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Yamagata Aritomo

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Japanese military leader and statesman (1838–1922)

In thisJapanese name, thesurname is Yamagata.
Yamagata Aritomo
山縣 有朋
Prime Minister of Japan
In office
8 November 1898 – 19 October 1900
MonarchMeiji
Preceded byŌkuma Shigenobu
Succeeded byItō Hirobumi
In office
24 December 1889 – 6 May 1891
MonarchMeiji
Preceded byKuroda Kiyotaka
Sanjō Sanetomi (acting)
Succeeded byMatsukata Masayoshi
President of the Privy Council
In office
26 October 1909 – 1 February 1922
MonarchsMeiji
Taishō
Vice PresidentHigashikuze Michitomi
Yoshikawa Akimasa
Kiyoura Keigo
Preceded byItō Hirobumi
Succeeded byKiyoura Keigo
In office
21 December 1905 – 14 June 1909
MonarchMeiji
Vice PresidentHigashikuze Michitomi
Preceded byItō Hirobumi
Succeeded byItō Hirobumi
In office
11 March 1893 – 12 December 1893
MonarchMeiji
Vice PresidentHigashikuze Michitomi
Preceded byOki Takato
Succeeded byKuroda Kiyotaka
Ministerial offices
Minister of Justice
In office
8 August 1892 – 11 March 1893
Prime MinisterItō Hirobumi
Preceded byKōno Togama
Succeeded byYoshikawa Akimasa
Minister of Home Affairs
In office
22 December 1885 – 17 May 1890
Prime MinisterItō Hirobumi
Kuroda Kiyotaka
Himself
Preceded byHimself (asLord of Home Affairs)
Succeeded bySaigō Jūdō
Lord of Home Affairs
In office
12 December 1883 – 22 December 1885
MonarchMeiji
Preceded byYamada Akiyoshi
Succeeded byHimself (asMinister of Home Affairs)
Lord of the Army
In office
30 June 1874 – 8 November 1878
MonarchMeiji
Preceded byIzuru Tsuda
Succeeded bySaigō Jūdō
In office
8 June 1873 – 2 July 1873
MonarchMeiji
Preceded byOffice established
Succeeded bySaigō Jūdō
Member of theHouse of Peers
In office
5 August 1895 – 1 February 1922
Personal details
Born(1838-06-14)14 June 1838
Died1 February 1922(1922-02-01) (aged 83)
Political partyIndependent
Spouse
Domestic partnerYoshida Sadako (1893–1922)
ChildrenFunakoshi Matsuko (daughter)
RelativesYamagata Isaburō (nephew)
Signature
Military service
AllegianceEmpire of Japan
Branch/service Imperial Japanese Army
Years of service1868–1905
RankField Marshal (Gensui)
Battles/wars
AwardsOrder of the Golden Kite(1st class)
Order of the Rising Sun(1st class with Paulownia Blossoms, Grand Cordon)
Order of the Chrysanthemum
Member of the Order of Merit
Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George

PrinceYamagata Aritomo (Japanese:山縣 有朋; 14 June 1838 – 1 February 1922) was a Japanese statesman and general who twice served asprime minister of Japan, in 1889–1891 and 1898–1900. He was a leading member of thegenrō, a group of senior courtiers and statesmen who dominated the politics of Japan during theMeiji era. As theImperial Japanese Army's inauguralChief of Staff, he was the chief architect of itsnationalist andreactionary ideology,[1] which has led some historians to consider him the "father" ofJapanese militarism.[2]

Born to a low-rankingsamurai family in theChōshū Domain, Yamagata became a leader in the loyalist movement to overthrow theTokugawa shogunate. As a commander in theBoshin War, he helped lead the military forces of theSatsuma–Chōshū Alliance to victory in theMeiji Restoration. Following the Restoration, he traveled to Europe to study Western military systems and returned to become the central figure in the creation of the modern Imperial Japanese Army, implementing a nationwide conscription system. He led the new conscript army to victory over theSatsuma Rebellion in 1877, which validated his military reforms and destroyed the last vestiges of the samurai class, including the right to bear swords. He further secured the army's independence from civilian control by creating an autonomousImperial Japanese Army General Staff which reported directly to theEmperor.

Entering civilian government, Yamagata served asHome Minister, where he established an efficient, centralized police and local government system. As Prime Minister from 1889 to 1891, he oversaw the opening of the firstImperial Diet under the newMeiji Constitution. Thereafter, he engaged in a protracted political contest withItō Hirobumi over the nature of constitutional government.[3] Whereas Itō grew to favor a system of compromise with the political parties, Yamagata remained a staunch advocate of a "transcendental" government where the cabinet would be composed of non-partisan bureaucrats accountable only to the emperor.[4] After theFirst Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, he served a second term as Prime Minister from 1898 to 1900, during which he passed laws to prevent political party members from holding key bureaucratic posts.

