The aim of the conference was to shape a postwar peace that represented not only acollective security order, but also a plan to giveself-determination to the liberated peoples of Europe. Intended mainly to discuss the re-establishment of the nations of war-torn Europe, within a few years, with theCold War dividing the continent, the conference became a subject of intense controversy.
Soviet, American and British diplomats during the Yalta conference Yalta American Delegation in Livadia Palace from left to right: Secretary of StateEdward Stettinius, Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, Admiral E. J. King, General George C. Marshall, Ambassador Averell Harriman, Admiral William Leahy, and President F. D. Roosevelt. Livadia Palace, Crimea,RSFSR
During the Yalta Conference, the Western Allies had liberated all ofFrance andBelgium and were fighting on the western border of Germany. In the east, Soviet forces were 65 km (40 mi) from Berlin, having already pushed back the Germans fromPoland,Romania, andBulgaria. There was no longer a question regarding German defeat. The issue was the new shape of postwar Europe.[3][4][5]
The French leader GeneralCharles de Gaulle was not invited to either the Yalta orPotsdam Conferences, a diplomatic slight that was the occasion for deep and lasting resentment.[6] De Gaulle attributed his exclusion from Yalta to the longstanding personal antagonism towards him by Roosevelt, but the Soviets had also objected to his inclusion as a full participant. However, the absence of French representation at Yalta also meant that extending an invitation for de Gaulle to attend the Potsdam Conference would have been highly problematic since he would have felt honor-bound to insist that all issues agreed at Yalta in his absence be reopened.[7]
The initiative for calling a second "Big Three" conference had come from Roosevelt, who hoped for a meeting before theUS presidential elections in November 1944 but pressed for a meeting early in 1945 at a neutral location in the Mediterranean. Malta, Cyprus, Sicily, Athens, and Jerusalem were all suggested. Stalin, insisting that his doctors opposed any long trips, rejected those options.[8][9] He proposed instead for them meet at theBlack Sea resort of Yalta in the Crimea. Stalin's fear of flying also was a contributing factor in the decision.[10]
Each of the three leaders had his own agenda for postwar Germany and liberated Europe. Roosevelt wanted Soviet support in thePacific War againstJapan, specifically for the planned invasion of Japan (Operation August Storm), as well as Soviet participation in theUnited Nations. Churchill pressed for free elections and democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe, specifically Poland. Stalin demanded a Sovietsphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Europe as an essential aspect of the Soviets' national security strategy, and his position at the conference was felt by him to be so strong that he could dictate terms. According to US delegation member and future Secretary of StateJames F. Byrnes, "it was not a question of what we would let the Russians do, but what we could get the Russians to do".[11]
Poland was the first item on the Soviet agenda. Stalin stated, "For the Soviet government, the question of Poland was one of honor" and security because Poland had served as a historical corridor for forces attempting to invade Russia.[12] In addition, Stalin stated regarding history that "because the Russians had greatly sinned against Poland", "the Soviet government was trying to atone for those sins".[12] Stalin concluded that "Poland must be strong" and that "the Soviet Union is interested in the creation of a mighty, free and independent Poland". Accordingly, Stalin stipulated thatPolish government-in-exile demands were not negotiable, and the Soviets would keep the territory ofeastern Poland that they hadannexed in 1939, with Poland to be compensated for that by extending its western borders at the expense of Germany.
Roosevelt wanted the Soviets to enter the Pacific War against Japan with the Allies, which he hoped would end the war sooner and reduce American casualties.[13]
One Soviet precondition for a declaration of war against Japan was an American official recognition of the Mongolian independence from China (theMongolian People's Republic had been a Soviet satellite state from 1924 to World War II). The Soviets also wanted the recognition of Soviet interests in theChinese Eastern Railway andPort Arthur but not asking the Chinese to lease.
