With a documented history of at least 2,500 years, a succession of people and empires have vied for control over all or parts of this territory. The territory came under the rule of theQing dynasty in the 18th century, which was later replaced by theRepublic of China. Since 1949 and theChinese Civil War, it has been part of the People's Republic of China. In 1954, theChinese Communist Party (CCP) established theXinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to strengthen border defense against the Soviet Union and promote the local economy by settling soldiers into the region.[24] In 1955, Xinjiang was administratively changed from aprovince into anautonomous region. In recent decades, abundant oil and mineral reserves have been found in Xinjiang and it is currently China's largest natural-gas-producing region.
The general region of Xinjiang has been known by many different names throughout time. These names includeAltishahr, the historicalUyghur name for the southern half of the region referring to "the six cities" of theTarim Basin, as well as Khotan, Khotay,Chinese Tartary, High Tartary, East Chagatay (it was the eastern part of theChagatai Khanate),Moghulistan ("land of the Mongols"), Kashgaria, Little Bokhara,Serindia (due to Indian cultural influence)[30] and, in Chinese,Xiyu (西域), meaning "Western Regions".[31]
Between the 2nd century BC and 2nd century AD, the Han Empire established theProtectorate of the Western Regions or Xiyu Protectorate (西域都護府) in an effort to secure the profitable routes of theSilk Road.[32] The Western Regions during theTang era were known asQixi (磧西). Qi refers to theGobi Desert while Xi refers to the west. The Tang Empire had established theProtectorate General to Pacify the West orAnxi Protectorate (安西都護府) in 640 to control the region.
During theQing dynasty, the northern part of Xinjiang,Dzungaria was known as Zhunbu (準部, "Dzungar region") and the Southern Tarim Basin was known asHuijiang (回疆, "Muslim Frontier"). Both regions merged after Qing dynasty suppressed theRevolt of the Altishahr Khojas in 1759 and became the region of "Xiyu Xinjiang" (西域新疆, literally "Western Regions' New Frontier"), later simplified as "Xinjiang" (新疆;formerly romanized as "Sinkiang"). The official name was given during the reign of theGuangxu Emperor in 1878.[33] It can be translated as "new frontier" or "new territory".[34] In fact, the term "Xinjiang" was used in many other places conquered, but never were ruled by Chinese empires directly until the gradualGaitu Guiliu administrative reform, including regions in Southern China.[35] For instance, present-dayJinchuan County in Sichuan was then known as "Jinchuan Xinjiang",Zhaotong in Yunnan was named directly as "Xinjiang",Qiandongnan region,Anshun andZhenning were named as "Liangyou Xinjiang" etc.[36]
In 1955, Xinjiang Province was renamed "Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region". The name that was originally proposed was simply "Xinjiang Autonomous Region" because that was the name for the imperial territory. This proposal was not well-received by Uyghurs in the Communist Party, who found the name colonialist in nature since it meant "new territory".Saifuddin Azizi, the first chairman of Xinjiang, registered his strong objections to the proposed name withMao Zedong, arguing that "autonomy is not given to mountains and rivers. It is given to particular nationalities." Some Uyghur Communists proposed the name "Tian Shan Uyghur Autonomous Region" instead. The Han Communists in the central government denied the name Xinjiang was colonialist and denied that the central government could be colonialists both because they were communists and because China was a victim of colonialism. However, due to the Uyghur complaints, the administrative region would be named "XinjiangUygur Autonomous Region".[37][34]
Description
Dzungaria (red) and the Tarim Basin / Altishahr (blue)Physical map showing the separation of Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin (Altishahr) by the Tien Shan Mountains
Xinjiang consists of two main geographically, historically and ethnically distinct regions with different historical names, Dzungaria north of the Tianshan Mountains and the Tarim Basin south of the Tianshan Mountains, before Qing China unified them into one political entity called Xinjiang Province in 1884. At the time of the Qing conquest in 1759, Dzungaria was inhabited by steppe dwelling, nomadicTibetan Buddhist Dzungar people, while the Tarim Basin was inhabited by sedentary, oasis dwelling, Turkic-speaking Muslim farmers, now known as the Uyghurs, who were governed separately until 1884.
The Qing dynasty was well aware of the differences between the former Buddhist Mongol area to the north of the Tian Shan and the Turkic Muslim area south of the Tian Shan and ruled them in separate administrative units at first.[38] However, Qing people began to think of both areas as part of one distinct region called Xinjiang.[39] The very concept of Xinjiang as one distinct geographic identity was created by the Qing.[40] During the Qing rule, no sense of "regional identity" was held by ordinary Xinjiang people; rather, Xinjiang's distinct identity was given to the region by the Qing, since it had distinct geography, history and culture, while at the same time it was created by the Chinese, multicultural, settled by Han and Hui and separated from Central Asia for over a century and a half.[41]
In the late 19th century, it was still being proposed by some people that two separate regions be created out of Xinjiang, the area north of the Tianshan and the area south of the Tianshan, while it was being argued over whether to turn Xinjiang into a province.[42]
The east-west chain of the Tian Shan separate Dzungaria in the north from the Tarim Basin in the south. Dzungaria is a dry steppe and the Tarim Basin contains the massiveTaklamakan Desert, surrounded by oases. In the east is theTurpan Depression. In the west, the Tian Shan split, forming theIli River valley.
Map of Han Dynasty in 2 AD. Light blue is the Tarim Basin protectorate.
The earliest inhabitants of the region encompassing modern day Xinjiang were genetically ofAncient North Eurasian andNortheast Asian origin, with later geneflow from during theBronze Age linked to the expansion of earlyIndo-Europeans. These population dynamics gave rise to a heterogeneous demographic makeup.Iron Age samples from Xinjiang show intensified levels of admixture between Steppe pastoralists and northeast Asians, with northern and eastern Xinjiang showing more affinities with northeast Asians, and southern Xinjiang showing more affinity with central Asians.[43][44]
Between 2009 and 2015, the remains of 92 individuals in theXiaohe Cemetery were analyzed forY chromosome andmitochondrial DNA markers. Genetic analyses of the mummies showed that the paternal lineages of the Xiaohe people were of almost all European[45] origin, while the maternal lineages of the early population were diverse, featuring bothEast Eurasian andWest Eurasian lineages, as well as a smaller number ofIndian / South Asian lineages. lineages. Over time, the west Eurasian maternal lineages were gradually replaced by east Eurasian maternal lineages. Outmarriage to women from Siberian communities, led to the loss of the original diversity ofmtDNA lineages observed in the earlier Xiaohe population.[46][47][48]
The Tarim population was therefore always notably diverse, reflecting a complex history of admixture between people ofAncient North Eurasian,South Asian andNortheast Asian descent. TheTarim mummies have been found in various locations in the Western Tarim Basin such asLoulan, theXiaohe Tomb complex andQäwrighul. These mummies have been previously suggested to have been Tocharian or Indo-European speakers, but recent evidence suggest that the earliest mummies belonged to a distinct population unrelated to Indo-European pastoralists and spoke an unknown language, probably alanguage isolate.[49]
Although many of the Tarim mummies were classified asCaucasoid by anthropologists, Tarim Basin sites also contain both "Caucasoid" and "Mongoloid" remains, indicating contact between newly arrived western nomads and agricultural communities in the east.[50] Mummies have been found in various locations in the Western Tarim Basin such asLoulan, theXiaohe Tomb complex andQäwrighul.
