Since coming to power, Xi's tenure has witnessed a significant increase incensorship andmass surveillance, a deterioration inhuman rights (including thepersecution of Uyghurs), the rise of acult of personality, theremoval ofterm limits for the presidency in 2018, as well as an increased role for the CCP in society. Xi's political ideas and principles, known asXi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into theparty andnational constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, overseen significant reforms of Party, state and military bodies, while also increasing CCP's influence over the state bodies. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was re-elected state president for an unprecedented third term in March 2023.
Xi went toBeijing Bayi School,[6][7] and thenBeijing No. 25 School,[8] in the 1960s. He became friends withLiu He, who attendedBeijing No. 101 School in the same district, and who later became China's vice premier and a close advisor to Xi after he became China's paramount leader.[9][10] In 1963, when Xi was ten years old, his father was purged from the CCP and sent to work in a factory inLuoyang, Henan.[11] In May 1966, theCultural Revolution cut short Xi's secondary education when all secondary classes were halted for students to criticise and fight their teachers. Student militants ransacked the Xi family home.[12][13] Also during the Cultural Revolution, Xi's sister Heping hanged herself at her military academy.[14]: 238–239
Later, his mother was forced to publicly denounce his father, as he was paraded before a crowd as an enemy of the revolution. His father was later imprisoned in 1968 when Xi was aged 15. In 1968, Xi submitted an application to the Bayi School's Reform Committee and insisted on leaving Beijing for the countryside.[15] On 13 January 1969, they left Beijing and arrived inLiangjiahe Village,Yan'an, Shaanxi, alongsideCCP ChairmanMao Zedong'sDown to the Countryside Movement.[16] The rural areas of Yan'an were very backward,[17] which created a big gap for Xi as a teenager. He once recalled that he had to overcome "five hurdles" (flea, food, life, labor and thought hurdle),[18] and the experience led him to feel affinity with the rural poor.[17] After a few months, unable to stand rural life, he ran away to Beijing. He was arrested during a crackdown on deserters from the countryside and sent to a work camp to dig ditches. He later returned to the village, under the persuasion of his aunt Qi Yun and uncle Wei Zhenwu.[19] He worked as theparty secretary of Liangjiahe, where he lived in acave house.[20]
He then spent a total of seven years inYanchuan.[21][22] In 1973, Yanchuan County assigned Xi Jinping to Zhaojiahe Village in Jiajianping Commune to lead social education efforts.[23] Due to his effective work and strong rapport with the villagers, the community expressed a desire to keep him there. However, after Liangjiahe Village advocated for his return, Xi went back in July that same year. Liang Yuming (梁玉明) and Liang Youhua (梁有华), the village branch secretaries, supported his application to the Chinese Communist Party.[24] Yet, due to his father, Xi Zhongxun, still facing political persecution, the application was initially blocked by higher authorities.[7] Despite submitting ten applications, it wasn't until the new commune secretary, Bai Guangxing (白光兴), recognized Xi's capabilities that his application was forwarded to the CCP Yanchuan County Committee and approved in early 1974.[25] Around that time, as Liangjiahe village underwent leadership changes, Xi was recommended to become the Party branch chairman of the Liangjiahe Brigade.[26][27]
After taking office, Xi noted thatMianyang, Sichuan was usingbiogas technology and, given the fuel shortages in his village, he traveled to Mianyang to learn about biogas digesters.[28] Upon returning, he successfully implemented the technology in Liangjiahe, marking a breakthrough in Shaanxi that soon spread throughout the region.[29] Additionally, he led efforts to drill wells for water supply, establish iron industry cooperatives, reclaim land, plant flue-cured tobacco, and set up sales outlets to address the village's production and economic challenges.[30][31] In 1975, when Yanchuan County was allocated a spot atTsinghua University, the CCP Yanchuan County Committee recommended Xi for admission.[32] From 1975 to 1979, Xi studiedchemical engineering at Tsinghua University as aworker-peasant-soldier student in Beijing.[33][34]
On 25 March 1982, Xi was appointed deputy party secretary ofZhengding County in Hebei.[37][38] Together with Lü Yulan (吕玉兰), the other deputy party secretary of Zhengding, Xi wrote a letter to the central government addressing the excessive requisitions that burdened local farmers.[39] Their efforts successfully convinced the central government to reduce the annual requisition amount by 14 million kilograms.[23] In 1983, Zhengding adjusted its agricultural structure, leading to a significant increase in farmers' incomes from 148 yuan to over 400 yuan in 1984,[40] thoroughly solving the county's economic issues.[41]
As the secretary of the CCP Zhengding County Committee in July 1983,[42][39] Xi initiated several development projects, including the development of "Nine Articles of Zhengding talents",[42] the construction of Changshan Park,[43] the restoration of theLongxing Temple, the formation of a tourism company, and the establishment of the Rongguo Mansion and Zhengding Table Tennis Base.[44] He also persuaded the China Teleplay Production Center to set the filming base ofDream of the Red Mansions in Zhengding and secured 3.5 million yuan to build Rongguo Mansion,[45] which significantly boosted the county's tourism industry, generating 17.61 million yuan in revenue that year.[46] Additionally, Xi invited prominent figures such asHua Luogeng,Yu Guangyuan, Pan Chengxiao to visit Zhengding,[47] which eventually led to the development of the county's "semi-urban" strategy,[44] leveraging its proximity to Shijiazhuang for diverse business growth.[48][49]
In September 1984, during a briefing session chaired by He Zai, the secretary-general of theCCP Central Organization Department, Xi Jinping's strategic vision and comprehensive understanding of Zhengding County's development were highlighted.[50] He Zai, along withWei Jianxing, deputy head of the CCP Central Organization Department, communicated these findings toHu Yaobang, describing Xi as a leader with a strategic outlook and a strong alliance ideology between workers and peasants.[51][52] In 1985, Xi participated in a study tour on corn processing and traveled toIowa, the United States,[53] to study agricultural production and corn processing technology.[54][50] During his visit to the U.S., the CCP Central Organization Department decided to transfer him toXiamen as a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Xiamen Municipal Committee and as vice mayor.[51]
Fujian
Arriving in Xiamen as vice-mayor in June 1985, Xi drafted the first strategic plan for the development of the city, the Xiamen Economic and Social Development Strategy for 1985–2000.[55] From August, Along with helping to prepareXiamen Airlines,[56] the Xiamen Economic Information Center,[57] and the Xiamen Special Administrative Region Road Project, etc., he oversaw the resolution for Yundang Lake's comprehensive treatments.[58] He marriedPeng Liyuan then in Xiamen.[59][60]
He started serving as the head of a region after being appointed just as the secretary ofNingde in September 1988.[61] Ningde's economy was far worse at that time than that of Fuzhou and Xiamen.[62] Xi organized his work log and experience during his Ningde period into his bookGetting out of Poverty,[63] and handled the local poverty eradicating efforts and local CCP building projects.[64] The CCP Fujian Provincial Committee decided in May 1990 to assign Xi toFuzhou City as the Municipal Committee Secretary.[65]
In 1997, he was named an alternate member of the15th CCP Central Committee. In 1999, he was promoted to the office of Vice Governor of Fujian, and became governor a year later. Xi proposed the concept of the Golden Triangle at Min River (Chinese:闽江口金三角经济圈) and oversaw the construction of the Fuzhou 3820 Project Master Plan,[66] which outlines Fuzhou City's growth strategy for 3, 8, and 20 years.[67] He concentrated on the development ofChangle International Airport, the Min River Water Transfer Project, the Fuzhou Telecommunication Hub, andFuzhou Port, among others. He concentrated on attracting Taiwanese and foreign investment,[68] establishing Southwest TPV Electronics and Southeast Automobile in Fuzhou, and fosteringFuyao Glass,Newland Digital Technology and other manufacturing firms.[65] Furthermore, he rehabilitated local cultural landmarks, including as theSanfang Qixiang in Fuzhou, advanced urban renewal initiatives, and effectively addressed the issue of poverty alleviation onPingtan Island. In 1995, Xi Jinping was elevated to deputy secretary of theFujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and served asGovernor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, during which he presented the notion of "Megalopolises" and advocated for the inter-island growth strategy of Fuzhou and Xiamen, which motivated local officials to swiftly overcome the repercussions of theYuanhua smuggling case (Chinese:远华走私案) and adopt a new development strategy.[69] Xi also oversaw the development of "Digital Fujian", including the province's complaint hotline into the "12345 Citizen Service Platform", so enhancing organizational efficiency.[66]
Zhejiang
In 2002, Xi left Fujian and took up leading political positions in neighbouring Zhejiang. He eventually took over asprovincial Party Committee secretary after several months as acting governor, occupying a top provincial office for the first time in his career. In 2002, he was elected a full member of the16th Central Committee, marking his ascension to the national stage. While in Zhejiang, Xi presided over reported growth rates averaging 14% per year.[70] During this period, Zhejiang increasingly transitioned away from heavy industry.[71]: 121 Xi's career in Zhejiang was marked by a tough and straightforward stance against corrupt officials. This earned him a name in the national media and drew the attention of China's top leaders.[72] Between 2004 and 2007,Li Qiang acted as Xi's chief of staff through his position as secretary-general of theZhejiang Party Committee, where they developed close mutual ties.[73] During this period, Xi and Li drafted theDouble Eight Strategy, which listed eight comparative advantages of Zhejiang and eight corresponding actions to improve the province.[74]
Shanghai
Following the dismissal ofShanghai Party secretaryChen Liangyu in September 2006 due to asocial security fund scandal, Xi was transferred to Shanghai in March 2007, where he was the party secretary there for seven months.[75][76] While in Shanghai, he worked on preserving unity of the local party organisation. He pledged there would be no 'purges' during his administration, despite the fact many local officials were thought to have been implicated in the Chen Liangyu corruption scandal.[77] In Shanghai, Xi avoided controversy and was known for strictly observing party discipline. For example, Shanghai administrators attempted to earn favour with him by arranging a special train to shuttle him between Shanghai andHangzhou for him to complete handing off his work to his successor as Zhejiang party secretaryZhao Hongzhu. However, Xi reportedly refused to take the train, citing a loosely enforced party regulation that stipulated that special trains can only be reserved for "national leaders".[78] On most issues, Xi largely echoed the line of the central leadership.[79] He developed a reputation in his early career for avoiding controversy and not making political opponents.[80]: 75
Politburo Standing Committee
Xi Jinping greeting U.S. presidentGeorge W. Bush in August 2008Xi Jinping with Russian presidentDmitry Medvedev on 28 September 2010
Xi was appointed to the nine-man PSC after the17th Party Congress in October 2007. He was ranked aboveLi Keqiang, an indication that he was going to succeed Hu Jintao as China'snext leader. In addition, Xi served in the CCP'sCentral Secretariat. This assessment was further supported at the first session of the11th National People's Congress in March 2008, when Xi was elected as vice president of China.[81]
Following his elevation, Xi held a broad range of portfolios. He was put in charge of the comprehensive preparations for the2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, as well as being the central government's leading figure in Hong Kong and Macau affairs. In addition, he also became thepresident of the Central Party School, the CCP's icadre-training and ideological education school. In the wake of the2008 Sichuan earthquake, Xi visited disaster areas inShaanxi andGansu. After the Olympics, Xi was assigned the post of committee chair for the preparations of the60th Anniversary Celebrations of the founding of the PRC. He was also reportedly at the helm of a top-level CCP committee dubbed the6521 Project, which was charged with ensuring social stability during a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009.[82]