From the outset of the 1900s, Yamagata vied against Itō for supremacy among theMeiji oligarchy. Upon Ito's assassination on 26 October 1909, he consolidated power over Japan'simperial court.[5][6][7] However, a political scandal that involved his meddling in Crown PrinceHirohito'sengagement led to him losing power shortly before his death in 1922.[8][9]

Early life

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Yamagata Aritomo, first named Tatsunosuke, was born on 14 June 1838, in the castle town ofHagi, the capital of theChōshū Domain (present-dayYamaguchi Prefecture).[10][11] His father, Yamagata Arinori, was a low-rankingsamurai of thechūgen (foot soldier) class, the lowest rank of direct vassals to thedaimyō.[12][13] The family was poor, and their duties were barely distinguishable from those of commoners, but they retained the privileges of the samurai class.[14] Yamagata's mother died when he was five, and he was raised by his grandmother, Katsu, who instilled in him the ideals of the samurai.[14] Under his father's tutelage, he was schooled in the classical literature of China and Japan and developed a talent for writing poetry. He also received military training infencing,spearmanship, andjujitsu.[15]

From the age of thirteen, Yamagata held a series of minor jobs in thehan bureaucracy, first as an errand boy in the treasury office and later as a servant in thehan school. He eventually became an informer in thehan police organization, where his faithful service brought him to the attention of his superiors.[16] Yamagata grew up during a period of major reform in Chōshū. Stung by its defeat at theBattle of Sekigahara in 1600, the domain nurtured a tradition of hostility toward theTokugawa shogunate.[17] In the 1830s, under the leadership of DaimyōMōri Takachika, Chōshū underwent significant economic and military reforms, strengthening its finances and adopting Western military technology. This atmosphere of change and innovation influenced Yamagata, making him aware of the benefits of modernization.[18]

Revolutionary loyalist

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Early political activity

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In 1858, at the age of twenty, Yamagata was selected to go toKyoto, the imperial capital, to serve as an intelligence agent for the domain.[19] His selection was recommended byYoshida Shōin, an influential Chōshū intellectual whose teachings were inspiring a new generation of loyalist activists.[20] This was a turning point in Yamagata's career, moving him from the confines ofhan administration into the turbulent national politics of thebakumatsu period.[17] The arrival ofCommodore Perry in 1853 had shattered Japan's seclusion policy and exposed the weakness of the Tokugawa shogunate. A growing movement known assonnō jōi (尊皇攘夷,Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian) emerged, calling for the restoration of the emperor's political power and the expulsion of foreigners.[21]

In Kyoto, Yamagata became associated with a group of radicalsonnō jōi activists and was introduced to the loyalist scholarsYanagawa Seigan andUmeda Umpin. These men were at the center of the anti-bakufu movement in Kyoto, and their ideas, combined with the political events Yamagata witnessed, persuaded him that drastic measures were needed to restore imperial rule and resist the West.[22] Upon his return to Hagi in October 1858, he began nearly six months of study under Yoshida Shōin at his private academy, theShōka Sonjuku (松下村塾,school beneath the pines).[23][13]

Following Yoshida'sexecution by the shogunate in 1859, Yamagata became a central figure among the young, radical Chōshū loyalists.[24] He participated in theShimonoseki campaign and was wounded during the bombardment of Shimonoseki by a multinational Western fleet in 1864, an experience that convinced him of the overwhelming superiority of Western military technology.[25] When a conservative faction in the Chōshū government made peace with the shogunate, Yamagata and other radicals launched an internal coup known as the "Chōshū Restoration".[26] In February 1865, he led a force in the decisive battle at Edo-Ota, which secured victory for the radical faction and committed Chōshū to a policy of overthrowing the Tokugawabakufu.[27] Under new leadership, Chōshū entered into the secretSatsuma–Chōshū Alliance with the rivalSatsuma Domain.[28]

Yamagata in 1869

Following the defeat at Shimonoseki, Yamagata had become an officer in theKiheitai (奇兵隊; lit. "Irregular Unit"), an innovative militia unit organized byTakasugi Shinsaku. Unlike traditional samurai units, theKiheitai was composed of men from all social classes, including commoners. Yamagata's experience in theKiheitai persuaded him of the fighting potential of well-trained, well-equipped commoner soldiers, a lesson he would later apply to the entire nation.[29] He distinguished himself as a military commander during theSecond Chōshū expedition in 1866, leadingkiheitai units in amphibious raids across theShimonoseki Strait.[30] Takasugi's premature death in 1867 was a major loss for the loyalist movement; though Yamagata was a talented officer, Takasugi passed over him for command of theKiheitai, selectingŌmura Masujirō for the role as Ōmura had greater technical and tactical expertise and was seen as less ideological.[30]

Yamagata played a key role in the subsequentBoshin War of 1868, leading Chōshū forces in the campaigns in northern Japan that culminated in the overthrow of the shogunate and theMeiji Restoration.[31] His command during the war, however, was marked by occasional setbacks; in one campaign on the western coast, his forces stalled and he failed to cut off the retreating shogunate army.[32]