Nomadic tribes such as theYuezhi,Saka andWusun were probably part of the migration of Indo-European speakers who had settled in Tarim Basin of Xinjiang long before theXiongnu and Han Chinese. By the time theHan dynasty underEmperor Wu (r. 141–87 BC) wrested the western Tarim Basin away from its previous overlords (the Xiongnu), it was inhabited by various peoples who included theIndo-European-speakingTocharians in Turfan andKucha, the Saka peoples centered in theShule Kingdom and theKingdom of Khotan, the variousTibeto-Burmese groups (especially people related to theQiang) as well as the Han Chinese people.[51] Some linguists posit that the Tocharian language had high amounts of influence fromPaleosiberian languages,[52] such asUralic andYeniseian languages.
Yuezhi culture is documented in the region. The first known reference to the Yuezhi was in 645 BC by the Chinese chancellorGuan Zhong in his work,Guanzi (管子, Guanzi Essays: 73: 78: 80: 81). He described theYúshì,禺氏 (orNiúshì,牛氏), as a people from the north-west who suppliedjade to the Chinese from the nearby mountains (also known as Yushi) in Gansu.[53] The longtime jade supply[54] from the Tarim Basin is well-documented archaeologically: "It is well known that ancient Chinese rulers had a strong attachment to jade. All of the jade items excavated from the tomb of Fuhao of theShang dynasty, more than 750 pieces, were fromKhotan in modern Xinjiang. As early as the mid-first millennium BC, the Yuezhi engaged in the jade trade, of which the major consumers were the rulers of agricultural China."[55]
Crossed by theNorthern Silk Road,[56] the Tarim and Dzungaria regions were known as the Western Regions. At the beginning of the Han dynasty the region was ruled by the Xiongnu, a powerful nomadic people.[57]: 148 During the 2nd century BC, the Han dynasty prepared forwar against Xiongnu when Emperor Wu of Han dispatchedZhang Qian to explore the mysterious kingdoms to the west and form an alliance with the Yuezhi against the Xiongnu. As a result of the war, the Chinese controlled the strategic region from theOrdos and Gansucorridor toLop Nor. They separated the Xiongnu from theQiang people on the south and gained direct access to the Western Regions. Han China sent Zhang Qian as an envoy to the states of the region, beginning several decades of struggle between the Xiongnu and Han China in which China eventually prevailed. During the 100s BCE, the Silk Road brought increasing Chinese economic and cultural influence to the region.[57]: 148 In 60 BCE, Han China established the Protectorate of the Western Regions (西域都護府) at Wulei (烏壘, near modernLuntai), to oversee the region as far west as thePamir Mountains. The protectorate was seized during the civil war againstWang Mang (r. AD 9–23), returning to Han control in 91 due to the efforts of generalBan Chao.
Old Uyghur/Yugur art from the Bezeklik muralsThe Tarim Basin in the 3rd century AD
The WesternJin dynasty succumbed to successive waves of invasions by nomads from the north at the beginning of the 4th century. The short-lived kingdoms that ruled northwestern China one after the other, includingFormer Liang,Former Qin,Later Liang andWestern Liáng, all attempted to maintain the protectorate, with varying degrees of success. After the final reunification of Northern China under theNorthern Wei empire, its protectorate controlled what is now the southeastern region of Xinjiang. Local states such as Shule,Yutian,Guizi andQiemo controlled the western region, while the central region around Turpan was controlled byGaochang, remnants of a state (Northern Liang) that once ruled part of what is now Gansu province in northwestern China.
During theAnshi Rebellion, which nearly destroyed the Tang dynasty,Tibet invaded the Tang on a broad front from Xinjiang toYunnan. It occupied the Tang capital of Chang'an in 763 for 16 days, and controlled southern Xinjiang by the end of the century. TheUyghur Khaganate took control of Northern Xinjiang, much of Central Asia and Mongolia at the same time.
As Tibet and the Uyghur Khaganate declined in the mid-9th century, theKara-Khanid Khanate (a confederation of Turkic tribes including theKarluks,Chigils and Yaghmas)[61] controlled Western Xinjiang during the 10th and 11th centuries. After the Uyghur Khaganate in Mongolia was destroyed by the Kirghiz in 840, branches of the Uyghurs established themselves inQocha (Karakhoja) andBeshbalik (near present-day Turfan and Ürümqi). The Uyghur state remained in eastern Xinjiang until the 13th century, although it was ruled by foreign overlords. The Kara-Khanids converted to Islam. The Uyghur state in Eastern Xinjiang, initiallyManichean, later converted toBuddhism.
Remnants of theLiao dynasty fromManchuria entered Xinjiang in 1132, fleeing rebellion by the neighboringJurchens. They established a new empire, theQara Khitai (Western Liao), which ruled the Kara-Khanid and Uyghur-held parts of the Tarim Basin for the next century. AlthoughKhitan and Chinese were the primary administrative languages, Persian and Uyghur were also used.[62]
Present-day Xinjiang consisted of the Tarim Basin and Dzungaria and was originally inhabited by Indo-European Tocharians and Iranian Sakas who practiced Buddhism andZoroastrianism. The Turfan and Tarim Basins were inhabited by speakers of Tocharian languages,[63] with Caucasian mummies found in the region.[64] The area becameIslamified during the 10th century with the conversion of theKara-Khanid Khanate, who occupied Kashgar. During the mid-10th century, the Saka BuddhistKingdom of Khotan was attacked by the Turkic Muslim Karakhanid ruler Musa; the Karakhanid leader Yusuf Qadir Khan conquered Khotan around 1006.[65]
AfterGenghis Khan unified Mongolia and began his advance west the Uyghur state in the Turpan-Urumchi region offered its allegiance to the Mongols in 1209, contributing taxes and troops to the Mongol imperial effort. In return, the Uyghur rulers retained control of their kingdom; Genghis Khan'sMongol Empire conquered theQara Khitai in 1218. Xinjiang was a stronghold ofÖgedei Khan and later came under the control of his descendant,Kaidu. This branch of the Mongol family kept the Yuan dynasty at bay until their rule ended.
During the Mongol Empire era theYuan dynasty vied with theChagatai Khanate for rule of the region and the latter controlled most of it. After the Chagatai Khanate divided into smallerkhanates during the mid-14th century, the politically-fractured region was ruled by a number of Persianized Mongol Khans, including those fromMoghulistan (with the assistance of localDughlat emirs), Uigurstan (later Turpan) and Kashgaria. These leaders warred with each other and theTimurids ofTransoxiana to the west and theOirats to the east: the successor Chagatai regime based in Mongolia and China. During the 17th century, theDzungars established an empire over much of the region.
