William Appleman Williams | |
|---|---|
| Born | (1921-06-12)June 12, 1921 NearAtlantic, Iowa, US |
| Died | March 5, 1990(1990-03-05) (aged 68) Newport, Oregon, US |
| Academic background | |
| Alma mater | University of Wisconsin |
| Doctoral advisor | Fred Harvey Harrington |
| Other advisor | William Best Hesseltine |
| Influences | |
| Academic work | |
| Discipline | History |
| Doctoral students | |
William Appleman Williams (June 12, 1921 – March 5, 1990) was one of the 20th century's most prominentrevisionist historians of American diplomacy. He achieved the height of his influence while on the faculty of the department of history at theUniversity of Wisconsin–Madison and is considered to be the foremost member of the"Wisconsin School" of diplomatic history.[2]
Williams was born and raised in the small town ofAtlantic, Iowa. He attendedKemper Military School inBoonville, Missouri, then earned a degree inengineering at theUnited States Naval Academy inAnnapolis. He graduated and was commissioned an ensign in 1945. After serving in the South Pacific as an executive officer aboard aLanding Ship Medium, he was stationed inCorpus Christi, Texas, where he made plans to become an aviator like his father. His father had been in theArmy Air Corps until he died in a plane crash in 1929.[3]
A wartime back injury caused enormous pain and ended his chances at becoming a naval aviator after the war. He requested a medical discharge from the navy in 1946 and moved toUniversity of Wisconsin–Madison to begin graduate studies in 1947. He earned a master's degree and a PhD there and came under the influence of theBeardian historians, especiallyFred Harvey Harrington,Merle Curti, andHoward K. Beale. After teaching at various other colleges, he returned toMadison in 1957 to teach in the history department.
Williams completed his M.S. in 1948 and his Ph.D. in 1950. Subsequent additional research led to his first book, an expansion and revision of his doctoral thesis, published asAmerican-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (1952). In the meantime, Williams pursued a series of appointments. His first, toWashington and Jefferson College, came in 1950. The following academic year (1951–52) Williams taught atOhio State University, but (according to Williams) he had a faculty dispute withWoody Hayes (in his first year as football coach and, like Williams, a former naval officer) over low grades for a football player that Williams would not change, the incident apparently leading to his needing to find another appointment.[4]
In the fall of 1952, Williams took up a tenure-track appointment to theUniversity of Oregon where he would remain for five years (with a year in Madison, Wisconsin, again on a Ford Fellowship from 1955 to 1956).[5] When Fred Harvey Harrington became the chair of the history department at the University of Wisconsin in 1957, he arranged for an unusual direct appointment of Williams as his replacement in teaching U.S. foreign relations. Williams accepted the tenure-track appointment and returned to Wisconsin in the fall of 1957 and remained there until 1968.
Williams was a member of theFair Play for Cuba Committee.[6]
Graduate students found his challenges to the establishedhistoriography quite compelling and flocked to the university to study with him, regardless of their fields.[citation needed] The same year that his most influential book,The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, was published, Williams's students who were members of the campus's Socialist Club, began publication ofStudies on the Left, a manifesto of the emergingNew Left in the United States. Like Williams, its articles offered a critique of the dominant liberalism, but after it moved to offices to New York in 1963, the club reflected less of his thinking and gradually declined and expired.
Williams departed from the mainstream of U.S. historiography in the 1950s. Whereas many U.S. historians wrote the story of the United States in terms of the expansion and spread of freedom, Williams argued that the U.S. had also expanded as an empire. Williams's "central conception of American diplomacy", one critic has written, is that it was shaped "by the effort of American leaders to evade the domestic dilemmas of race and class through an escapist movement: they used world politics, he feels, to preserve a capitalist frontier safe for America's market and investment expansion". In this regard, Williams's understanding of American history owes a considerable debt toFrederick Jackson Turner and the first generation of American progressive historians. Because his history of American diplomacy pivots onJohn Hay'sOpen Door Notes to China–at around the same time as the closing of the internal American frontier–Williams's larger argument is sometimes referred to as the "Open Door thesis". InThe Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Williams described the Open Door Policy as "America's version of the liberal policy of informal empire or free trade imperialism."
Williams maintained that the United States was more responsible for theCold War than the Soviet Union.[7] Williams argued that American politicians, fearful of a loss of markets inEurope, had exaggerated the threat of world domination from the Soviet Union. Amid much criticism, Williams made no moral distinction between the foreign policy ofJoseph Stalin in Eastern Europe and the foreign policy of the United States in Latin America, Africa, or Asia. In the context of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, he went out of his way in an expanded second edition ofThe Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1962) to strongly criticize the behavior of the Soviet Union, but he noted the Kennedy Administration'sBay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba as a parallel behavior. The difference in domestic policy between Stalin's Soviet Union and American democracy, he argued, made the U.S. embrace of empire all the more "tragic."
Williams'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy is often described as one of the most influential books written on American foreign policy.Bradford Perkins, a traditionalist diplomatic historian emeritus at the University of Michigan, said this in a twenty-five-year retrospective onTragedy: "The influence of William Appleman Williams'sThe Tragedy of American Diplomacy... is beyond challenge".Tragedy brought Williams to the attention of not only academics but also American policymakers.Adolf A. Berle, a former member of FDR'sBrain Trust, was quite impressed with Williams after readingTragedy and meeting him in person in Madison asked if he would be his "personal first assistant" in the new position Berle had taken in the Kennedy Administration as the head of an interdepartmental task force on Latin America. Williams turned down the offer to serve in the Kennedy Administration and later claimed that he was glad he had because of Kennedy's sponsorship of theBay of Pigs invasion.[8]
Williams' historical success is consequent of his revisionist school of thought. His unorthodox ideology has become more recognised and celebrated since theThe Tragedy of American Diplomacy. According to a review by Richard A. Melanson,[9] focusing particularly on Williams' historiography, "his influence on a generation of American diplomatic historians has remained strong."
