Electronic warfare (EW) is a technology that interferes withradio communications between the operator and all enemyelectronic equipment, includingunmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),air defense systems (ADS), andartillery. Following the onset of the full-scaleRussian invasion of Ukraine, EWs have played a key role in ensuring Ukraine's defensive capability. In particular, means ofradio-electronic warfare deal with the suppression ofmobile andsatellite communications to disorient the enemy. EW has had a strong influence on all aspects of theRussian-Ukrainian war.
According to "ArmiyaFM", the first experience of combat use of Ukrainian EW was during a peacekeeping operation inIraq.[1] The use of radio-electronic warfare among theArmed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) prevented the undermining of any personnel and equipment of the Ukrainian peacekeeping group. After this, other nations began to learn about Ukrainian EW technology allowing its specialists to be appraised at a higher level of ability. Until 2014, only four enterprises manufactured EW devices in Ukraine. Three of them were located inDonetsk and theDonetsk Oblast in territory occupied by Russia as of August 2024.[2] These factories produced only eight types of installations, consisting mostly of radio suppression andradio jamming equipment. After Russiaoccupied Crimea and the eastern regions of Ukraine in 2014, the demand for EW in Ukraine increased dramatically, leading to significant production increases and the founding of new private enterprises. Despite this, on February 24, 2022, almost 65% of the anti-aircraft missiles that the AFU had in their arsenal were still ofSoviet design.[3]
After the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the number of domestically produced EWs doubled. Companies receive active support in thecodification of their products from theBrave1 platform, aGovernment of Ukraine platform to bring together companies to promote innovation and development of military technologies for Ukrainian defense. During the platform's first year of operation in 2023, it united more than 50 manufacturers. In 2023, theMinistry of Digital Transformation announced the Ukrainian development of its EW system created as part of the Brave1— the Piranha AVD 360 program. The autumn 2023 Russian losses were high, but their more distributed and decentralized electronic systems were more effective in blunting Ukrainian counteroffensives, particularly in jammingAmerican rockets.[4] As of 2024, almost the entire share of the production of electronic warfare equipment in Ukraine is exclusively produced by private companies, some of which work in partnership with foreign manufacturers.[1][3][5] Ukrainian companies have increased production of jamming gear and have become nimble in adjusting to battlefield changes of thefrequency spectrum being utilized.[6]
In conflict, dominance in the electromagnetic space gives one party an advantage over its enemy in the management of troops and weapons. This is greatly aided by means of radio-electronic warfare (EW), which is one of the most significant and important elements of contemporary wars and, as a result, has had the most rapid and dynamic development among all modern types of weapons. Ukrainian EW tools can be divided into several main types:

Signals intelligence (Ukrainian:Засоби радіоелектронної розвідки) systems are designed to detect and analyze enemy combatant signals. SI is very important formilitary intelligence because it acts as the main, and in many cases the only, way to obtain intelligence information of adversarial parties. SI detects intelligence, and can intercept and analyze radio transmissions and radio-electronic emissions. SI can also determine the location of enemy radio-electronic systems, and works without direct contact with intelligence objects, can cover large distances and space, and can work continuously at different times of the year and day and in any weather. SI systems used by Ukraine can provide highly reliable information due to it directly coming from the enemy. According to various estimates, 80–90% of primary information uncovered by Ukraine is obtained by means of SI.[7]
Radio electronic suppression (Ukrainian:Засоби радіоелектронного подавлення) is aimed at thejamming and suppression of enemy signals, including radio communications, drone control systems, and other electronic systems. RES counters any weapon systems that use radio-electronic oropto-electronic (infrared orlaser) guidance or aiming systems. In their work, RES systems use two methods: they set obstacles and generate false signals. In most modern examples of electronic suppression technology, especially in thenaval forces, both methods are used in a single integrated system. This also includes false targets, which are fakes that imitate real military objects. They can be similar in shape to amissile, drone or other type of weapon, and can emit thermal and electronic traces as well as engine sounds to sound closer to a real weapon. Deceptions are used to distract the enemy and force them to waste ammunition on non-existent military objects.[8]
Radio-electronic protection (Ukrainian:Засоби радіоелектронного захисту) is used for the physical and technical protection of Ukraine's own control systems and combat capability, as well as protection of personnel. REP acts as a response to electronic suppression measures, whose components are in constant competition with each other. Ukraine's current REP models generally correspond to the development and introduction of weapons and counterweapons, akin to theshield and thesword in historical combat. REP covers all methods and means that radio-electronics has, including measures to ensure the concealment of the actions ofradar systems, methods of complexation and duplication, and special methods of interference-resistant signal processing. REP is very important in combat, because in case of weakness of radio-electronic protection, the enemy can get receive all the information about any vulnerable points in the army.[8]