The Mongolian Dzungars were the collective identity of several Oirat tribes which formed and maintained, one of the lastnomadic empires. TheDzungar Khanate covered Dzungaria, extending from the westernGreat Wall of China to present-day Eastern Kazakhstan and from present-day Northern Kyrgyzstan to SouthernSiberia. Most of the region was renamed "Xinjiang" by the Chinese after the fall of the Dzungar Empire, which existed from the early 17th to the mid-18th century.[66]
TheDzungar–Qing Wars, between the Qing Dynasty and the Dzungar Khanate
The sedentary Turkic Muslims of the Tarim Basin were originally ruled by the Chagatai Khanate and the nomadic Buddhist Oirat Mongols in Dzungaria ruled the Dzungar Khanate. TheNaqshbandi SufiKhojas, descendants ofMuhammad, had replaced the Chagatayid Khans as rulers of the Tarim Basin during the early 17th century. There was a struggle between two Khoja factions: the Afaqi (White Mountain) and the Ishaqi (Black Mountain). The Ishaqi defeated the Afaqi and theAfaq Khoja invited the5th Dalai Lama (the leader of theTibetans) to intervene on his behalf in 1677. The Dalai Lama then called on his Dzungar Buddhist followers in the Dzungar Khanate to act on the invitation. The Dzungar Khanate conquered the Tarim Basin in 1680, setting up the Afaqi Khoja as their puppet ruler. After converting to Islam, the descendants of the previously-Buddhist Uyghurs in Turfan believed that the "infidel Kalmuks" (Dzungars) built Buddhist monuments in their region.[67]
The Battle of Oroi-Jalatu in 1756, between the Manchu and Oirat armiesThe Qing Empire ca. 1820Scene from the 1828 Qing campaign against rebels inAltishahr
The Turkic Muslims of the Turfan andKumul oases then submitted to the Qing dynasty and asked China to free them from the Dzungars; the Qing accepted their rulers as vassals. They warred against the Dzungars for decades before defeating them; Qing ManchuBannermen then conducted theDzungar genocide, nearly eradicating them and depopulating Dzungaria. The Qing freed the Afaqi Khoja leader Burhan-ud-din and his brother, Khoja Jihan, from Dzungar imprisonment and appointed them to rule the Tarim Basin as Qing vassals. The Khoja brothers reneged on the agreement, declaring themselves independent leaders of the Tarim Basin. The Qing and the Turfan leaderEmin Khoja crushed their revolt, and by 1759 China controlled Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin.[68]
TheManchu Qing dynasty gained control of eastern Xinjiang as a result of along struggle with the Dzungars which began during the 17th century. In 1755, with the help of the Oirat nobleAmursana, the Qing attackedGhulja and captured the Dzungar khan. After Amursana's request to be declared Dzungar khan went unanswered, he led a revolt against the Qing. Qing armies destroyed the remnants of the Dzungar Khanate over the next two years, and many Han Chinese andHui moved into the pacified areas.[69]
The native Dzungar Oirat Mongols suffered greatly from the brutal campaigns and a simultaneoussmallpox epidemic. WriterWei Yuan described the resulting desolation in present-day northern Xinjiang as "an empty plain for several thousandli, with no Oiratyurt except those surrendered."[70] It has been estimated that 80 percent of the 600,000 (or more) Dzungars died from a combination of disease and warfare,[71] and recovery took generations.[72]
Han and Hui merchants were initially only allowed to trade in the Tarim Basin; their settlement in the Tarim Basin was banned until the 1830Muhammad Yusuf Khoja invasion, when the Qing rewarded merchants for fighting off Khoja by allowing them to settle in the basin.[73] The Uyghur MuslimSayyid andNaqshbandiSufi rebel of theAfaqi suborder,Jahangir Khoja wassliced to death (Lingchi) in 1828 by the Manchus forleading a rebellion against the Qing. According toRobert Montgomery Martin, many Chinese with a variety of occupations were settled in Dzungaria in 1870; in Turkestan (the Tarim Basin), however, only a few Chinese merchants and garrison soldiers were interspersed with the Muslim population.[74]
The 1765Ush rebellion by the Uyghurs against the Manchu began after Uyghur women were raped by the servants and son of Manchu official Su-cheng.[75] It was said that "Ush Muslims had long wanted to sleep on [Sucheng and son's] hides and eat their flesh" because of the months-long abuse.[76] The Manchu emperor ordered the massacre of the Uyghur rebel town; Qing forces enslaved the Uyghur children and women, and killed the Uyghur men.[77] Sexual abuse of Uyghur women by Manchu soldiers and officials triggered deep Uyghur hostility against Manchu rule.[78]
By the 1860s, Xinjiang had been underQing rule for a century. The region was captured in 1759 from theDzungar Khanate,[79] whose population (theOirats) became the targets of genocide. Xinjiang was primarily semi-arid or desert and unattractive to non-tradingHan settlers, and others (including the Uyghurs) settled there.[citation needed]
TheDungan Revolt by the Muslim Hui and otherMuslim ethnic groups was fought in China'sShaanxi,Ningxia and Gansuprovinces and in Xinjiang from 1862 to 1877. The conflict led to a reported 20.77 million deaths due to migration and war, with many refugees dying of starvation.[80][failed verification] Thousands of Muslim refugees from Shaanxi fled to Gansu; some formed battalions in eastern Gansu, intending to reconquer their lands in Shaanxi. While the Hui rebels were preparing to attack Gansu and Shaanxi,Yaqub Beg (an Uzbek orTajik commander of theKokand Khanate) fled from the khanate in 1865 after losingTashkent to theRussians. Beg settled in Kashgar, and soon controlled Xinjiang. Although he encouraged trade, builtcaravansareis, canals and other irrigation systems, his regime was considered harsh. The Chinese took decisive action against Yettishar; an army under GeneralZuo Zongtang rapidly approached Kashgaria, reconquering it on 16 May 1877.[81]
19th-century Khotan Uyghurs in Yettishar
Afterreconquering Xinjiang in the late 1870s from Yaqub Beg,[82] the Qing dynasty established Xinjiang ("new frontier") as a province in 1884[83] – making it part of China, and dropping the old names of Zhunbu (準部, Dzungar Region) and Huijiang (Muslimland).[84][85]
After Xinjiang became a Chinese province, the Qing government encouraged the Uyghurs to migrate from southern Xinjiang to the northern, former Dzungar region (such as between Qitai and the capital, largely inhabited by Han Chinese, and Ürümqi, Tacheng (Tabarghatai), Yili, Jinghe, Kur Kara Usu, Ruoqiang, Lop Nor and the lower Tarim River.[86]
In 1912, the Qing dynasty was replaced by theRepublic of China. The ROC continued to treat the Qing territory as its own, including Xinjiang.[87]: 69 Yuan Dahua, the last Qing governor of Xinjiang, fled. One of his subordinates,Yang Zengxin, took control of the province and acceded in name to the Republic of China in March of that year. Balancing mixed ethnic constituencies, Yang controlled Xinjiang until his 1928 assassination after theNorthern Expedition of theKuomintang.[88]
The Soviet Unioninvaded the province; it was brought under the control of northeast Han warlordSheng Shicai after the 1937Xinjiang War. Sheng ruled Xinjiang for the next decade with support from theSoviet Union, many of whose ethnic and security policies he instituted. The Soviet Union maintained a military base in the province and deployed several military and economic advisors. Sheng invited a group ofChinese Communists to Xinjiang (including Mao Zedong's brother,Mao Zemin),[92]: 111 but executed them all in 1943 in fear of a conspiracy. In 1944,President andPremier of ChinaChiang Kai-shek, informed by the Soviet Union of Shicai's intention to join it, transferred him toChongqing as the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry the following year.[93] During theIli Rebellion, the Soviet Union backed Uyghur separatists to form theSecond East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the Ili region while most of Xinjiang remained under Kuomintang control.[89]