Xi's position as the apparent successor to become the paramount leader was threatened with the rapid rise ofBo Xilai, the party secretary ofChongqing at the time. Bo was expected to join the PSC after the18th Party Congress, with most expecting that he would try to eventually maneuver himself into replacing Xi.[83] Bo's policies in Chongqing inspired imitations throughout China and received praise from Xi himself during Xi's visit to Chongqing in 2010. Records of praises from Xi were later erased after he became paramount leader. Bo's downfall would come with theWang Lijun incident, which opened the door for Xi to come to power without challengers.[84] On 18 October 2010, at the fifth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee, Xi was elected to be a vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission,[85] followed by his appointment as vice chairman of the state CMC on 28 October by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.[86]
Xi is considered one of the most successful members of thePrincelings, a quasi-clique of politicians who are descendants of early Chinese Communist revolutionaries. Former prime minister of Singapore,Lee Kuan Yew, when asked about Xi, said he felt he was "a thoughtful man who has gone through many trials and tribulations."[87] Lee also commented: "I would put him in theNelson Mandela class of persons. A person with enormous emotional stability who does not allow his personal misfortunes or sufferings affect his judgment. In other words, he is impressive."[88] Former U.S. Treasury SecretaryHenry Paulson described Xi as "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line."[89] Australian prime ministerKevin Rudd said that Xi "has sufficient reformist, party and military background to be very much his own man."[90]
Diplomacy
Xi made his first foreign trip as vice president to North Korea, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen from 17 to 25 June 2008.[91] In February 2009, in his capacity as vice president, Xi embarked on a tour of Latin America, visiting Mexico, Jamaica,[92] Colombia, Venezuela,[93] Brazil,[94] and Malta, after which he returned to China.[95] On 11 February 2009, while visiting Mexico, Xi spoke in front of a group ofoverseas Chinese and explained China's contributions during the international financial crisis, saying that it was "the greatest contribution towards the whole of human race, made by China, to prevent its 1.37 billion people from hunger."[b] He went on to remark: "There are some bored foreigners, with full stomachs, who have nothing better to do than point fingers at us. First, China doesn't export revolution; second, China doesn't export hunger and poverty; third, China doesn't come and cause you headaches. What more is there to be said?"[c][96] The story was reported on some local television stations. The news led to a flood of discussions on Chinese Internet forums and it was reported that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught off-guard by Xi's remarks, as the actual video was shot by some accompanying Hong Kong reporters and broadcast on Hong Kong TV, which then turned up on various Internet video websites.[97]
The Muscatine, Iowa house where Xi stayed with an American family during a 1985 agricultural visit to the United States. The home was turned into a museum decades later.
In theEuropean Union, Xi visited Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania from 7 to 21 October 2009.[98] He visited Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, and Myanmar on his Asian trip from 14 to 22 December 2009.[99] He later visited the United States, Ireland and Turkey in February 2012. This visit included meeting with then U.S. presidentBarack Obama at the White House and vice presidentJoe Biden (with Biden as the official host);[100] and stops in California andIowa. In Iowa, he met with the family that previously hosted him during his 1985 tour as aHebei provincial official.[101]
A few months before his ascendancy to the party leadership, Xi disappeared from official media coverage and cancelled meetings with foreign officials for several weeks beginning on 1 September 2012, causing rumors.[7] He then reappeared on 15 September.[102] On 15 November 2012, immediately after the18th Party National Congress, Xi was elected to the posts of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the Party CMC by the18th Central Committee of the CCP. This made him, formally theCCP leader, and informally, theparamount leader and also the first to be born after the founding of the PRC. The following day Xi led the new line-up of the PSC onto the stage in their first public appearance.[103] The PSC was reduced from nine to seven, with Xi and Li Keqiang retaining their seats; the other five members were new.[104][105][106]
In a marked departure from the common practice of Chinese leaders, Xi's first speech as general secretary was plainly worded and did not include any political slogans or mention his predecessors.[107] Xi mentioned the aspirations of the average person, remarking, "Our people ... expect better education, more stable jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment." Xi also vowed to tackle corruption at the highest levels, alluding that it would threaten the CCP's survival; he was reticent about far-reaching economic reforms.[108]
In December 2012, Xivisited Guangdong in his first trip outside Beijing since taking the general secretaryship. The overarching theme of the trip was to call for further economic reform and a strengthened military. Xi visited the statue of Deng Xiaoping and his trip was described as following in the footsteps ofDeng's own southern trip in 1992, which provided the impetus for further economic reforms in China after conservative party leaders stalled many of Deng's reforms in the aftermath of the1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. On his trip, Xi consistently alluded to his signature slogan, the "Chinese Dream". "This dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a strong military," Xi told sailors.[109] Xi's trip was significant in that he departed from the established convention of Chinese leaders' travel routines in multiple ways. Rather than dining out, Xi and his entourage ate regular hotel buffet. He travelled in a large van with his colleagues rather than a fleet of limousines, and did not restrict traffic on the parts of the highway he travelled.[110]
Xi was elected president on 14 March 2013, in a confirmation vote by the12th National People's Congress in Beijing. He received 2,952 for, one vote against, and three abstentions.[103] He replaced Hu Jintao, who retired after serving two terms.[111] Xi was also elected as the chairman of the state CMC. He subsequently nominated Li Keqiang to be the premier, who was then appointed by the NPC.[112]
"To speak the truth" means to focus on the nature of things, to speak frankly, and follow the truth. This is an important embodiment of a leading official's characteristics of truth seeking, embodying justice, devotion to public interests, and uprightness. Moreover, he highlighted that the premise of telling the truth is to listen to the truth.
Xi vowed to crack down on corruption immediately after he ascended to power. In his inaugural speech as general secretary, Xi mentioned that fighting corruption was one of the toughest challenges for the party.[114] A few months into his term, Xi outlined theEight-point Regulation, listing rules intended to curb corruption and waste during official party business; it aimed at stricter discipline on the conduct of officials. Xi vowed to root out "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and ordinary party functionaries.[115] He also launched theParty's Mass Line Education and Practice Activities, aiming CCP cadres to usemass line and instill Party discipline. The campaign lasted from 2013 to 2014.[116]: 95
The campaign has led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including members of the PSC.[117] Xi initiated cases against former CMC vice chairmenXu Caihou andGuo Boxiong, former PSC member and security chiefZhou Yongkang and former Hu Jintao chief aideLing Jihua.[118] Along with new disciplinary chiefWang Qishan, Xi's administration spearheaded the formation of "centrally-dispatched inspection teams". These were cross-jurisdictional squads whose task was to gain understanding of the operations of provincial and local party organizations, and enforce party discipline mandated by Beijing. Work teams had the effect of identifying and initiating investigations of high-ranking officials. Over one hundred provincial-ministerial level officials were implicated during a nationwide anti-corruption campaign. These included former and current regional officials, leading figures of state-owned enterprises and central government organs, and generals. Within the first two years of the campaign alone, over 200,000 officials received warnings, fines, and demotions.[119]
Xi has overseen significant reforms of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP's highestinternal control institution.[120] He and CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan further institutionalized CCDI's independence from the day-to-day operations of the CCP, improving its ability to function as abona fide control body.[120] According toThe Wall Street Journal, anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial level need approval from Xi.[121] In February 2018, theNational Supervision Commission was established as the highest state supervisory and anti-corruption authority in an effort to aid the CCDI.[122] As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials have been prosecuted.[123]: 129
In January 2018, Xi launched a three-yearSpecial Campaign to Crack Down on Organized Crime and Eliminate Evil that lasted until 2020.[124] After the special campaign exposed problems in the legal system, the CCP announced a campaign toeducate and rectify the political and legal teams in July 2020.[125][126] Especially since 2023, Xi has also overseen significant anti-corruption efforts in the military, with some targets involving those that rose to prominence under his leadership.[127] Those targeted included former defense ministersLi Shangfu andWei Fenghe,[128] CMC vice chairmanHe Weidong, and CMC memberMiao Hua,[129] Bloomberg News estimated that as October 2025, at least 14 generals out of 79 appointed under Xi's leadership have been officially ousted.[130]
Political observers have called Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since ChairmanMao Zedong, especially since the ending of presidential two-term limits in 2018.[131][132][133][134] Xi has departed from thecollective leadership practices under Hu Jintao.[135] In the opinion of at least one political scientist, Xi "has surrounded himself with cadres he met while stationed on the coast, Fujian andShanghai and in Zhejiang."[136] Observers have said that Xi has seriously diluted the influence of the once-dominant "Tuanpai", also called the Youth League Faction, which were CCP officials who rose through the Communist Youth League (CYLC).[137] He criticized the cadres of the CYLC, saying that "[these cadres] can't talk about science, literature and art, work or life [with young people]. All they can do is just repeat the same old bureaucratic, stereotypical talk."[138]
In 2018, theNational People's Congress (NPC) passedconstitutional amendments including removal of term limits for the president and vice president, the creation of aNational Supervisory Commission, as well as enhancing the central role of the CCP.[139][140] Xi was reappointed as president, now without term limits,[141][142] while Li Keqiang was reappointed premier.[143] According to theFinancial Times, Xi expressed his views of constitutional amendment at meetings with Chinese officials and foreign dignitaries. Xi explained the decision in terms of needing to align two more powerful posts—general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC—which have no term limits. However, Xi did not say whether he intended to be party general secretary, CMC chairman and state president, for three or more terms.[144]
In its sixth plenary session in November 2021, CCP adopted theResolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century, a kind of document that evaluated the party's history. This was the third of historical resolution after ones adopted by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.[145][146] In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history.[147] To accompany the historical resolution, the CCP promoted the termsTwo Establishes andTwo Upholds, calling the CCP to unite around and protect Xi's core status within the party.[148]
The20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held between 16 and 22 October 2022, has overseen amendments in theCCP constitution and the re-election of Xi as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC for a third term, with the overall result of the Congress further strengthening Xi's power.[149] Xi's re-election made him the firstparty leader since Mao Zedong to be chosen for a third term.[150] The new Politburo Standing Committee elected just after the CCP Congress was filled almost completely with people close to Xi, with four out of the seven members of the previous PSC stepping down.[151] Xi was further unanimously re-elected as the PRC president and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission on 10 March 2023 during the opening of the14th National People's Congress.[152] At the same time, Xi allyLi Qiang succeeded Li Keqiang as the Premier.
