 | It has been suggested thatHeadwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River) bemerged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since November 2025. |
| War over Water | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theArab-Israeli conflict | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Israel |  Syria Jordan Lebanon | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Zalman ShazarLevi EshkolYitzhak Rabin | Amin al-HafizNureddin al-AtassiHusseinCharles Helou | ||||||
TheWar over Water, also known as theBattle over Water, was a series of confrontations betweenIsrael and itsArab neighbors from November 1964 to May 1967 overcontrol of water sources in theJordan Riverdrainage basin.
Following the1948 Arab–Israeli War, the1949 Armistice Agreements created threedemilitarized zones on the Israel-Syria border. The southernmost, and also the largest, stretched from the south-eastern part of theSea of Galilee eastwards to theYarmuk River where the borders of Israel,Jordan andSyria converge. The issue of water sharing from the Jordan–Yarmuk system turned out to be a major problem between Israel, Syria and Jordan.[1]
Small-scale water-related skirmishes had occurred following the 1949 agreements. In July 1953, Israel began construction of an intake for its National Water Carrier at the Daughters of Jacob Bridge in the demilitarized zone north of the Sea of Galilee. Syria protested to theUnited Nations, and Syrian artillery units opened fire on the construction site. TheUN Security Council voted to allow Israel to resume work, but this wasvetoed by theSoviet Union. The Israelis then moved the intake to an economically inferior site at the Sea of Galilee.[2]
In 1955 aUnited States-brokered deal, theJordan Valley Unified Water Plan (Johnston Plan), was accepted by the technical committees of both Israel and the Arab League, but the Arab League Council decided on 11 October 1955 not to ratify the plan. According to most observers, including US envoyEric Johnston, the Arab non-adoption of the plan was not total rejection. While they failed to approve it politically, they nevertheless seemed determined to adhere to the technical details of the agreement. Moreover, it continued to be taken seriously by Arab leaders.[3] Though the Unified Plan failed to be ratified, both Jordan and Israel undertook to operate within their allocation limits.
Israel'sNational Water Carrier project included works to pump water from theSea of Galilee. Its initial diversion capacity, without supplementary booster pumps, was 320 million m3, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan.[4]
The Arab states were not prepared to accept a project which utilized resources that didn't belong to Israel. In January 1964 anArab League summit meeting convened in Cairo and decided:
The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic, and social aspects, so that if the necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel.[5]
Pumping from the Sea of Galilee commenced in June 1964. In November 1964, the Syrian military fired on Israeli patrols around the National Water Carrier works, drawing Israeli counterattacks.[6] The Arab states accepted that they were not able to halt the Carrier scheme by direct military action, and instead formed a plan todivert the Jordan River headwaters to theYarmouk River.[4][7]
Work on the project began in 1965. The scheme was technically difficult and expensive, but if it had succeeded, it would have diverted 35% of the water that Israel intended to withdraw from the upper Jordan. Israel declared that it would regard the diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights.[4]
Border clashes ensued, with Syrian forces firing on Israeli farmers and army patrols, and Israeli tanks and artillery destroying Syrian tanks as well as earth-moving equipment used for the diversion plan.[6][7] In July 1966, theIsraeli Air Force bombed a concentration of earth-moving equipment and shot down a SyrianMiG-21.[6][7]
The Arab states abandoned the diversion effort, but conflict continued on the Israel–Syria border, including an Israeli air strike into Syrian territory in April 1967. Control ofwater resources became a significant factor behind the outbreak of theSix-Day War in June 1967.[1][4][6]
The war is referenced in the famous US antiwar 1965 song "Eve of Destruction" byBarry McGuire with the line "And even the Jordan River has bodies floatin'".[citation needed]
In July 1953, Israel began construction on the intake of its National Water Carrier at the Daughters of Jacob Bridge (Gesher B'not Ya'akov) north of the Sea of Galilee and in the demilitarized zone. Syria deployed its armed forces along the border and artillery units opened fire on the construction and engineering sites (Cooley, 1984, pp. 3 and 10). Syria also protested to the United Nations and, although a 1954 resolution for the resumption of work by Israel carried a majority, the USSR vetoed the resolution. The Israelis then moved the intake to its current site at Eshed Kinrot on the north-western shore of the Sea of Galilee (Garbell, 1965, p. 30). … In 1964 Israel began withdrawing 320 MCM/yr of Jordan water for its National Water Carrier… In 1965, the Arab states began construction of their Headwater Diversion Plan to prevent the Jordan headwaters from reaching Israel. … The Israeli army attacked the diversion works in Syria in March, May, and August of 1965. These events set off what has been called 'a prolonged chain reaction of border violence that linked directly to the events that led to the [June 1967] war' (Safran cited in Cooley, 1984, p. 16). Border incidents continued between Israel and Syria, triggering air battles in July 1966 and April 1967 and, finally, all-out war in June 1967.
Nasser, too, assured the American undersecretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnson [sic] Plan.
The initial diversion capacity of the National Water Carrier without supplementary booster pumps was 320 million m³, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan. … Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters. … According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive. … Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees. In response, Israel stressed that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan. … The Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to estimates, completion of the project would have deprived Israel of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one-ninth of Israel's annual water budget. In a series of military strikes, Israel hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the June 1967 war.
In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on its agenda was the threat posed by Israel's diversion of water from the north to irrigate the south and the expected reduction in the water supplies available to Syria and Jordan. The reaction of the summit to this threat was deadly serious. The preamble to its decisions stated, 'The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic, and social aspects, so that if the necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel.'
After Israel began pumping water from the Sea of Galilee into its National Water Carrier on June 5, 1964, Syria responded with a plan to divert the Jordan's sources into its own territory. Israel stepped up patrols in areas adjacent to the sources, around Kibbutz Dam. In November, Syrian positions fired on the patrols, drawing artillery and tank counterfire and, eventually, air power, which silenced the guns. In 1965 there were three major incidents in which IDF tanks and artillery destroyed tanks and earth-moving equipment after the Syrians fired at border patrols or farmers.
After two summit conferences in 1964, the Arab states accepted that they were not strong enough to thwart the Israeli plan by military force. They therefore chose to implement a scheme that involved the damming of the Hasbani and the Banias, and the diversion of their flow across the plateau of the Golan and into the Yarmuk. A dam was to be built on the Yarmuk to impound the additional water. The Arab states established a unified military command to deter any Israeli attack. It proved ineffective. Israel attacked construction works in Syria on a number of occasions over the next three years. By the time full-scale war broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbours in June 1967, the Arab states had already allowed their diversion plan to wither away.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link){{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)