TheTruman Doctrine is aU.S. foreign policy that pledges American support for U.S.-aligned nations against allegedauthoritarian threats.[1] The doctrine originated with the primary goal of countering the growth of theSoviet bloc during theCold War. It was announced toCongress by PresidentHarry S. Truman on March 12, 1947,[2] and further developed on July 4, 1948, when he pledged to oppose thecommunistrebellions in Greece andSoviet demands on Turkey. More generally, the Truman Doctrine implied U.S. support for other nations threatened by Moscow. It led to the formation ofNATO in 1949. Historians often use Truman's speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, to date the start of the Cold War.[3]
Truman told Congress that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[4] Truman contended that becausetotalitarian regimes coerced free peoples, they automatically represented a threat to international peace and thenational security of the United States. Truman argued that if Greece and Turkey did not receive the aid, they would inevitably fall out of the United States' sphere of influence and into the communist bloc, withgrave consequences throughout the region.
The Truman Doctrine was informally extended to become the basis of American Cold War policy throughout Europe and around the world.[5] It shifted U.S. policy toward theSoviet Union from a wartime alliance tocontainment of Soviet expansion, as advocated by diplomatGeorge F. Kennan.
At the conclusion ofWorld War II,Turkey was pressured by the Soviet government to allow Soviet shipping to flow freely through theTurkish straits, which connected theBlack Sea to theMediterranean. As the Turkish government would not submit to the Soviet Union's requests, tensions arose in the region, leading to a show of naval force on the site of the Straits. Since British assistance to Turkey had ended in 1947, the U.S. dispatched military aid to ensure that Turkey would retain chief control of the passage. Turkey received $100 million in economic and military aid and theU.S. Navy sent theMidway-class aircraft carrierUSS Franklin D. Roosevelt.[6]
KingGeorge II of Greece (r. 1922–1924, 1935–1947), whose rule was opposed by communist insurgents in the Greek Civil War
In October 1944, British and Greek forceslanded in Greece following the gradual withdrawal ofAxis occupational forces from the country. Despite theCaserta Agreement stipulating that allGreek resistance factions would join a newGreek Army under British command, GeneralRonald Scobie ordered theEAM's armed wing,ELAS, to unilaterally disarm on December, 1 1944. EAM responded to the "Scobie Order" by organizing a rally inAthens on December 3 in protest, which was fired upon by Greek security forces, killing 28 protestors. This sparked theDekemvriana, a series of clashes between EAM and Greek government forces along with their British allies. It ended in EAM's defeat and disarmament under the terms of theTreaty of Varkiza, which marked the end of ELAS and broke EAM's power. This was followed by theWhite Terror, a period of persecution against Greek leftists, which contributed to the outbreak of theGreek Civil War in 1946.[7][8]
After the civil war broke out,Communist Party of Greece (KKE) guerrillas revolted against the internationally recognized Greek government which was formed afterelections in 1946 which were boycotted by the KKE. The British realized that the KKE were being directly funded byJosip Broz Tito in neighboringYugoslavia. In line with the Anglo-Sovietpercentages agreement, the KKE received no help from the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia provided them support and sanctuary againstJoseph Stalin's wishes.[9] By late 1946, Britain informed the U.S. that due to its own declining economy, it could no longer continue to provide military and economic support to the Greek government.[10]
In 1946–47, the United States and the Soviet Union moved from being wartime allies to Cold War adversaries. The breakdown of Allied cooperation inGermany provided a backdrop of escalating tensions for the Truman Doctrine.[5] To Truman, the growing unrest in Greece began to look like apincer movement against the oil-rich areas of theMiddle East and the warm-water ports of the Mediterranean.[11] In February 1946, George F. Kennan, an American diplomat inMoscow, sent his famed "Long Telegram", which predicted the Soviets would only respond to force and that the best way to handle them would be through a long-term strategy of containment; that is, stopping their geographical expansion. After the British warned that they could no longer help Greece, and followingPrime MinisterKonstantinos Tsaldaris's visit toWashington, D.C. in December 1946 to ask for assistance,[12] theU.S. State Department formulated a plan. Aid would be given to both Greece and Turkey, to help cool the long-standing rivalry between them.[citation needed]
American policy makers recognized the instability of the region, fearing that if Greece was lost to communism, Turkey would not last long. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be endangered.[13] A regionaldomino effect threat therefore guided the American decision. Greece and Turkey were strategic allies important for geographical reasons as well, for the fall of Greece would put the Soviets on a particularly dangerous flank for the Turks, and strengthen the Soviet Union's ability to cut off allied supply lines in the event of war.[14]
Truman's 1947 message to Congress, recommending assistance to Greece and Turkey
To pass any legislation, Truman needed the support of theRepublicans, who controlled both houses of Congress. The chief Republican spokesman SenatorArthur Vandenberg strongly supported Truman and overcame the doubts of isolationists such as SenatorRobert A. Taft.[15]: 127 Truman laid the groundwork for his request by having key congressional leaders meet with himself,Secretary of StateGeorge C. Marshall, and Undersecretary of StateDean Acheson. Acheson laid out the "domino theory" in the starkest terms, comparing a communist state to a rotten apple that could spread its infection to an entire barrel. Vandenberg was impressed, and advised Truman to appear before Congress and "scare the hell out of the American people."[15]: 127–128 On March 7, Acheson warned Truman that the communists in Greece could win within weeks without outside aid.[2]: 545