Xi has had acult of personality constructed around himself since entering office[153][154] with books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines honouring his rule.[155] Following Xi's ascension to theleadership core of the CCP, he had been referred to asXi Dada (习大大, Uncle or Papa Xi),[155][156] though this stopped in April 2016.[157] The village of Liangjiahe, where Xi was sent to work, is decorated with propaganda and murals extolling the formative years of his life.[158] The CCP's Politburo named Xi Jinpinglingxiu (领袖), a reverent term for "leader" and a title previously only given to Mao Zedong and his immediate successorHua Guofeng.[159][160][161] He is also sometimes called the "pilot at the helm" (领航掌舵).[162] On 25 December 2019, the Politburo officially named Xi as "People's Leader" (人民领袖;rénmín lǐngxiù), a title only Mao had held previously.[163]
Since Xi became general secretary, censorship has stepped up.[164][165] Xi has overseen the increased coordination and consolidation of censorship authorities, raising their efficiency, and under his leadership censorship practices have tightened.[166] At theSymposium on News Reporting and Public Opinion in 2016, Xi stated that "party and government-owned media must hold the family name of the party" and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority".[167] Chairing the 2018 China Cyberspace Governance Conference, Xi committed to "fiercely crack down on criminal offenses including hacking, telecom fraud, and violation of citizens' privacy."[168]
Xi's administration has overseen more Internet restrictions imposed, and is described as being "stricter across the board" on speech than previous administrations.[169][170] A law enacted in 2013 authorized a three-year prison term for bloggers who shared more than 500 times any content considered "defamatory".[171] The State Internet Information Department summoned influential bloggers to a seminar to instruct them to avoid writing about politics, the CCP, or making statements contradicting official narratives. Many bloggers stopped writing about controversial topics, andWeibo went into decline, with much of its readership shifting toWeChat users speaking to limited social circles.[171] In 2014, the Chinese government launched theCleaning the Web campaign, aiming to crack down on pornographic, vulgar, and politically questionable content.[172] China under Xi has taken a strong stand to control internet usage inside China, includingGoogle andFacebook,[173] advocating Internet censorship under the concept ofinternet sovereignty.[174][175] Thecensorship of Wikipedia has been stringent; in April 2019, all versions of Wikipedia were blocked.[176] Likewise, the situation for users of Weibo has been described as a change from fearing one's account would be deleted, to fear of arrest.[177] Under Xi's administration, China started enforcing anInternet real-name system for online platforms, requiring them to collect users' real names, ID numbers, and other information when providing services.[178]
Xi was initially seen as a market reformist,[179] and a Central Committee under him announced "market forces" would begin to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources.[180] This meant that the state would gradually reduce its involvement in the distribution of capital, and restructurestate-owned enterprises (SOEs) to allow further competition, potentially by attracting foreign and private sector players in industries previously highly regulated. This policy aimed to address the bloated state sector that had unduly profited from re-structuring by purchasing assets at below-market prices, assets no longer being used productively. Xi launched theShanghai Free-Trade Zone in 2013, which was seen as part of the economic reforms.[181] However, by 2017, Xi's promise of economic reforms was said to have stalled by experts.[182][179] In 2015, theChinese stock market bubble popped, which led Xi to use state forces to fix it.[183] China's economy has grown under Xi, more than doubling from $8.7 trillion in 2012 to $18.7 trillion in 2024,[184] while China's nominal GDP per capita surpassed the world average in 2021,[185] though growth has slowed from 7.9% in 2012 to 5% in 2024.[186]
Xi has increased state control over the economy, voicing support for SOEs,[187][179] while also supporting the private sector.[188] CCP control of SOEs has increased, while limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs were undertaken.[189] From 2012 to 2022, the share of the market value of private sector firms in China's top listed companies increased from 10% to over 40%.[190] He has overseen the relaxation of restrictions onforeign direct investment (FDI) and increased cross-border holdings of stocks and bonds.[190] His administration made it easier for banks to issuemortgages, increased foreign participation in the bond market, and increased the national currencyrenminbi's global role, helping it to joinIMF's basket ofspecial drawing right.[191] In 2018, he promised to continue reforms but warned nobody "can dictate to the Chinese people."[192] Xi has overseen regional economic development initiatives within China such as theCoordinated Development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region,[193]Strategy for Integrated Development of the Yangtze River Delta[194] and theGuangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area.[195] Xi has been involved in the development ofXiong'an, anew area announced in 2017, planned to become a major metropolis near Beijing; the relocation aspect is estimated to last until 2035 while it is planned to developed into a "modern socialist city" by 2050.[196]
Xi has formulated thenew concept for development, stressing the importance of "high-quality development" rather than "inflated growth".[197] He has stated China has abandoned a growth-at-all-costs strategy which Xi refers to as "GDP heroism".[198] Instead, Xi said other social issues such as environmental protection are important.[198] Xi has made eradicating extreme poverty throughtargeted poverty alleviation a key goal.[199] In 2015, he launched thebattle against poverty.[200] The campaign concluded by 2021, when Xi declared a "complete victory" over extreme poverty, saying nearly 100 million have been lifted out of poverty under his tenure, though some experts said China'spoverty threshold was lower than that of theWorld Bank.[201] In 2020, premier Li Keqiang, citing theNational Bureau of Statistics (NBS) said that China still had 600 million people living with less than 1000 yuan ($140) a month, althoughThe Economist said the methodology NBS used was flawed.[202] When Xi took office in 2012, 58% of people in China were living on less than $8.30 per day, in 2021 this had fallen to 21%.[203]
Xi supportsdual circulation, a reorientation of the economy towards domestic consumption while remaining open to foreign trade and investment.[204] Xi has prioritised boostingproductivity.[205] Xi has attempted to reform the property sector to combat the steep increase in prices and cut the economy's dependence on it.[206] In the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi declared "houses are for living, not for speculation."[207] In 2020, Xi's government formulated the "three red lines" policy that aimed to deleverage the heavily indebted property sector.[208] Xi has supported aproperty tax, for which he has faced resistance from members of the CCP.[209] His administration pursued a debt-deleveraging campaign, seeking to slow and cut the unsustainable amount of debt China has accrued during its growth.[210] Since 2021, China has faced aproperty sector crisis, with decreasing house prices, shrinking of the real estate sector and bankruptcies of many property developers, partially as a result of Xi's efforts to decrease the sector's role in the Chinese economy.[211]
Xi has heavily emphasized the role of advanced manufacturing and technology development to drive China's future economic growth.[212] Since shortly after taking office as General Secretary, Xi emphasised the use of industrial policy to increase domestic innovation and reduce reliance on foreign tehchnology.[80]: 105 In 2015, Xi's administration launched theDouble First-Class Construction, a higher education development and sponsorship scheme intended to replace the previous programsProject 211 andProject 985.[213] Xi's administration has promotedMade in China 2025 plan that aims to make China self-reliant in key technologies, although publicly China de-emphasised this plan due to the outbreak of aChina–United States trade war. Since the outbreak of the trade war in 2018, Xi has revived calls for "self-reliance", especially on technology.[214] Domestic spending on R&D has significantly increased, surpassing the European Union (EU) and reaching a record $564 billion in 2020.[215] The Chinese government has supported technology companies likeHuawei through grants, tax breaks, credit facilities and other assistance, enabling their rise, leading to US countermeasures.[216] In 2023, Xi put forwardnew productive forces, this refers to a new form of productive forces derived from continuous sci-tech breakthroughs and innovation that drive strategic emerging and future industries in a more intelligentinformation era.[217] Under Xi, China made rapid advances in key technological areas, becoming a world leader in tech such aselectric vehicles,lithium batteries and solar panels.[218]
Common prosperity is an essential requirement of socialism and a key feature of Chinese-style modernization. The common prosperity we are pursuing is for all, affluence both in material and spiritual life, but not for a small portion nor for uniform egalitarianism.