Founding the Imperial Japanese Army

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Yamagata in the 1870s

Yamagata Aritomo was a central figure in creating the new military foundations of the Meiji state.[33] From 1869 to 1870, he andSaigō Tsugumichi undertook a tour of Europe to study Western military systems. Yamagata was deeply impressed by thePrussian military, particularly its use of universalconscription, which he saw as the key to creating a modern, powerful army.[34] Upon his return, he was appointed Assistant Vice Minister of Military Affairs and set about organizing a national army. He was instrumental in establishing theImperial Bodyguard (Goshimpei (御親兵)), the first military unit under the direct command of the central government, composed of troops from Satsuma, Chōshū, andTosa.[35] This force provided the military backing for theabolition of the feudal domains in 1871, a crucial step in the centralization of political power.[36]

Conscription and the Satsuma Rebellion

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Yamagata's most significant contribution was the establishment of a nationwide conscription system. He was the primary driver behind the Conscription Act of 1872, which made military service compulsory for all male citizens, regardless of social class.[37][38] He saw the policy as a multi-faceted tool: it would create a modern, powerful army based on the Prussian model he admired, but it would also curtail the power of the samurai class and instill a new sense of national identity and loyalty to the emperor and the state.[39] Convinced of the merit of peasant soldiers from his command of mixed commoner-samurai units during the Restoration, he also viewed conscription as a way of educating future generations in citizenship.[37] The policy faced strong opposition, both from peasants who resented the "blood tax" and from samurai who saw it as a violation of their traditional status.[40] AsArmy Minister from 1873, Yamagata vigorously suppressed this opposition.[41]

During theSatsuma Rebellion of 1877, led by the celebrated Restoration heroSaigō Takamori, Yamagata served as field commander of the government forces. He had initially proposed an amphibious assault to strike at the rebellion's base inKagoshima, but the government rejected his plan in favor of a direct relief of the besiegedKumamoto Castle.[39] Leading a cautious and methodical campaign, Yamagata's conscript army ultimately crushed the rebellion in a decisive victory.[42][43] When the emperor visited the wounded after the rebellion, Yamagata was among the dignitaries present. Observing the emperor touch the scars of the maimed soldiers, Yamagata "stood erect and saluted, at which everyone wept".[44] The victory validated the conscription system and ended the last major challenge to the authority of the Meiji government. Despite the military triumph, Yamagata expressed deep personal sorrow over the death of his former comrade Saigō.[45]

Creation of the General Staff

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Yamagata in 1880

Following the Satsuma Rebellion, Yamagata worked to further professionalize and depoliticize the army. In reaction to the rebelliousness of soldiers who had joined Saigō, and to address grievances that had led to theTakebashi Mutiny of 1878, he issued the "Admonition to Soldiers" (gunjin kunkai), prepared for him by the scholar-officialNishi Amane, which stressed strict discipline and forbade soldiers from petitioning or questioning state policies.[46][47][48] He reorganized the military along German lines and, in 1878, with the advice of his subordinateKatsura Tarō, established an independentImperial Japanese Army General Staff, modeled on the Prussian system.[49][50][37] This new body was responsible for military planning and command and reported directly to the emperor, not to the civilian government. This effectively separated military command from political administration, ensuring the army's autonomy from civilian control and becoming a major source of the military's political power in the following decades.[51]

To instill a uniform ideology in the new army, Yamagata was the principal force behind theImperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882. This document, which he promulgated as a more far-reaching response to the growing influence of theFreedom and People's Rights Movement, served as the ethical code for all military personnel until the end ofWorld War II.[52][53][48] It emphasized absolute personal loyalty to the emperor as the soldier's highest duty, running counter to the democratic assertions of the movement, and strictly forbade any involvement in politics.[54][48] It shaped the nationalist and reactionary ideological development of the army.[55]

Political career

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Yamagata Aritomo
Premiership of Yamagata Aritomo
MonarchEmperor Meiji
PartyMilitary (Army)
SeatNaikaku Sōri Daijin Kantei

First term

24 December 1889 – 6 May 1891
CabinetFirst Yamagata Cabinet
Election1890

Second term

8 November 1898 – 19 October 1900
CabinetSecond Yamagata Cabinet


Emblem of the Government of Japan

Yamagata's influence was not confined to the military; his career included service asHome Minister,Prime Minister,Minister of Justice, andPresident of the Privy Council.[56] In 1883, he was appointed Home Minister and embarked on a major reform of the state's internal administration.[57] Using German models and with the assistance of the German advisorAlbert Mosse, he established a new local government system that centralized authority and extended the reach of the central government down to the village level.[58][59] He also reformed the police system, creating a powerful, centralized force under the firm control of the Home Ministry.[60][61] A staunch conservative, Yamagata viewed the growingFreedom and People's Rights Movement with alarm and used his position as Home Minister to suppress political opposition, culminating in the harsh Peace Preservation Law of 1887, which gave the police broad powers to quell dissent.[62][61]

First premiership

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See also:First Yamagata Cabinet
Yamagata in 1887