The PRC autonomous region was established on 1 October 1955, replacing the province;[90] that year (the first modern census in China was taken in 1953), Uyghurs were 73 percent of Xinjiang's total population of 5.11 million.[37] Although Xinjiang has been designated a "Uygur Autonomous Region" since 1954, more than 50 percent of its area is designated autonomous areas for 13 native non-Uyghur groups.[96] Modern Uyghurs developedethnogenesis in 1955, when the PRC recognized formerly separately self-identified oasis peoples.[97]
Southern Xinjiang is home to most of the Uyghur population, about nine million people, out of a total population of twenty million; fifty-five percent of Xinjiang's Han population, mainly urban, live in the north.[98][99] This created an economic imbalance, since the northern Junghar basin (Dzungaria) is more developed than the south.[100]
Land reform andcollectivization occurred in Uyghur agricultural areas at the same general pace as in most of China.[101]: 134 Hunger in Xinjiang was not as great as elsewhere in China during theGreat Leap Forward and a million Han Chinese fleeing famine resettled in Xinjiang.[101]: 134
In 1980, China allowed the United States to establish electronic listening stations in Xinjiang so the United States could monitor Soviet rocket launches in central Asia in exchange for the United States authorizing the sale ofdual-use civilian and military technology and nonlethal military equipment to China.[102]
TheChinese economic reform since the late 1970s has exacerbated uneven regional development, more Uyghurs have migrated to Xinjiang's cities and some Han have migrated to Xinjiang for economic advancement.Chinese leaderDeng Xiaoping made a nine-day visit to Xinjiang in 1981 and described the region as "unsteady".[103] The Deng era reforms encouraged China's ethnic minorities, including Uyghurs, to establish small private companies for commodity transit, retail, and restaurants.[104] By the early 1990s, a total of 19 billion yuan had been spent in Xinjiang on large- and medium-sized industrial projects, with an emphasis on developing modern transportation, communications infrastructure, and support for the oil and gas industries.[57]: 149
A brisk cross-bordershuttle trade by Uyghurs further developed following the adoption of the Soviet Union'sperestroika.[104]
In 2000, Uyghurs made up 45 percent of Xinjiang's population and 13 percent of Ürümqi's population. With nine percent of Xinjiang's population, Ürümqi accounts for 25 percent of the region's GDP; many rural Uyghurs have migrated to the city for work in itslight,heavy andpetrochemical industries.[106] Han in Xinjiang are older, better-educated and work in higher-paying professions than their Uyghur counterparts. Han are more likely to cite business reasons for moving to Ürümqi, while some Uyghurs cite legal trouble at home and family reasons for moving to the city.[107] Han and Uyghurs are equally represented in Ürümqi'sfloating population, which works primarily in commerce.Auto-segregation in the city is widespread in residential concentration, employment relationships andendogamy.[108] In 2010, Uyghurs were a majority in the Tarim Basin and a plurality in Xinjiang as a whole.[109]
Xinjiang has 81public libraries and 23 museums, compared to none in 1949. It has98 newspapers in 44 languages, compared with four in 1952. According to official statistics, the ratio of doctors, medical workers,clinics and hospital beds to the general population surpasses the national average; theimmunization rate has reached 85 percent.[5]
In 2014,Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in Xinjiang commenced aPeople's War against the "Three Evil Forces" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. They deployed two hundred thousand party cadres to Xinjiang and the launched theCivil Servant-Family Pair Up program.[128][129]Chinese Communist Party leaderXi Jinping was dissatisfied with the initial results of the People's War and replacedZhang Chunxian withChen Quanguo asParty Committee Secretary in 2016. Following his appointment Chen oversaw the recruitment of tens of thousands of additional police officers and the division of society into three categories: trusted, average, untrustworthy. He instructed his subordinated to "Take this crackdown as the top project," and "to preëmpt the enemy, to strike at the outset." Following a meeting with Xi in Beijing Chen Quanguo held a rally in Ürümqi with ten thousand troops, helicopters, and armored vehicles. As they paraded he announced a "smashing, obliterating offensive," and declared that they would "bury the corpses of terrorists and terror gangs in the vast sea of the People's War."[128]
Chinese authorities have operated internment camps to indoctrinate Uyghurs and other Muslims as part of the People's War since at least 2017.[130][27] The camps have been criticized by a number of governments and human-rights organizations for patterns ofabuse and mistreatment, with various characterizations up to and including that of a genocide being perpetrated by the Chinese government.[131] In 2020,CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping said: "Practice has proven that the party's strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct."[132]
In 2021, authorities sentencedSattar Sawut andShirzat Bawudun—former heads of Xinjiang's education and justice departments respectively—both todeath with a two-year reprieve on separatism and bribery charges.[133] Such a sentence is usually commuted to life imprisonment.[134] Officials said Sawut was found guilty of incorporating ethnic separatism, violence, and religious extremism content into Uyghur-language textbooks, which had influenced several people to participate in attacks inUrumqi. They said Bawudun was found guilty of colluding withETIM and carrying out "illegal religious activities at his daughter's wedding".[133][135] Three other educators were sentenced to life in prison.[136] Chen was replaced as Community Party Secretary for Xinjiang byMa Xingrui in December 2021.[137]
Xi Jinping made a four-day visit to Xinjiang in July 2022 whereKompas TV had documented groups of Uyghurs welcoming his arrival.[138] Xi called on local officials to do more in preserving ethnic minority culture[139] and following an inspection of theXinjiang Production and Construction Corps, he praised the organisation's "great progress" in reform and development.[140] During another visit to Xinjiang in August 2023, Xi said in a speech that the region should open up more fortourism to attract domestic and foreign visitors.[141][142]
These are then divided into 13 districts, 29 county-level cities, 62 counties and 6 autonomous counties. Twelve of the county-level cities do not belong to any prefecture and arede facto administered by theXinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Sub-level divisions of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is shown in the adjacent picture and described in the table below:
* – Altay Prefecture or Tacheng Prefecture are subordinate to Ili Prefecture. / The population or area figures of Ili do not include Altay Prefecture or Tacheng Prefecture which are subordinate to Ili Prefecture.
Administrative divisions in Uyghur, Chinese and varieties of romanizations
Xinjiang is the largestpolitical subdivision of China, accounting for more than one sixth of China's total territory and a quarter of its boundary length. Xinjiang is mostly covered with uninhabitable deserts and dry grasslands, with dotted oases conducive to habitation accounting for 9.7 percent of Xinjiang's total area by 2015[17] at the foot ofTian Shan,Kunlun Mountains andAltai Mountains, respectively.
Xinjiang is split by the Tian Shan mountain range (تەڭرى تاغ, Tengri Tagh, Тәңри Тағ), which divides it into two large basins: theDzungarian Basin in the north and the Tarim Basin in the south. A small V-shaped wedge between these two major basins, limited by the Tian Shan's main range in the south and theBorohoro Mountains in the north, is the basin of theIli River, which flows into Kazakhstan'sLake Balkhash; an even smaller wedge farther north is theEmin Valley.
Other major mountain ranges of Xinjiang include thePamir Mountains andKarakoram in the southwest, the Kunlun Mountains in the south (along the border with Tibet) and the Altai Mountains in the northeast (shared with Mongolia). The region's highest point is the mountainK2, aneight-thousander located 8,611 metres (28,251 ft) above sea level in the Karakoram Mountains on the border withPakistan.