In 2020,The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi ordered a halt toAnt Group'sinitial public offering (IPO), in reaction to its founderJack Ma criticizing government regulation in finance.[220] Under Xi,government guidance funds, public-private investment funds set up by or for government bodies, have raised more than $900 billion for early funding to companies that work in sectors the government deems as strategic.[221] Xi's administration has overseen a decrease in offshore IPOs by Chinese companies, with most Chinese IPOs taking place either in Shanghai or Shenzhen as of 2022[update], and has increasingly directed funding to IPOs of companies that works in sectors it deems as strategic, including electric vehicles,biotechnology,renewable energy,artificial intelligence,semiconductors and other high-technology manufacturing.[221]
Since 2021, Xi has promoted the termcommon prosperity, which he defined as an "essential requirement of socialism", described as affluence for all and said entailed reasonable adjustments to excess incomes.[219][222] Common prosperity has been used as the justification forlarge-scale crackdowns and regulations towards the perceived "excesses" of several sectors, most prominently tech and tutoring industries.[223] Actions taken include fining large tech companies[224] and passing laws such as theData Security Law. China introduced severe restrictions on private tutoring in the name of promoting social equality, effectively eliminating the private education industry and enacting theDouble Reduction Policy.[225][80]: 131, 173–174 Xi opened anew stock exchange in Beijing targeted for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).[226] There have been other cultural regulations including restrictions on minors playing video games and crackdowns on celebrity culture.[227][228] The push for common prosperity has also included salary and bonus cuts, especially across the financial sector,[229][230] as well as crackdowns on wealth flaunting.[231]
Reforms
In November 2013, at the conclusion of thethird plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the Communist Party delivered theDecision on Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a far-reaching reform agenda that alluded to changes in both economic and social policy. Xi signaled at the plenum that he was consolidating control of the massive internal security organization that was formerly the domain of Zhou Yongkang.[180] TheCentral Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms—anotherad hoc policy coordination body led by Xi upgraded to a commission in 2018—was also formed to oversee the implementation of the reform agenda.[232][233] Termed "comprehensive deepening reforms", they were said to be the most significant since Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour. The plenum also announced economic reforms and resolved to abolish thelaogai system of "re-education through labour", which was largely seen as a blot on China's human rights record. The system has faced significant criticism for years from domestic critics and foreign observers.[180]
In 2015, Xi announced theFour Comprehensives, namely comprehensively build amoderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the nation according tolaw, and strictly governing the Party;[234][235] in 2021, at the 100th anniversary of the CCP, Xi declared that China achieved its goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.[236] In January 2016, atwo-child policy replaced theone-child policy,[237] which was in turn was replaced with athree-child policy in May 2021.[238] In July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.[239]
The most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The greatest advantage of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and the party is the highest political leading force.
Xi's administration taken a number of changes to the structure of the CCP and state bodies, especially in a large overhaul in 2018. These reforms have been characterized by the integration of CCP and state bodies.[241] Beginning in 2013, the CCP under Xi has created a series of Central Leading Groups: supra-ministerial steering committees, designed to bypass existing institutions when making decisions, and ostensibly make policy-making a more efficient process. Xi was also believed to have diluted the authority of premier Li Keqiang, taking authority over the economy which has generally been considered to be the domain of the premier.[242][243]
2023 has seen further reforms to the CCP and state bureaucracy called theplan on reforming Party and state institutions, which included the strengthening of Party control over the financial and technology domains.[249] This included the creation of two CCP bodies for overseeing finance; theCentral Financial Commission (CFC), as well as the revival of theCentral Financial Work Commission (CFWC) that was previously dissolved in 2002.[249] Additionally, a new CCPCentral Science and Technology Commission would be established to broadly oversee the technology sector, while a newly createdSociety Work Department was tasked with CCP interactions with several sectors, including civic groups, chambers of commerce and industry groups, as well as handling public petition and grievance work.[249] Regulatory bodies saw large overhauls.[250] Several regulatory responsibilities were also transferred from thePeople's Bank of China (PBC) to another regulatory body, while the PBC reopened offices around the country that were closed in a previous reorganization.[251] In 2024, the CCP's role was strengthened further with theOrganic Law of the State Council amended to add a clause about following CCP ideology and policies.[252]
Efforts should be made to enable the people to see that justice is served in every judicial case.
— Xi Jinping during a speech in November 2020[253]
The party under Xi announced a raft oflegal reforms at the Fourth Plenum held in the fall 2014, and he called for "Chinese socialistic rule of law" immediately afterwards. The party aimed to reform the legal system, which had been perceived as ineffective at delivering justice and affected by corruption, local government interference and lack of constitutional oversight. The plenum, while emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party, also called for a greater role of the constitution in the affairs of state and a strengthening of the role of the National People's Congress Standing Committee in interpreting the constitution.[254] It also called for more transparency in legal proceedings, more involvement of ordinary citizens in the legislative process, and an overall "professionalization" of the legal workforce. The party also planned to institute cross-jurisdictional circuit legal tribunals as well as giving provinces consolidated administrative oversight over lower level legal resources, which is intended to reduce local government involvement in legal proceedings.[255]
There have been several reforms to the court system under Xi, including transferring the authority over local court finance and personnel from local governments to the provincial-level, establishing a personnel quota system, emphasizing "lifetime accountability" for judges for their judicial decisions, and specification of case transferring procedures between various courts.[256] In 2014, China started efforts to pass a unifiedCivil Code, which was eventually adopted in 2020.[257] In 2015, Xi's administration oversaw the establishment of two circuit courts under the Supreme People's Court, followed by four other circuit courts being established in 2016.[258] Under Xi, an increasing share of laws passed by the NPC explicitly affirmed the leadership of the CCP, with the share increasing from 4% in 2018 to nearly 70% in 2024.[259]
Since taking power in 2012, Xi has undertaken an overhaul of thePeople's Liberation Army, including both political reform and its modernization.[260]Military-civil fusion has advanced under Xi.[261][262] Xi has been active in his participation in military affairs, taking a direct hands-on approach to military reform. In addition to being the chairman of the CMC and leader of theCentral Leading Group for Military Reform founded in 2014 to oversee comprehensive military reforms, Xi has delivered numerous high-profile pronouncements vowing to clean up malfeasance and complacency in the military. Xi has repeatedly warned that the depoliticization of the PLA from the CCP would lead to a collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union.[263] Xi held the New Gutian Conference in 2014, gathering China's top military officers, re-emphasizing the principle of "the party has absolute control over the army" first established by Mao at the 1929Gutian Congress.[264]
In the USSR, where the military was depoliticized, separated from the party and nationalized, the party was disarmed. When the Soviet Union came to crisis point, a big party was gone just like that. Proportionally, the Soviet Communist Party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist.
Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization.[266] In November 2015, the Central Leading Group for Military Reform announced extensive reforms in the PLA calledDeepening National Defense and Military Reform.[267] In 2016, Xi reduced the number oftheater commands of the PLA from seven to five.[268] He has also abolished the four autonomous general departments of the PLA, replacing them with 15 agencies directly reporting to the CMC.[260] Two new branches of the PLA were created under his reforms, theStrategic Support Force[269] and theJoint Logistics Support Force.[270] PLA Second Artillery Corps was also upgraded to thePLA Rocket Force.[271] In March 2016, the CMC announced theabolishment of paid services by the PLA and thePeople's Armed Police (PAP), meaning activities like military-run hospitals and hotels open to the public, by 2019.[272]
On 21 April 2016, Xi was namedcommander-in-chief of the country's new Joint Operations Command Center of the PLA.[273][274] Some analysts interpreted this move as an attempt to display strength and strong leadership and as being more "political than military."[275] According to Ni Lexiong, a military affairs expert, Xi "not only controls the military but also does it in an absolute manner, and that in wartime, he is ready to command personally."[276] According to aUniversity of California, San Diego expert on Chinese military, Xi "has been able to take political control of the military to an extent that exceeds what Mao and Deng have done."[277] In 2018, the PAP was placed under the sole control of the CMC; the PAP was previously under the joint command of the CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.[278]: 15 The PLA went through further extensive reforms in 2024; the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and theAerospace Force, theCyberspace Force and theInformation Support Force was established as arms of the PLA, joining the Joint Logistics Support Force.[279]
Under Xi,China's official military budget has more than doubled,[215] reaching a record $246 billion in 2025.[280] Though predating Xi, his administration has taken a more assertive stance towards maritime affairs, and has boosted CCP control over the maritime security forces.[281] ThePLA Navy has grown rapidly under Xi, with China adding more warships, submarines, support ships and major amphibious vessels during certain years than the United Kingdom or the United States did.[282] Aircraft careersShandong andFujian entered into service under Xi in 2019 and 2025 respectively.[283] In 2017, China established the navy's firstoverseas base in Djibouti.[284] Xi has also undertaken an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, with him calling China to "establish a strong system of strategic deterrence." TheFederation of American Scientists (FAS) has estimated China's total amount of nuclear arsenals to be 600 in 2025, with theUS Department of Defense estimating that China's arsenal could reach 1,000 by 2030.[285]
Xi has taken a harder line on security issues as well as foreign affairs, projecting a morenationalistic and assertive China on the world stage.[286] His political program calls for a China more united and confident of its own value system and political structure.[287] Foreign analysts and observers have frequently said that Xi's main foreign policy objective is to restore China's position on the global stage as agreat power.[288][265][289] Xi advocates "baseline thinking" in China's foreign policy: setting explicit red lines that other countries must not cross.[290] In the Chinese perspective, these tough stances on baseline issues reduce strategic uncertainty, preventing other nations from misjudging China's positions or underestimating China's resolve in asserting what it perceives to be in its national interest.[290] Xi stated during the 20th CCP National Congress that he wanted to ensure China "leads the world in terms ofcomposite national strength and international influence" by 2049.[291]
Xi's foreign policy thoughts are collectively known asXi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.[292] Xi has promotedmajor-country diplomacy, stating that China is already a "big power" and breaking away from previous Chinese leaders who had a more precautious diplomacy.[293] Diplomats under Xi have adopted a hawkish foreign policy posture called "wolf warrior diplomacy" starting from the late 2010s;[294] this form of diplomacy peaked in the early 2020s and declined afterwards.[295] October 2020, he said that "the East is rising and the West is declining", saying that the power of the Western world was in decline and their COVID-19 response was an example of this, and that China was entering a period of opportunity because of this.[296] Xi has frequently alluded tocommunity with a shared future for mankind, which Chinese diplomats have said does not imply an intention to change the international order,[297] but which foreign observers say China wants a new order that puts it more at the centre.[298]
During the Xi administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.[299] Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers", and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.[299] Xi has put an emphasis on increasing China's "international discourse power" (国际话语权) to create a more favorable global opinion of China in the world.[300] In this pursuit, Xi has emphasised the need to "tell China's stories well", meaning expanding China's external propaganda (外宣) and communications.[301] Xi has expanded the focus and scope of theunited front, which aims to consolidate support for CCP in non-CCP elements both inside and outside China, and has accordingly expanded the United Front Work Department.[302]
