The Wahhabi movement staunchly denounced rituals related to theveneration of Muslim saints andpilgrimages to their tombs and shrines, which were widespread amongst the people of Najd. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were highly inspired by theHanbali scholarIbn Taymiyya (1263–1328 CE/AH 661–728) who advocated a return to the purity of the first three generations (salaf) to rid Muslims ofbid'a (innovation) and regarded his works as core scholarly references in theology. While being influenced by Hanbali school, the movement repudiatedTaqlid to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya andIbn Qayyim (d. 1350 CE/AH 751).[6]
Wahhabism has been characterized by historians as "puritanical",[d] while its adherents describe it as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "puremonotheistic worship". Socio-politically, the movement represented the first majorArab-led revolt against the Turkish, Persian and foreign empires that had dominated theIslamic world since theMongol invasions and the fall ofAbbasid Caliphate in the 13th century; and would later serve as a revolutionary impetus for 19th-centurypan-Arab trends.[e] In 1744, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed apact with a local leader,Muhammad bin Saud, establishing a politico-religious alliance with theSaudi monarchy that lasted for more than 250 years. The Wahhabi movement gradually rose to prominence as an influentialanti-colonial reform trend in the Islamic world that advocated the re-generation of the social and political prowess ofMuslims. Its revolutionary themes inspired severalIslamic revivalists, scholars,pan-Islamist ideologues andanti-colonial activists as far asWest Africa.[f]
For more than two centuries, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings were championed as the official creed in thethree Saudi States. As of 2017, changes to Saudi religious policy byCrown PrinceMohammed bin Salman have led to widespread crackdowns onIslamists in Saudi Arabia and the rest of theArab world. By 2021, the waning power of the religious clerics brought about by the social, economic, political changes, and the Saudi government's promotion of a nationalist narrative that emphasizes non-Islamic components, led to what has been described as the "post-Wahhabi era" of Saudi Arabia.[g] Saudi Arabia's annual commemoration of itsfounding day on 22 February since 2022, which marked the establishment ofEmirate of Dir'iyah byMuhammad ibn Saud in 1727 and de-emphasized hispact with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1744, has led to the official "uncoupling" of the religious clergy by the Saudi state.[h]
The Arabic termWahhabi translates in English to "ofWahhab", meaning "the Bestower", which is one of thenames of God in Islam.[7] The word is primarily anexonym and was not used by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab or by his partisans, who called themselvesMuwahhidun ("the Unitarians") derived fromTawhid, the central Islamic tenet denoting the oneness of God.[8] Later, many followers adopted the termSalafi instead, ascribing themselves to the first three generations known as thesalaf.[8][9]
The designationWahhabi for this movement was likely first used bySulayman ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an ardent critic of his brother's views, who used the term in his purported treatiseFasl al-Khitab fi al-Radd ala Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.[10] The movement's political opponents widely used the term to denounce it.[11] Modern-day followers of the movement continue to reject the termWahhabi for themselves.[7]
The term"Wahhabi" should not be confused withWahbi, which is the dominant creed withinIbadism.[12]
Alongside its basic definition as an 18th century reformist/revivalist movement,[i][4] the Wahhabi movement has also been characterized as a "movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society",[4] "a conservative reform movement",[14] and a sect with a "steadfastly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the tradition ofIbn Hanbal".[15]
Supporters of the Wahhabi movement characterize it as being "pure Islam",[j] indistinct fromSalafism, and in fact "the trueSalafist movement"[17] seeking "a return to the pristine message of theProphet" and attempted to free Islam from "superimposed doctrines" and superstitions".[18] Opponents of the movement and what it stands for label it as "a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances".[19] The term"Wahhabism" has also become as a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of theQur'an andhadith".[20]
Abdallah al Obeid, the former dean of theIslamic University of Medina and member of the Saudi Consultative Council, has characterized the movement as "a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for power-sharing purposes", but not a distinct religious movement, because "it has no special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of religion that differ from the main body ofSunni Islam".[21]
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself or his followers typically refer to themselves asSalafi,Sunni orMuwahhidun.[1][2][3] The termWahhabi was probably first used bySulayman ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a staunch opponent of his brother's views until 1776 CE/AH 1190, who declared the Wahhabi movement as the personal interpretation of its leader.[22][4] Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his movement's early followers referred to themselves as"al-muwahhidun" (monotheists;[22][23]Arabic:الموحدون,lit. '"one who professes God's oneness" or "Unitarians"'[24][25][26][27] derived fromTawhid (the oneness of God).[15][28] The movement's present-day followers continue to reject the term and instead often refer to themselves asSalafi (also used by followers of other Islamic reform movements).[23]
The term "Wahhabism" has frequently been used by external parties as a sectarian[29] The term used in this manner "most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority" with the intent of "conjuring up images of Saudi Arabia" and foreign interference.[30][15][28][24][31][32][33][excessive citations] Labelling by the term"Wahhabism" has historically been expansive beyond the doctrinal followers ofMuhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, who tend to all reject the label.[1][2][3][34][k][excessive citations]
Since thecolonial period, theWahhabi epithet has been commonly invoked by various external observers to erroneously or pejoratively denote a wide range ofreform movements across theMuslim world.[35] During thecolonial era, theBritish Empire had commonly employed the term to refer to thoseMuslim scholars and thinkers seen as obstructive to their imperial interests; punishing them under various pretexts. Many Muslim rebels inspired bySufiAwliyaa (saints) andmystical orders, were targeted by theBritish Raj as part of a wider "Wahhabi" conspiracy which was portrayed as extending fromBengal toPunjab. Despite sharing little resemblance with the doctrines of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, outside observers of the Muslim world have frequently traced various religious purification campaigns across the Islamic World to Wahhabi influence.[36][37][38][39] According to Qeyamuddin Ahmed:[40]
In the eyes of the British Government, the wordWahabi was synonymous with 'traitor' and 'rebel' .... The epithet became a term of religio-political abuse.
In general, the so-calledWahhabis do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was averse to the elevation of scholars and other individuals, including using a person's name to label an Islamic school (madhhab).[30][41][42] Due to its perceived negative overtones, the members of the movement historically identified themselves as "Muwahhidun", Muslims, etc. and more recently as"Salafis".[43] According toRobert Lacey "the Wahhabis have always disliked the name customarily given to them" and preferred to be calledMuwahhidun (Unitarians).[44] Another preferred term was simply "Muslims", since they considered their creed to be the "pure Islam".[45] However, critics complain these terms imply that non-Wahhabi Muslims are either not monotheists ornot Muslims.[45][46] Additionally, the termsMuwahhidun and Unitarians are associated with other sects, both extant and extinct.[47]
Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and/or prefer includeAhl al-Hadith ("People of the Hadith"),Salafi dawah ("Salafi preaching"), oral-da'wa ila al-tawhid ("preaching of monotheism" for the school rather than the adherents),[48][9]al-Tariqa al-Salafiyya ("the way of the pious ancestors"),[9] "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh" (the sheikh being Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab), etc.[50] Their self-designation"People of the Sunnah" was important for Wahhabism's authenticity, because during the Ottoman period onlySunnism was the legitimate doctrine.[51]
Other writers such as Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term"Salafi", maintaining that "one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves asWahhabis or organizations that useWahhabi in their title, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology; even then, its use is limited and often appears asSalafi/Wahhabi)".[30] ANew York Times journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the termWahhabism, "feeling it sets them apart and contradicts the notion that Islam is a monolithic faith".[52]
Saudi KingSalman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud for example has attacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist here" [in Saudi Arabia] and challenged users of the term to locate any "deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the teachings of theQuran and PropheticHadiths".[53][54] ProfessorIngrid Mattson stated that "Wahhbism is not a sect: It is a social movement that began 200 years ago to rid Islam of rigid cultural practices that had [been] acquired over the centuries."[55] In an interview given toThe Atlantic magazine in 2018, Saudi Arabian Crown PrinceMohammed bin Salman asserted that the Western usage of the term itself has been amisnomer. Stating that the terminology itself is indefinable, Mohammed bin Salman said: "When people speak of Wahhabism, they don't know exactly what they are talking about."[56]
On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security andLibrary of Congress the term is now commonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd,[57] a region often called the "heartland" of Wahhabism.[58] Journalist Karen House callsSalafi "a more politically correct term" forWahhabi.[59] In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the ChristianQuakers, Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors".[44] However, the confusion is further aggravated due to the common practice of various authoritarian governments broadly using the label"Wahhabi extremists" for all opposition, legitimate and illegitimate, to justify massive repressions on any dissident.[60]
Another movement, whose adherents are also called"Wahhabi" but whom wereIbaadiKharijites, has caused some confusion in North and sub-Saharan Africa, where the movement's leader –Abd al-Wahhab ibn Abd al-Rahman – lived and preached in the eighth centuryCE. This movement is often mistakenly conflated with theMuwahhidun movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.[61]
There is considerable confusion between Wahhabism andSalafism, but many scholars and critics draw clear distinctions between the two terms. According to analyst Christopher M. Blanchard, Wahhabism refers to "a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia", while Salafism is "a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed independently at various times and in various places in the Islamic world".[41] However, many view Wahhabism as the Salafism native to Arabia.[62] Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, allWahhabis aresalafists, but not allsalafists areWahhabis."[17] Quintan Wiktorowicz asserts modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis.[63]
According to Joas Wagemakers, associate professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies atUtrecht University,Salafism consists of broad movements ofMuslims across the world who aspire to live according to the precedents of theSalaf al-Salih; whereas"Wahhabism" – a term rejected by its adherents – refers to the specific brand of reformation (islah) campaign that was initiated by the 18th century scholarMuhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and evolved through his subsequent disciples in the central Arabian region of Najd.[l] Despite their relations with Wahhabi Muslims of Najd; other Salafis have often differed theologically with the Wahhabis and hence do not identify with them. These included significant contentions with Wahhabis over their unduly harsh enforcement of their beliefs, their lack of tolerance towards other Muslims and their deficient commitment to their stated opposition totaqlid and advocacy ofijtihad.[64]
In doctrines of'Aqida (creed), Wahhabis and Salafis resemble each other; particularly in their focus onTawhid. However, theMuwahidun movement historically were concerned primarily aboutTawhid al-Rububiyya (Oneness of Lordship) andTawhid al-Uloohiyya (Oneness of Worship) while theSalafiyya movement placed an additional emphasis onTawhid al-Asma wa Sifat (Oneness of Divine Names and Attributes); with a literal understanding of God's Names and Attributes.[65]
The Wahhabi movement started as arevivalist andreform movement in theArabian Peninsula during the early 18th century, whose adherents described themselves as "Muwahhidun" (Unitarians).[m] A young Hanbali cleric namedMuhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792 CE/AH 1115–1206), the leader of theMuwahhidun and eponym of the Wahhabi movement,[n] called upon his disciples to denounce certain beliefs and practices associated withSufi orders as idolatrous impurities and innovations in Islam (bid'ah).[67][28] His movement emphasized adherence to theQuran andhadith, and advocated the use ofijtihad.[66] Eventually, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhabformed a pact with a local leader,Muhammad bin Saud,[69] offering political obedience and promising that protection and propagation of the Wahhabi movement meant "power and glory" and rule of "lands and men".[69]