In December 1889, Yamagata became the third Prime Minister of Japan, heading a new cabinet after the resignation ofKuroda Kiyotaka.[63][64] His government oversaw the opening of the firstImperial Diet in 1890, an event that marked a new phase in Japanese politics.[65][66] In a speech before the Diet in March 1890, he articulated for the first time his strategic concept of national security. He defined a "line of sovereignty" (主権線,shukensen; the nation's borders) and a "line of interest" (利益線,riekisen; a buffer zone of strategic interest, specificallyKorea, essential to the defense of the line of sovereignty).[67][68] This doctrine guided Japanese foreign policy for decades and was used to justify military expansion on the Asian continent.[69]

Yamagata immediately clashed with the opposition parties in the Diet over the budget, particularly his demands for increased military spending.[70] A former military man, Yamagata was reluctant to yield ground and had little inclination to cultivate the sort of contacts with politicians that might have forestalled the conflict.[71] The confrontation became deadlocked, and Yamagata considered dissolving the Diet, but was dissuaded by his rivalItō Hirobumi.[72] On 10 February 1891, he delivered a speech declaring that his cabinet could not answer questions on certain budget items, which was harshly criticized by Itō as a "foolish statement" that needlessly antagonized the opposition.[70] He eventually secured a compromise by working with a splinter faction of theLiberal Party, though the final budget incorporated almost three-quarters of the cuts the opposition had demanded.[73][74][71] To forestall coalitions between opposition parties in future sessions, Yamagata revised the Regulations for Public Meetings and Political Associations, forbidding any party from combining or communicating with another.[75] During this period, he was also a key figure behind the promulgation of theImperial Rescript on Education (1890), which established a conservative, emperor-centered moral framework for the national education system.[76] He resigned as Prime Minister in May 1891, his government having survived the first Diet session but weakened by Itō's criticism.[77][78][79]

Second premiership

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See also:Second Yamagata Cabinet
Japanese mission attending the coronation ofNicholas II, 1896. Yamagata is seated in the center.[80]

Yamagata's political influence continued to grow throughout the 1890s. During theFirst Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), against the better judgment of the government, he successfully insisted on being appointed commander of theFirst Army.[81] He arrived at the front in September, after thecapture of Pyongyang, but a bout of illness cut short his command.[82][83] While convalescing, he remained at the front and, frustrated with the Imperial General Headquarters' operational guidance, unilaterally ordered his army to pursue the Chinese forces, an act of insubordination that created friction with the central command.[84] In December, the emperor had to personally order his return to Japan.[85][86] After the war, he used the victory to push for a massive expansion of the army, doubling its size from seven to thirteen divisions. He argued for "bigger, not more" divisions, focusing on increasing the infantry strength of the existing formations rather than creating new ones.[87][88]

In November 1898, Yamagata formed his second cabinet following the collapse of the short-livedŌkuma ShigenobuItagaki Taisuke party cabinet.[89][90][91] His primary objective was to secure funding for the postwar military expansion and address the growing fiscal deficit, which required a significant increase in the land tax.[92][93] To overcome opposition in the Diet, he formed an unprecedented alliance with Itagaki'sKenseitō, the successor to the Liberal Party, promising them concessions on other policies in exchange for their support on the tax bill.[94][95][96] After successfully passing the tax increase, however, Yamagata moved to undermine the political parties' influence. In March 1899, he enacted a series of civil service ordinances that made it difficult for party members to be appointed to high positions in the bureaucracy, effectively insulating it from political control.[97][98][99][100] During this period, his government also passed the 1900 Peace Police Law to suppress the labor movement.[101] In May 1900, he revised the regulations for service ministers, stipulating that only active-duty generals and admirals could serve as ministers of the army and navy, giving the military a powerful veto over the formation of any cabinet.[102][99][103][104][101] He resigned in October 1900, having secured the army's long-term expansion and strengthened the foundations of bureaucratic rule, and after theBoxer Rebellion had been suppressed.[97][105][106][101]

Elder statesman (genrō)

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Yamagata (right) withItō Hirobumi, 1896

After 1900, Yamagata retired from direct participation in cabinet government, but he continued to exercise influence as a member of thegenrō (元老), an unofficial group of elder statesmen who advised the emperor and selected Japan's prime ministers.[107] He became the central figure in a long-standing political rivalry withItō Hirobumi.[13] This rivalry split the oligarchy into two major factions: a "militarist" faction led by Yamagata, and a "civil" faction led by Itō.[108] Throughout 1900 to 1909, Yamagata vied against Itō for control of Japanese policy while exercising influence through his protégé,Katsura Tarō.[109] While both men were conservatives, Yamagata championed bureaucratic, non-party government, whereas Itō, believing cooperation with the parties was necessary, formed his own party, theRikken Seiyūkai, in 1900.[110][111] In 1903, Yamagata and Katsura engineered Itō's removal from party leadership by having him appointed President of thePrivy Council, effectively isolating him from direct political involvement.[112][113][114][115] After the assassination of Itō Hirobumi in 1909, Yamagata emerged as the highest authority in the Meiji government below theEmperor.[116][117][6]