During Xi's administration, China has maintained cordial relationships with each Africa government exceptEswatini, which recognizes Taiwan but not the PRC.[310] Under Xi, China has cut back lending to Africa after fears that African countries couldn't repay their debts to China.[311] Xi has also promised that China would write off debts of some African countries.[312] In 2025, China announced that it would remove nearly all import tariffs on African countries.[313]
Under Xi, China initially took a more critical stance on North Korea due toits nuclear tests.[314] However, starting in 2018, the relations started to improve due tomeetings between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.[315] Xi has initially improved relationships with South Korea,[314] and the two countries signed afree-trade agreement in December 2015.[316] Starting in 2017, China's relationship with South Korea soured over theTerminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a missile defense system, purchase of the latter, but improved after South Korea halted purchase of the THAAD.[317] China–Japan relations have initially soured under Xi's administration; the most thorny issue between the two countries remains the dispute over theSenkaku Islands, which China calls Diaoyu.[318] However, the relations later started to improve, with Xi being invited to visit in 2020,[319] though the trip was later canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[320]
Since Xi came to power, China has been rapidly building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a decisionStudy Times of theCentral Party School said was personally taken by Xi.[321] Relations between China and India had ups and downs under Xi, later deteriorating due to various factors. The two countries had astandoff in Depsang in 2013,[322] andagain had a standoff over a Chinese construction of a road inDoklam, a territory both claimed byBhutan, India's ally, and China, in 2017.[323] The most serious crisis in the relationship came when the two countries had adeadly clash in 2020 at theLine of Actual Control, leaving some soldiers dead.[324][325] While China has historically been wary of getting closer to theMiddle East countries, Xi has changed this approach, getting closer to both Iran and Saudi Arabia.[326]
China's efforts under Xi has been for the European Union (EU) to stay in a neutral position in their contest with the U.S.[327] China and the EU announced theComprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) in 2020, although the deal was later frozen due to mutual sanctions over Xinjiang.[328] Xi has cultivatedstronger relations with Russia, particularly in the wake of theUkraine crisis of 2014.[329] During theRusso-Ukrainian war, Xi expressed opposition tosanctions against Russia[330] and asserted China'ssupport for Russia on issues of sovereignty and security, but also said China is committed to respecting "the territorial integrity of all countries",[331] while China has cast itself as a neutral party.[332]
United States
Xi has called China–United States relations in the contemporary world a "new type of great-power relations", a phrase theObama administration had been reluctant to embrace.[333] Xi has indirectly spoken out critically on the U.S. "strategic pivot" to Asia.[334] Relations with the U.S. soured after Donald Trump became president in 2017.[335] Since 2018, U.S. and China have been engaged in an escalatingtrade war.[336] In 2020, the relations further deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[337]
National security
Xi has devoted a large amount of work towards national security, calling for aholistic national security architecture that encompasses "all aspects of the work of the party and the country."[338] He introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."[339]: 3 A new National Security Commission was formed in 2014 with Xi at its helm, which commentators have said would help Xi consolidate over national security affairs.[340][341] Since its creation by Xi, the National Security Commission has established local security committees, focusing on dissent.[342]
Xi has championed theFengqiao experience, calling on officials to contain and resolve conflicts at the grassroots level without needing to involve higher legal bodies.[343] In the name of national security, Xi's government has passed numerous laws including acounterespionage law in 2014,[344]national security[345] and acounterterrorism law in 2015,[346] acybersecurity law[347] and a law restricting foreignNGOs in 2016,[348] anational intelligence law in 2017,[349] and adata security law in 2021.[350] Under Xi,China's mass surveillance network has dramatically grown, with comprehensive profiles being built for each citizen.[351]Grid-style social management, which involves subdividing China's counties into smaller zones, and assigning each zone to a person that reports all activity to the local government on a regular basis, has risen in prominence under Xi.[352] Public security spending has increased significantly under Xi, reaching $210 billion in 2020, more than double from the decade prior; this was accompanied by a significant decrease in crime.[353]
During his leadership, Xi has supported and pursued a greater political and economic integration ofHong Kong to mainland China, including through projects such as theHong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge.[354] He has pushed for theGreater Bay Area project, which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine other cities in Guangdong.[195][354] Xi's integration efforts have led to deeper economic links between mainland China and Hong Kong, as well as decreased freedoms and the weakening of Hong Kong's distinct identity from mainland China.[195][355]
Many of the views held by the central government and eventually implemented in Hong Kong were outlined in a white paper published by the State Council in 2014 namedThe Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which outlined that the China's central government has "comprehensive jurisdiction" over Hong Kong.[356] Under Xi, the Chinese government also declared theSino-British Joint Declaration to be legally void.[356] In August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) made adecision allowing universal suffrage for the2017 election of thechief executive of Hong Kong, also requiring the candidates to "love the country, and love Hong Kong," as well as other measures that ensured the Chinese leadership would be the ultimate decision-maker on the selection, leading toprotests,[357] and the eventual rejection of the reform bill in the Legislative Council due to a walk-out by thepro-Beijing camp to delay to vote.[358]
In the 2017 chief executive election,Carrie Lam was victorious, reportedly with the endorsement of the CCP Politburo.[359] Xi supported theHong Kong Government and Carrie Lam against the protesters in the2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, which broke out after aproposed bill that would allow extraditions to mainland China.[360] He has defended theHong Kong police's use of force, saying that "We sternly support the Hong Kong police to take forceful actions in enforcing the law, and the Hong Kong judiciary to punish in accordance with the law those who have committed violent crimes."[361] Whilevisiting Macau on 20 December 2019 as part of the 20th anniversary of its return to China, Xi warned of foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong andMacau,[362] while also hinting that Macau could be a model for Hong Kong to follow.[363]
Xi swearing in John Lee as chief executive during the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China
In 2020, the NPCSC passed anational security law in Hong Kong that dramatically expanded government clampdown over the opposition in the city; amongst the measures were the dramatic restriction on political opposition and the creation of acentral government office outside Hong Kong jurisdiction to oversee the enforcement of the law.[356] This was seen as the culmination of a long-term project under Xi to further closely integrate Hong Kong with the mainland.[356] Xi visited Hong Kong as Chinese leader in 2017 and 2022, in the 20th and 25th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong respectively.[364] Inhis 2022 visit, he swore inJohn Lee as chief executive, a former police officer that was backed by the Chinese government to expand control over the city.[365][366]
In the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi reaffirmed six of the nine principles that had been affirmed continuously since the 16th Party Congress in 2002, with the notable exception of "Placing hopes on theTaiwan people as a force to help bring aboutunification".[371] According to theBrookings Institution, Xi used stronger language on potentialTaiwan independence than his predecessors towards previous DPP governments in Taiwan. Xi said that "we will never allow any person, any organisation, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time at any form."[371]
In January 2019, Xi Jinping gave a speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of theMessage to Compatriots in Taiwan, outliningfive points proposing unification under theone country, two systems formula.[372]: 240 He called on Taiwan to reject formal independence from China, saying: "We makeno promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Those options, he said, could be used against "external interference". Xi also said that they "are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities."[373][374] President Tsai responded to the speech by saying Taiwan would not accept a one country, two systems arrangement with the mainland, while stressing the need for all cross-strait negotiations to be on a government-to-government basis.[375]
According to theHuman Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012.[376] The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre."[377] Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained.[378] He presided over the709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained.[379] His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such asXu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with theNew Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activistPu Zhiqiang of theWeiquan movement was also arrested and detained.[380]
In 2017, the local government of theJiangxi province toldChristians to replace their pictures ofJesus with Xi Jinping as part of a general campaign on unofficial churches in the country.[381][382][383] According to local social media, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party."[381] According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematicsuppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982," and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith."[384]
Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling backaffirmative action in the country by 2019,[385] and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language.[386] In 2014, Xi called to foster asense of community for the Chinese nation among ethnic minorities.[387] In 2020,Chen Xiaojiang was appointed as head of theNational Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954.[388] On 24 June 2022,Pan Yue, another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities.[389] Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]eitherHan chauvinism norlocal ethnic chauvinism is conducive to the development of a community for the Chinese nation."[390]
Xi Jinping's picture at the entrance hall of theXinjiang Museum inÜrümqi, August 2018
Following several terrorist attacks inXinjiang in 2013 and 2014, the CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution to the attacks,[391] leading to Xi to launch theStrike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnicUyghurs there.[392][393] The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people ininternment camps, mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020,[391] and a birth suppression campaign that led to a large drop in the Uyghur birth rate by 2019.[394] Human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majorityethnic Han society.[395] This program has been called a genocide by western observers, whilea report by theUN Human Rights Office said they may amount to crimes against humanity.[396][397]
Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of thepeople's democratic dictatorship" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism."[393][398] The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed aboutIslamic extremism in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment."[393] However, he also warned against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicateIslam in China, calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong."[393] Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his words have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang.[399][400]
During a four-day visit to Xinjiang in July 2022, Xi urged local officials to always listen to the people's voices[401] and to do more in preservation of ethnic minority culture.[402] He also inspected theXinjiang Production and Construction Corps and praised its "great progress" in reform and development.[403] During another visit to Xinjiang in August 2023, Xi said in a speech that the region was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more fortourism to attract domestic and foreign visitors.[404][405]
On 20 January 2020, Xi commented for the first time on the emergingCOVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan, and ordered "efforts to curb the spread" of the virus.[406] He gave premier Li Keqiang some responsibility over the COVID-19 response, in what has been suggested byThe Wall Street Journal was an attempt to potentially insulate himself from criticism if the response failed.[407] The government initially responded to the pandemic with a lockdown and censorship, with the initial response causing widespread backlash within China.[408] He met withTedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), on 28 January.[409]Der Spiegel reported that in January 2020 Xi pressured Tedros Adhanom to hold off on issuing aglobal warning about the outbreak of COVID-19 and hold back information on human-to-human transmission of the virus, allegations denied by the WHO.[410] On 5 February, Xi met with Cambodian prime ministerHun Sen in Beijing, the first foreign leader allowed into China since the outbreak.[409] After the COVID-19 outbreak got under control in Wuhan, Xi visited the city on 10 March.[411]