When a draft for Truman's address was circulated to policymakers, Marshall, Kennan, and others criticized it for containing excess "rhetoric." Truman responded that, as Vandenberg had suggested, his request would only be approved if he played up the threat.[2]: 546
On March 12, 1947, Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress. In his eighteen-minute speech, he stated:
I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.[2]: 547
The domestic reaction to Truman's speech was broadly positive, though there were dissenters. Anti-communists in both parties supported both Truman's proposed aid package and the doctrine behind it, andCollier's described it as a "popularity jackpot" for the President.[2]: 548 [15]: 129 Influential columnistWalter Lippmann was more skeptical, noting the open-ended nature of Truman's pledge; he felt so strongly that he almost came to blows while arguing with Acheson over the doctrine.[2]: 549 [16]: 615 Others argued that the Greek monarchy Truman proposed to defend was itself a repressive government, rather than a democracy.[16]: 615
Despite these objections, the fear that there was a growing communist threat almost guaranteed the bill's passage.[16]: 616 In May 1947, two months after Truman's request, a large majority of Congress approved $400 million in military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.[2]: 553–554 [15]: 129 Increased American aid assisted the Greek government's defeat of the KKE, after interim defeats for government forces from 1946 to 1948.[16]: 616–617 The Truman Doctrine was the first in a series of containment moves by the United States, followed by economic restoration of Western Europe through theMarshall Plan and military containment by the creation ofNATO in 1949.[citation needed]
HistorianEric Foner writes that the doctrine "set a precedent for American assistance toanticommunist regimes throughout the world, no matter how undemocratic, and for the creation of a set of global military alliances directed against the Soviet Union."[17]
The Truman Doctrine underpinned American Cold War policy in Europe and around the world. In the words of historianJames T. Patterson:
The Truman Doctrine was a highly publicized commitment of a sort the administration had not previously undertaken. Its sweeping rhetoric, promising that the United States should aid all 'free people' being subjugated, set the stage for innumerable later ventures that led to globalisation commitments. It was in these ways a major step.[15]: 129
Historian Dennis Merill argues that the doctrine endured because it addressed broader cultural insecurity regarding modern life in a globalized world. It dealt with Washington's concern over communism's domino effect, it enabled a media-sensitive presentation of the doctrine that wonbipartisan support, and it mobilized American economic power to modernize and stabilize unstable regions without direct military intervention. It brought nation-building activities and modernization programs to the forefront of foreign policy.[5]
The Truman Doctrine became a metaphor for aid to keep a nation from communist influence. Truman used disease imagery not only to communicate a sense of impending disaster in the spread of communism but also to create a "rhetorical vision" of containing it by extending a protective shield around non-communist countries throughout the world. It echoed the "quarantine the aggressor" policy Truman's predecessor,Franklin D. Roosevelt, had sought to impose to containGerman andJapanese expansion in 1937 ("quarantine" suggested the role of public health officials handling an infectious disease). The medical metaphor extended beyond the immediate aims of the Truman Doctrine in that the imagery, combined with fire and flood imagery evocative of disaster, provided the U.S. with an easy transition to direct military confrontation in later years with theKorean War and theVietnam War. By framing ideological differences in life or death terms, Truman was able to garner support for this communism-containing policy.[18]
^"The Truman Doctrine, 1947".Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State.Archived from the original on May 16, 2017. RetrievedSeptember 24, 2022.
^Bærentzen, Lars, John O. Iatrides, and Ole Langwitz. Smith.Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945–1949. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1987. 273–280. Google Books. Web. 28 Apr. 2010.onlineArchived 2023-04-06 at theWayback Machine
^Painter 2012, p. 29: "Although circumstances differed greatly in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, U.S. officials interpreted events in all three places as part of a Soviet plan to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Mention of oil was deliberately deleted from Truman's March 12, 1947, address before Congress pledging resistance to communist expansion anywhere in the world; but guarding access to oil was an important part of the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was named after Harry S. Truman. This doctrine stated that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces."
One draft, for example, of Truman's speech spoke of the "great natural resources" of the Middle East at stake (Kolko & Kolko 1972, p. 341).
^Freeland, Richard M. (1970).The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. pp. g. 90.
^Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards (2006).The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism. The University Press of Kentucky. p. 64.
^McGhee, George (1990).The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East. St. Harry's Press. pp. g. 21.
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