Much of the Tarim Basin is dominated by the Taklamakan Desert. North of it is the Turpan Depression, which contains the lowest point in Xinjiang and in the entire PRC, at 155 metres (509 ft) below sea level.
The Dzungarian Basin is slightly cooler, and receives somewhat more precipitation, than the Tarim Basin. Nonetheless, it, too, has a largeGurbantünggüt Desert (also known as Dzoosotoyn Elisen) in its center.
Xinjiang is geologically young. Collision of the Indian and the Eurasian plates formed the Tian Shan,Kunlun Shan, and Pamir mountain ranges; said tectonics render it a very active earthquake zone. Older geological formations are located in the far north, whereKazakhstania is geologically part of Kazakhstan, and in the east, where is part of theNorth China Craton.[citation needed]
Having hot summer and low precipitation, most of Xinjiang isendorheic. Its rivers either disappear in the desert, or terminate in salt lakes (within Xinjiang itself, or in neighboring Kazakhstan), instead of running towards an ocean. The northernmost part of the region, with theIrtysh River rising in the Altai Mountains, that flows (via Kazakhstan and Russia) toward theArctic Ocean, is the only exception. But even so, a significant part of the Irtysh's waters were artificially diverted via theIrtysh–Karamay–Ürümqi Canal to the drier regions of southern Dzungarian Basin.
Elsewhere, most of Xinjiang's rivers are comparatively short streams fed by the snows of the several ranges of the Tian Shan. Once they enter the populated areas in the mountains' foothills, their waters are extensively used for irrigation, so that the river often disappears in the desert instead of reaching the lake to whose basin it nominally belongs. This is the case even with the main river of the Tarim Basin, theTarim, which has been dammed at a number of locations along its course, and whose waters have been completely diverted before they can reach theLop Lake. In the Dzungarian basin, a similar situation occurs with most rivers that historically flowed intoLake Manas. Some of the salt lakes, having lost much of their fresh water inflow, are now extensively use for the production of mineral salts (used e.g., in the manufacturing ofpotassium fertilizers); this includes the Lop Lake and the Manas Lake.
Due to water scarcity, most of Xinjiang's population lives within fairly narrow belts that are stretched along the foothills of the region's mountain ranges in areas conducive to irrigated agriculture. It is in these belts where most of the region's cities are found.
A semiarid or desert climate (KöppenBSk orBWk, respectively) prevails in Xinjiang. The entire region has great seasonal differences in temperature with cold winters. The Turpan Depression often records some of the hottest temperatures nationwide in summer,[152] with air temperatures easily exceeding 40 °C (104 °F). Winter temperatures regularly fall below −20 °C (−4 °F) in the far north and highest mountain elevations. On 18 February 2024, a record low temperature for the region of −52.3 °C (−62.1 °F) was recorded.[153]
Continuouspermafrost is typically found in the Tian Shan starting at the elevation of about 3,500–3,700 m above sea level. Discontinuousalpine permafrost usually occurs down to 2,700–3,300 m, but in certain locations, due to the peculiarity of theaspect and the microclimate, it can be found at elevations as low as 2,000 m.[154]
Despite the province's easternmost point being more than 1,600 kilometres (990 mi) west of Beijing, Xinjiang, like the rest of China, is officially in theUTC+8 time zone, known by residents as Beijing Time. Despite this, some residents, local organizations and governments observeUTC+6 as the standard time and refer to this zone asXinjiang Time.[155] Han people tend to use Beijing Time, while Uyghurs tend to use Xinjiang Time as a form of resistance to Beijing.[156] Time zones notwithstanding, most schools and businesses open and close two hours later than in the other regions of China.[157]
Xinjiang maintains the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), an economic and paramilitary organization administered by the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It plays a critical role in the region's economy, owning or being otherwise connected to many companies in the region as well as dominating Xinjiang's agricultural output.[159] It additionally directly administers cities throughout Xinjiang, mainly concentrated in the northern parts. It is headed by the CCP secretary of Xinjiang, while the CCP secretary of the XPCC is considered the second most powerful person in the region.[159]
Poverty alleviation programs
Local governments in Xinjiang seek to address ethnic tensions in the region throughpoverty alleviation andredistributive programs.[160]: 189 These efforts include working with state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the mining sector.[160]: 189 For example, during theTargeted Poverty Alleviation Campaign, officials paired 1,000 villages with 1,000 enterprises for economic development projects.[160]: 189
Human Rights Watch has documentedthe denial of due legal process and fair trials and failure to hold genuinely open trials as mandated by law e.g. to suspects arrested following ethnic violence in the city of Ürümqi's 2009 riots.[161]
The Chinese government, under Chinese Communist Party general secretaryXi Jinping's administration,[27] launched theStrike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention and surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs there;[162] the program was massively expanded by Chen Quanguo when he was appointed as CCP Xinjiang secretary in 2016.[163] The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people ininternment camps, mostly Uyghurs, but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020.[163] An October 2018exposé byBBC News claimed, based on analysis ofsatellite imagery collected over time, that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs were likely interned in the camps, and they are rapidly being expanded.[164] In 2019,The Art Newspaper reported that "hundreds" of writers, artists, and academics had been imprisoned in (what the magazine qualified as) an attempt to "punish any form of religious or cultural expression" among Uyghurs.[165] China has also been accused of targeting Muslim religious figures, Mosques and tombs in the region.[166] This program has been called a genocide by some observers, whilea report by theUN Human Rights Office said they may amount to crimes against humanity.[167][168]
On 28 June 2020, theAssociated Press published a report which stated the Chinese government was taking draconian measures to slash birth rates among Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, even as it encouraged some of the country's Han majority to have more children.[169] While individual women have spoken out before about forced birth control, the practice was far more widespread and systematic than previously known, according to an AP investigation based on government statistics, state documents and interviews with 30 ex-detainees, family members and a former detention camp instructor. The campaign over the past four years in Xinjiang has been labeled by some experts as a form of "demographic genocide."[169] The allegation of Uyghur birth rates being lower than those of Han Chinese have been disputed by pundits fromPakistan Observer,[170]Antara,[171] andDetik.com.[172]
TheKök Bayraq has become a symbol of the East Turkestan independence movement.
Some factions in Xinjiang, most prominentlyUyghur nationalists, advocate establishing an independent country namedEast Turkestan (also sometimes called "Uyghuristan"),[173] which has led to tension,conflict,[174] and ethnic strife in the region.[175][176][177] Autonomous regions in China do not have a legal right to secede, and each one is considered to be an "inseparable part of the People's Republic of China" by the government.[178][179] The separatist movement claims that the region is not part of China, but was invaded by the CCP in 1949 and has been under occupation since then. The Chinese government asserts that the region has been part of China since ancient times,[180] and has engaged in "strike hard" campaigns targeted at separatists.[181] The movement has been supported by both militant Islamic extremist groups such as theTurkistan Islamic Party,[182] as well as advocacy groups with no connection to extremist groups.