Yamagata was a central figure in Japan's foreign policy during this period. As a check against Russian expansionism, he was a strong proponent of theAnglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902.[118] During theRusso-Japanese War (1904–1905), he was the final authority on military strategy as Chief of the Army General Staff.[119] Believing Japan's resources were overextended, he successfully argued for an end to the war after thevictory at Mukden, against the wishes of some field commanders who wanted to press on.[120][121][122] After the war, convinced that Russia would seek revenge, he pushed for another massive expansion of the army, calling for a force of fifty divisions.[123] He was a key architect of the 1907 Imperial Defense Policy, which established Russia as the army's primary hypothetical opponent and codified a forward-based, offensive strategy on the Asian continent. Invoking the military's prerogative of supreme command, he ensured that the plan was drafted with no input from civilian leaders.[124][125] He was also a key force behind theannexation of Korea in 1910.[126]

Yamagatac. 1910s

Yamagata's authority was seriously challenged after the death ofEmperor Meiji in July 1912. He had his protégé Katsura elevated to the powerful court positions ofGrand Chamberlain andLord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Yamagata intended for Katsura to guide the new, inexperiencedEmperor Taishō, but he was also motivated by a growing distrust of Katsura's own political ambitions; their personal relationship had cooled, and the appointment was a way to remove Katsura from the political arena.[127] However, during theTaishō Political Crisis of 1912–1913, his support for the army's demand for two new divisions led to the resignation of the Seiyūkai cabinet ofSaionji Kinmochi. He then orchestrated the appointment of Katsura as Prime Minister.[128] This move, however, sparked a nationwide popular uprising that forced Katsura's resignation and temporarily undermined the power of thegenrō and the military. The crisis also led to the reversal of Yamagata's 1900 ordinance requiring active-duty officers as service ministers.[129][130]

DuringWorld War I, Yamagata's influence remained decisive. He supported Japan's entry into the war but was critical of Foreign MinisterKatō Takaaki's handling of theTwenty-One Demands to China in 1915, fearing it would alienate the Western powers. Yamagata led the othergenrō in forcing Katō to moderate the demands, demonstrating the elders' continuing power over foreign policy.[131] Driven by a long-held fear of international racial conflict, he also engineered the secretRusso-Japanese Alliance of 1916 to secure Japan's position against the Western allies after the war.[132]

Final years and death

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In his final years, Yamagata remained the "power behind the curtain". He was a central, though initially reluctant, figure in the decision to undertake theSiberian Intervention in 1918.[133] In the same year, after the1918 rice riots, he was forced to accept the appointment ofHara Takashi as Prime Minister. Yamagata had initially hoped to avoid a pure party cabinet by persuading Saionji to head a cabinet of national unity, but when Saionji refused and recommended Hara, and with the outgoing premierTerauchi Masatake also favoring Hara, Yamagata bowed to the inevitable. Unwilling to recommend a party politician himself, he entrusted the duty to Saionji, paving the way for the first party cabinet in Japanese history, a landmark in Japanese constitutional history.[134][135][136] Though he distrusted party politics, he developed a working relationship with Hara, whom he respected for his conservative pragmatism;[137] by 1921, Yamagata had come to appreciate that Hara's cabinet was providing better coordination of government than any of its predecessors.[138]

Yamagata on his 83rd birthday in 1921, at his New Chinzansō villa inTokyo

His final major political involvement was the "grave court affair" of 1920–1921 concerning the marriage of Crown PrinceHirohito.[139] Yamagata attempted to block the marriage, citing hereditarycolor blindness in the family of the bride (Princess Nagako), theShimazu clan of Satsuma. His effort was widely seen as an attack on Satsuma and was ultimately defeated by a coalition of court nobles and his political opponents, a major blow to his prestige.[140] Saddened by this defeat and the assassination of Prime Minister Hara in November 1921, an event he lamented, Yamagata's health declined.[141] He died on 1 February 1922, at his villa inOdawara. He was given a state funeral and buried at theGokokuji temple in Tokyo.[142][143][144]

Legacy

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Yamagata Aritomo was one of the most important and controversial figures in the history of modern Japan. For over half a century, his influence was a major factor in nearly every significant development, from the creation of the modern army to the conduct of foreign policy.[145] His career was one of extraordinary success, rising from an insignificant samurai to become the nation's most powerful military and political leader.[146] He was the architect of the modern Japanese army and the modern Japanese bureaucracy, both of which he molded in his own conservative, authoritarian image.[147] Personally stern, private, and silent, his dour and methodical plans for the nation contrasted with the more casual and breezy approach of his rivalItō Hirobumi.[13]

His political philosophy, which championed a strong, centralized state led by a non-partisan bureaucracy and military, set the pattern for Japanese government for decades and obstructed the development of a more liberal, democratic order.[148] While he consistently adhered to the principle of non-party cabinets, he was also a realist who compromised with political parties when necessary to achieve national goals, most notably during his second premiership.[149] Nevertheless, his actions based on his conservative beliefs, taken within the constitutional framework he had helped create, made it inevitable that the parties would expand their political influence, making him an unintended benefactor in the development of constitutional government in Japan.[150]