18th and 19th century Europeanhistorians, scholars, travellers anddiplomats compared the Wahhabi movement with various Euro-American socio-political movements in theAge of Revolutions.Calvinist scholarJohn Ludwig Burckhardt, author of the well-received works "Travels in Arabia" (1829) and "Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys" (1830), described theMuwahhidun as Arabian locals who resisted Turkish hegemony and its "Napoleonic" tactics. Historian Loius Alexander Corancez in his book "Histoire des Wahabis" described the movement as anAsiatic revolution that sought a powerful revival ofArab civilisation by establishing a new order in Arabia and cleansing all the irrational elements and superstitions which had been normalised throughSufi excesses from Turkish and foreign influences.Scottish historianMark Napier attributed the successes of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's revolution to assistance from "frequent interpositions of Heaven".[70]
After theUnification of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabis were able spread their political power and consolidate their rule over the Islamic holy cities ofMecca andMedina. After the discovery of petroleum near thePersian Gulf in 1939, Saudi Arabia had access to oil export revenues, revenue that grew to billions of dollars. This money – spent on books, media, schools, universities, mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for journalists, academics andIslamic scholars – gave Wahhabi ideals a "preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world.[71]
The Wahhabi movement was part of theIslamic revivalist trends of the 18th and 19th centuries; such as theMahdist movement in 19th centurySudan,Senussi movement inLibya,Fulani movement ofUthman Dan Fodio inNigeria,Faraizi movement ofHaji Shariatullah (1784–1840) inBengal, the South AsianMujahidin movement ofSayyid Ahmed Barelvi (1786–1831) and thePadri movement (1803–1837) inIndonesia, all of which are considered precursors to the ArabSalafiyya movement of late nineteenth century. These movements sought anIslamic Reform,renewal and socio-moral re-generation of the society through a direct return to the fundamental Islamic sources (Qur'an andHadith) and responded to the military, economic, social, moral, cultural stagnation of theIslamic World. The cause of decline was identified as the departure of Muslims from the Islamic values of the early Muslims during the era of theSalaf, brought about by the infiltration and assimilation of local and un-Islamic beliefs and practices. The prescribed cure for Muslim societies was therefore a return to "true Islam".[72]
Kadizadeli (alsoQādīzādali) was a seventeenth-century puritanical fundamentalist religious movement in theOttoman Empire that followedKadızade Mehmed (1582–1635), a revivalist Islamic preacher. Kadızade and his followers were determined rivals ofSufism andpopular religion. They condemned many of the Ottoman practices that Kadızade felt werebidʻah "non-Islamic innovations", and passionately supported "reviving the beliefs and practices of the first Muslim generation in the first/seventh century" ("enjoining good and forbidding wrong").[73]
Driven by zealous and fiery rhetoric, Kadızade Mehmed was able to inspire many followers to join in his cause and rid themselves of any and all corruption found inside theOttoman Empire. Leaders of the movement held official positions as preachers in the major mosques of Baghdad, and "combined popular followings with support from within the Ottoman state apparatus".[74] Between 1630 and 1680 there were many violent quarrels that occurred between the Kadızadelis and those that they disapproved of. As the movement progressed, activists became "increasingly violent" and Kadızadelis were known to enter "mosques,tekkes andOttoman coffeehouses in order to mete out punishments to those contravening their version of orthodoxy."
The Wahhabi movement was part of the overall current of various Islamic revivalist trends in the 18th century. It would be influenced by and in turn, influence many other Islamic reform-revivalist movements across the globe. TheAhl-i Hadith movement ofIndian subcontinent was a Sunni revivalist movement inspired by the thoughts ofShah Waliullah Dehlawi,al-Shawkani, andSyed Ahmad Barelvi. They condemnedtaqlid and advocatedijtihad based on scriptures.[75] Founded in the mid-19th century inBhopal, it places great emphasis on hadith studies and condemns imitation to the canonical law schools. They identify with the early school ofAhl al-Hadith. During the late 19th century, Wahhabi scholars would establish contacts with Ahl-i-Hadith and many Wahhabi students would study under the Ahl-i-Hadithulama, and later become prominent scholars in theSaudi Wahhabi establishment.[76][77]
The Wahhabi and Ahl-i-Hadith movements both opposeSufi practices such as visiting shrines and seeking aid at the tombs ofIslamic saints. Both the movements revived the teachings of the medieval Sunni theologian and jurist, Ibn Taymiyya,[o] whom they both consider aShaykh al-Islam. Suffering from the instabilities of 19th-century Arabia, many Wahhabiulama would make their way to India and study under Ahl-i-Hadith patronage.[76][78] After the establishment ofSaudi Arabia and the subsequentoil boom, the Saudi Sheikhs would repay their debts by financing the Ahl-i-Hadith movement. TheGrand Mufti of Saudi ArabiaIbn Baz strongly supported the movement, and prominent Ahl-i-Hadith scholars were appointed to teach in Saudi Universities.[79][80]
Salafi scholarMuhammad Rashid Rida (Arabic:محمد رشيد رضا; AH 1282–1354) made vital contributions in the rehabilitation of Wahhabism across theArab World during the early 20th-century
During the early 19th century, Egyptian Muslim scholaral-Jabarti had defended the Wahhabi movement. From the 19th century, prominent ArabSalafiyya reformers would maintain correspondence with Wahhabis and defend them against Sufi attacks. These includedShihab al Din al Alusi, Abd al Hamid al Zahrawi, Abd al Qadir al Jabarti, Abd al Hakim al Afghani, Nu'man Khayr al-Din Al-Alusi, Mahmud Shukri Al Alusi and his discipleMuhammad Bahjat al-Athari,Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi,Tahir al-Jaza'iri [fr],Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Muhammad Hamid al Fiqi and most notably,Muhammad Rasheed Rida who was considered as the "leader of Salafis". All these scholars would correspond with Arabian and IndianAhl-i-Hadith scholars and champion the reformist thought. They shared a common interest in opposing various Sufi practices, denouncing blind following and reviving correct theology andHadith sciences. They also openedZahiriyya library, Salafiyya library,Al Manar Library, etc., propagating Salafi thought as well as promoting scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Hazm. Rashid Rida would succeed in his efforts to rehabilitate Wahhabis in the Islamic World and would attain the friendship of many Najdi scholars. With the support of theThird Saudi State by the 1920s, a concept of"Salafiyya" emerged on a global scale claiming heritage to the thought of 18th-century Islamic reform movements and the pious predecessors (Salaf). Many of Rida's disciples would be assigned to various posts in Saudi Arabia and some of them would remain in Saudi Arabia. Others would spread theSalafi da'wa to their respective countries. Prominent amongst these disciples were the Syrian Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (1894–1976), Egyptian Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi (1892–1959) and the MoroccanTaqi al-Din al-Hilali (1894–1987).[81][82][83][84]
TheSyrian-Albanian Islamic scholarAl-Albani (c. 1914–1999), an avid reader ofAl-Manar and also student of Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (disciple of Rida and Al-Qasimi), was an adherent to theSalafiyya methodology. Encouraged by their call for hadith re-evaluation and revival, he would invest himself inHadith studies, becoming a renownedMuhaddith. He followed in the footsteps of the ancientAhl al-Hadith school and took the call ofAhl-i-Hadith. In the 1960s, he would teach in Saudi Arabia making a profound influence therein. By the 1970s, Albani's thoughts would gain popularity and the notion of "Salafi Manhaj" was consolidated.[85]
OriginalSalafiyya and its intellectual heritage were not hostile to competing Islamic legal traditions. However, critics argue that as Salafis aligned with Saudi promoted neo-Wahhabism, religious concessions for Saudi political patronage distrted the early thrust of the renaissance movement. The earlySalafiyya leaders likeMuhammad ibn 'Ali al-Shawkani (d. 1835 CE/AH 1250), Ibn al-Amir Al-San'ani (d. 1810 CE/AH 1225),Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935 CE/AH 1354), etc. advocatedIjtihad (independent legal research) of Scriptures to solve the new contemporary demands and problems faced by Muslims living in a modern age through a pragmatic,juristic path faithful to the rich Islamic tradition. However, as other Salafi movements got increasingly sidelined by the Saudi-backed neo-WahhabiPurists; the legal writings that were made easily accessible to the general public became often rigidly literalist and intolerant of the wider Sunni legal tradition, limited to a selective understanding of the Hanbalite works of Ibn Taymiyya andIbn Qayyim.[86][87]
TheSyrian-Albanian SalafiMuhaddithMuhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) publicly challenged the foundational methodologies of the neo-Wahhabite establishment. According to Albani, although Wahhabis doctrinally professed exclusive adherence to theQur'an, theHadith, and theIjma ofSalaf al-salih; in practice they almost solely relied on Hanbali jurisprudence for theirfatwas—acting therefore as undeclared partisans of a particularmadhab. As the most prominent scholar who championed anti-madhab doctrines in the 20th century, Albani held that adherence to a madhab was abid'ah (religious innovation). Albani went as far as to castigate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as a "Salafi in creed, but not inFiqh". He strongly attacked Ibn Abd al-Wahhab on several points; claiming that the latter was not amujtahid infiqh and accused him of imitating the Hanbali school. Albani's outspoken criticism embarrassed the Saudi clergy, who finally expelled him from the Kingdom in 1963 when he issued afatwa permitting women to uncover their face, which ran counter to Hanbali jurisprudence and Saudi standards.[88][89][90][91][92]
In addition, Albani would also criticise Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab for his weakness inhadith sciences. He distinguished betweenSalafism and Wahhabism, criticizing the latter while supporting the former. He had a complex relationship to each movement. Although he praised Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in general terms for his reformist efforts and contributions to the MuslimUmmah, Albani nonetheless censured his later followers for their harshness inTakfir.[93]: 68 : 220
In spite of this, Albani's efforts athadith revivalism and his claims of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself; made the former's ideas highly popular amongst Salafi religious students across the World, including Saudi Arabia.[88][92]
Intheology, Wahhabism is closely aligned with theAthari (traditionalist) school which represents the prevalent theological position of the Hanbalilegal school.[94][95] Athari theology is characterized by reliance on thezahir (apparent or literal) meaning of theQur'an andhadith, and opposition to rational argumentation in matters of'Aqidah (creed) favored byAsh'arite andMaturidite theologies.[96][97] However, Wahhabis diverged in some points of theology from other Athari movements.[98]Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab did not view the issue of God's Attributes and Names as a part ofTawhīd (monotheism), rather he viewed it in the broader context ofaqāʾid (theology). While his treatises strongly emphasisedTawhid al-ulūhiyya (monotheism in Worship), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not give prominence to the theology of God's Names and Attributes that was central to Ibn Taymiyya and the Salafi movement.[99] Following this approach, the early Wahhabi scholars had not elucidated the details ofAthari theology such as Divine Attributes and other creedal doctrines. Influenced by the scholars of theSalafiyya movement, the later Wahhabis would revive Athari theological polemics beginning from the mid-twentieth century; which lead to charges of anthropomorphism against them by opponents such asAl-Kawthari. By contrast, the creedal treatises of early Wahhabis were mostly restricted to upholding Tawhid and condemning various practices of saint veneration which they considered asshirk (polytheism).[100] They also staunchly opposedTaqlid and advocatedIjtihad.[101]
Hammad Ibn 'Atiq (d. 1883 CE/AH 1301) was one of the first Wahhabi scholars who seriously concerned himself with the question of God's Names and Attributes; a topic largely neglected by the previous Wahhabi scholars whose primary focus was limited to condemningidolatry and necrolatry. Ibn 'Atiq established correspondence withAthari scholars like Sīddïq Hasān Khán, an influential scholar of theAhl al-Hadith movement in the Islamic principality ofBhopal. In his letters, Ibn 'Atiq praisedNayl al-Maram, Khan's Salafi commentary onQur'an, which was published via prints inCairo. He solicited Khan to accept his son as his disciple and requested Khan to produce and send more commentaries on the various treatises of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. Khan accepted his request and embarked on a detailed study of the treatises of both the scholars. Hammad's son Sa'd ibn Atiq would study under Khan and varioustraditionalist theologians in India. Thus, various Wahhabi scholars began making efforts to appropriate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's legacy into mainstream Sunni Islam by appropriating them to the broader traditionalist scholarship active across theIndian subcontinent,Iraq,Syria,Egypt,Yemen, etc.[102]
David Commins describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching as being that "Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether." This put Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of those Muslims who argued that the "shahada" (i.e., the testimony of faith; "There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") alone made one a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and performance of other obligatory rituals rendered them "a sinner", but "not an unbeliever."[104]
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.
In Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book calledKitab al-Tawhid, he states that'Ibādah (Worship) in Islam consists of conventional acts of devotion such as the five daily prayers (salat); fasting for the holy month ofRamadan (Sawm);Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Isti'âna (seeking help), and Istigātha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Directing these deeds beyond Allah – such as throughdu'a orIstigāthā to the dead – are acts ofshirk and in violation of the tenets ofTawhid (monotheism).[105][106] Based on the doctrine ofTawhid espoused inKitab al-Tawhid, the followers of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab referred themselves by the designation "Al-Muwahhidun" (Unitarians).[107][108]
The essence ofIbn 'Abd al-Wahhab's justification for fighting his opponents in Arabia can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans fought by Muhammad "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that they performed sacrifices, vows and supplications to other beings. According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, someone who perform such things even if their lives are otherwise exemplary; is not aMuslim but an unbeliever. Once such people have received the call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit.[109][110] Clarifying his stance onTakfir, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab states:[111]
As fortakfir, I only maketakfir of whoever knows the religion of theMessenger and thereafter insults it, forbids people from it, and manifests enmity towards whoever practices it. This is who I maketakfir of. And most of the ummah, and all praise is for God, is not like this... We do not make takfeer except on those matters which all of theūlemá have reached aconsensus on.
The disagreement between Wahhabis and their opponents over the definition of worship (Ibadah) and monotheism (Tawhid) has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins: "One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature... the main points in the debate [have] stay[ed] the same [since 1740]."[104] According to another source, Wahhabi jurists were unique for their literal interpretation of theQur'an andSunnah which tended to re-inforce local practices of the region of Najd.[112] Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed.[113][114]
The Wahhabi scholars upheld the right of qualified scholars to performIjtihad on legal questions and condemnedTaqleed ofMujtahids. This stance pitted them against theOttomanSufiulema who shunnedIjtihad and obligatedTaqleed. The ArabSalafiyya reformers of 19th and 20th centuries would defend the Wahhabis on theIjtihad issue as well as join forces with Wahhabis to condemn various Sufi practices and orders (tariqats) which they considered to be reprehensibleBid'ah (innovations). Prominent amongst thoseSalafiyyaulema who backed Wahhabism included Khayr al-Din al-Alusi,Tahir al-Jaza'iri,Muhammad Rashid Rida,Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, etc.[115]
Condemning the doctrine of blind-following (Taqlid) prevalent amongst the masses and obliging them to directly engage with the Scriptures;Sulāyman ibn Ābd-Allah Aal-Shaykh (1785–1818 CE/AH 1199–1233) wrote:[116]
... what the believer must do, if the Book of Allah and theSunnah of His Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) have reached him and he understands them with regard to any matter, is to act in accordance with them, no matter who he may be disagreeing with. This is what our Lord and our Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) have enjoined upon us, and all the scholars are unanimously agreed on that, apart from the ignorant blind followers and the hard-hearted. Such people are not scholars.
The Wahhabis furthermore rejected the idea of closure ofIjtihad as an innovated principle. Although they professed adherence to Hanbali school, they refrained from taking its precepts as final. Since the issue ofIjtihad andTaqlid was amongst their principal concerns, Wahhabis developed a set of juristic procedures to solve legal questions. These included referencingQur'an andHadith as the primary sources of legislation. In case the solution was not accessible from the Scriptures, the principle of'Ijma (consensus) was employed.Ijma was restricted toAhl al-Sunnah and consisted of consensus ofCompanions of the Prophet,Salaf as-Salih and the consensus of scholars. If any Hanbali interpretations were proven wrong through these principles, they must be abandoned. Defending their pro-Ijtihad stance, Wahhabis quoted Qur'anic verses which implied that only Qur'an and Hadith constituted the bases ofsharia (Islamic law).[117][118] Prominent WahhabiQadi of theSecond Saudi State, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn HasanAal-Al Shaykh (1782–1868 CE/AH 1196–1285) strongly condemned the practice oftaqlid as a form ofshirk (polytheism) in his treatises, writing:[119]
One who asks for areligious verdict concerning an issue, he should examine the sayings and opinions of theImams and scholars and take only what complies with Allah's Rulings and the teachings of His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Allah, the Almighty says, "O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger ... and those of you [Muslims] who are in authority. [And] if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger" ... (Surah An-Nisa': 59) Thus, it is forbidden to prefer the opinion of any of Allah's creatures over theSunnah of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) and this is because to do so is an act ofshirk (polytheism); since it constitutes obedience to other than Allah (Glorified be He).
The Wahhabis also advocated a principle in Islamic legal theory often referred to as "the rule againstIjtihad reversal". This principle allows overturning a scholar'sfatwa (legal judgement) when he bases it on personalIjtihad (personal legal reasoning), rather than a clear textual source fromQur'an andHadith. In effect, this allowed the Wahhabiqadis to remain autonomous. Opponents of Wahhabi movement harshly rebuked them for advocatingIjtihad and not recognising the finality ofmad'habs (law schools).[120]
As areligious revivalist movement that works to bringMuslims back from what it considers as foreign accretions that have corrupted Islam,[121] and believes that Islam is a complete way of life which has prescriptions for all aspects of life, Wahhabism is quite strict in what it considers Islamic behavior. TheMuwahhidun movement has been described byThe Economist as the "strictest form of Sunni Islam".[122] On the other hand, religious critics assert that Wahhabism is not strict, castigating it as a distorted version of Islam that deviates from traditionalShari'a law, and argue that their practices are neither typical nor mired in the roots of Islam.[123][124] Unlike other schools of Sunnism, Wahhabis admonishes to ground Islamic principles solely on theQur'an andHadith,[125] rejecting much material derived within Islamic culture.
Photo of a marketplace in the town ofAl-Hasa c. 1922
This does not mean, however, that all adherents agree on what is required orforbidden, or that rules have not varied by area or changed over time. In Saudi Arabia, the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi doctrines were visible as late as the 1990s; such as the conformity in dress, public deportment, public prayers.[126] Its presence was visible by the wide freedom of action of the "religious police", clerics inmosques, teachers in schools, andQadis (i.e. judges who are religious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.[127]
Wahhabism is noted for its policy of "compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers", and for "enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere".[128] According to theAmerican journalistLawrence Wright, due to Wahhabi emphasis on the "purification of Islam"; the teaching becomes very repressive to the followers.[129]
While otherMuslims might urgesalat prayer, modest dress, and abstention from alcohol, for Wahhabis, prayer "that is punctual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men." Not only is modest dress prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by women (a blackabaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified. Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco".[57] While being influenced by Hanbali doctrines, the movement repudiatedTaqlid to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya andIbn Qayyim (d. 1350 CE/AH 751).[6]
Following the preaching and practice of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following ofsharia (Islamic law), anofficial committee was empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so-called "religious police")[128][130] in Saudi Arabia – the one country founded with the help of Wahhabi warriors and whose scholars and pious citizens dominated many aspects of the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforce strict closing of shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and other social restrictions.[131]
A large number of practices was reported to be forbidden by Saudi Wahhabi officials, preachers or religious police. Practices that have been forbidden asBid'a (innovation) or shirk (polytheism) and sometimes "punished by flogging" during Wahhabi history include performing or listening to music; dancing;fortune telling;amulets; non-religious television programs; smoking; playingbackgammon,chess, orcards; drawing human or animal figures; acting in a play or writing fiction; dissectingcadavers, even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of medical research; recorded music played over telephones on hold; or the sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in the hospital.[132][133][134][135][136][137] Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam include listening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting tombs (including the tomb of Muhammad), celebratingmawlid (birthday of the Prophet),[138] the use of ornamentation on or in mosques, all of which is considered orthodoxy in the rest of the Islamic world.[139] Until 2018, driving of motor vehicles by women was allowed in every country except the Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia.[140] Certain forms of Dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strictTaliban, is sometimes discouraged by Wahhabis.[141]
Wahhabism also emphasizes "Thaqafah Islamiyyah" orIslamic culture and the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices and non-Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,[142][143] on the grounds that theSunnah forbids imitating non-Muslims.[144] Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimes simply condemned by Wahhabi preachers as un-Islamic, include celebrating foreign days (such asValentine's Day[145] orMothers Day[142][144]) giving of flowers,[146] standing up in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs.[136] Some Wahhabi activists have warned against taking non-Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on their holidays.[52]
Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists go further than the official Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin.Juhayman al Utaybi declaredfootball forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non-Muslim, foreign practice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the foreign non-Muslim language used in matches.[147][148] In response, the SaudiGrand Mufti rebuked suchfatwas and called on the religious police to prosecute its author.[149]
According to senior Saudi scholars, Islam forbids the traveling or working outside the home by a woman without their husband's permission – permission which may be revoked at any time – on the grounds that the different physiological structures and biological functions of the two sexes mean that each is assigned a distinctive role to play in the family.[150] Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished with flogging,[151]
Despite this strictness, throughout these years senior Saudi scholars in the kingdom made exceptions in ruling on what isharam (forbidden). Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king needed them to confrontSaddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not atKing Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Until 2018, movie theaters and driving by women were forbidden, except at theARAMCO compound in eastern Saudi, populated by workers for the company that provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made at KAUST were also in effect at ARAMCO.[152]