According to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the two main sources forseparatism in the Xinjiang Province are religion and ethnicity. Religiously, the most Uyghur peoples of Xinjiang followIslam; in the rest of China, many are Buddhist,Taoist andConfucian, although many follow Islam as well, such as theHui ethnic subgroup of the Han ethnicity, comprising some 10 million people. Thus, the major difference and source of friction with eastern China is ethnicity and religious doctrinal differences that differentiate them politically from other Muslim minorities elsewhere in the country.[181]
The distribution map of Xinjiang's GDP per person (2011)Ürümqi is a major industrial center within Xinjiang.Wind farm in XinjiangSunday market inKhotan
The GDP of Xinjiang was aboutCN¥1.774 trillion (US$263 billion) as of 2022[update].[184] Economic growth has been fueled by to discovery of the abundant reserves of coal, oil, gas as well as theChina Western Development policy introduced by the State Council to boost economic development in Western China.[185] Itsper capita GDP for 2022 was CN¥68,552 (US$10,191). Southern Xinjiang, with 95 percent non-Han population, has an average per capita income half that of Xinjiang as a whole.[184] XPCC plays an outsized role in Xinjiang's economy, with the organization producingCN¥350 billion (US$52 billion), or around 19.7% of Xinjiang's economy, while the per capita GDP was CN¥98,748 (US$14,680).[186][non-primary source needed]
In general,China's autonomous regions have some of the highest per capita government spendingpublic goods and services.[187]: 366 Providing public goods and services in these areas is part of a government effort to reduce regional inequalities, reduce what the government views as a risk of separatism, and stimulate economic development.[187]: 366 Economic development of Xinjiang is a priority for China.[188] As of at least 2019, Xinjiang is among the regions of China with the highest total per capita government expenditure, including onhealth care,education, andsocial security.[187]: 367–369
In 1997, the 26,000 km Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Chinese highway became operational.[57]: 150 In 1998, theTurpan–Ürümqi–Dahuangshan Expressway was completed, linking several key areas in Xinjiang.[57]: 150 In 2000, the government articulated its strategy for developing thewestern regions of the country, and that plan made Xinjiang a major focus.[188] Accelerating development in Xinjiang is intended by China to achieve a number of objectives, including narrowing the economic gap between Xinjiang and the more developed eastern provinces, as well as alleviating political discontent and security problems by alleviating poverty and raising the standard of living in order to increase stability.[188] From 2014 to 2020, fiscal transfers from China's central government to Xinjiang grew by an average of 10.4% per year.[189]: 110
Local governments in China's 19 provinces andmunicipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai,Guangdong, Zhejiang andLiaoning, are engaged in the commitment of "pairing assistance" support projects in Xinjiang to promote the development of agriculture, industry, technology, education and health services in the region.[190]
Xinjiang has traditionally been an agricultural region, but is also rich inminerals andoil. Xinjiang is a major producer ofsolar panel components due to its large production of the base materialpolysilicon. In 2020 45 percent of global production of solar-grade polysilicon occurred in Xinjiang. Concerns have been raised both within the solar industry and outside it that forced labor may occur in the Xinjiang part of the supply chain.[191] The global solar panel industry is under pressure to move sourcing away from the region due to human rights and liability concerns.[192] China's solar association claimed the allegations were baseless and unfairly stigmatized firms with operations there.[193] A 2021 investigation in the United Kingdom found that 40 percent of solar farms in the UK had been built using panels from Chinese companies linked to forced labor in Xinjiang.[194]
Agriculture and fishing
Main area is of irrigated agriculture. By 2015, the agricultural land area of the region is 631 thousand km2 or 63.1 million ha, of which 6.1 million ha is arable land.[195][needs update] In 2016, the total cultivated land rose to 6.2 million ha, with the crop production reaching 15.1 million tons.[196] Agriculture in Xinjiang is dominated by the XPCC, which employs a majority of the organization's workforce.[197]Wheat was the main staple crop of the region,maize grown as well,millet found in the south, while only a few areas (in particular, Aksu) grewrice.[198]
Cotton became an important crop in several oases, notably Hotan,Yarkand and Turpan by the late 19th century.[198]Sericulture is also practiced.[199] TheXinjiang cotton industry is the world's largest cotton exporter, producing 84 percent of Chinese cotton while the country provides 26 percent of global cotton export.[200] Xinjiang also producespeppers and pepper pigments used in cosmetics such lipstick for export.[201]
Xinjiang is famous for its tomatoes, grapes and melons, particularlyHami melons and Turpanraisins.[202] The region is a leading source fortomato paste, which it supplies for international brands.[200]
The main livestock of the region have traditionally been sheep. Much of the region's pasture land is in its northern part, where more precipitation is available,[203] but there are mountain pastures throughout the region.[204]: 29
Due to the lack of access to the ocean and limited amount of inland water, Xinjiang's fish resources are somewhat limited. Nonetheless, there is a significant amount of fishing inLake Ulungur andLake Bosten and in theIrtysh River. A large number of fish ponds have been constructed since the 1970s, their total surface exceeding 10,000 hectares by the 1990s. In 2000, the total of 58,835 tons of fish was produced in Xinjiang, 85 percent of which came fromaquaculture.[205][needs update] The Sayram Lake is both the largest alpine lake and highest altitude lake in Xinjiang, and is the location of a major cold-water fishery.[citation needed] Originally Sayram had no fish but in 1998,northern whitefish (Coregonus peled) from Russia were introduced and investment in breeding infrastructure and technology has consequently made Sayram into the country's largest exporter of northern whitefish with an annual output of over 400 metric tons.[206][better source needed]
Xinjiang was known for producing salt,soda,borax, gold, andjade in the 19th century.[207]
TheLop Lake was once a large brackish lake during the end of thePleistocene but has slowly dried up in theHolocene where average annual precipitation in the area has declined to just 31.2 millimeters (1.2 inches), and experiences annual evaporation rate of 2,901 millimeters (114 inches). The area is rich in brinepotash, a key ingredient infertilizer and is the second-largest source of potash in the country. Discovery of potash in the mid-1990s, has transformed Lop Nur into a major potash mining industry.[208]
Theoil and gas extraction industry in Aksu and Karamay is growing, with theWest–East Gas Pipeline linking to Shanghai. The oil and petrochemical sector get up to 60 percent of Xinjiang's economy.[209] The region contains over a fifth of China's hydrocarbon resources and has the highest concentration of fossil fuel reserves of any region in the country.[210] The region is rich in coal and contains 40 percent of the country's coal reserves or around 2.2 trillion tonnes, which is enough to supply China's thermal coal demand for more than 100 years even if only 15 percent of the estimated coal reserve prove recoverable.[211][212]
Tarim basin is the largest oil and gas bearing area in the country with about 16 billion tonnes of oil and gas reserves discovered.[213] The area is still actively explored and in 2021,China National Petroleum Corporation found a new oil field reserve of 1 billion tons (about 907 million tonnes). That find is regarded as being the largest one in recent decades. As of 2021, the basin produces hydrocarbons at an annual rate of 2 million tons, up from 1.52 million tons from 2020.[214]
Trade with Central Asian countries is crucial to Xinjiang's economy.[215] Most of the overall import/export volume in Xinjiang was directed to and from Kazakhstan through Ala Pass. China's first borderfree trade zone (Horgos Free Trade Zone) was located at the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan border city of Horgos.[216] Horgos is the largest "land port" in China's western region and it has easy access to the Central Asian market. Xinjiang also opened its second border trade market to Kazakhstan in March 2006, the Jeminay Border Trade Zone.[217]