His legacy is deeply contested. In the West and in postwar Japan, he has often been depicted as the "arch-villain" ofJapanese militarism and reaction, the primary force that led Japan down the path to aggressive war and defeat in 1945.[151] Others have argued that Yamagata, while an authoritarian, was also a cautious and pragmatic statesman whose primary goal was ensuring Japan's national security in a hostile world. His life was characterized by a deep and unwavering loyalty to the emperor and the nation, and his actions, however harsh, were consistently aimed at building a strong, independent Japan capable of standing among the great powers. In this, he was spectacularly successful. His life and career are inseparable from the story of Japan's phenomenal transformation into a modern state.[152]

Personal life

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Yamagata was a man of contrasts. In public, he was a stern, disciplined, and often ruthless military leader and politician. He disliked publicity and was not an able public speaker, preferring to exert his influence from behind the scenes.[153] In his private life, however, he was a man of refined tastes. He was a prolific writer of classical poetry, which he used to express his emotions, even in the heat of battle. He was also a master of landscape gardening, and his villas, including theMurinan inKyoto and the Kokinan inOdawara, were famous for their beautifully designed gardens.[154]

In 1867, he married Yamagata Yūko. They had seven children, but only one daughter survived to adulthood. After his wife's death in 1893, he remained a widower. He adopted his nephew,Yamagata Isaburō, as his heir.[155]

Awards

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Japanese

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Peerages in theKazoku and other titles

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Decorations

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Order of precedence

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  • Fifth Rank,August 1870
  • Fourth Rank,December 1872
  • Third Rank,December 1884
  • Second Rank,October 1886
  • Senior Second Rank,20 December 1895
  • Junior First Rank,1 February 1922 (posthumous)