The Soviets wanted the return ofSouth Sakhalin, which had been taken from Russia by Japan in theRusso-Japanese War in 1905, and the cession of theKuril Islands by Japan, both of which were approved by the other Allies. In return, Stalin pledged that the Soviet Union wouldenter the Pacific War three months after the defeat of Germany.[13][14]
The fate of Korea is not mentioned in the records of demands and concessions at Yalta.[15][16] However, several declassified documents later revealed that on 8 February, while Churchill was not present, Roosevelt and Stalin secretly discussed the peninsula. Roosevelt brought up the idea of putting Korea into a trusteeship divided among the Soviets, the Americans, and the Chinese for a period of 20 to 30 years. He expressed reluctance to invite the British to the trusteeship, but Stalin reportedly replied that the British "would most certainly be offended. In fact, the Prime Minister might 'kill us'". Roosevelt agreed with the assessment. Stalin suggested the trusteeship be as short as possible. The two quickly agreed that their troops should not be stationed in Korea. Korea was not discussed again throughout the conference.[13][16]
The Soviet Army had occupied Poland completely and held much of Eastern Europe with a military power three times greater than Allied forces in the West.[citation needed] The Declaration of Liberated Europe did little to dispel the sphere of influence agreements, which had been incorporated into armistice agreements.[18]
All three leaders ratified the agreement of theEuropean Advisory Commission setting the boundaries ofpostwar occupation zones for Germany with three zones of occupation, one for each of the three principal Allies. They also agreed to give France a zone of occupation carved out of the US and UK zones, but De Gaulle maintained the principle of refusing to accept that the French zone would be defined by boundaries established in his absence. He thus ordered French forces to occupyStuttgart in addition to the lands earlier agreed upon as comprising the French occupation zone. He only withdrew when threatened with the suspension of essential American economic supplies.[19] Churchill at Yalta then argued that the French also needed to be a full member of the proposedAllied Control Council for Germany. Stalin resisted that until Roosevelt backed Churchill's position, but Stalin still remained adamant that the French should not be admitted to full membership of the Allied Reparations Commission to be established in Moscow and relented only at thePotsdam Conference.[citation needed]
Also, the Big Three agreed that all original governments would be restored to the invaded countries, with the exceptions of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, whose government-in-exile was also excluded by Stalin, and that all of their civilians would be repatriated.[citation needed]
There were also discussions on theMiddle East and the issue ofPalestine, whereby Roosevelt supported the creation of a new Jewish state, believing that it would be a model of social justice and would raise the standard of living in the region, over the opposition of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Roosevelt cited the views ofWalter C. Lowdermilk that Palestine could absorbed many millions more people. Prior to the conference,Secretary of StateEdward Stettinius Jr. urged Roosevelt not to make any decisions about Palestine without Soviet approval as they might use it to gain influence in the Middle East, and instead try to win agreement from the British and the Soviets on a policy that considered the interests of both Arabs and Jews and avoid uncritical support forZionism. However, at the conference, Stalin did not object to Roosevelt's goals and Churchill gave informal support in exchange for refraining discussions on theWhite Paper of 1939.[20][page needed]
Leaders of the Big Three at the negotiating table at the Yalta conference
The Declaration of Liberated Europe was created by Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin during the Yalta Conference. It was a promise that allowed the people of Europe "to create democratic institutions of their own choice". The declaration pledged that "the earliest possible establishment through free elections governments responsive to the will of the people". That is similar to the statements of theAtlantic Charter for "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live".[21]
Agreement to the priority of theunconditional surrender ofNazi Germany. After the war, Germany and Berlin would be split into four occupied zones.
Stalin agreed that France would have afourth occupation zone in Germany if it was formed from the American and the British zones.
Germany would undergodemilitarization anddenazification. At the Yalta Conference, the Allies decided to provide safeguards against a potential military revival of Germany, to eradicate German militarism and theNazi general staff, to bring about thedenazification of Germany, to punish the war criminals and to disarm and demilitarise Germany.[22]
Creation of a reparation council which would be located in the Soviet Union.
The status of Poland was discussed. The recognition of the communistProvisional Government of the Republic of Poland, which had been installed by the Soviet Union "on a broader democratic basis", was agreed to.[24]
The Polish eastern border would follow theCurzon Line, and Poland would receive territorial compensation in the west from Germany.
Stalin pledged to permit free elections in Poland.
Roosevelt obtained a commitment by Stalin to participate in theUnited Nations.