Vietnam is a major importer of Xinjiang cotton.[218]: 45
Ürümqi Economic & Technological Development Zone is northwest of Ürümqi. It was approved in 1994 by the State Council as a national level economic and technological development zones. It is 1.5 km (0.93 mi) from the Ürümqi International Airport, 2 km (1.2 mi) from the North Railway Station and 10 km (6.2 mi) from the city center. Wu Chang Expressway and 312 National Road passes through the zone. The development has unique resources and geographical advantages. Xinjiang's vast land, rich in resources, borders eight countries. As the leading economic zone, it brings together the resources of Xinjiang's industrial development, capital, technology, information, personnel and other factors of production.[222]
Ürümqi Export Processing Zone is in Urumuqi Economic and Technology Development Zone. It was established in 2007 as a state-level export processing zone.[223]
Ürümqi New & Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone was established in 1992 and it is the only high-tech development zone in Xinjiang, China. There are more than 3470 enterprises in the zone, of which 23 are Fortune 500 companies. It has a planned area of 9.8 km2 (3.8 sq mi) and it is divided into four zones. There are plans to expand the zone.[224]
For a time after theJuly 2009 riots, authorities placed restrictions on the internet andtext messaging, gradually permitting access to state-controlled websites likeXinhua News Agency,[228] until restoring Internet to the same level as the rest of China on 14 May 2010.[229][230][231]
The earliest Tarim mummies, dated to 1800 BC, are of aCaucasoid physical type.[243] East Asian migrants arrived in the eastern portions of the Tarim Basin about 3000 years ago and the Uyghur peoples appeared after the collapse of the Orkhon Uyghur Kingdom, based in modern-day Mongolia, around 842 AD.[244][245]
The Han Chinese of Xinjiang arrived at different times from different directions and social backgrounds. There are now descendants of criminals and officials who had been exiled from China during the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries; descendants of families of military and civil officers fromHunan, Yunnan, Gansu and Manchuria; descendants of merchants fromShanxi, Tianjin,Hubei and Hunan; and descendants of peasants who started immigrating into the region in 1776.[247]
The languages of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous RegionUyghur girl inKashgarCounty-level ethnicity map of Xinjiang as of 2018
Some Uyghur scholars claim descent from both the Turkic Uyghurs and the pre-Turkic Tocharians (or Tokharians, whose language was Indo-European); also, Uyghurs often have relatively-fair skin, hair and eyes and other Caucasoid physical traits.
In 2002, there were 9,632,600 males (growth rate of 1.0 percent) and 9,419,300 females (growth rate of 2.2 percent). The population overall growth rate was 1.09 percent, with 1.63 percent ofbirth rate and 0.54 percentmortality rate.
Three Uyghur girls at a Sunday market in the oasis cityKhotan.
The Qing began aprocess of settling Han, Hui, and Uyghur settlers into Northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria) in the 18th century. At the start of the 19th century, 40 years after the Qing reconquest, there were around 155,000 Han and Hui Chinese in northern Xinjiang and somewhat more than twice that number of Uyghurs in Southern Xinjiang.[248] A census of Xinjiang under Qing rule in the early 19th century tabulated ethnic shares of the population as 30 percent Han and 60 percent Turkic and it dramatically shifted to 6 percent Han and 75 percent Uyghur in the 1953 census. However, a situation similar to the Qing era's demographics with a large number of Han had been restored by 2000, with 40.57 percent Han and 45.21 percent Uyghur.[249] Professor Stanley W. Toops noted that today's demographic situation is similar to that of the early Qing period in Xinjiang.[250] Before 1831, only a few hundred Chinese merchants lived in Southern Xinjiang oases (Tarim Basin), and only a few Uyghurs lived in Northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria).[251]
After 1831, the Qing encouraged Han Chinese migration into the Tarim Basin, in southern Xinjiang, but with very little success, and permanent troops were stationed on the land there as well.[252] Political killings and expulsions of non-Uyghur populations during the uprisings in the 1860s[252] and the 1930s saw them experience a sharp decline as a percentage of the total population[253] though they rose once again in the periods of stability from 1880, which saw Xinjiang increase its population from 1.2 million,[254][255] to 1949. From a low of 7 percent in 1953, the Han began to return to Xinjiang between then and 1964, where they comprised 33 percent of the population (54 percent Uyghur), like in Qing times. A decade later, at the beginning of the Chinese economic reform in 1978, the demographic balance was 46 percent Uyghur and 40 percent Han,[249] which did not change drastically until the 2000 Census, when the Uyghur population had reduced to 42 percent.[256] In 2010, the population of Xinjiang was 45.84 percent Uyghur and 40.48 percent Han. The 2020 Census showed the share of the Uyghur population decline slightly to 44.96 percent, and the Han population rise to 42.24 percent[257][258]
Military personnel are not counted andnational minorities are undercounted in the Chinese census, as in some other censuses.[259] 3.6 million people reside in XPCC administered areas, around 14 percent of Xinjiang's population.[186] While some of the shift has been attributed to an increased Han presence,[18] Uyghurs have also emigrated to other parts of China, where their numbers have increased steadily. Uyghur independence activists express concern over the Han population changing the Uyghur character of the region though the Han and Hui Chinese mostly live in Northern Xinjiang Dzungaria and are separated from areas of historic Uyghur dominance south of the Tian Shan mountains (Southwestern Xinjiang), where Uyghurs account for about 90 percent of the population.[260]
In general, Uyghurs are the majority in Southwestern Xinjiang, including the prefectures of Kashgar, Khotan,Kizilsu and Aksu (about 80 percent of Xinjiang's Uyghurs live in those four prefectures) as well asTurpan Prefecture, in Eastern Xinjiang. The Han are the majority in Eastern and Northern Xinjiang (Dzungaria), including the cities of Ürümqi,Karamay,Shihezi and the prefectures ofChangjyi,Bortala,Bayin'gholin,Ili (especially the cities ofKuitun) andKumul. Kazakhs are mostly concentrated inIli Prefecture in Northern Xinjiang. Kazakhs are the majority in the northernmost part of Xinjiang.
Major ethnic groups in Xinjiang by region (2018 data)[I] P = Prefecture; AP = Autonomous prefecture; PLC = Prefecture-level city; DACLC = Directly administered county-level city.[262]
The major religions in Xinjiang areIslam, practiced largely by Uyghurs and the Hui Chinese minority, as well asChinese folk religions, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, practiced essentially by the Han Chinese.Christianity in Xinjiang is practiced by 1 percent of the population according to the Chinese General Social Survey of 2009.[265] According to a demographic analysis of the year 2010, Muslims formed 58 percent of the province's population.[266] In 1950, there were 29,000 mosques and 54,000 imams in Xinjiang, which fell to 14,000 mosques and 29,000 imams by 1966. Following theCultural Revolution, there were only about 1,400 remaining mosques. By the mid-1980's, the number of mosques had returned to 1950 levels.[267] According to a 2020 report by theAustralian Strategic Policy Institute, since 2017, Chinese authorities have destroyed or damaged 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang – 65 percent of the region's total.[268][269]
According to aDeWereldMorgen report in March 2024, there are more than 100 Islamic associations in Xinjiang where imams have lessons intheology, Arabic and Mandarin.[202] A majority of the Uyghur Muslims adhere toSunni Islam of theHanafi school of jurisprudence ormadhab.[citation needed] A minority ofShias, almost exclusively of theNizari Ismaili (Seveners) rites are located in the higher mountains of Tajik and Tian Shan. In the western mountains (the Tajiks), almost the entire population of Tajiks (Sarikolis and Wakhis), are NizariIsmaili Shia.[18] In the north, in the Tian Shan, the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are Sunni.