Foreign

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References

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  1. ^Norman, E. Herbert (1943)."Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription (Part II)".Pacific Affairs.16 (2): 158.doi:10.2307/2751956.JSTOR 2751956.
  2. ^Hackett 1971.
  3. ^Akita 1967, pp. 103–106.
  4. ^Akita 1967, pp. 70, 73–74.
  5. ^Hein, Patrick (2009).How the Japanese Became Foreign to Themselves: The Impact of Globalization on the Private and Public Spheres in Japan. Münster, Germany: Lit Verlag. p. 73.ISBN 978-3-643-10085-6.After the death of [Itō] Hirobumi in 1909, Yamagata became the most influential [Japanese] politician and remained so until his death in 1922. As president of the Privy Council from 1909 to 1922, Yamagata remained the power behind the [Japanese] government and dictated the selection of future prime ministers. To strengthen the grip of the state on citizens [,] Yamagata instituted a military circumscription system that relied on militarily trained loyal subjects, expanded its control on local entities by directly or indirectly appointing prefectural governors, city mayors and district heads and by establishing and extending the power of police.
  6. ^abPerez, Louis G. (1998).The History of Japan. Greenwood,CT: Greenwood Press. p. 211.ISBN 0-313-30296-0.Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) – leader of the Chōshū faction of genrō; called the 'Father of Japan's Army'; often Premier and Home Minister; controlled the government after the death of Itō in 1909.
  7. ^Samuels, Richard J. (2003).Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress. p. 62.ISBN 0-8014-3492-0.Yamagata served in the Privy Council for seventeen years and continuously as President from 1909 (when Itō was assassinated in Korea) until 1922 when he died. He was even more successful than Itō in insinuating his bureaucratic allies into the Privy Council. He placed his protégés strategically within each of the institutions he sought to control: the civilian bureaucracy, the military, the House of Peers, the colonial administrations, the Privy Council. He was never reluctant to use and reward his supporters or, conversely, to punish his opponents by intervening in elections, by excluding them from important posts, or by dissolving political groups altogether...He tried to control the House of Peers to assure support for military expansion and favorable budgets. But he constructed his most influential network around the emperor, both in the Privy Council and in the imperial household. By the time he was done, Yamagata had outlived his competitors, and had completed institutional arrangements to preclude the rise of others. He was genrō of the genrō, oligarch of the oligarchs.
  8. ^Bix 2001, pp. 96–97: "...Since [Prince] Hirohito had already met Princess Nagako and liked her, and she had all the qualifications needed to become an empress, [Imperial Household Minister] Hatano informed Prince Kuni by letter, in January 1918, of his daughter's selection as the crown prince's fiancée. The Kuni family thereupon hired Sugiura [Shigetake], Hirohito's ethics teacher, to begin giving her weekly lectures in ethics. ¶The imperial engagement ceremony was scheduled to be held at the end of 1920, but in June 1920 the most powerful of the remaininggenrō, Field Marshal Yamagata, attempted to have the engagement canceled on the ground that color blindness existed in the Shimazu family, on Nagako's mother's side. On June 18 Yamagata forced Hatano to resign—ostensibly for not having thoroughly investigated the matter but also in order to expedite sending Hirohito on a foreign tour—and began to install his own Chōshū-faction followers, starting at the top with Gen. Nakamura Yūjirō, as the new minister of the imperial household. Supporting Yamagata was Prime Minister Hara [Takashi]. He too was troubled by the possibility that the Taishō emperor's chronic ill health and mental debility might have been caused by genetic defects in the imperial family, but he was also hoping to strengthen his influence in court affairs by cultivating good relations with Yamagata. Thinking of a healthy imperial family in the future, rather than the maintenance of the purity of the imperial bloodline for its own sake, Yamagata wrote to Prince Kuni asking him to 'withdraw out of respect for the imperial house.' ¶Instead of submitting, Prince Kuni dug in his heels and secretly fought back, enlisting the support of Empress Sadako and Sugiura..."
  9. ^Bix 2001, pp. 98–99: "[...] Sometime in January 1921 two pan-Asianists of the 'new right,' the Orientalist scholar Ōkawa Shūmei and the China 'expert' and Nichiren Buddhist thinker Kita Ikki, learned about Yamagata's attempt to annul the crown prince's engagement. Ōkawa had recently formed, with Professor Mitsukawa Kametarō of Takushoku University, a nationalist, anti-Marxist discussion group, the Yūzonsha...which Kita later joined. From its ranks rumors spread of a plot to assassinate Yamagata. ¶ In early February 1921, with the forty-fourth Diet still in session and the problem of thekokutai threatening to surface as a weapon in the hands of the opposition parties, Prime Minister Hara [Takashi] withdrew his support for Yamagata...Imperial Household Minister Nakamura also submitted to Sugiura, as did another Yamagata backer, the high court official Hirata Tōsuke. Faced with all these losses...Yamagata gave up the struggle. [¶] On the evening of February 10,1921, officials of the Imperial Household Ministry and Home Ministry informed the Tokyo newspapers that the crown prince's engagement would go ahead as planned and that Nakamura and his vice minister, Ishihara Kenzō, had both resigned...[On February 22] Yamagata offered to resign asgenrō and president of the privy council and to return his many medals and renounce his titles...Hara and the court declined to accept his resignation but Yamagata had clearly fallen from power..."
  10. ^Hackett 1971, p. 16.
  11. ^Nihon dai hyakka zensho. Shōgakkan. 1989. 山県有朋.ISBN 4-09-526001-7.OCLC 14970117.
  12. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 17–18.
  13. ^abcdJansen 2000, p. 396. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  14. ^abHackett 1971, p. 18.
  15. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 19–20.
  16. ^Hackett 1971, p. 20.
  17. ^abHackett 1971, p. 24.
  18. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 21–23.
  19. ^Hackett 1971, p. 25.
  20. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 25, 27–28.
  21. ^Hackett 1971, p. 27.
  22. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 26–27.
  23. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 27, 30.
