TheTreaty of Versailles[ii] was apeace treaty signed on 28 June 1919. As the most important treaty ofWorld War I, it ended the state of war between Germany and most of theAllied Powers. It was signed in thePalace of Versailles, exactly five years after theassassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which led to the war. The otherCentral Powers on the German side signed separate treaties.[iii] Although thearmistice of 11 November 1918 ended the actual fighting, and agreed certain principles and conditions including the payment of reparations, it took six months of Allied negotiations at theParis Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty. Germany was not allowed to participate in the negotiations before signing the treaty.
The treatyrequired Germany to disarm, make territorial concessions, extradite alleged war criminals, agree toKaiser Wilhelm being put on trial, recognise the independence of states whose territory had previously been part of the German Empire, and payreparations to theEntente powers. The most critical and controversial provision in the treaty was: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." The other members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles. This article,Article 231, became known as the "War Guilt" clause.
Critics includingJohn Maynard Keynes declared the treaty too harsh, styling it as a "Carthaginian peace", and saying the reparations were excessive and counterproductive. On the other hand, prominent Allied figures such as French MarshalFerdinand Foch criticized the treaty for treating Germany too leniently. This is still the subject of ongoing debate by historians and economists.
The result of these competing and sometimes conflicting goals among the victors was a compromise that left no one satisfied. In particular, Germany was neitherpacified nor conciliated, nor was it permanently weakened. The United States never ratified the Versailles treaty; instead it made a separate peace treaty with Germany, albeit based on the Versailles treaty. The problems that arose from the treaty would lead to theLocarno Treaties, which improved relations between Germany and the other European powers. The reparation system was reorganized and payments reduced in theDawes Plan and theYoung Plan. Bitter resentment of the treaty powered therise of theNazi Party, and eventually the outbreak of asecond World War.
Although it is often referred to as the "Versailles Conference", only the actual signing of the treaty took place at the historic palace. Most of the negotiations were in Paris, with the "Big Four" meetings taking place generally at the FrenchMinistry of Foreign Affairs on theQuai d'Orsay.
Newsreel footage of the signing of the peace treaty at Versailles
War broke out following theJuly Crisis in 1914. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, followed quickly by Germany declaring war on Russia on 1 August, and on Belgium and France on 3 August. The German invasion of Belgium on 3 August led to a declaration of war by Britain on Germany on 4 August, creating the conflict that became theFirst World War.[4] Two alliances faced off, theCentral Powers (led by Germany) and theTriple Entente (led by Britain, France and Russia). Other countries entered as fighting raged widely acrossEurope, as well as theMiddle East,Africa andAsia. Having seen the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in theFebruary Revolution and the Kerensky government in theOctober Revolution, the newRussian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic underVladimir Lenin in March 1918 signed theTreaty of Brest-Litovsk, amounting to a surrender that was highly favourable to Germany. Sensing victory before theAmerican Expeditionary Forces could be ready, Germany now shifted forces to the Western Front and tried to overwhelm the Allies. It failed. Instead, the Allies won decisively on the battlefield, overwhelmed Germany's Turkish, Austrian, and Bulgarian allies, and forced anarmistice in November 1918 that resembled a surrender.[5]
The United States entered the war against the Central Powers in 1917 and PresidentWoodrow Wilson played a significant role in shaping the peace terms. His expressed aim was to detach the war from nationalistic disputes and ambitions. On 8 January 1918, Wilson issued theFourteen Points. They outlined a policy offree trade,open agreements, and democracy. While the term was not used,self-determination was assumed. It called for a negotiated end to the war, international disarmament, the withdrawal of the Central Powers from occupied territories, the creation of aPolish state, the redrawing of Europe's borders along ethnic lines, and the formation of aLeague of Nations to guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of all states.[6][n. 3]It called for what it characterised as a just and democratic peace uncompromised by territorialannexation. The Fourteen Points were based on the research of theInquiry, a team of about 150 advisors led by foreign-policy advisorEdward M. House, into the topics likely to arise in the expected peace conference.[7]
Map showing the Western Front as it stood on 11 November 1918. The German frontier of 1914 had been crossed in the vicinities ofMulhouse,Château-Salins, andMarieulles in Alsace-Lorraine. The post-war bridgeheads over the Rhine are also shown.