After getting the outbreak in Wuhan under control, Xi has favoured what has officially been termed "dynamiczero-COVID policy"[412] that aims to control and suppress the virus as much as possible within the country's borders. This has involved local lockdowns and mass-testing.[413] While initially credited for China's suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the policy was later criticized by foreign and some domestic observers for being out of touch with the rest of the world and taking a heavy toll on the economy.[413] This approach has especially come under criticism during a 2022 lockdown on Shanghai, which forced millions to their homes and damaged the city's economy,[414] denting the image ofLi Qiang, close Xi ally and Party secretary of the city.[415] Conversely, Xi has said that the policy was designed to protect people's life safety.[416] On 23 July 2022, theNational Health Commission reported that Xi and other top leaders have taken the local COVID-19 vaccines.[417]
At the 20th CCP Congress, Xi confirmed the continuation of the zero-COVID policy,[418] stating he would "unswervingly" carry out "dynamic zero-COVID" and promising to "resolutely win the battle",[419] though China started a limited easing of the policies in the following weeks.[420] In November 2022,protests broke out against China's COVID-19 policies, with afire in a high-rise apartment building in Ürümqi being the trigger.[421] The protests were held in multiple major cities, with some of the protesters demanding the end of Xi's and the CCP's rule.[421] The protests were mostly suppressed by December,[421] though the government further eased COVID-19 restrictions in the time since.[422] On 7 December 2022, China announced large-scale changes to its COVID-19 policy, including allowing quarantine at home for mild infections, reducing ofPCR testing, and decreasing the power of local officials to implement lockdowns, effectively ending the zero-COVID policy.[423]
Xi identifies environmental protection as one of China's five major priorities for national progress.[424]: 164 Xi has popularized a metaphor of "two mountains" to emphasize the importance of environmental protection.[424]: 164 The concept is that a mountain made of gold or silver is valuable, butgreen mountains with clear waters are more valuable.[424]: 164 The slogan's meaning is that economic development priorities must also provide for economic protection.[424]: 164
In September 2020, Xi announced that China will "strengthen its 2030 climate target (NDC), peak emissions before 2030 and aim to achievecarbon neutrality before 2060."[425] If accomplished, this would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2–0.3 °C – "the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker."[425] Xi mentioned the link between the COVID-19 pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the decision, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature."[426] On 27 September, Chinese scientists presented a detailed plan how to achieve the target.[427] In September 2021, Xi announced that China will not build "coal-fired power projects abroad", which was said to be potentially "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.[428] Xi Jinping did not attendCOP26 personally. However, a Chinese delegation led by climate change envoyXie Zhenhua did attend.[429][430] During the conference, the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduceGHG emission by co-operating on different measures.[431]
Governance style
Known as a very secretive leader, little is known publicly about how Xi makes political decisions, or how he came to power.[432][433] Xi's speeches generally get released months or years after they are made.[432] Xi has also never given a press conference since becoming paramount leader, except in rare joint press conferences with foreign leaders.[432][434]The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi prefers micromanaging in governance, in contrast to previous leaders such as Hu Jintao who left details of major policies to lower-ranking officials.[121] Reportedly, ministerial officials try to get Xi's attention in various ways, with some creating slide shows and audio reports.The Wall Street Journal also reported that Xi created a performance-review system in 2018 to give evaluations on officials on various measures, including loyalty.[121] According toThe Economist, Xi's orders have generally been vague, leaving lower level officials to interpret his words.[399]
Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency said that Xi "personally reviews every draft of major policy documents" and "all reports submitted to him, no matter how late in the evening, were returned with instructions the following morning."[435] With regard to behavior of Communist Party members, Xi emphasizes the "Two Musts" (members must not be arrogant or rash and must keep their hard-working spirit) and the "Six Nos" (members must say no to formalism, bureaucracy, gift-giving, luxurious birthday celebrations, hedonism, and extravagance).[436] Xi called for officials to practiceself-criticism which, according to observers, is in order to appear less corrupt and more popular among the people.[437][438][439] According to Japanese diplomatHideo Tarumi, who served as the Japanese ambassador to China, Xi has engaged in heavy process of centralization in order to maintain the legitimacy of the rule of Chinese Communist Party.[440]
A party and its authority rests on winning the hearts and minds of the people. What the public opposes and hates, we must address and resolve.
[M]aterial and cultural needs grown; demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are also increasing each day.
According toQiushi, the Chinese Dream is about Chinese prosperity, collective effort, socialism, and national glory.
Xi and CCP ideologues coined the phrase "Chinese Dream" to describe his overarching plans for China as its leader. Xi first used the phrase during a high-profile visit to theNational Museum of China on 29 November 2012, where he and hisPolitburo Standing Committee colleagues were attending a "national revival" exhibition. Since then, the phrase has become the signature political slogan of the Xi era.[442][443] The origin of the term "Chinese Dream" is unclear. While the phrase has been used before by journalists and scholars,[444] some publications have posited the term likely drew its inspiration from the concept of theAmerican Dream.[445]The Economist noted the abstract and seemingly accessible nature of the concept with no specific overarching policy stipulations may be a deliberate departure from the jargon-heavy ideologies of his predecessors.[446] Xi has linked the "Chinese Dream" with the phrase "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".[447]
Xi has intensified efforts for a revival of traditional Chinese culture.[448] He has called traditional culture the "soul" of the nation and the "foundation" of the CCP's culture.[449] He has praised the "splendid Chinese civilization", calling CCP's rule part of "the uninterrupted development of a civilization for several thousand years" which is "rarely seen among nations in the world".[450] Xi has also called for integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's traditional culture.[308] He has established the "four matters of confidence", which has later been added to the CCP constitution, calling for CCP members, government officials and the Chinese people to be "confident in our chosen path, confident in our guiding theories, confident in our political system, and confident in our culture." He has unveiled Global Civilisation initiative in 2023, calling for "respecting the diversity of civilisations, advocating the common values of humanity, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilisations, and strengthening international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation".[308]
In recent years, top political leaders of the CCP such as Xi have overseen the rehabilitation of ancient Chinese philosophical figures likeHan Fei into the mainstream of Chinese thought alongsideConfucianism. At a meeting with other officials in 2013, he quotedConfucius, saying "he who rules by virtue is like the Pole Star, it maintains its place, and the multitude of stars pay homage." While visitingShandong, the birthplace of Confucius, in November, he told scholars that the Western world was "suffering a crisis of confidence" and that the CCP has been "the loyal inheritor and promoter of China's outstandingtraditional culture."[451] According to several analysts, Xi's leadership has been characterised by a resurgence of the ancient political philosophyLegalism.[452][453][454] Han Fei gained new prominence with favourable citations; one sentence of Han Fei's that Xi quoted appeared thousands of times in official Chinese media at the local, provincial, and national levels.[454] Xi has additionally supported theNeo-Confucian philosopherWang Yangming, telling local leaders to promote him.[455] Xi has promoted initiatives to boost China's birthrate.[456] At a meeting of theAll China Women’s Federation, Xi called for "a new marriage and childbirth culture, strengthen guidance of young people's views on marriage, parenthood and family".[457]Hanfu, the traditional dress of Han Chinese, has seen a revival under him, associated with the revival of traditional culture.[458]
Xi supports a socialist artistic revival, including the promotion of patriotic art and red classics.[459]: 253 Since the18th Party Congress, Xi has emphasized utilizing red resources, telling red stories, and inheriting red genes.[460]: xii On 15 October 2014, Xi Jinping emulated theYan'an Forum with his 'Speech at the Forum on Literature and Art.'[461]: 15 Consistent with Mao's view in the Yan'an Talks, Xi believes works of art should be judged by political criteria.[461]: 16 In 2021, Xi quoted the Yan'an Talks during the opening ceremony of the 11th National Congress of theChina Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the 10th National Congress of theChinese Writers Association.[462] According to Xi, art should be judged by political criteria.[461]: 16 This view rejects the concept ofart-for-art's-sake and contends that art should serve the goal of national rejuvenation.[461]: 16 Xi criticizes market-driven art which he deems sensationalist, particularly works which "exaggerate society's dark side" for profit.[461]: 16 He ordered the arts industry to "tell China's stories and spread Chinese voices to strengthen the country's international communication capacity."[463] Xi states that Chinese writers should follow the Party's leadership, serve the cause of socialism, and "let people see the good, feel hope, [and] have dreams".[459]: 252 Xi is a proponent of the "Sinicization of Chinese religion".[464] At the19th Party Congress, Xi stated, "We will fully implement the Party's basic policy on religious affairs, uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt themselves to a socialist society."[464]
Xi has said that "only socialism can save China."[465] Xi has also declaredsocialism with Chinese characteristics to be the "only correct path to realize national rejuvenation."[466] According toBBC News, while the CCP was perceived to have abandoned its communist ideology since it initiatedeconomic reforms in the 1970s, Xi is believed by some observers to be more believing in the "idea of a communist project",[467] and was described as aMarxist–Leninist by former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd.[468] Xi's emphasis on prioritizing ideology has included re-asserting the Party's goal of eventuallyrealizing communism and reprimanding those who dismiss communism as impractical or irrelevant.[189] Xi described the communist ideal as the "calcium" in a Party member's spine, without which the Party member would suffer the "osteoporosis" of political decay and be unable to stand upright.[189]
Xi has supported stronger CCP leadership, saying "government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west –the party leads them all."[469] During the100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021, he said that "without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation," and that "the leadership of the Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes the greatest strength of this system."[470] Xi has said that "our party is so large, and our country, so huge-it is such that if the Party Central lacks the sole authority to make decisions, nothing can be achieved", comparing the Party Central to the CCP's "cerebrum" and the "central nervous system", and said it "should have the sole authority in making decisions".[471] He has called for the furtherSinicization of Marxism, referring to adaptingMarxism to the Chinese context. In July 2021, he formulated theTwo Integrations, calling for integrating Marxism with China's specific conditions and China's traditional culture.[472]
Xi has said that China, despite many setbacks, has achieved great progress under the CCP, saying that "socialism with Chinese characteristics has become the standard-bearer of 21st-century socialist development."[473] However, he has also warned that it will take a long time for China under the CCP to complete its rejuvenation, and during this timeframe, party members must be vigilant to not let CCP rule collapse.[473] Xi has spoken out against "historical nihilism", meaning historical viewpoints that challenge the official line of the CCP.[474] Xi said that one of the reasons for thecollapse of the Soviet Union has been historical nihilism.[475] Subscribing to the view that socialism will eventually triumph over capitalism, Xi has said "Marx and Engels'sanalysis of the basic contradictions ofcapitalist society is not outdated, nor is thehistorical materialist view that capitalism is bound to die out and socialism bound to win."[476] Xi has overseen the increase of "Socialist Political Economy With Chinese Characteristics" as a major study topic for academics in China, aiming to decrease the influence of Western-influenced economics.[476] Though he has called a stop to what he considers to be "disorderly expansion of capital", he has also said that "it is necessary to stimulate the vitality of capital of all types, including nonpublic capital, and give full play to its positive role."[476]
China's success proves that socialism is not dead. It is thriving. Just imagine this: had socialism failed in China, had our communist party collapsed like the party in the Soviet Union, then global socialism would lapse into a long dark age. And communism, like Karl Marx once said, would be a haunting spectre lingering in limbo.