More general rules of permissiveness changed over time.Abdulaziz Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabi doctrines and practices "in a progressively gentler form" as his early 20th-century conquests expanded his state into urban areas, especially theHejaz.[128] After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia allowed the use of paper money (in 1951), theabolition of slavery (in 1962), education of females (1964), and use of television (1965).[153] Music, the sound of which once might have led tosummary execution, is now commonly heard on Saudi radios.[128] Minarets formosques and use of funeral markers, which were once forbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance, which was once enforced by flogging, is no longer.[154]
The uniformity of dress among men and women in Saudi Arabia (compared to otherMuslim countries in the Middle East) has been called by Arthur G Sharp as a "striking example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society", and an example of the Wahhabi belief that "outward appearances and expressions are directly connected to one's inward state."[139]
A "badge" of a particularly pious Wahhabi man is a robe too short to cover the ankle, an untrimmed beard,[155] and no cord (Agal) to hold the head scarf in place.[156] The warriors of the WahhabiIkhwan religious militia wore a white turban in place of anagal.[157]
Da'wah Wahhabiyya, or the Wahhabi mission, is the idea of spreading Wahhabism throughout the world.[158] Tens of billions of dollars have been spent by the Saudi government and charities on mosques, schools, education materials, scholarships, throughout the world to promote the Wahhabi influences. Tens of thousands of volunteers[159] and several billion dollars also went in support of the jihad against the atheist communist regime governing Afghanistan.[160]
Adherents to the Wahhabi movement identify asSunni Muslims.[161] The primary Wahhabi doctrine is affirmation of the uniqueness and unity ofGod (Tawhid),[28][162] and opposition toshirk (violation of tawhid – "the one unforgivable sin", according to Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab).[163] They call for adherence to the beliefs and practices of theSalaf al-Salih (exemplary early Muslims). They strongly oppose what they consider to be heterodox doctrines, particularly those held by theSufi andShiite traditions,[164] such as beliefs and practices associated with the veneration ofProphets andsaints. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab associated such practices with the culture ofTaqlid (imitation to established customs) adored by pagan-cults of theJahiliyya period.[165] The movement emphasized reliance on the literal meaning of theQuran andhadith, rejecting rationalistic theology (kalam). Adherents of Wahhabism are favourable to derivation of new legal rulings (ijtihad) so long as it is true to the essence of the Quran, Sunnah and understanding of thesalaf, and they do not regard this asbid'ah (innovation).[166]
Muwahhidun (Wahhabi) movement is highly influenced by the doctrines of the classical Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE/AH 728)
The movement is heavily influenced by the works of thirteenth-century Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya who rejectedKalam theology; and his discipleIbn Qayyim who elaborated Ibn Taymiyya's ideals. Ibn Taymiyya's priority of ethics and worship over metaphysics, in particular, is readily accepted by Wahhäbis.[167][168] Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was a dedicated reader and student of Ibn Taymiyya's works, such asAl-Aqidah Al-Wasitiyya,Al-Siyasa Al-Shar'iyya,Minhaj al-Sunna and his various treatises attacking the cult of saints and certain forms of Sufism. Expressing great respect and admiration for Ibn Taymiyya; Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab wrote:[169]
I know of no one, who stands ahead of Ibn Taymiyya, after the Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal in the science of interpretation and the hadith
According to various sources – scholars,[128][170][171][172][173][174]former Saudi students,[175] Arabic-speaking/reading teachers who have had access to Saudi text books,[176]and journalists[177] Ibn `Abd al Wahhab preached and his successors preach that theirs is the one true form of Islam. According to the doctrine known asal-wala` wa al-bara` (literally, "loyalty and disassociation"), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was "imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible and unequivocal".[178]Even as late as 2003, entire pages in Saudi textbooks were devoted to explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism were deviation.[176] Shia critic Hamid Algar argued in 2002 that Saudi government had "discreetly concealed" this view from other Muslims "over the years" in order to depict itself as the defender of "Muslim interests".[171][179]
In a reply dated 2003, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied the above allegations", including claims that "their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education."[41]
Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab defined armedjihad as a sacred endeavour that must have a valid religious justification and which can only be declared by anImam. The purpose of combat was to safeguard the community from the aggression and military attacks by various external threats.[180][181] While early methods of his reformist efforts were based on preaching and educational efforts; state consolidation project ofEmirate of Diriyah resulted in military conflicts with rival tribal chiefs. As a senior scholar, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab closely advised EmirMuhammad ibn Saud on military tactics; convincing him to pursue a largely defensive strategy and enjoining him to adhere toIslamic rules of warfare. The Emirate's soldiers were rigorously forbidden from launching attacks targeting women, children and non-combatant civilians.[181]
Throughout his letters and treatises, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb maintained that the military campaigns of theEmirate of Dirʿiyya were strictly defensive and rebuked his opponents as being the first to initiateTakfir.[182] Justifying the Wahhabi military campaigns as defensive operations against their enemies, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab asserts:[182][183]
As for warfare, until today, we did not fight anyone, except in defense of our lives and honor. They came to us in our area and did not spare any effort in fighting us. We only initiated fighting against some of them in retaliation for their continued aggression, [The recompense for an evil is an evil like thereof] (42:40)... they are the ones who started declaring us to be unbelievers and fighting us
This defensive approach to warfare largely got abandoned after Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's retirement in 1773. EmirAbdulaziz, Muhammad ibn Saud's son and successor, was an advocate of expansionist policy and launched offensive military campaigns.[181] The excesses reported to have committed by soldiers ofEmirate of Diriyah were regularly rebuked by the traditional WahhabiAal al-Shaykhs (descendants of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab) who took care to condemn and religiously delegitimisewar crimes. Condemning the military excesses committed during the Wahhabi conquest of Mecca in 1218–1803,Abdullah ibn MuhammadAal Ash-Shaykh (1751–1829 CE/AH 1164–1244) stated:[184]
As for the fact that some Bedouins destroyed books belonging to the people ofTa'if it was committed by the ignorant, who were admonished, along with others, from repeating this and similar actions. The stance that we take is that we do not takeArabs as captives and will not practice that in the future. We did not initiate hostilities againstnon-Arabs either, and we do not agree to killing of women and children.
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered some beliefs and practices of theShia to violate the doctrine of monotheism.[185] DeLong-Bas maintains that when Ibn Abd al-Wahhab denounced theRafidah, he was not using a derogatory name for Shia but denouncing "an extremist sect" within Shiism who call themselvesRafidah. He criticized them for assigning greater authority to their current leaders than toMuhammad in interpreting theQur'an andsharia, and for denying the validity of the consensus ('Ijma) of the early Muslim community.[185] In his treatise "Risalah fi al-radd ala al-Rafidah" (Treatise/Letter on the Denial/Rejection Pertaining to the Rafidah), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab addressed thirty-two topics on points of both theology and law refuting theRaafida. In doing so, Ibn Abdul Wahhab spoke as a scholar who had studied Shi'i scholarly works, outlining a broad and systematic perspective of the Shi'i worldview and theology. He also believed that the Shia doctrine ofinfallibility of the imams constituted associationism with God.[185] However, at no point did Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab "suggest that violence of any sort should be used against the Rafidah or Shi'is". Rather, he implored his followers to peacefully clarify their own legal teachings. He instructed that this procedure of education and debate should be carried out with the support of truthfululama,hadith transmitters, and righteous people employing logic, rhetoric, examination of the primary texts and scholarly debates.[186]
Although Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his son and successor'Abdullah categorised various Shi'ite sects likeRaafida,Zaydis, etc. as heretics and criticized many of their tenets, they had regarded them as Muslims. Abdullah's son, Sulayman (d. 1818) would articulate a new doctrine ofTakfir which set the foundations for the excommunication of Shi'ites outside the pale of Islam. Sulayman's doctrines were revived by later scholars of theMuwahhidun like 'Abd al-Latif ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) during theOttoman annexation of Al-Hasa in 1871.Al-Hasa was a Shi'ite majority area, and Ottoman invasion was assisted by the British. The Ottoman invasion had become a major danger to theEmirate of Nejd. From 1871, 'Abd al-Latif began to write tracts harshly condemning theOttomans,Shi'ites andBritish aspolytheists and called upon Muslims to boycott them. Integrating the concept ofHijra into his discourse ofTakfir, 'Abd al-Latif also forbadeMuslims to travel or stay in the lands of Ottomans,Rafidis, British, etc. 'Abd al-Latif viewed the Shi'ite sects of his time as idolators and placed them outside the pale of Islam.[187]
According to Jeffry R. Halverson, theMuwahidun movement was characterised by a strong opposition tomysticism.[98] Although this feature is typically attributed to the influence of the classical theologian Ibn Taymiyya, Jeffry Halverson states that Ibn Taymiyyah only opposed what he saw as Sufi excesses and never mysticism in itself, being himself a member of theQadiriyyahSufi order.[98] DeLong-Bas writes that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not denounceSufism or Sufis as a group, but rather attacked specific practices which he saw as inconsistent with theQur'an andhadith.[188]
When he was asked on a religious matter, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab praised the pious Sufis, stating:[189]
Let it be known — may Allah guide you — that Allah Most High sent Muhammad (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) with guidance, which is known as the beneficial knowledge, and true religion, which are virtuous actions.... among those who affiliate themselves to religion, there are those who focus on knowledge andfiqh and speak regarding it, such as the jurists, and those who focus on worship and the quest for the hereafter, such as the Sufis.
Scholars like Esther Peskes point to the cordial relations between theMuwahidun movement and the SufiShaykhAhmad Ibn Idris and his followers inMecca during the beginning of the 19th century; to aver that notions of absolute incompatibility betweenSufism and Wahhabism are misleading. The early Wahhabi historiography had documented no mention that suggested any direct confrontations between Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and contemporary Sufis nor did it indicate that his activism was directed specifically against Sufism. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's reforms were not aimed against socio-religious orientations such as Sufism; but were directed against the status quo prevalent in Islamic societies. Thus his efforts attempted a general transformation ofIslamic societies, including Sufis and non-Sufis; the elite as well as the commoners. This resulted in the widespread desacralisation of the public sphere that heralded the advent of a new socio-political model in Arabia.[190]
My father and I do not deny or criticise the science of Sufism, but on the contrary we support it because it purifies the external and the internal of the hidden sins which are related to the heart and the outward form. Even though the individual might externally be on the right way, internally he might be on the wrong way. Sufism is necessary to correct it.