Williams inspired a generation of historians to re-think the Cold War and was a critic of theVietnam War. These includedGar Alperovitz,Lloyd Gardner,Patrick J. Hearden,Gabriel Kolko,Walter LaFeber, andThomas J. McCormick, who, along with Williams, argued that theVietnam War was neither democratizing nor liberating, but was an attempt to spread American dominance. He later edited a book of readings together with Gardner, LaFeber, and McCormick (who had taken his place at UW–Madison when Williams left to teach in Oregon) calledAmerica in Vietnam: A Documentary History in 1989.
During the 1960s, Williams' work became very popular among theNew Left and Williams has been called "the favorite historian of the Middle American New Left".[10] However, the Wisconsin School and the New Left were distinct, with the latter more radical in outlook.[11] Indeed Williams left the University of Wisconsin in the late 1960s in part because he disliked the militant direction that student protests were taking there.[2]
Also tiring of the grind of teaching graduate students, Williams moved to Oregon in 1968 to, in the words of his biographer,Paul Buhle, "teach undergraduates, live by the ocean, and live in a diversified community of 'ordinary' Americans".[10] While teaching atOregon State University, Williams "called for a return to theArticles of Confederation and a radical decentralization of political and economic power".[10] "Not only did he see the U.S. under the Articles as relatively anti-imperial, he also believed that the strong localism made possible under the Articles was the only form of governance suitable to real Americans living real lives".[12]
Williams served as president of theOrganization of American Historians in 1980. He retired from Oregon State University in 1988, and died inNewport, Oregon, in 1990.[13][14] Always a bit eccentric and not a little idiosyncratic, Williams gave his interpretation of the nation's past a moralistic tone, finding soul mates in conservatives likeJohn Quincy Adams andHerbert Hoover.[10] He always distrusted cosmopolitanism and championed small communities, while distrusting intellectuals who sneered at the unwashed masses. For all his radicalism, he never outgrew the kind of populist approach that he believed was an important part of the American heritage. In this sense he fit in well with his Wisconsin colleagues,William B. Hesseltine andMerrill Jensen, all of whom added to what has been called the "Wisconsin school" of historical interpretation.
To some degree, Williams's economic interpretation of American diplomacy has been criticized on the same grounds asCharles A. Beard's larger economic analysis of American history. In 1974, for instance,N. Gordon Levin Jr., compared Williams to Beard and argued that theOpen Door model "is inadequate because it insists on forcing all political-moral and strategic motivations" for American foreign policy into "the Procrustean confines" of relentless economic expansion.[15] Williams' response was that he was merely re-stating what American intellectual and political leaders said at the time.
Another serious critique of Williams's work was offered byRobert W. Tucker in 1971, followed byRobert James Maddox and J. A. Thompson in 1973,[16] and byHoward Schonberger in 1975. Tucker's arguments challenged those of Williams by arguing that United States foreign policy had been generally passive, rather than aggressive, before 1939. Tucker's arguments were elaborated and expanded later by other scholars. Maddox inThe New Left and the Origins of the Cold War criticized Williams,Lloyd Gardner, and other revisionist scholars for alleged pervasive misuse of historical source documents and for a general lack of objectivity. Williams and the others published detailed rebuttals in theNew York Times Book Review in 1973.
In 1986,Arthur Schlesinger Jr., whom Williams always distrusted for his closeness to power brokers, criticized him from a liberal perspective inThe Cycles of American History. In the 1950s, Schlesinger had accused Williams of "communist" influence, because of Williams's critique of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union inAmerican-Russian Relations and theMonthly Review article "Second Look at Mr. X", a response toGeorge F. Kennan'sForeign Affairs article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", published under the moniker Mr. X in 1947.
More recently, Marc-William Palen and Mary Speck have called into question the application of the Open Door for the American Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as during this period the United States subscribed to closed door protectionist policies at home and abroad.[17][18][19]
Williams' works and overall school of thought is evaluated and critiqued in Andrew J. Bacevich's Journal Article.[20] Bacevich brought into discussion the Vietnam anti-war movement coupled with the emergence of the 'New Left' which surprisingly disappointed Williams, insinuating that the consequences made by the American people were unavoidable issues for the future. Denouncing the applauded historian, Bacevich suggests Williams' "greatness was confined to a specific sphere." Evidently, Bacevich reviews Williams' political conscious and philosophical attributes as less celebrated.
Some of Williams' ideas about the imperial nature of American foreign policy have been revived byAndrew Bacevich, who uses them as a starting point for his own critique of U.S. policies since the end of the Cold War inAmerican Empire.
The anniversary of the publication ofTragedy in 2009 occasioned a number of retrospectives and analyses of the longer-term impact of Williams' work, and such reconsideration inevitably identified the enormous impact of his work on the field and drew parallels between Williams' work and the state of U.S. foreign relations in the years after the attacks of September 11, 2001.[21] The second edition ofMichael Hogan's edited collection of essays on postwar American foreign policy, now coedited withFrank Costigliola, noted that "Williams' work remains influential well into the twenty-first century".[22]
In 2001, Justus D. Doenecke[23] wrote a review, evaluating Williams' work, implying that the "crux of Williams's foreign policy" is within his thesis that the United States had become engaged in an "economic expansion and the creation of an informal empire." This idea of an 'American Empire' is also talked about in J.A. Thompson's 'William Appleman Williams and the 'American Empire'.[24]' Thompson echoes this school of thought, claiming that Williams' line of argument toward American Foreign Policy "has always been an expansionist, imperialist power."