Xi has ruled out amulti-party system for China, saying that "constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, a multi-party system and a presidential system, we considered them, tried them, but none worked."[477] However, Xi considers China to be ademocracy, saying that "China'ssocialist democracy is the most comprehensive, genuine and effective democracy."[478] China's definition of democracy is different fromliberal democracies and is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, and is based on the phrases people's democratic dictatorship anddemocratic centralism.[478] Xi has additionally coined the term whole-process people's democracy which he said was about having "the people as masters".[479] Foreign analysts and observers have widely disputed that China is a democracy, saying that it is a one-party authoritarian state and Xi an authoritarian leader.[486] Xi has sometimes referred to as "traditionalist" or "neo-authoritarian".[487][488][489] Xi has additionally rejectedWesternisation as the only way to modernize, instead promoting what he says is "Chinese-style modernisation".[490] He has identified five concepts as part of Chinese-style modernisation, including modernisation of a huge population, common prosperity, material and cultural-ethical advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and peaceful development.[491]
In September 2017, the CCP Central Committee decided that Xi's political philosophies, generally referred to as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," would become part of the Party Constitution.[492][493] Xi first made mention of the "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in his opening day speech delivered to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. His Politburo Standing Committee colleagues, in their own reviews of Xi's keynote address at the Congress, prepended the name "Xi Jinping" in front of "Thought".[494] On 24 October 2017, at its closing session, the 19th Party Congress approved the incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought into the Constitution of the CCP,[131] while in March 2018, the National People's Congress changed the state constitution to include Xi Jinping Thought.[495]
Xi himself has described the Thought as part of the broad framework created around socialism with Chinese characteristics, a term coined by Deng Xiaoping that places China in theprimary stage of socialism. In official party documentation and pronouncements by Xi's colleagues, the Thought is said to be a continuation ofMarxism–Leninism,Mao Zedong Thought,Deng Xiaoping Theory, theThree Represents, and theScientific Outlook on Development, as part of a series of guiding ideologies that embody "Marxism adopted to Chinese conditions" and contemporary considerations.[494] It has additionally been described as the "21st century Marxism" by two professors in the Central Party School of the CCP.[17]Wang Huning, a top political adviser and a close ally of Xi, has been described as pivotal to developing Xi Jinping Thought.[17] The concepts and context behind Xi Jinping Thought are elaborated in Xi'sThe Governance of China book series, published by theForeign Languages Press for an international audience. Volume one was published in September 2014, followed by volume two in November 2017.[496]Xuexi Qiangguo, an app for teaching Xi Jinping Thought had become the most popular smartphone app in China in 2019, as the CCP launched a new campaign that calls on its cadres to immerse themselves in the political doctrine every day.[497]
Xi's first marriage was toKe Lingling, the daughter ofKe Hua, China's ambassador to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. They divorced within a few years.[498] The two were said to fight "almost every day," and after the divorce, Ke moved to England.[7] In 1987, Xi married the prominent Chinese folk singer Peng Liyuan.[499] Xi and Peng were introduced by friends as many Chinese couples were in the 1980s. Xi was reputedly academic during their courtship, inquiring about singing techniques.[500] Peng Liyuan, ahousehold name in China, was better known to the public than Xi until his political elevation. The couple frequently lived apart due largely to their separate professional lives. Peng has played a much more visible role as China's "first lady" compared to her predecessors; for example, Peng hosted U.S. First LadyMichelle Obama on her high-profile visit to China in March 2014.[501] Xi and Peng have a daughter namedXi Mingze, who graduated fromHarvard University in the spring of 2015. While at Harvard, she used a pseudonym and studied Psychology and English.[502] Xi's family has a home inJade Spring Hill, a garden and residential area in north-western Beijing run by the CMC.[503]
In June 2012,Bloomberg News reported that members of Xi's extended family have substantial business interests, although there was no evidence he had intervened to assist them.[504] The Bloomberg News website was blocked inmainland China in response to the article.[505] Since Xi embarked on an anti-corruption campaign,The New York Times reported members of his family were selling their corporate and real estate investments beginning in 2012.[506] Relatives of highly placed Chinese officials, including seven current and former senior leaders of the Politburo of the CCP, have been named in thePanama Papers, includingDeng Jiagui,[507] Xi's brother-in-law. Deng had twoshell companies in theBritish Virgin Islands while Xi was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, which became dormant by the time Xi became general secretary of the CCP in November 2012.[508]
Personality
Peng described Xi as hardworking and down-to-earth: "When he comes home, I've never felt as if there's some leader in the house. In my eyes, he's just my husband."[509] In 1992,The Washington Post journalist Lena H. Sun had an interview with Xi, then CCP secretary of Fuzhou; Sun described Xi as considerably more at ease and confident than many officials his age, and said that he talked without consulting notes.[510] He was described in a 2011The Washington Post article by those who know him as "pragmatic, serious, cautious, hard-working, down to earth and low-key." He was described as a good hand at problem solving and "seemingly uninterested in the trappings of high office."[511] The Chinese state media has also cast him as a fatherly figure and a man of the people, determined to stand up for Chinese interests.[433]
Football
Xi is an avid football fan.[512] While working in Hebei, it was reported that Xi often asked his friendNie Weiping, a professionalGo player, for football tickets.[513] During a trip toIreland in 2012 as China's vice-president, Xi visitedCroke Park, the home of theGaelic Athletic Association.[512] In 2011, Xi outlined a vision to turn China from a footballing minnow to a football superpower. He outlined a three-stage plan for the national team: to qualify for anotherWorld Cup, to host a World Cup and to win a World Cup.[514] In 2015, Xi approved China's 50-point plan for the sport, which included including football in the national school curriculum and setting up 50,000 football schools in the country by 2025.[515] However, according toCNN, "poor financial decisions and alleged high-level corruption coupled with athree-year pandemic have left the sport in tatters".[514] In 2023, Xi said he is "not so sure" of the abilities of the national team.[516]
It is hard to gauge the opinion of the Chinese public on Xi, as no independent surveys exist in China and social media is heavily censored.[523] However, he is believed to be widely popular in the country.[524][525] According to a 2014 poll co-sponsored by theHarvard Kennedy School'sAsh Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Xi ranked 9 out of 10 in domestic approval ratings.[526] AYouGov poll released in July 2019 found that about 22% of people in mainland China list Xi as the person they admire the most, a plurality, although this figure was less than 5% for residents of Hong Kong.[527]
In the spring of 2019, the Pew Research Center made a survey on confidence on Xi Jinping among six-country medians based on Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and South Korea, which indicated that a median 29% have confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs, meanwhile a median of 45% have no confidence; these numbers are slightly higher than those of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (23% confidence, 53% no confidence).[528] A poll byPolitico andMorning Consult in 2021 found that 5% of Americans have a favorable opinion of Xi, 38% unfavorable, 17% no opinion and 40%, a plurality, never hearing of him.[529]
Xi, Jinping (2016).General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series. Vol. II. Beijing: People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House.ISBN9787514706284.
Xi, Jinping (2017).The Governance of China. Vol. II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.ISBN9787119111643.[535]
Xi, Jinping (2019).The Belt And Road Initiative. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.ISBN978-7119119960.
Xi, Jinping (2020).The Governance of China. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.ISBN9787119124117.
Xi, Jinping (2020).On Propaganda and Ideological Work of Communist Party. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press.ISBN9787507347791.
Xi, Jinping (2021).On History of the Communist Party of China. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press.ISBN9787507348033.
Xi, Jinping (2022).The Governance of China. Vol. IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.ISBN9787119130941.
^习近平：＂我坚信我的父亲是一个大英雄＂ [Xi Jinping: "I firmly believe my father is a great hero"] (in Chinese).State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television. 14 October 2013. Archived fromthe original on 5 March 2018. Retrieved6 March 2018.女儿习和平……在＂文化大革命＂中被迫害致死，是习仲勋难以抹去的心痛。 [His daughter Xi Heping... was persecuted to death during the "Cultural Revolution", which is a heartache that Xi Zhongxun could not erase.]
^Shi, Z. C. (2017).习近平的七年知青岁月 [Xi Jinping's Seven Years as an Educated Youth] (in Chinese). China Central Party School Press. p. [page needed].ISBN978-7-5035-6163-4. Retrieved18 August 2024.
^不忘初心：是什么造就了今天的习主席? [What Were His Original Intentions? The President Xi of Today].Youku (in Simplified Chinese). 30 January 2018.Archived from the original on 30 January 2018. Retrieved30 January 2018.
^《足迹》第1集：过＂五关＂有多难 ["Footprints" Episode 1: How difficult is it to pass the "Five Gates"].Xinhua News Agency (in Chinese). 23 May 2022.Archived from the original on 18 August 2024. Retrieved18 August 2024.
^习近平的七年知青岁月 [Xi Jinping's Seven Years as an Educated Youth].China News Service (in Chinese). 1 July 2018.Archived from the original on 18 August 2024. Retrieved18 August 2024.
^ab習近平扶貧故事 [Xi Jinping's Poverty Alleviation Story] (in Chinese). Sino United Electronic Publishing Limited. 2021. pp. 19–61.ISBN978-988-8758-27-2. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^習近平如何改變中國 [How Xi Jinping is changing China]. China Interpretation Series (in Chinese). Linghuo wenhua shiye youxiang gongsi. 2014. p. 12.ISBN978-986-5721-05-3. Retrieved23 August 2024.
^延川县志 [Yanchuan County Annals]. Shaanxi Local Chronicles Series (in Chinese). Shaanxi People's Publishing House. 1999. p. 41.ISBN978-7-224-05262-6. Retrieved23 August 2024.