Since the Arabian Peninsula was never occupied bycolonial powers, it wasn't directly challenged byWesternmodernity until the mid-twentieth century, unlike the rest of theIslamic World. While the Saudi ruling class spearheaded modernization drive across theKingdom; response of the religious establishment to the drastic influx of modernity was varied, ranging from scholars who rejected modern influences to tech-savvy clerics who eagerly embracemodern technology andsocial media. Various preachers harmonise pious lifestyle with modern culture while simultaneously engaging withMuslims of diverse backgrounds across the globe through social media networks. Assisted by scholarly guidance from a wide range of Islamic revivalists across the world likeAbul Hasan Ali Nadvi,Abul A'la Maududi, etc. TheIslamic University of Medina was established in 1961 to promote apan-Islamic response to contemporary challenges and modern ideologies. To intellectually counter the ideological spread ofWestern liberalism,socialism andsecularnationalism; numerous works of classical scholars likeIbn Kathir,Ibn Qudama,Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyya,Ibn Qayyim, etc. were mass-distributed through Saudi publishing centres and duringPilgrimages.[194]
On the other hand, some influential Wahhabi clerics had also been noteworthy for issuing various archaicfatawa such as declaring "that the sun orbited the Earth", and forbidding "women from riding bicycles on the grounds that they were "the devil's horses", and "from watching TV without veiling, just in case the presenters could see them through the screen". The most senior cleric in Saudi Arabia as of early 2022,Saleh Al-Fawzan, once issued afatwa forbidding "all-you-can-eat buffets, because paying for a meal without knowing what you'll be eating is akin to gambling".[195] Despite this, the contemporary Wahhabi religious framework has largely been able to maintain Saudi Arabia's global image as a pious society which is also aptly capable of addressing modern challenges.[196]
To resolve the novel issues of the 20th century,King'Abd al-Azeez ibn Saud appointedMuhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal Al-Shaykh (d. 1969) as theGrand Mufti in 1953 to headDar al-Ifta, the legal body tasked with crafting Wahhabi juristic response to the novel problems faced by Arabian Muslims. In 1971,Dar al-Ifta was re-organized to include a larger number of elder scholars to boost its intellectual output. Dar al-Ifta headed by the Saudi Grand Mufti, consists of two agencies: i)Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) ii) Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (C.R.L.O) Wahhabi scholars advocated a positive approach to embracing technology, political affairs, etc. while maintaining a traditional stance on social issues. Contemporaryfatwas also demonstrate a receptive outlook on visual media, medical field, economic affairs, etc.Dar al-Ifta became an influential institution in Arabian society and it sought a balanced approach to modernity; positioning itself between religious idealism and varying societal, economic and material demands. As a result, some scholars like Fandy Mamoun have stated that "In Saudi Arabia, different times and different places exist at once. Saudi Arabia is both a pre-modern and a post-modern society." The legal approach is characterized by taking from all law schools (Madhabs) through Scriptural precedents to sustain a legal system compatible with modernity.[197]
In opposition to theTaqlid doctrine, Wahhabi scholars advocated the proof-evaluation theory which believes in the continuous appearance of absoluteMujtahids (Mujtahid Mutlaq) and claims an'Ijma (scholarly consensus) that the doors ofIjtihad remain always open. This juristic approach had enabled flexibility in response of Wahhabi legal bodies to modernity. These include the encouragement of mass-media liketelevision,internet, etc. to promote virtue. Internet would be made publicly accessible to Saudi citizens as early as 1997.[198][199] In 2000fatwa on the internet,Grand MuftiʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āal al-Shaykh explains:[200]
In my opinion, the Internet is both a blessing and a curse at one and the same time. It is a blessing as long as it used for doing God's will, commanding good and forbidding wrong. However, it is liable to be evil when it aggravates God .... I call our leaders ... to imposeInternet studies primarily in schools and among society.
In the financial sector, Wahhabi approach is based onIslamic economics.Islamic banking system is encouraged and digital transactions likecredit cards have been sanctioned. Employing the results from observatories to sight the monthlyCrescent moon is today permitted and preferred by the clerics. In themedical field, variousfatwas legalising novel procedures likecorneal transplant,autopsies,organ donations, etc. have been issued. In marital and gender-related issues,divorce is encouraged for incompitable marriages. On the issues ofbirth control,abortions andfamily planning, the legal bodies are conservative and generally prohibit them, viewing them as a contrary toQur'anic commandments and Islamic principles to raise Muslim population. However, family planning measures are permitted in certain scenarios, wherein the legal principles of necessity are applicable.[201] The Board of Senior Ulema (BSU) stated in a 1976fatwa:[202]
wBirth control and contraception, due to fear of want (khishyat al-imlāq) are prohibited, since God guaranties the sustenance of His creatures. However, if birth control comes to avoid harm to the woman ... or in cases in which both spouses agree that it is in their best welfare to prevent or postpone a pregnancy, then birth control is permitted.
Wahhabi approach toFiqh radically challenged prevalent conventions of schoolTaqlid and was based on Ibn Taymiyya's broader theological call for a return to the values of theSalaf al-Salih.[203] Of the four majorsources inSunniFiqh – theQur'an, theSunna,'Ijma (juristic consensus) andQiyas (analogical reasoning) – Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's writings emphasized theQur'an andSunna. He used'ijma only "in conjunction with its corroboration of theQur'an andhadith"[204] (and giving preference to theijma of Muhammad'scompanions rather than theijma of legal specialists after his time), andqiyas only in cases of extreme necessity.[205] He rejected deference to past juridical opinion (taqlid) in favor of independent reasoning (ijtihad), and opposed using local customs.[206] He urged his followers to "return to the primary sources" of Islam in order "to determine how theQur'an andMuhammad dealt with specific situations" without being beholden to the interpretations of previous Islamic scholarship, while engaging inIjtihad.[207]
Historically, many established figures from Hanbalite andShafiite schools were noteworthy for their denunciation oftaqlid since the classical period. Influenced by these scholars, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, fervently denouncedTaqlid and upheld that the Gates ofIjtihad remained open.[208] According toEdward Mortimer, it was imitation of past judicial opinion in the face of clear contradictory evidence fromhadith orQur'anic text that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab condemned.[209] According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers, God's commandments to obey Him alone and follow the Prophetic teachings, necessitated a complete adherence toQur'an andhadith. This entailed a rejection of all interpretations offered by the four legal schools – including theMuwahhidun's own Hanbali school – wherein they contradict the two primary sources.[117][118]
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab asserted that every Muslim layman, even one without modest educational credentials, have a duty to read and study theQur'an and theSunnah; encouraging them to research religious scriptures. Regional rivals castigated him as a self-taught "ignorant" since "knowledge could come only from being taught by shaykhs" and not by treating the Scriptures as one's teacher. Although the issue ofijtihad and rejection oftaqlid were central themes of his doctrines, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not lay down his approach toUsul-al Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence) comprehensively. Rather, that was left to his son-in-law and pupil Hamad ibn Nasir ibn Mu'ammar (d. 1811 CE/AH 1225), who would explicate a clarified Wahhabi position onUsul al-Fiqh, after Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. Moreover, in his writings, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab relied primarily only onhadith (Prophetic traditions) rather than opinions of early Hanbali jurists. This stance arose uncertainty over his formal affiliation to theHanbalimad'hab and would lead many local Hanbalite detractors to accuse him of undermining classicalfiqh in general. Despite their conceptual doctrine based on repudiation oftaqlid (emulating legal precedent) to a legal school and jettisoning the juristic super-structure that developed after the Islamic fourth century; in-order to lower clerical resistance to their campaign; Wahhabis sustained the local juristic tradition of Najd, which was based on Hanbalism.[210]
According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself "produced no unprecedented opinions". The "Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not overfiqh rules at all, but over'aqida, or theological positions".[211] Professor of history atDickinson College,David Commins also states that early disputes with otherMuslims did not center onfiqh, and that the belief that the distinctive character of Wahhabism stems from Hanbali legal thought is a "myth".[212] Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. TheEncyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith".[213] Cyril Glasse'sThe New Encyclopedia of Islam states that "strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school",[214] and that in doing so they correspond to the ideal aimed at byIbn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'.[209][215] According toDeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering unquestionably toFiqh, and did not consider "the opinion of any law school to be binding". In the absence of ahadith, he encouraged following the examples of thecompanions of Muhammad rather than following a law school.[216] He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything not explicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use ofqiyas (analogical reasoning), and takingmaslaha (public interest) and'adl (justice) into consideration.[217]
Compilation of ibn Mu'ammar's treatises and legal verdicts published bySayyid Rashid Rida in 1925–1926 CE
While Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself was not inclined to adhere to a particularmadhab, many of his followers would perpetuate the Hanbali legal theory.[218] Hanbali jurist Hamad ibn Nasir ibn Mu'ammar (AH 1160–1125/ 1747–1810 CE) laid out a comprehensive legal theory in his treatises likeRisala al-Ijtihad wal Taqlid ("Treatise on Ijtihad and Taqlid") which became influential in the scholarly circles of theMuwahhidun. Ibn Mu'ammar believed that maintaining the practice ofIjtihad in every era was a religious obligation and tasked theIslamic scholars for carrying out this responsibility. This was to be done through proof evaluation from the Scriptures and by employingUsul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence). Based on one's expertise and knowledge, Ibn Mu'ammar ranked a hierarchy ofFuqaha (Islamic jurists) for carrying out the duty of issuingfatwas. At the top was the absoluteMujtahid who issues verdicts solely based on the principles (Usul) of his madhab by independently determining the preponderant view from all the possible scenarios tracked down by himself as well as supplement the former rulings. After this came the 3 levels of partialIjtihad which limited the scope of research: initially just to the past opinions, then to the rulings found in the 4madhabs and finally to the views within one's ownmadhab. The lowest of Ibn Mu'ammar's hierarchy constituted the non-Mujtahid laity who are required to directly engage with the Scriptural sources in consultation with scholars, as well as by analysing past scholarly works. Thus, Ibn Mu'ammar's legal theory strived for the reconciliation between thereformist programme of theMuwahhidin and the classical jurisprudential structures. What made Ibn Mu'ammar's proposed system unique was its "microcosmic" and flexible nature; which permitted the scholars to simultaneously represent different ranks within the hierarchy to carry out their responsibilities ofIjtihad.[219]