Stalin requested that all of the 16Soviet Socialist Republics would be grantedUN membership. That was taken into consideration, but 14 republics were denied; Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to membership forUkraine andByelorussia. While Roosevelt requested additional votes, with Churchill agreeing in principle and Stalin suggesting two addition votes so as to be equal to the Soviet Union, the United States ultimately did not request more than one vote.[25]
Stalin agreed to enter the fight against theEmpire of Japan "in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated". As a result, the Soviets would take possession of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, the port ofDalian would be internationalized, and the Soviet lease of Port Arthur would be restored, among other concessions.[26]
Nazi war criminals were to be found and put on trial in the territories in which their crimes had been committed. Nazi leaders were to be executed.
A "Committee on Dismemberment of Germany" was to be set up. Its purpose was to decide whether Germany was to be divided into several nations. Some examples of partition plans are shown below:
The Big Three further agreed that democracies would be established, all liberated European and former Axis satellite countries would hold free elections and that order would be restored.[29] In that regard, they promised to rebuild occupied countries by processes that will allow them "to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."[29] The resulting report stated that the three would assist occupied countries to form interim government that "pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of the Governments responsive to the will of the people" and to "facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections".[29]
The agreement called on signatories to "consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration". During the Yalta discussions, Molotov inserted language that weakened the implication of enforcement of the declaration.[30]
Regarding Poland, the Yalta report further stated that the provisional government should "be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot".[29] The agreement could not conceal the importance of acceding to the pro-Soviet short-termLublin government control and of eliminating language that called for supervised elections.[30]
According to Roosevelt, "if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charges that we are attempting to go back on the Crimea decision". Roosevelt conceded that, in the words of Admiral William D. Leahy, the language of Yalta was so vague that the Soviets could "stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it".[31]
The final agreement stipulated that "the Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad".[29] The language of Yalta conceded predominance of the pro-Soviet Lublin government in a provisional government but a reorganized one.[30]
Allied-occupied territories (red) on 15 February 1945, four days after the end of the conferencePoland's old and new borders, 1945 –Kresy in light red
Because of Stalin's promises, Churchill believed that he would keep his word regarding Poland and he remarked, "PoorNeville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I am wrong about Stalin."[32]
Churchill defended his actions at Yalta in a three-day parliamentary debate starting on February 27, which ended in avote of confidence. During the debate, many MPs criticised Churchill and expressed deep reservations about Yalta and support for Poland, with 25 drafting an amendment protesting the agreement.[33]
On March 1, 1945, Roosevelt assuredCongress, "I come from the Crimea with a firm belief that we have made a start on the road to a world of peace".[34] However, the Western Powers soon realized that Stalin would not honour his promise of free elections for Poland. After receiving considerable criticism in London following Yalta regarding the atrocities committed in Poland by Soviet troops, Churchill wrote Roosevelt a desperate letter referencing the wholesale deportations and liquidations of opposition Poles by the Soviets.[34] On March 11, Roosevelt responded to Churchill: "I most certainly agree that we must stand firm on a correct interpretation of the Crimean decision. You are quite correct in assuming that neither the Government nor the people of this country will support participation in a fraud or a mere whitewash of the Lublin government and the solution must be as we envisaged it in Yalta."[35]
By March 21, Roosevelt's Ambassador to the Soviet Union,Averell Harriman, cabled Roosevelt that "we must come clearly to realize that the Soviet program is the establishment oftotalitarianism, endingpersonal liberty and democracy as we know it".[36] Two days later, Roosevelt began to admit that his view of Stalin had been excessively optimistic and that "Averell is right."[36]
Four days later, on March 27, the Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) arrested 16 Polish opposition political leaders who had been invited to participate in provisional government negotiations.[36] The arrests were part of a trick employed by the NKVD, which flew the leaders to Moscow for a latershow trial, followed by sentencing to agulag.[36][37] Churchill thereafter argued to Roosevelt that it was "as plain as a pike staff" that Moscow's tactics were to drag out the period for holding free elections "while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power".[36] ThePolish elections, held on January 16, 1947, resulted in Poland's official transformation to acommunist state by 1949.