^红墙内的子女们 [Children Within the Red Wall] (in Chinese). Yanbian University Press. 1998. p. 468.ISBN978-7-5634-1080-4. Retrieved23 August 2024.
^缙麓别调（三） [Jinlu Special Tune (Part 3)] (in Chinese). Chongqing daxue dianzi yinxiang chubanshe. 2021. p. 76.ISBN978-7-5689-2545-7. Retrieved23 August 2024.
^Pengpeng, Z.谜一样的人生 [A Mysterious Life] (in Chinese). Zhu Peng Peng. p. 619.ISBN978-0-9787999-2-2. Retrieved23 August 2024.
^Zhong, Wen; Zhang, Jie (2022).习近平传 [Biography of Xi Jinping] (in Chinese). Bouden House. p. 3.ISBN978-1-034-94892-6. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^ab精准扶贫的辩证法 [The Dialectics of Targeted Poverty Alleviation] (in Chinese). Xiamen University Press. 2018. p. 59.ISBN978-7-5615-6916-0. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^"习近平同志当县委书记时就被认为是栋梁之才" [Comrade Xi Jinping was considered a pillar of talent when he was the county party secretary].Xinhua News Agency (in Chinese). 8 February 2018.Archived from the original on 30 August 2024. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^决战2020：拒绝贫困 [Decisive Battle of 2020: Say No to Poverty] (in Chinese). China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House. 2016. p. 12.ISBN978-7-5162-1125-0. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^ab正定縣志 [Zhengding Chronicle] (in Chinese). China City Press. 1992. pp. 73–548.ISBN978-7-5074-0610-8. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^紅色后代 [Red Offspring] (in Chinese). Chengdu Publishing House. 1996. p. 286.ISBN978-7-80575-946-3. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^血脉总相连: 中国名人后代大寻踪 [Blood is Always Connected: Tracing the Descendants of Chinese Celebrities] (in Chinese). Beijing Yanshan Publishing House. 1993. p. 363.ISBN978-7-5402-0658-1. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^河北青年 [Hebei Youth] (in Chinese). Hebei Youth Magazine. 1984. p. 5. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^决策论 [Decision Theory] (in Chinese). Beijing Book Co. Inc. 2018. p. 141.ISBN978-7-226-05307-2. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^社会的逻辑 [The Logic of Society] (in Chinese). Peking University Press. 2017. p. 17.ISBN978-7-301-26916-9. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^ab"习近平与人民日报的10个故事" [10 stories about Xi Jinping and People's Daily].Haiwai Net (in Chinese). 15 June 2018.Archived from the original on 30 August 2024. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^ab"中共元老何載逝世 曾薦習近平「棟樑之才」" [He Zai, the veteran of the CCP, passed away. He once recommended Xi Jinping as a "pillar of talent"].China Times (in Chinese). 17 November 2023.Archived from the original on 30 August 2024. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^"104岁中共元老何载逝世 曾荐习近平"栋梁之才"" [He Zai, a 104-year-old CCP veteran, passed away. He once recommended Xi Jinping as a "pillar of talent"].Sing Tao Daily (in Chinese). 16 November 2023.Archived from the original on 30 August 2024. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^"˭谁能想到石家庄食品协会主席成了中国领导人" [Who would have thought that the chairman of Shijiazhuang Food Association would become the Chinese leader?].China National Radio (in Chinese). 23 September 2015.Archived from the original on 30 August 2024. Retrieved30 August 2024.
^Huang, Qunhui; Zhang, Qizi; et al. (2016).厦门城市治理体系和治理能力现代化研究 [Research on the modernization of Xiamen's urban governance system and governance capacity]. A series of achievements of inter-academy cooperation of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Xiamen (in Chinese).Social Sciences Literature Press. p. 9.ISBN978-7-5097-9562-0. Retrieved19 September 2024.
^"白鹭振翅 向风而行" [Egrets flap their wings and fly into the wind].Xinhua News Agency (in Chinese). 25 July 2024.Archived from the original on 24 September 2024. Retrieved19 September 2024.
^"习近平同志推动厦门经济特区建设发展的探索与实践" [Comrade Xi Jinping's exploration and practice in promoting the construction and development of Xiamen Special Economic Zone].State Council of the People's Republic of China (in Chinese). 26 May 2023. Retrieved19 September 2024.
^中国脱贫攻坚精神 [China's Spirit of Poverty Alleviation] (in Chinese). Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press. 2021. p. 74.ISBN978-7-5680-6816-1. Retrieved19 September 2024.
^Wang, Lei (25 December 2014).习近平为官之道 拎着乌纱帽干事 [Xi Jinping's Governmental Path – Carries Official Administrative Posts].Duowei News (in Simplified Chinese). Archived fromthe original on 3 February 2015. Retrieved7 September 2019.
^习近平任上海市委书记 韩正不再代理市委书记 [Xi Jinping is Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee – Han Zheng is No Longer Acting Party Secretary].Sohu (in Simplified Chinese). 24 March 2007.Archived from the original on 16 October 2007. Retrieved7 September 2019.
^从上海到北京 习近平贴身秘书只有钟绍军 [From Shanghai to Beijing, Zhong Shaojun Has Been Xi Jinping's Only Personal Secretary].Mingjing News (in Simplified Chinese). 11 July 2013.Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved12 September 2019.
^新晋政治局常委: 习近平 [Newly Appointed Member of Politburo Standing Committee: Xi Jinping].Caijing (in Simplified Chinese). 22 October 2007. Archived fromthe original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved12 September 2019.
^"全国人大常委会表决决定习近平为中华人民共和国中央军事委员会副主席" [The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress voted to appoint Xi Jinping as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China].Xinhua News Agency. 28 October 2010. Archived fromthe original on 1 December 2010. Retrieved27 October 2025.
^Lai, Jinhong (18 February 2009).習近平出訪罵老外 外交部捏冷汗 [Xi Jinping Goes and Scolds at Foreigners, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cold Sweat].United Daily News (in Simplified Chinese). Archived fromthe original on 21 February 2009. Retrieved27 February 2009.
^People's Daily, Department of Commentary (20 November 2019). "Stories of Incorrupt Government: "The Corruption and Unjustness of Officials Give Birth to the Decline of Governance"".Narrating China's Governance. Singapore: Springer Singapore. pp. 3–39.doi:10.1007/978-981-32-9178-2_1.ISBN978-981-329-177-5.
^Hou, Xiaojia (2024). "China's Shift to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping's Centralization of Political Power". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.).China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment.Leiden University Press.ISBN9789087284411.
^ab"31个省级纪委改革方案获批复 12省已完成纪委"重建"" [31 Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection Reform Plans Approved 12 Provinces Have Completed "Reconstruction"].Xinhua News Agency. 13 June 2014. Archived fromthe original on 3 July 2014. Retrieved7 January 2015.
^"把扫黑除恶专项斗争不断推向深入" [Continue to deepen the special campaign against organized crime and evil].Legal Daily. 13 October 2019. Archived fromthe original on 30 September 2020. Retrieved27 October 2020.
^Meng, Chuan (4 November 2014).习近平军中"亮剑" 新古田会议一箭多雕 [Xi Jinping And Central Army's New "Bright Sword" Conference In Gutian Killed Many Birds With Only A Single Stone].Duowei News (in Simplified Chinese).Archived from the original on 21 January 2015. Retrieved8 September 2019.
^Fisher, Richard D. Jr. (6 January 2016). "China establishes new Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force".Jane's Defence Weekly.53 (9). Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group.ISSN0265-3818.This report also quotes Chinese expert Song Zhongping saying that the Rocket Force could incorporate 'PLA sea-based missile unit[s] and air-based missile unit[s]'.
^Gong, Xiang-sheng (29 July 2022)."習近平近期對港台統戰之比較" [Comparison of Xi Jinping's recent united front works in Hong Kong and Taiwan].The Defense Security Bi-weekly (in Traditional Chinese).59. Taipei, Taiwan:Institute for National Defense and Security Research. Retrieved3 August 2022.
^Chen, Dean P. (2024). "Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP "1992 Consensus"". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.).China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment.Leiden University Press.ISBN9789087284411.
^Momen Langka! Presiden China Xi Jinping Kunjungi Kampung Muslim Uighur,Kompas TV, 19 July 2022,archived from the original on 7 March 2024, retrieved7 March 2024 – via Youtube,Selama 4 hari, Xi Jinping mengunjungi sejumlah situs di Xinjiang termasuk perkebunan kapas, zona perdagangan dan museum. Penduduk Uighur pun menyambut Presiden Xi Jinping. Dalam kunjungannya, Xi mendesak agar pejabat Xinjiang selalu mendengarkan suara rakyat demi memenangkan hati dan membuat rakyat bersatu.
^Ong Han Sean (20 November 2023)."China's Xinjiang: A marvel of wild beauty and a land full of culture and charm".The Star.Archived from the original on 20 November 2023.Our visit came on the heels of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Ürümqi, where he reportedly stressed on the positive promotion of the region to show an open and confident Xinjiang. Xi also called for Xinjiang to be opened more widely for tourism to encourage visits from domestic and foreign tourists.
^"China: How is Beijing whitewashing its Xinjiang policy?".Deutsche Welle. 11 September 2023.Archived from the original on 7 March 2024. Retrieved7 March 2024.But amid growing global attention on Xinjiang, China has been eager to portray the region as a "success story" by welcoming more tourists. In a speech that he made while visiting the region last month, Xi said Xinjiang was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more to domestic and foreign tourism.
^Liu, Xiaodong; Chen, Yu (18 September 2017).中共中央政治局召开会议 研究拟提请党的十八届七中全会讨论的文件-新华网 [The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Convened to Study the Documents to be Submitted to the Seventh Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee] (in Simplified Chinese).Xinhua News Agency.Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved4 October 2017.
^Buckley, Chris (8 February 2012)."China leader-in-waiting carries heavy political baggage to U.S."Reuters. Retrieved29 August 2022.At a 2007 dinner with the U.S. ambassador to Beijing, Xi mentioned his affection for Hollywood films, including World War II stories such as "Saving Private Ryan," according to U.S. diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks.
.jpg)
.svg)
_(cropped).jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
_02.jpg)