The Wahhabi legal theory stipulated proof-evaluation based on Hanbali principles as one of its major hallmarks. By claiming themselves as Hanbali,Muwahhidun scholars implied directly adhering to the fiveUsul al-Fiqh (Principles of jurisprudence) of the Hanbali school.[220] Despite the main methodology ofWahhabi movement being derived from Hanbalite Ahl al-Hadith, scholars also take the rulings from otherMadhhabs, as long they regard them as being verified through Hadith and traditions orSunnah authenticated by Sahabah. (Qaul Sahabiyyah according to modern contemporary Muslim scholars[221]). Prominent Wahhabi scholarMuhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymeen derived rulings from theShafiite jurisprudence in his commentary ofThe Meadows of the Righteous book authored byal-Nawawi, wherein theIjtihad (reasoning) of Abu Hurairah was taken by al-Nawawi for rulings ofWudu (ablution ritual).[222]
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab concerned himself with the social reformation of his people. He stressed the importance of education, especially for females and encouraged women to be active in educational endeavours and lead various communal and social activities.Diriyah had become a major centre of learning and foreign travellers often noted the higher literacy rates of townsfolk of Central Arabia. In line with his methodology, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab also denounced the practice of instanttriple talaq, counting it as only a singletalaq (regardless of the number of pronouncements). The outlawing oftriple talaq has been considered to be one of the most significant reforms in the Islamic World in the 20th and 21st centuries. As an 18th-century reformer, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab advocatedIjtihad of qualified scholars in accordance with the teachings ofQur'an andHadeeth. His thoughts reflected the major trends apparent in the 18th-centuryIslamic reform movements. Numerous significant socio-economic reforms would be advocated by the Imam during his lifetime. After his death, his followers continued his legacy. Notablejurists like Ibn Mu'ammar (AH 1160–1225/ 1747–1810 CE) would issue ground-breakingfatwas (legal verdicts) on contemporary issues such as authorization ofsmall-pox vaccinations; at a time whenopposition to small-pox vaccinations was widespread among the scientific and political elites ofEurope. Many women were influential in various reformist endeavours of theMuwahhidun; such as mass-education, communal activities, campaigns againstsuperstitions, etc. These included Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's own daughter Fatimah, a reveredIslamic scholar who travelled far and wide; and taught numerous men and women. However, future events such as the destruction of theEmirate of Diriyah in theWahhabi Wars of 1818, subsequent persecution of Salafis and otherIslamic reformers, etc. would result in a halt to the social reforms implemented by the Wahhabi jurists and their suspicions towards the outside world would linger throughout the 19th century.[223][224][225][226]
With the resurgence of risingreform currents ofSalafiyya across the Muslim world from the late 19th century, the Wahhabis of Najd too underwent a rejuvenation. After the establishment of theThird Saudi State andUnification of Saudi Arabia, aSalafiyya Global movement would crystallise with the backing of a state.Ibn Saud's reforms would get criticism from zealots amongst some of his Wahhabi clergy-men; reminiscent of the 19th-century harshness. However, otherulema would allow them, eventually paving way for gradual reforms in KSA. Thus, new education policies would be approved that taught foreign languages, sciences, geography, etc. Overruling the objections ofIkhwan, the Wahhabiulema would permit the introduction of telegraph and other wireless communication systems. Soon after, oil industries would be developed with the discovery of petroleum. Influential clerics such asMufti Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Aal ash-Shaykh would endorse female education.[227]
Military campaigns and political expansion of theEmirate of Diriyah (1744 – 1814 CE)
According to ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab; there are three objectives forIslamic government andsociety: "to believe in Allah, enjoin good behavior, and forbid wrongdoing". This doctrine has been sustained in missionary literature, sermons,fatwa rulings, and explications of religious doctrine by Wahhabis since the death of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.[57] Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab saw a role for theImam, "responsible for religious matters", and theAmir, "in charge of political and military issues".[228] Despite this, inSaudi history; theImam had not been a religious preacher or scholar, butMuhammad ibn Saud and the subsequentSaudi dynastic rulers.[48][229][230]
He also believed that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned allegiance as a religious obligation from his subjects; so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God (Shari'ah). A Muslim must present abay'ah (oath of allegiance) to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death.[57][231] Any counsel given to a ruler from community leaders orulama should be private, not through public acts such as petitions, demonstrations, etc.[232][233] This principle caused confusion during the dynastic disputes of the Second Saudi State during the late 19th-century, when rebels succeeded in overthrowing the monarch, to become ruler.[234][235] While it gave the king a wide range of power, respectingshari'a does impose limits, such as givingqadi (Islamic judges) independence. This meant non-interference in their deliberations, as well as not codifying laws, following precedents or establishing a uniform system of law courts – both of which violate theqadi's independence.[236]
Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to theHouse of Saud, but a movement of "Salafi jihadis" has emerged in the contemporary among those who believe that Al-Saud has abandoned the laws of God.[237][238] According to Zubair Qamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is another "strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis after the fall of the second Saudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholarAbu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the 'Shu'aybi' school".[239]
Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as theMuslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics and government and the importance ofda'wah (proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non-Muslims but towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative and do not deal with concepts such associal justice,anticolonialism, oreconomic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.[158] Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'."[69] While socio-political issues constituted a major aspect of hisreformist programme, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab nonetheless didn't advocate revolutionary overthrowal of the ruling order to establish aCaliphate across the Muslim world. Following the classical Sunni understanding, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab advocated accommodation with the status quo, stating:[240]
For a very long time, since before the time of ImamAhmad, till nowadays, the people have not united under one single ruler. Nor is it known from any of the scholars that there is any ruling which is invalid except with thegreater imam (al-imam al-a'zam).
18th and 19th century European travellers,ambassadors and writers considered theMuwahhidun as championing an "Islamic revolution" that campaigned for a pristine Islam stripped of all complex rituals, cultural accretions, superstitions, etc. and a simpler creedal ethos based on universal brotherhood and fraternity; analogous to various European frondeurs during theAge of Revolutions. Contemporary European diplomats and observers who witnessed its emergence drew parallels with theAmerican andFrench revolutions in Wahhabi opposition toOttoman clerical hierarchy and foreign imperialism; with some even labelling them as "WahhabiJacobins" and its reformist efforts as a sort of "Protestantism".[241][242][243]
Cambridge historianChristopher Allen Bayly noted that the religious movement of the ArabianMuwahhidun also had a revolutionary political programme comparable to theEuropean revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries. The difference lied in their political language; wherein themes ofanti-imperialism, opposition to foreign aggression, promotion ofcivic values,duties &rights, etc. were conveyed to the local populace in terms ofIslamic values.[3] Tracing the movement's popularity to the wider phenomenon ofOttoman decline, the far-reachingimpacts of the French revolution on theArab world; and deciphering the sudden collapse of its revolutionaryEmirate to invasion by military despots of the old order; Bayly wrote:[244]
theWahhabi revolt against intrusiveOttoman rule and the decline of proper religious observance in the cities ofSaudi Arabia should be regarded as a variety of world revolution ....Ibn Saud's revolt began in the 1740s, before theAmerican andEuropean revolutions, but arose as an analogous response to the pressures of taxation and state interference in formerly independent communities .... [T]he influence of Wahhabism persisted indirectly across the Muslim world, inspiring imitations and reactions among the MuslimSufi brotherhoods ofNorth andEast Africa over the next hundred years .... [I]f we examine the social roots ofrevolution, the word may be appropriate for these events within Islam .... [T]hese were often revolts of underprivileged suburbanites, the semi-settledbedouin on the fringe of the Muslim urban economies. These revolts exemplified that perennial conflict between the nomad and the city noted byIbn Khaldun in theMiddle Ages.
The Wahhabi movement, while predominant across Saudi Arabia, was established from the Najd region, and it is there that its conservative practices have the strongest support, more so than in regions in the kingdom to the east or west of it.[p][249][250] Cyril Glasse credits the softening of some Wahhabi doctrines and practices outside of the Najd region on the conquest of the Hejaz region "with its more cosmopolitan traditions and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to alienate".[128] Aside from Saudi Arabia, the only other country whose native population is predominantly Wahhabi is the adjacent gulf monarchy ofQatar.[251][252] Estimates of the number of adherents to Wahhabism vary.[q]
The "boundaries" of Wahhabism have been called "difficult to pinpoint",[21] but in contemporary usage, the terms "Wahhabi" and "Salafi" are sometimes used interchangeably, and they are considered to be movements with different roots that have merged since the 1960s.[256][257][r] However, Wahhabism is generally recognised as form ofSalafism", contextualised as an ultra-conservative, Saudi brand of the wider movement.[259][260]Muhammad Iqbal, praised the 18th-century Najdi movement as "the first throb of life in modern Islam", and noted that its influence on 19th-century religious reformers was "traceable, directly or indirectly [in] nearly all the great modern movements of Muslim Asia and Africa".[261]
There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member ofAl ash-Sheikh (a descendant ofMuhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example, Abd al-Latif was the son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan.
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was the founder of the Wahhabi movement.[262][263]
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al ash-Sheikh (1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentieth century. He has been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed unrivaled religious authority".[264]
'Abd al-Azeez ibn Baz (1910–1999) has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism during his time.[267]
Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925–2001) is another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, no one "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment" since their deaths.[267]
The appeal ofArab nationalism, which considered theOttoman Empire to be a foreign occupying power and took a powerful precedent from the Wahhabi rebellion against the Ottomans
Wahhabi calls for a return to the pristine Islam of theSalaf al-Salih (righteous predecessors) which rejected much of the classical legal precedents; instead deriving directly fromQur'an,Hadith and the sayings of theSalaf; throughIjtihad. This also appealed to the Islamic reformers who pushed for a revival ofijtihad, and a direct return to the original sources for interpreting theQur'an andSunnah, to seek solutions to the present day problems.
