officers to fall from power since theLin Biao incident in 1971.
Zhang was born and raised inBeijing, but traces his ancestry to Yantou Village,Weinan,Shaanxi Province. He is the son ofZhang Zongxun, a Communist general in theChinese Civil War, giving himprinceling status.[1][2] Zhang Youxia's father and CCP General SecretaryXi Jinping's fatherXi Zhongxun both come from the Weinan region ofShaanxi and served in theFirst Field Army. His father participated withMao Zedong in theAutumn Harvest Uprising (1927) and was a veteran of theLong March (1934–1936). During theChinese Civil War, his father was a commander of the First Field Army, where Xi Jinping's father was political commissar.[3][4] Zhang attendedBeijing Jingshan School.[3]
Zhang joined the army in December 1968 at 18 years of age. In 1976, he was serving in the 6th Company of the 119th Regiment of the 40th Division of the14th Group Army, stationed inYunnan province; and was rapidly promoted. In 1971, he was transferred to the headquarters of the 119th Regiment and served in the training section. After being promoted to officer in 1976, he returned to the grassroots unit and served as the company commander of the 8th Company of the 119th Regiment of the 40th Division of the 14th Army.[3]
Zhang took part in theSino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Because of his performance, he was promoted to the head of the training section of the 118th Regiment (at the battalion level) and later became the chief of staff of the 118th Regiment (at the deputy regimental level). In 1981, he was transferred to the 118th Regiment as deputy regimental commander. In 1983, he was transferred to the 119th Regiment as regimental commander. In 1984, he led his troops to participate in theBattle of Laoshan.[3][5]
After the Battle of Laoshan, Zhang was immediately promoted to deputy commander of the 40th Division of the Army. However, due to the requirements of military reforms at the time, all officers at the regimental level and above needed to have military academy training before being promoted. He was assigned to study at the Basic Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Military Academy (now thePeople's Liberation Army National Defense University) and three years later, in 1987, obtained his associate degree. Only then did he officially return to the headquarters of the 40th Division to assume his new post. After the restoration of the military rank system in 1988, he was awarded the rank of colonel.[6]
In 1990, Zhang was promoted to commander of the 40th Motorized Infantry Division and awarded the rank of senior colonel. In 1994, he was promoted to deputy commander of the13th Group Army. In August 2000, he was named commander of the 13th Group Army.[6] In December 2005, he became the vice commander of theBeijing Military Region. He was promoted to commander of theShenyang Military Region in September 2007. He has been associated withNational University of Defense Technology as an Adjunct Professor since 2010.[7]
Zhang attained the rank of major general in 1997, and lieutenant general in 2007. He became a member of theCentral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007. In July 2011, he was promoted to General. Prior to the18th Party Congress held in 2012 (where he was a delegate), a wholesale re-shuffle of the PLA leadership took place. At the panel discussions of the party congress on the report of theGeneral SecretaryHu Jintao, Zhang promised to accelerate the research and development of high-tech weapons and military equipment. He was tapped to replaceChang Wanquan as the director of thePLA General Armaments Department (later replaced by theEquipment Development Department also headed by Zhang). In November 2012, as was customary for the directors of the "four big departments" of the PLA, Zhang was named a member of theCentral Military Commission.[8] As director of the Equipment Development Department, he also headedChina's human spaceflight program and was chief flight officer of theShenzhou 10 spacecraft.[9]
In October 2017, Zhang was named as a member of thePolitburo of the Chinese Communist Party and the second-rankingvice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission. He also became the vice chairman of the state CMC in March 2018.[7][10] Zhang met with director of theGeneral Political Bureau of the Korean People's ArmyKim Su Gil in August 2019, where he told Kim that the delegation's visit as was of "crucial significance in bilateral exchange."[11] According toSouth China Morning Post in November 2021, Zhang headed the anti-ship missile testing programme including a weapons-testing range with amock-up US aircraft carrier.[12] In January 2022, during a meeting of PLA's disciplinary officials, Zhang said the PLA should come up with innovative measures to eliminate corruption problems.[13] He met with Pakistani Chief of Army StaffQamar Javed Bajwa, where both sides pledged to increase military ties.[14]
Although expected to retire under the CCP's informal retirement age of 68, Zhang remained on the Politburo following the20th CCP National Congress in October 2022, and was re-appointed as the first-ranking CMC vice chairman.[1][15] He was also re-appointed as PRC CMC vice-chairman in March 2023. In August 2023, Zhang told top military officials ensuring the quality of weaponry should be a top goal.[16] In October 2023, Zhang addressed theBeijing Xiangshan Forum by saying the PLA would "show no mercy" against any moves towardsTaiwan independence.[17] He visited Russia in November 2023, meeting with Defense MinisterSergei Shoigu and PresidentVladimir Putin.[18] At the 19thWestern Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao in April 2024, Zhang called for abandoning "cold war mentality" and promised "firm countermeasures against unreasonable provocations" in theSouth China Sea.[19]