Ukraine has a variety of EW systems in service. According to the range of their action, they are conditionally divided into three groups: trench, tactical and strategic-operational:[8]
In addition, systems can be mobile and can be easily moved and quickly redeployed in any place to provide powerful radio-electronic protection. Mobile systems can also be placed on cars. Mobile stations can also bestationary systems — placed on permanent objects to provide long-term protection of important infrastructure objects from radio-electronic threats.[8]
Ukrainian EW systems are characterized by Ukrainian information security researchers emphasize the role of advanced technology and reliability to create combat-ready systems to work effectively in different conditions and counter a wide range of threats. In February 2024, the Pokrova EW system became operational in Ukraine, and is capable of intercepting Russian attack drones. The system uses technology that replaces satellite signals and confuses the navigation devices of enemy drones, causing them to deviate from the route and fly past the target or fall without causing damage.[8]

Due to the necessity of dynamic innovation of Ukrainian EW systems to resist Russia's invasion, many Ukrainian EW technologies are unique systems that do not have analogues either in Russia or in theWest, with an emphasis on their efficiency and compactness. The following settings can be noted:[7][8]
Ukrainian EW complexes play a significant role in the post-invasionRusso-Ukrainian war. They work not only on the battlefield, but throughout the country, and are capable of protecting critical infrastructure,nuclear plants, andhydraulic structures.[9]
With the assistance of EW systems during theBattle of Kyiv in 2022, the Ukrainian military destroyed Russian combat drones and effectively blocked reconnaissance devices. Another example of EW playing a key role in protecting civilians took place during the Russian missile attack on the night of January 13, 2023.[10] Russia usedcruise,aeroballistic,ballistic, aircraft-fired, and anti-aircraft guided missiles in addition to attack drones against Ukraine. Ukrainian air defense destroyed 7Kh-101/kh-555/Kh-55 cruise missiles and 1Kh-59 guided air missile. TheUkrainian Air Force noted that more than 20 air attack vehicles were not included in the downed statistics, because they simply lost control and fell due to active interference from electronic warfare equipment.[11] The Americanthink tank "Institute for the Study of War" (ISW) called this event a "change" in the capabilities of Ukrainian EW. It was noted there that earlier, the capabilities of radio-electronic warfare were used to disable drones, but not missiles.[10][12]
In just one week on the frontline, from July 18 to July 24, 2024, Ukrainian fighters of the electronic warfare units managed to neutralize almost 8,000 Russian drones.[13] The commander of theGround Forces,Lieutenant GeneralOleksandr Pavlyuk, reported on the results of the work of the Ukrainian EW. He published statistics, which stated that EW "suppressed" 7,916 enemy UAVs. Of these, 4,313 units were winged drones, and 3,603 units wereFPV drones.[14]
Calculations showed that 1,979 drones per day or 82 per hour were forcibly stopped on the 700-kilometer front line.[13]
Ukraine actively cooperates with other countries in the field ofelectronic warfare (EW) production, and experts regularly participate in international training and exchange of experience. On February 17, 2024, theCoalition of Drones officially began its work. This is an organization of countries referred to as a capability coalition, established as a subgroup of theUkraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), that participates in the production and transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles, including EW, to Ukraine in order to repel Russian attacks. The leaders of the coalition are theUnited Kingdom andLatvia.Denmark,Estonia,Lithuania,Canada, theNetherlands,Germany andSweden also joined the work.[15]
An extra separateElectronic Warfare capability coalition (under the leadership of Germany and Sweden) have been formed within UDCG in April 2025, for procurement of EW capabilities, training, and the development of EW policies and doctrine.[16][17]