Societal factors: With the influx of modernity, younger generations ofMuslims increasingly departed from the "localized" religious understanding of their parents and looked up to apan-Islamic outlook authentically rooted in Scriptures and early generations ofSalaf al-Salih
Rise of other nativeIslamic reformist movements such as theAhl-e Hadith inSouth Asia and theSalafiyya movement in theArab world which shared a common religious outlook. These movements expanded collaboration in various socio-economic, political and educational fields and formed a joint intellectual alliance. Additionally, influential conservative reform movements likeDeobandism began co-operating with Wahhabis to a certain extent, despite doctrinal variations
According to French scholar and critic ofIslamismGilles Kepel, the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover ofSaudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in theIslamic World.[s]
Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100billion";[270] $2–3billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annualSoviet propaganda budget of $1billion/year);[271] and "at least $87billion" from 1987 to 2007.[272] Reliability of these rough estimates have been disputed due to their inconsistencies and lack of a scientific methodology for precise quantification.[273]
Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim world, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.[274] It extended to young and old, from children'smadrasas to high-level scholarship.[275] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[276] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses aroundEgypt forAl Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[277] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools".[271][278] Apart from state patronage, a major source of proselytization has been the private charities and religious activities of Muslim individuals and organizations.[279]
This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian andLee Kuan Yew,[274] arguing that it caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"[280]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation – or the "gold standard" of Islam – in many Muslims' minds.[281][282]
Peter Mandaville asserts that the commonly reported data estimates regarding Saudi religious funding are unreliable due to the sources being "internally inconsistent" and based on "non-specific hearsay". According to Mandaville, the wide-ranging and controversial usage of the term "Wahhabism" has rendered researching Saudi religious transnationalism and assessing its actual magnitude even more confusing. Moreover, thepost-Cold War era governments had commonly used the label "Wahhabism" to designate a wide swathe of religious sects, including those which were doctrinally at odds with Wahhabism.[273]
Allegations of links between Wahhabism proper and the ideology ofmilitant Islamists such asal-Qaeda andIslamic State, have been disputed.[283] Throughout the 20th centuryBoard of Senior Ulema (BSU) of theDar al-Ifta in Saudi Arabia, were known for issuingfatawa which strongly condemned various forms ofwar crimes andterrorism, in line withIslamic military jurisprudence. In a well-knownfatwa issued at its 32nd session inTa'if on 25 August 1988, the board members recommended the death penalty for acts of terrorism.[284] Moreover, the Wahhabiulema of Saudi Arabia had ruled the illegality of all forms ofsuicide bombings, including inIsrael. The doctrine of suicide bombings which started appearing in the manuals of various Egyptian extremists during the 1970s and 1980s; has been rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi scholars.[283] Jonathan Sozek reports that while Bin Laden self-identified as a Salafist, he was not affiliated with the Wahhabi movement.[285]
The Yemeni origins of theBin Laden family also reflected a non-Wahhabi heritage.[286][287] Bin Laden's feud with the Saudi government intensified during theGulf War; prompting Saudi authorities to place Bin Laden underhouse arrest in 1991, before exiling him the same year. In 1994, Saudi Arabia revoked Bin Laden'scitizenship and froze all his assets, turning him into a fugitive and the Bin Laden family disowned him. After Saudi pressure onSudan, the Al-Qaeda leader sought refuge under theTaliban government in Afghanistan. Taliban's denial of Saudi requests to extradite Bin Laden led to a diplomatic row betweenAfghanistan andSaudi Arabia.[288][289] Throughout the 1990s, mainstream Wahhabi clerics in the Kingdom supportedUS-Saudi alliance againstBa'athist Iraq during theGulf War and condemned terrorist acts by Al-Qaeda. Anti-establishment Wahhabi scholars have also been vehemently opposed to tactics advocated by Bin Laden, not withstanding their opposition toAmerican foreign policy in West Asia.[290] Scholars likeProfessorF. Gregory Gause have strongly opposed hysterical assertions made bywar hawks in theBush administration, contrasting their portrayals of Wahhabism with attempts made byfar-right militants to appropriateAmerican patriotism.[291]
In contemporary discourse, thepost-Soviet states widely employ the term"Wahhabism" to denote any manifestation of Islamic assertion in neighbouring Muslim countries.[38] During theSoviet-era, the Muslim dissidents were usually labelled with terms such as "Sufi" and "fanatic" employingIslamophobic discourses that aroused hysteria of an underground religious activists threatening the stability of the Marxist order. By the late 1990s, the"Wahhabi" label would become the most common term to refer to the alleged "Islamic menace" in state propaganda, while "Sufism" was invoked as a "moderate" force that balanced the "radicalism" of those who were being accused as"Wahhabis". The old-guard of the post-Soviet states found the label useful to depict all opposition as extremists, thereby bolstering their 'strongman' credentials. In short, any Muslim critical of the religious or political status quo, came at risk of being labelled"Wahhabi".[292]
According toM. Reza Pirbhai, Associate Professor of History atGeorgetown University, notions of a"Wahhabi conspiracy" against theWest have in recent times resurfaced in various sections of theWestern media; employing the term as a catch-all phrase to frame an official narrative that erases the concerns of broad and disparate disenchanted groups pursuing redress for local discontentment caused byneo-colonialism. The earliest mention of"Wahhabism" inThe New York Times had appeared in a 1931 editorial which described it as a "traditional" movement; without associating it with "militant" or "anti-Western" trends. Between 1931 and 2007,The New York Times published eighty-six articles that mentioned the word"Wahhabism", out of which six articles had appeared before September 2001, while the rest were published since. During the 1990s, it began to be described as "militant", but not yet as a hostile force. By the 2000s, the 19th century terminology of"Wahhabism" had resurfaced, reprising its role as the " 'fanatical' and 'despotic' antithesis of a civilized world. Reza Pirbhai asserts that this use is deployed to manufacture an official narrative that assists imperial purposes by depicting a coherent and coordinated international network of ideological revolutionaries.[293] Commonneo-liberal depictions ofWahhabism define it as a collection of restrictive dogmas, particularly for women, whileneo-conservative depictions portray "Wahhabis" as "savages" or "fanatics".[294]
Among the criticism, or comments made by critics, of the Wahhabi movement are:
That it is not so much strict and uncompromising as aberrant,[295] going beyond the bounds of Islam in its restricted definition oftawhid (Islamic monotheistic tenets), and much too willing to committakfir (Excommunicate)Muslims found in violation of Wahhabi doctrines.[296] According to some sources, during the secondWahhabi-Saudi conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, an estimated 400,000 were killed or wounded according to some estimates.[132][297][298][299] However, the validity of the 400,000 casualty count is contentious and seen as an exaggerated figure by many scholars, who trace it as a fabrication that emerged during the 1990s. More reliable tallies estimate the number of killed and wounded somewhere between 10,000 and 25,000.[300]
That the Wahhabi stances that rejecttaqlid (imitation of juristic precedent) and advocate opening ofijtihad (independent legal judgement) would result in the formulation of various ideological pretensions that could "erode the very essence of Islam".Sufi traditionalists strongly emphasize the necessity of taqlid to the four majormadhhabs (legal schools) and invoke the teachings and legacy of its founders to defend themadhhab-based legal system.[301][302]
ThatMuhammad bin Saud's agreement to wagejihad to spreadIbn 'Abd al-Wahhab's teachings had more to do with traditional Najdi practice of raiding – "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre" – than with religion;[303]
That its rejection of the "orthodox" belief insaints, a belief which had become a cardinal doctrine in Sunni Islam very early on,[304][305][306] represents a departure from something which has been an "integral part of Islam... for over a millennium."[307]
It has been reported that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's father was critical of his son. The dispute arose when Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab began his publicda'wa activities inHuraymila. However, none of the sources state the exact nature of this disagreement. Salafi scholaral-Uthaymin noted that it probably was not concerning an issue of'Aqidah (beliefs) as Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, "did not lend any support to the saint-cults and other false practices". It is speculated that they disputed over payment of judges in solving disputes and in the manner of givingda'wa, spreading Islamic teachings. Until his father's death in AH 1153; Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was not overly active and public in hisda'wah efforts.[308]
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's brother allegedly wrote a book in refutation of his brother's new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab", also known as:"Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School").[309] It has been reported that his brother repented and eventually returned to his call.[310][311]
In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932",[309] Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (firqa) and outliers (Kharijites) in communications betweenOttomans andEgyptian KhediveMuhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars (muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (Jahala).
Turkish columnist Ekrem Buğra Ekinci wrote an article in the pro-AKP newspaperDaily Sabah, in which he argued against classifying Wahhabism as part of Sunnism.[312] According to British writer Simon Ross Valentine, Wahhabism has been vehemently criticized by many Sunni Muslims and some Islamic scholars in the strongest terms as a "new faction, a vile sect".[313]
In our time Ibn Abdal Wahhab Najdi appeared, and attacked the two noble sanctuaries (Makkah and Madinah). He claimed to be a Hanbali, but his thinking was such that only he alone was a Muslim, and everyone else was a polytheist! Under this guise, he said that killing theAhl as-Sunnah was permissible, until Allah destroyed them (Wahhabi's) in the year 1233 AH by way of the Muslim army.[316]
The followers ofMuhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered the ideas of the Hanbali theologianAhmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 CE) highly attractive and made him their central classical scholarly reference. However, for centuries Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts were mostly ignored by those who constituted the scholarly mainstream; who would accuse the Wahhabis for overemphasizing the scholarly works of Ibn Taymiyya. It was only during the 19th century that Ibn Taymiyya came to exercise prominent scholarly influence over Muslim youth and by the 20th century he would be a major reference for Islamic revolutionaries.[317] On the other hand, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab would deny that he had bias towards Ibn Taymiyya; and states inHadiyya al-Thaniyya:[118]
Ibn Qayyim and his illustrious teacher Ibn Taymiyyah were both righteous leaders according to the Sunni school of thought and their writings are dear to my heart, but I do not follow them rigidly in all matters.
Another early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the SunniSufijurist Ibn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted to whoever "declares that there is no god but God and prays towardMecca" for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not a form of worship but merely calling out to them, and that worship at graves is not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the power to determine the course of events. These arguments were specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi leader at the time.[318]
Opposition to Wahhabism emerged inSouth Asia during the early 19th century; which was led by prominent Islamic scholar and theologianFazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (1796–1861). By the late 19th century, the anti-Wahhabi campaign in South Asia was led byAhmed Raza Khan (1856–1921) and his disciples, who engaged in extensive written refutations and polemics against Wahhabism. His movement became known as theBarelvi movement and was defined by rejection of Wahhabi beliefs.[320]
The transnationalLebanon-basedAl-Ahbash movement usestakfir against Wahhabi andSalafi leaders.[321][322] The head of Al-Ahbash,Abdullah al-Harari accuses Wahhabis of falling into anthropomorphic descriptions of God and imitating polytheists.[323]
According toFrenchPolitical ScientistGilles Kepel, the alliance betweenIbn 'Abd-al Wahhab and the tribal chiefMuhammad ibn Saud to wagejihad on neighboring allegedly ignorant Muslims, was a "consecration" by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab since he renamed the Saudi tribe's long-standing raids as Jihad. Part of the Najd's "Hobbesian state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin tribes against one another for control of the scarce resources that could stave off starvation." And a case of substitutingfath, "the 'opening' or conquest of a vast territory through religious zeal", for the "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre".[303]
The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom manifested in it, though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of the schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of the Prophet.
Salafi scholarBilal Philips asserted that the charge of "Wahhabi" was deployed by the proponents ofMadh'hab fanaticism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries toTakfir (excommunicate) the legalnon-conformists.[330] According to Philips:[331]
It is interesting to note that separate places of prayer for each of the Madh-habs remained around the Ka'bah until the first quarter of the twentieth century when 'Abdul-'Azeez ibn Sa'oud and his army conquered Makkah (October 1924) and united all worshippers behind a single Imaam regardless of his or their Madh-habs
Syrian-Egyptian Islamic revivalist scholarMuhammad Rashid Rida was one of the most influential supporters of the Wahhabi movement during the 20th century. Rida had developed favourable views towards the Wahhabis as early as his arrival inEgypt during the 1890s; after reading about the movement in the histories ofAl-Jabartī andAl-Nāṣiri.[332] Rida asserted that the social and military expansion of the Wahhabi movement could successfully launch an authenticIslamic revival throughout theIslamic World.[333] Rida believed that thedecline of Muslims was a result of the stagnation caused by the excesses ofSufism; which had distorted the pristine message of Islam. As a leading figure of theSalafiyya movement,[334] Rida launched his project of re-habilitating Wahhabism[335][336] and would popularise Najdi scholarly treatises across the Muslim World through hisAl-Manar printing press.[337]
Sukarno, the firstpresident of Indonesia, had openly expressed his view in his bookDibawah bendera revolusi, that the progressiveTajdid movement by Wahhabis was essentially a positive influence on Islam globally, particularly in developing nations struggling to gain independence.[338] Sukarno also appreciated the "wisdom ofIbn Saud to support Wahhabi scholars in their effort to reject various one thousand one kind ofBidʻah".[338] It is argued by some that Sukarno was also influenced by Islamist figures such asAhmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi,Agus Salim, and particularlyHamka, his elementary teacher.