At some point in early 1945, Churchill had commissioned a contingency military enforcement operation plan for war on the Soviet Union to obtain "square deal for Poland" (Operation Unthinkable), which resulted in a May 22 report that stated unfavorable success odds.[46] The report's arguments included geostrategic issues (a possible Soviet–Japanese alliance resulting in moving ofJapanese troops from theAsian continent to theHome Islands, threat toIran andIraq) and uncertainties concerning land battles in Europe.[47]
ThePotsdam Conference was held from July to August 1945, which included the participation ofClement Attlee, who had replaced Churchill as prime minister[48][49] and President Harry S Truman (representing the United States afterRoosevelt's death).[50] At Potsdam, the Soviets denied claims that they were interfering in the affairs of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.[45] The conference resulted in thePotsdam Declaration, regarding thesurrender of Japan,[51] and thePotsdam Agreement, regarding the Soviet annexation of former Polish territory east of the Curzon Line, provisions to be addressed in an eventual Final Treaty ending World War II, and the annexation of parts of Germany east of theOder–Neisse line into Poland and of northernEast Prussia into the Soviet Union.
Roosevelt's generous terms to Stalin, followed quite quickly by the start of theCold War under Roosevelt's Vice President and successor,Harry Truman meant that Yalta was often seen in a bad light in American public opinion, particularly among most shades ofRepublicans and more Conservative Democrats in the South and West as well as by many Americans with links to Eastern Europe. WhenEisenhower was elected as President on the Republican ticket there were hopes that Yalta would berepudiated by the new Administration and the newly Republican Senate. Efforts were made by both the newSenate majority leader,Robert A. Taft, and Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee, although this fizzled out after Stalin's death.[52]
^Couzigou, Irène (October 2015)."Yalta Conference (1945)".Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Rn. 13 – via Oxford Public International Law.
^Ariel Davis, "An Examination of American Diplomacy During the Tehran and Yalta Conferences."The General Assembly Review 2.1 (2021): 1-11.
^Fenby, Jonathan (2012).The General; Charles de Gaulle and the France he saved. Skyhorse. p. 282.
^Lewkowicz, Nicolas (2008).The German Question and the Origins of the Cold War. Milan: IPOC. p. 73.ISBN978-88-95145-27-3.
^Pavel Polian.Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR. Central European University Press 2003ISBN963-9241-68-7 pp. 244–49
^Osmańczyk, Edmund (2003).Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements: T to Z. Taylor & Francis. p. 2773.ISBN978-0-415-93924-9.
^abcdeFebruary 11, 1945Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference,reprinted in Grenville, John Ashley Soames and Bernard Wasserstein,The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts, Taylor and Francis, 2001ISBN0-415-23798-X, pp. 267–77
^Telegram, President Roosevelt to the British prime minister, Washington, 11 March 1945, in United States Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: 1945 Volume V, Europe (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 509–10.
^Granville, Johanna (2004).The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Texas A&M University Press.ISBN978-1-58544-298-0.
^"Operation Unthinkable". Northeastern University. Archived fromthe original on November 16, 2010. RetrievedSeptember 25, 2015.defined as no more than square deal for Poland
^"Operation Unthinkable". Northeastern University. Archived fromthe original on November 16, 2010. RetrievedSeptember 25, 2015.defined as no more than square deal for Poland
Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna (2007),Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, Da Capo Press,ISBN978-0-306-81538-6
Black, Cyril E.; English, Robert D.; Helmreich, Jonathan E.; McAdams, James A. (2000),Rebirth: A Political History of Europe since World War II, Westview Press,ISBN978-0-8133-3664-0
Cook, Bernard A. (2001),Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia, Taylor & Francis,ISBN0-8153-4057-5
Ehrman, John (1956).Grand Strategy Volume VI, October 1944 – August 1945. London: HMSO (British official history). pp. 96–111.
Grenville, John Ashley Soames (2005),A History of the World from the 20th to the 21st Century, Routledge,ISBN978-0-415-28954-2
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![The eventual partition of Germany into Allied Occupation Zones:[28] British zone French zone (two exclaves) and beginning in 1947, the Saar Protectorate American zone, including Bremen Soviet zone, later the GDR Polish and Soviet annexed territory](/mt/?noimg=&dark=on&url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2fwiki%2fFile%3aMap-Germany-1945.svg)
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