A native ofDietikon (Switzerland), Urs Fischbacher studied mathematics at theUniversity of Zurich from 1978 to 1985, earning adoctoral degree under Prof. Dr.Pierre Gabriel with a thesis on the combinatorics of algebras with finiteideals. Thereafter, Fischbacher worked as a software developer in the private sector for Mettler Instrumente (1985–87) and Mecasoft AG (1987-81) before becoming a researcher at theSwiss Federal Institute WSL. In 1995, Fischbacher began working at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics on the development of z-Tree, a programming language for the implementation of scientific laboratory experiments that is being used worldwide in numerous research institutions.,[3][4] where he also began to perform research in experimental economics. This research resulted in hishabilitation in economics in 2006 on the topics of human motivation and cooperation. Since 2007, Fischbacher has been a full professor at theUniversity of Konstanz and the head of the Thurgau Institute of Economics. Additionally, he has also held visiting appointments atHarvard Business School, theUniversity of Copenhagen, theUniversity of Nottingham, and theUniversity of Maastricht. In terms of professional service, Fischbacher performs editorial duties at theEuropean Journal of Political Economy, theJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, andExperimental Economics, among others.[5]
Although a majority of subjects in thepublic goods game display conditional cooperation, about a third of subjectsfreeride completely, thus explaining why cooperation in public goods games tends to break down over time (withSimon Gächter andErnst Fehr).[7]
Inultimatum games, rejection rates for identical offers depend on what other offers are available to the proposer, implying that the utility of an action is affected by the alternatives to that action (with Falk and Fehr).[9]
The inclusion of social preferences, i.e. preferences that also care about the payoffs given to certain other agents, is necessary to understand the effects of competition and material incentives, cooperation and collective action, the optimality of contracts and property rights arrangements, and how social norms and market failures emerge (with Fehr).[10]
Voluntary cooperation inpublic goods games is fragile because many people want to contribute less than others, rather than because of changing beliefs regarding others' contributions or differences between people's preferences, and often eventually devolves into universal freeriding.[11]
Both agents' positive and negative reciprocal behaviour is affected by their beliefs about other agents' intentions to behave fairly (with Falk and Fehr).[12]
In experiments oncheating, 39% of participants were completely honest, while at most 22% lied completely. In some cases, people lied to their disadvantage, which is shown to be motivated by the desire to maintain a positive self-concept, e.g. regarding honesty and a lack of greediness (with Franziska Föllmi-Heusi).[13]
Theories offairness postulating that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities in cooperation games cannot explain why cooperators keep punishing defectors even in situations where payoff inequalities cannot be reduced, thus suggesting a role forretaliation as a driving force behind informal sanctions (with Falk and Fehr).[14]
Fischbacher is listed byThomson Reuters in the "Highly Cited Researchers 2014" list as one of the world's most cited scientists.[15] In the FAZ economists 2014 Rankings, he finished second.[16] In December 2016, Fischbacher was awarded the Joachim Herz Research prize for "Best research work". The prize acknowledged his research on reciprocity in social exchange and the development of the z-Tree laboratory software.[17]