According to notable Arab LinguistTaha Hussein (1889–1973 CE), the Wahhabi movement was new, yet simultaneously old. Although it was novel for its contemporary generations, it was also ancient in its powerful calls for return to a pure Islam untainted by the impurities ofShirk (polytheism). Acclaiming its role in theArab Awakening and intellectual renewal, Taha Hussein states:[339]
Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab admonished the people of Najd for reverting to the ways of ignorance in creed and practice.... [I]t was hoped, thismadhhab would have united the Arabs in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (AH), just as the appearance of Islam united them in the first century (AH). What we need to emphasize regarding thismadhhab is its impact on the intellectual and literary life amongArabs, which was great and profound in various ways. It awakened the Arab soul and placed in front of it, a higher example which it loved, and as a consequence, strived in its cause with the sword, the pen and other weapons. It again directed the attention of all Muslims, especially people of Iraq,Ash-Sham and Egypt, towards the Arabian Peninsula.
^The term "Wahhabism" is primarily anexonym; it was not used by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself or his followers, who typically refer to themselves asSalafi,Sunni, orMuwahhidun.[1][2][3]
Kerr, Anne; Wright, Edmund (2015).A Dictionary of World History (3rd ed.).Oxford University Press.ISBN9780199685691.Wahhabism...The doctrine of an Islamic reform movement .... It is based on the Sunni teachings of Ibn Hanbal (780–855)
Ahsan, Sayyid (1987). "IV: Foundations of the Saudi State – II: Reforms of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab".Trends in Islam in Saudi Arabia. Department of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University. pp. 141–142.
W. Brown, Daniel (2009).A New Introduction to Islam: Second Edition. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. p. 245.ISBN9781405158077.
Ahmad Khan, Mu'Īnuddin (March 1968). "A Diplomat's Report on Wahhabism of Arabia".Islamic Studies.7 (1). Translated by Jones, Harford:33–46.JSTOR20832903.
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Tibi, Bassam (1990).Arab nationalism: A Critical Enquiry. Translated by Sluglett, Marion Farouk; Sluglett, Peter (2nd ed.). London: The Macmillan Press. p. 162.ISBN9781349208043.
Murzik Kobo, Ousman (2012).Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-century West African Islamic Reforms. Leiden:Brill. pp. 221, 277,283–285.ISBN978-90-04-21525-2.
^"Wahhabism refers to a conservative interpretation of Islam founded as a revival and reform movement in eighteenth-century Arabia."[13]
^"While Wahhabism claims to represent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances.[16]
^... "stereotypes and images are assumed to be based on the conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam despite the fact that no systematic analysis of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings about women and gender has ever been undertaken ... the assertion that these attitudes are characteristic of Wahhabism risks inaccuracy because the term Wahhabism is rarely defined. Many of the regimes and movements labeled as Wahhabi in the contemporary era do not necessarily share the same theological and legal orientations ... Wahhabism has become such a blanket term for any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith ... do not necessarily reflect the writings or teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. In fact, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's life and writings reflect a concern for women and women's rights ..."DeLong-Bas 2004, pp. 123–24
W. Brown, Daniel (2009).A New Introduction to Islam: Second Edition. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. p. 245.ISBN9781405158077.
Ahmad Khan, Mu'Īnuddīn (March 1968). "A Diplomat's Report on Wahhabism of Arabia".Islamic Studies.7 (1). Translated by Jones, Harford:33–46.JSTOR20832903.
Mattar, Philip (2004).Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East & North Africa (2nd ed.). Farmington Hills, Michigan: Thomson Gale. p. 1625.ISBN0028659872.
Agoston, Gabor; Masters, Bruce (2009).Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Facts on File. pp. 587–588.ISBN9780816062591.
Kerr, Anne; Wright, Edmund (2015).A Dictionary of World History (3rd ed.).Oxford University Press.ISBN9780199685691.Wahhabism...The doctrine of an Islamic reform movement founded by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al‐Wahhab (1703–92)... It is based on the Sunni teachings of Ibn Hanbal (780–855)
Ahsan, Sayyid (1987). "IV: Foundations of the Saudi State – ll : Reforms of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab".Trends in Islam in Saudi Arabia. Department of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University. pp. 141–142.
De Bellaigue, Christopher (2017). "1: Cairo".The Islamic Enlightenment: The Struggle Between Faith and Reason – 1798 to Modern Times. New York: Liveright. pp. 15–16.ISBN9780871403735.
Hoover, Jon (2019).Makers of the Muslim World: Ibn Taymiyya. London: One World Publications. pp. 3, 11, 43,68–69, 144.ISBN9781786076892.
^at least one scholar (David Commins), sometimes refers to Wahhabism as the"Najdi reform movement",[245]"Najdi movement",[246]"Najdi doctrine",[247] and "Najdi mission"[248]
^Other sources give far lower numbers of Shia though they do not estimate the number of Wahhabi. 15% of KSA is Shia.[253][254][255]
^Salafism has been termed a hybridation between the teachings of Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and others which have taken place since the 1960s.[258]
^... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam. Saudi Arabia's impact on Muslims throughout the world was less visible than that of Khomeini's Iran, but the effect was deeper and more enduring... it reorganized the religious landscape by promoting those associations and ulamas who followed its lead, and then, by injecting substantial amounts of money into Islamic interests of all sorts, it won over many more converts. Above all, the Saudis raised a new standard – the virtuous Islamic civilization – as foil for the corrupting influence of the West.[71]
^abCommins 2006, p. vi "What is the Wahhabi Mission?... A neutral observer could define the Wahhabi mission as the religious reform movement associated with the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792)"
^abBearman, Peri; Bianquis, Thierry; Bosworth, C. Edmund; van Donzel, E. J.; Heinrichs, Wolfhart P., eds. (2002).The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. XI (New ed.). Leiden:Brill. p. 39.ISBN9004127569.
^Asad, Muhammad (1988).The Road to Mecca. Theatre Communications. pp. 160–161.ISBN9780930452797.
^Commins 2009, p. viv. "While Wahhabism claims to represent Islam in its purest form, other Muslims consider it a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances."
H. Cordesman, Anthony (31 December 2002)."Saudi Arabia Enters The 21st Century".Center for Strategic and International Studies. pp. 8–9.Archived(PDF) from the original on 23 December 2020.
Atkin, Muriel (2000)."The Rhetoric of Islamophobia".CA&C Press.Archived from the original on 25 September 2021.In political, as well as religious matters, any Muslim who challenges the status quo is at risk of being labeled a Wahhabi. This is how the KGB and its post-Soviet successors have used the term.
Knysh, Alexander (2004)."A Clear and Present Danger: "Wahhabism" as a Rhetorical Foil".Modern Asian Studies.44 (1):9–13.JSTOR1571334.Archived from the original on 21 January 2023. Retrieved18 August 2022."The use of the term to label all distasteful opponents has become so routine in post–Soviet discourse that Feliks Kulov, then Minister for National Security in Kyrgyzstan, could speak in 1997 of "foreign Wahhabi emissaries, from Iran in particular"..."People accused of being "Wahhabis" are routinely charged with treason and subversion against the state".
^abHatina, Meir; Commins, David (2009). "10: Wahhabis, Sufis, and Salafis in early twentieth century Damascus".Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: ʿUlamaʾ in the Middle East. Boston:Brill. p. 231.ISBN9789004169531.
^Davis, Rohan (2009). "1: Wahhabism as a contested category".Western Imaginings: The intellectual contest to define Wahhabism. The American University in Cairo Press. p. 31.ISBN9789774168642.
^Ahmed, Qeyamuddin (2020).The Wahhabi Movement in India. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group. pp. ix, x.ISBN9780367514839.
^abcBlanchard, Christopher M. (24 January 2008).The Islamic traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya(PDF) (Report). CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service.Archived(PDF) from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved12 August 2015.
^Bederka, Alan."Wahhabism and Boko Haram"(PDF).Student Center for African Research and Resolutions (scarrdc.org). Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 27 July 2014. Retrieved4 August 2014.
^Mandaville, Peter; Hammond, Andrew (2022).Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam. New York:Oxford University Press. p. 35.ISBN9780197532577.
^Mandaville, Peter (2022). "2: Wahhabism and Salafism in global perspective".Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam.Oxford University Press. p. 43.ISBN9780197532577.
^abJuergensmeyer, Mark; Roof, Wade Clark, eds. (2011)."Wahhabis".Encyclopedia of Global Religion. Sage Publications. p. 1369.ISBN9781452266565.
^abcLacey 2009, pp. 10–11. "the two ... concluded a pact. Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the stern doctrines of the Wahhabi mission, which made the Koran the basis of government. In return, Abdul Wahhab would support the ruler, supplying him with 'glory and power'. Whoever championed his message, he promised, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men'."
^Abou El Fadl, Khalid (2005).The Great Theft. New York: HarperCollins. pp. 75, 93, 152.ISBN9780060563394.
^abMeijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism".Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement.Oxford University Press. p. 43.ISBN9780199333431.
^Lacroix, Stéphane (2011). "3: Resistance to Sahwa Ascendancy".Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press. pp. 84–85, 220.ISBN9780674049642.
^"From there he [Albani] learned to oppose taqlid in a madhab." Bennett,The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. "Al-Albani had denounced Wahhabi attachment to the Hanbali school." Stephane Lacroix, George Holoch,Awakening Islam, p. 85
^Spevack, Aaron (2014).The Archetypal Sunni Scholar: Law, Theology, and Mysticism in the Synthesis of Al-Bajuri. State University of New York Press. p. 44.
^Beránek, Ondřej; Ťupek, Pavel (2018). "2: Early Wahhabism and the Beginnings of Modern Salafism".The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam: Iconoclasm, Destruction and Idolatry.Edinburgh University Press. pp. 81–82, 119.ISBN9781474417570.
^NAHOUZA, Namira (April 2009). "3: Contemporary perceptions of the Salaf – the Wahhabi case".Contemporary Wahhabism rebranded as Salafism: the issue of interpreting the Qur'anic verses and hadith on the Attributes of God and its significance. University of Exeter. pp. 96–97.
^Ismail, Raihan (2021). "1: Salafism".Rethinking Salafism: The Transnational Networks of Salafi ʿUlama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.Oxford University Press. p. 16.ISBN9780190948955.
^Beránek, Ondřej; Ťupek, Pavel (2018). "2: Early Wahhabism and the Beginnings of Modern Salafism".The Temptation of Graves in Salafi Islam: Iconoclasm, Destruction and Idolatry.Edinburgh University Press. pp. 87–89.ISBN9781474417570.
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^Iqbal, Muhammad (2013).The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Stanford University Press. p. 121.ISBN9780804781466.But the spirit of Ibn Taymiyyah's teaching found a fuller expression in a movement of immense potentialities which arose in the eighteenth century, from the sands of Nejd, described by Macdonald as the "cleanest spot in the decadent world of Islam". It is really the first throb of life in modern Islam. To the inspiration of this movement are traceable, directly or indirectly, nearly all the great modem movements of Muslim Asia and Africa, e.g. the Sanusl movement, the Pan-Islamic movement, and the Babi movement, which is only a Persian reflex of Arabian Protestantism.
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^Juan Eduardo Campo,Encyclopedia of Islam (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), p. 600
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