 | This articleneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Baker Plan" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(December 2006) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
| Part of a series on the |
| Western Sahara conflict |
|---|
 |
| Background |
| Regions |
| Politics |
| Clashes |
| Issues |
| Peace process |
TheBaker Plan is aUnited Nations initiative to grantself-determination toWestern Sahara initially proposed by UN special envoyJames Baker in 2000. It was intended to replace theSettlement Plan of 1991, which was further detailed in theHouston Agreement of 1997.
Western Sahara's administration byMorocco since 1975 is challenged byPolisario guerillas living in exile in neighbouringAlgeria. Since 1991, aceasefire has been in place, accepted by both parties with the understanding that the UN would organize a referendum on independence. The 1991 referendum plan was stalled, however, due to disagreements on voter eligibility. Morocco demanded the inclusion of all people now living in the territory, including all Moroccan settlers. Following the 1975Green March, the Moroccan state has sponsoredsettlement schemes enticing thousands of Moroccans to move intothe Moroccan-occupied part of Western Sahara (80% of the territory). By 2015, it was estimated that Moroccan settlers made up at least two-thirds of the500,000 inhabitants.[1]
The Polisario Front insisted on inclusion of only found in the 1974 final Spanish census and their descendants; the 1974 census had been mentioned as the basis of voter lists in the 1991 agreement. SpecializedMinurso identification teams eventually found in favor of some 80,000 voters deemed to be indigenous to the territory. That number corresponded quite closely to the Spanish census of 75,000 persons, which caused Morocco to launch appeals against the voter list on behalf of over 100,000 rejected applicants from the Moroccan side. This stalled the process, and by the late 1990s, Morocco had begun declaring the referendum a "dead option."
The first draft of the plan, calledBaker I or theFramework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara, was circulated by the UN special envoyJames Baker in 2000, but never presented formally to the Security Council. Although based on Baker's proposals, it was drafted by a Morocco-sponsored legal team.[2] It offered the people of Western Sahara autonomy within the Moroccan state. Except for defense and foreign policy, all other decisions would be the responsibility of local government. Morocco accepted the plan, but the Polisario rejected it.[3]
The second version (thePeace Plan for Self-determination of the People of Western Sahara, informally known asBaker II) envisioned Saharan self-rule under aWestern Sahara Authority for a period of five years, with a referendum on independence to follow. In this referendum, the entire present-day population of Western Sahara would participate, including people who had migrated from or been settled by Morocco post-1975, something which Polisario had so far refused. On the other hand, a provision that the interim local government (the Western Sahara Authority) would be elected only by a restricted voters' list (those identified as original inhabitants of the territory byMINURSO) alienated Morocco.
After Morocco had voiced early objections to Baker II, the Polisario front reluctantly accepted the plan as a basis for negotiations. In July 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed the plan, something that it had not done with Baker's first draft, and unanimously called for the parties to implement it. Morocco, however, then rejected the plan, saying that it would no longer agree to any referendum that included independence as an option.
After not being able to seek agreement on the Baker II plan, James Baker resigned in protest, the second UN envoy to Western Sahara to do so. He indicated that given the irreconcilable positions of the parties and the Security Council's refusal to enforcing a solution over the objections of either party, there no longer appeared to be a feasible way to implement the 1991Settlement Plan or to reach another compromise solution. While the Polisario, anxious to have a strong mediator with US backing in charge of the UN process, deplored his resignation, Moroccan officials viewed it in a positive light; foreign minister Benaissa publicly called the resignation a result of "the tenacity of Moroccan diplomacy".[4]
Since early 2005, the UNSecretary General has not referred to the plan in his reports, and by now it seems largely shelved. No replacement plan exists, however worries persist that the political vacuum will result in renewed fighting. Morocco proposed its ownautonomy proposal in 2007 as a possible solution to the Western Sahara conflict.