In August 2024, Zhang met with US National Security AdvisorJake Sullivan, where he called on the US to "correct its strategic understanding of China, return to a rational and pragmatic policy toward China, [and] earnestly respectChina's core interests".[20] He visited Vietnam in October, where he met with Communist Party General SecretaryTô Lâm, PresidentLương Cường, Prime MinisterPhạm Minh Chính and Defense MinisterPhan Văn Giang, saying the two countries were "making new progress" in defense relations.[21] The same month, he oversaw military readiness drills in Hebei.[22] He also visited Pakistan in November, meeting with Chief of Army StaffAsim Munir.[23] In November 2025, Zhang visited Russia, where he met with Russian Defense MinisterAndrey Belousov.[24]
Zhang disappeared from public view after November 2025.[25] On 24 January 2026, theMinistry of National Defense announced that Zhang and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military CommissionLiu Zhenli were placed under investigation due to a decision by theCCP Central Committee over suspected "serious violations of discipline."[26][27] TheSouth China Morning Post reported Zhang was arrested on 19 January. It also reported that top CCP officials were briefed about Zhang's case on 23 January, and that Zhang was suspected of corruption, failing to rein in his close associates, family members and relatives and for not flagging problems to the party leadership at the first instance.[28] ThePeople's Liberation Army Daily published an editorial stating that Zhang and Liu had "severely trampled on and undermined theCMC Chairman responsibility system".[29] This was a more severe characterization than the previous characterization of the charges againstHe Weidong, former vice chairman of the CMC.[30]
It is speculated that Zhang's downfall may be related to the2023 Rocket Force corruption case, relating to his tenure as head of theEquipment Development Department (which succeeded the General Armaments Department) from 2016–2017.[30] Zhang was one of the six military generals appointed by Xi Jinping to the CMC at thefirst plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee; all, exceptZhang Shengmin, have since been removed underXi's anti-corruption campaign including Zhang, Liu Zhenli, He Weidong,Miao Hua andLi Shangfu. Zhang's fall from power marked the most significant incident to hit the Chinese military leadership since the1971 Lin Biao incident, with the move seen as consequential in Xi's centralization of power in the country.[31][32]
The Wall Street Journal reported on 25 January that there was a briefing to the top military officials regarding Zhang on 24 January, in which it was said Zhang was put under investigation for allegedly forming political cliques, promoting Li Shangfu as defense minister in exchange for large bribes, and leaking core technical data onChina's nuclear weapons to the United States. TheJournal added that some evidence against Zhang had come fromGu Jun [zh], the formergeneral manager of theChina National Nuclear Corporation who was also put under investigation. It also added authorities were investigating Zhang's previous leadership over the PLA General Armaments Department, and that Xi had dispatched a task force toShenyang to investigate Zhang's tenure at the Shenyang Military Region, where the team was staying at local hotels rather than military bases where Zhang might have a network of support.[33] On the other hand,The New York Times reported that Zhang was neither a spy for the U.S. government nor leaked China's nuclear secrets to the U.S., citing unnamed current and former U.S. officials.[34]
K. Tristan Tang, anAssociate Fellow at Secure Taiwan Associate Corporation and the Center for China Studies atNational Taiwan University, published an analysis forJamestown Foundation'sChina Brief. Analyzing publications and reports from theMinistry of National Defense,People's Daily, andPLA Daily, Tang said that the corruption charges against Zhang and Liu were unlikely and stemmed from political accusations related to their disagreement or defiance with the CMCchairman responsibility system. According to Tang, they prioritized military effectiveness over excessive political control of the military and resisted directives they assessed as unrealistic, particularly Xi's demands that the PLA be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027, a timeline Zhang reportedly saw as more realistic by 2035. Tang said that the discord became visible within the PLA and likely played a role in Zhang’s downfall.[35]
| Military offices | ||
|---|---|---|
| Preceded by | Commander of the13th Group Army 2000–2005 | Succeeded by Wang Xixin [zh] |
| Preceded by | Commander of theShenyang Military Region 2007–2012 | Succeeded by |
| Head of thePeople's Liberation Army General Armaments Department 2012–2015 | Succeeded by Position abolished | |
| New title | Head of theEquipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission 2015–2017 | Succeeded by |
| Party political offices | ||
| Preceded by Fan Changlong | Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party 2017– | Incumbent |
| Government offices | ||
| Preceded by | Vice Chairman of theCentral Military Commission 2018– | Incumbent |
Generals and admirals of China in active service | ||
|---|---|---|
| Ground Force and Strategic Support Force |  | |
| Navy* | ||
| Air Force | ||
| Rocket Force | ||
*Although navyshang jiang is officially translated as "admiral", there is no distinction between "general" and "admiral" in Chinese. | ||
| International | |
|---|---|
| National | |
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