  24. ^Hackett 1971, p. 31.
  25. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 36, 45.
  26. ^Drea 2009, p. 5.
  27. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 48–51.
  28. ^Hackett 1971, p. 55.
  29. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 38–40.
  30. ^abDrea 2009, p. 6.
  31. ^Hackett 1971, p. 62.
  32. ^Drea 2009, p. 17.
  33. ^Hackett 1971, p. 50.
  34. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 65–66.
  35. ^Drea 2009, p. 23.
  36. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 71–73.
  37. ^abcJansen 2000, p. 397. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  38. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 74, 80.
  39. ^abDrea 2009, p. 41.
  40. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 77, 81–82.
  41. ^Hackett 1971, p. 72, 82.
  42. ^Drea 2009, p. 43.
  43. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 91–93.
  44. ^Keene 2002, p. 286.
  45. ^Hackett 1971, p. 94.
  46. ^Drea 2009, p. 60.
  47. ^Keene 2002, p. 399.
  48. ^abcSims 2001, p. 65.
  49. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 95–96.
  50. ^Drea 2009, p. 61.
  51. ^Hackett 1971, p. 97.
  52. ^Drea 2009, p. 64.
  53. ^Jansen 2000, p. 398. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  54. ^Hackett 1971, p. 100.
  55. ^Norman, E. Herbert (1943)."Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription (Part II)".Pacific Affairs.16 (2): 158.doi:10.2307/2751956.JSTOR 2751956.
  56. ^Jansen 2000, p. 395. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  57. ^Hackett 1971, p. 115.
  58. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 116, 122–123.
  59. ^Jansen 2000, p. 400. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  60. ^Hackett 1971, p. 117.
  61. ^abJansen 2000, p. 401. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  62. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 111–112, 118–120.
  63. ^Hackett 1971, p. 139.
  64. ^Scalapino 1962, p. 169.
  65. ^Hackett 1971, p. 151.
  66. ^Jansen 2000, p. 416. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  67. ^Drea 2009, pp. 86–87.
  68. ^Keene 2002, p. 471.
  69. ^Hackett 1971, p. 153.
  70. ^abAkita 1967, p. 77.
  71. ^abSims 2001, p. 72.
  72. ^Akita 1967, p. 78.
  73. ^Scalapino 1962, p. 172.
  74. ^Akita 1967, p. 79.
  75. ^Akita 1967, p. 76.
  76. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 129, 148.
  77. ^Scalapino 1962, p. 173.
  78. ^Hackett 1971, p. 156.
  79. ^Akita 1967, p. 91.
  80. ^Ocampo, Ambeth (2009).Looking Back. Anvil Publishing. p. 48.ISBN 978-971-27-2336-0.
  81. ^Drea 2009, p. 100.
  82. ^Drea 2009, pp. 100–101.
  83. ^Hackett 1971, p. 176.
  84. ^Drea 2009, p. 101.
  85. ^Drea 2009, p. 102.
  86. ^Keene 2002, p. 498.
  87. ^Drea 2009, p. 105.
  88. ^Hackett 1971, p. 182.
  89. ^Scalapino 1962, p. 181.
  90. ^Akita 1967, pp. 142–143.
  91. ^Keene 2002, p. 571.
  92. ^Hackett 1971, p. 206.
  93. ^Akita 1967, p. 145.
  94. ^Scalapino 1962, pp. 181–182.
  95. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 207, 211.
  96. ^Akita 1967, p. 142.
  97. ^abScalapino 1962, p. 183.
  98. ^Hackett 1971, p. 213.
  99. ^abAkita 1967, p. 143.
  100. ^Keene 2002, pp. 469–470.
  101. ^abcSims 2001, p. 84.
  102. ^Hackett 1971, p. 216.
  103. ^Jansen 2000, p. 421. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  104. ^Keene 2002, p. 470.
  105. ^Hackett 1971, p. 222.
  106. ^Keene 2002, p. 597.
  107. ^Hackett 1971, p. 226.
  108. ^Scalapino 1962, p. 174.
  109. ^Kowner, Rotem (2017).Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. p. 614.ISBN 9781442281844.
  110. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 221, 227–228.
  111. ^Akita 1967, pp. 98–99.
  112. ^Scalapino 1962, p. 185.
  113. ^Hackett 1971, p. 236.
  114. ^Akita 1967, p. 156.
  115. ^Sims 2001, p. 88.
  116. ^Samuels, Richard J. (2003).Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p. 62.ISBN 0-8014-3492-0.
  117. ^Hein, Patrick (2009).How the Japanese Became Foreign to Themselves: The Impact of Globalization on the Private and Public Spheres in Japan. Münster, Germany: Lit Verlag. p. 73.ISBN 978-3-643-10085-6.After the death of [Itō] Hirobumi in 1909, Yamagata became the most influential [Japanese] politician and remained so until his death in 1922. As president of the Privy Council from 1909 to 1922, Yamagata remained the power behind the [Japanese] government and dictated the selection of future prime ministers. To strengthen the grip of the state on citizens [,] Yamagata instituted a military circumscription system that relied on militarily trained loyal subjects, expanded its control on local entities by directly or indirectly appointing prefectural governors, city mayors and district heads and by establishing and extending the power of police.
  118. ^Hackett 1971, p. 229.
  119. ^Hackett 1971, p. 241.
  120. ^Drea 2009, p. 121.
  121. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 242–243.
  122. ^Keene 2002, p. 621.
  123. ^Drea 2009, p. 138.
  124. ^Drea 2009, pp. 138–139.
  125. ^Keene 2002, pp. 650–651.
  126. ^Hackett 1971, p. 258.
  127. ^Sims 2001, p. 131.
  128. ^Kowner, Rotem (2017).Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War.Rowman & Littlefield. p. 614.ISBN 9781442281844.
  129. ^Drea 2009, p. 143.
  130. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 251, 264–265, 277.
  131. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 293, 302–304.
  132. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 305–306, 313.
  133. ^Hackett 1971, p. 328.
  134. ^Drea 2009, p. 155.
  135. ^Hackett 1971, p. 333.
  136. ^Sims 2001, pp. 147, 151–152.
  137. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 334–335.
  138. ^Sims 2001, p. 162.
  139. ^Bix 2001, pp. 96–97, 98–99.
  140. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 349, 352–353.
  141. ^Sims 2001, p. 163.
  142. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 355–356.
  143. ^Jansen 2000, p. 372. sfn error: no target: CITEREFJansen2000 (help)
  144. ^Sims 2001, p. 164.
  145. ^Hackett 1971, p. 357.
  146. ^Itō, Yukio; 伊藤之雄 (2009).Yamagata Aritomo : guchoku na kenryokusha no shōgai. Bungei Shunjū. pp. 11,20–22.ISBN 978-4-16-660684-9.OCLC 310394344.
  147. ^Hackett 1971, p. 358.
  148. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 360–361.
  149. ^Akita 1967, p. 137.
  150. ^Akita 1967, p. 158.
  151. ^Hackett 1971, p. 356.
  152. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 362–363.
  153. ^Hackett 1971, p. 360.
  154. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 360, 144, 249.
  155. ^Hackett 1971, pp. 169, 145.

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