The capital, Ürümqi, is home to theXinjiang University baseball team, an integrated Uyghur and Han group profiled in the documentary filmDiamond in the Dunes.
In 2008, according to the Xinjiang Transportation Network Plan, the government has focused construction on State Road 314, Alar-Hotan Desert Highway, State Road 218, Qingshui River Line-Yining Highway and State Road 217, as well as other roads.
The construction of the first expressway in the mountainous area of Xinjiang began a new stage in its construction on 24 July 2007. The 56 km (35 mi) highway linkingSayram Lake and Guozi Valley in Northern Xinjiang area had cost 2.39 billion yuan. The expressway is designed to improve the speed of national highway 312 in northern Xinjiang. The project started in August 2006 and several stages have been fully operational since March 2007. Over 3,000 construction workers have been involved. The 700 m-long Guozi Valley Cable Bridge over the expressway is now currently being constructed, with the 24 main pile foundations already completed. Highway 312 national highway Xinjiang section, connects Xinjiang with China's east coast,Central andWest Asia, plus some parts ofEurope. It is a key factor in Xinjiang's economic development. The population it covers is around 40 percent of the overall in Xinjiang, who contribute half of the GDP in the area.
Zulfiya Abdiqadir, head of the Transport Department was quoted as saying that 24,800,000,000 RMB had been invested into Xinjiang's road network in 2010 alone and, by this time, the roads covered approximately 152,000 km (94,000 mi).[271]
TheÜrümqi–Dzungaria railway connects Ürümqi with coal fields in the eastern Junggar Basin. TheHami–Lop Nur railway connects Hami with potassium salt mines in and around Lop Nur. TheGolmud–Korla railway, opened in 2020, provides an outlet to Qinghai. Planning is underway on additional intercity railways.[272] Railwaysto Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan have been proposed.[citation needed]
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^Sheila Hollihan-Elliot (2006).Muslims in China. Mason Crest Publishers. p. 55.ISBN1-59084-880-2.For most of their history, the Uyghurs lived as tribes in a loosely affiliated nation on the northern Chinese border (sometimes called East Turkestan).
^William Samolin (1964).East Turkistan to the Twelfth Century.The Hague: Mouton & Co. p. 9.The general boundaries of East Turkistan are the Altai range on the northeast, Mongolia on the east, the Kansu corridor or the Su-lo-ho basin on the southeast, the K'un-lun system on the south, the Sarygol and Muztay-ata on the west, the main range of the T'ien-shan system on the north to the approximate longitude of Aqsu (80 deg. E), then generally northeast to the Altai system which the boundary joins in the vicinity of the Khrebët Nalinsk and Khrebët Sailjuginsk.
^abJustin M. Jacobs (14 August 2019)."Episode 39: Ethnicity, Tibet, and Xinjiang in the PRC".podcasts.apple.com (Podcast). Beyond Huaxia: A College History of China and Japan. Event occurs at 60:00–62:18. Retrieved19 March 2022.
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^Wang, Wenjun; Ding, Manyu; Gardner, Jacob D.; Wang, Yongqiang; Miao, Bo; Guo, Wu; Wu, Xinhua; Ruan, Qiurong; Yu, Jianjun; Hu, Xingjun; Wang, Bo (March 2021)."Ancient Xinjiang mitogenomes reveal intense admixture with high genetic diversity".Science Advances.7 (14).Bibcode:2021SciA....7.6690W.doi:10.1126/sciadv.abd6690.PMC8011967.PMID33789892.In the Iron Age, in general, Steppe-related and northeastern Asian admixture intensified, with North and East Xinjiang populations showing more affinity with northeastern Asians and South Xinjiang populations showing more affinity with Central Asians. The genetic structure observed in the Historical Era of Xinjiang is similar to that in the Iron Age, demonstrating genetic continuity since the Iron Age with some additional genetic admixture with populations surrounding the Xinjiang region.
^Betts, Allison (2019).The Cultures of Ancient Xinjiang, western China: Crossroads of the Silk Roads. Summertown, Oxford: Archaeopress. p. 50.ISBN978-1-78969-407-9. "The first settlers had European paternal lineages, and maternal lineages of European and Siberian origin." [...] "a pattern that continued in to Xiaohe Phase II, in layers 3, 2 and 1, where the genes show greater mixing still (Li, et al. 2015). The origin of the mitochondrial lineages is more widespread, with the presence of west Eurasian, east Eurasian and Indian lineages." [...] "This may account for the marked genetic change over time in the Xiaohe population (Li 2010, Li, et al. 2010, Li et al. 2015)." The later Xiaohe people carried diverse east Eurasian maternal lineages, including a dominance of C4 and C5, generally linked to southern Siberia."
^Betts 2019, p. 50"This may account for the marked genetic change over time in the Xiaohe population (Li 2010, Li, et al. 2010, Li et al. 2015)." The later Xiaohe people carried diverse east Eurasian maternal lineages, including a dominance of C4 and C5, generally linked to southern Siberia."
^Schurr, Theodore (2015).Globalization. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology.ISBN978-1-934536-78-0. "In this regard, genetic data have recently been discovered from individuals interred in the Xiaohe cemetery from the Tarim Basin. Interestingly, they were shown to have both East Eurasian and West Eurasian mtDNA lineages, but only West Eurasian NRY lineages (Li et al 2010)."
^Zhang, Fan; Ning, Chao; Scott, Ashley; Fu, Qiaomei; Bjørn, Rasmus; Li, Wenying; Wei, Dong; Wang, Wenjun; Fan, Linyuan; Abuduresule, Idilisi; Hu, Xingjun (November 2021)."The genomic origins of the Bronze Age Tarim Basin mummies".Nature.599 (7884):256–261.Bibcode:2021Natur.599..256Z.doi:10.1038/s41586-021-04052-7.ISSN1476-4687.PMC8580821.PMID34707286.Using qpAdm, we modelled the Tarim Basin individuals as a mixture of two ancient autochthonous Asian genetic groups: the ANE, represented by an Upper Palaeolithic individual from the Afontova Gora site in the upper Yenisei River region of Siberia (AG3) (about 72%), and ancient Northeast Asians, represented by Baikal_EBA (about 28%) (Supplementary Data 1E and Fig. 3a). Tarim_EMBA2 from Beifang can also be modelled as a mixture of Tarim_EMBA1 (about 89%) and Baikal_EBA (about 11%).
^Tremblay, Xavier (2007). "The Spread of Buddhism in Serindia: Buddhism Among Iranians, Tocharians and Turks before the 13th Century". In Ann Heirman & Stephan Peter Bumbacker (eds.).The Spread of Buddhism. Leiden & Boston: Koninklijke Brill. p. 77.ISBN978-90-04-15830-6.
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^Adle (2003), p. 203, "By the autumn of 1759, the entire periphery of the Tarim basin had been pacified".
^从 斌静案 看清代驻疆官员与新疆的稳定 [Viewing the Stability of Xinjiang Officials and Xinjiang in the Case of Bin Jing] (in Chinese). Archived fromthe original on 20 April 2016. Retrieved16 April 2011.
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