During the autumn of 1918, the Central Powers began to collapse.[8] Desertion rates within the German army began to increase, and civilian strikes drastically reduced war production.[9][10] On theWestern Front, theAllied forces launched theHundred Days Offensive and decisively defeated the German western armies.[11] Sailors of theImperial German Navy at Kielmutinied in response to thenaval order of 24 October 1918, which prompted uprisings in Germany, which became known as theGerman Revolution.[12][13] The German government tried to obtain a peace settlement based on the Fourteen Points, and maintained it was on this basis that they surrendered. Following negotiations, the Allied powers and Germanysigned an armistice, which came into effect on 11 November while German forces were still positioned inFrance andBelgium.[14][15][16]
Many aspects of the Versailles treaty that were later criticised were agreed first in the 11 November armistice agreement, whilst the war was still ongoing. These included the German evacuation ofGerman-occupied France,Belgium,Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine, and theleft bank of the Rhine (all of which were to be administered by the Allies under the armistice agreement), the surrender of a large quantity of war materiel, and the agreed payment of "reparation for damage done".[17]
German forces evacuated occupied France, Belgium, and Luxembourg within the fifteen days required by the armistice agreement.[18] By late 1918, Allied troops had entered Germany and began the occupation of the Rhineland under the agreement, in the process establishing bridgeheads across the Rhine in case of renewed fighting at Cologne, Koblenz, and Mainz. Allied and German forces were additionally to be separated by a 10 km-wide demilitarised zone.[19][20]
Both Germany and Great Britain were dependent on imports of food and raw materials, most of which had to be shipped across theAtlantic Ocean. The Blockade of Germany was anaval operation conducted by the Allied Powers to stop the supply of raw materials and foodstuffs reaching the Central Powers. The GermanKaiserliche Marine was mainly restricted to theGerman Bight and usedcommerce raiders andunrestricted submarine warfare for a counter-blockade. The German Board of Public Health in December 1918 stated that763,000 German civilians had died during the Allied blockade, although an academic study in 1928 put the death toll at424,000 people.[21]
The blockade was maintained for eight months after the Armistice in November 1918, into the following year of 1919. Foodstuffs imports into Germany were controlled by the Allies after theArmistice with Germany until Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919.[22] In March 1919, Churchill informed the House of Commons, that the ongoing blockade was a success and "Germany is very near starvation."[23] From January 1919 to March 1919, Germany refused to agree to Allied demands that Germany surrender its merchant ships to Allied ports to transport food supplies. Some Germans considered the armistice to be a temporary cessation of the war and knew, if fighting broke out again, their ships would be seized.[24] Over the winter of 1919, the situation became desperate and Germany finally agreed to surrender its fleet in March.[25] The Allies then allowed for the import of 270,000 tons of foodstuffs.[25]
Both German and non-German observers have argued that these were the most devastating months of the blockade for German civilians,[26] though disagreement persists as to the extent and who is truly at fault.[27][28][29][30][31] According toMax Rubner 100,000 German civilians died due to the continuation blockade after the armistice.[32] In the UK,Labour Party member and anti-war activistRobert Smillie issued a statement in June 1919 condemning continuation of the blockade, claiming 100,000 German civilians had died as a result.[33][34]
Talks between the Allies to establish a common negotiating position started on 18 January 1919, in theSalle de l'Horloge (Clock Room) at theFrench Foreign Ministry on theQuai d'Orsay in Paris.[35]Initially, 70 delegates from 27 nations participated in the negotiations.[36]Russia was excluded due to their signing of a separate peace (theTreaty of Brest-Litovsk) and early withdrawal from the war. Furthermore, German negotiators were excluded to deny them an opportunity to divide the Allies diplomatically.[37]
Initially, a "Council of Ten" (comprising two delegates each from Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan) met officially to decide the peace terms. This council was replaced by the "Council of Five", formed from each country's foreign ministers, to discuss minor matters. French Prime MinisterGeorges Clemenceau, Italian Prime MinisterVittorio Emanuele Orlando, British Prime MinisterDavid Lloyd George, and United States PresidentWoodrow Wilson formed the "Big Four" (at one point becoming the "Big Three" following the temporary withdrawal of Orlando). These four men met in 145 closed sessions to make all the major decisions, which were later ratified by the entire assembly. The minor powers attended a weekly "Plenary Conference" that discussed issues in a general forum but made no decisions. These members formed over 50 commissions that made various recommendations, many of which were incorporated into the final text of the treaty.[38][39][40]
France had lost 1.3 million soldiers, including25% of French men aged18–30, as well as400,000 civilians. France had also been more physically damaged than any other nation; the so-calledzone rouge (Red Zone), the most industrialized region and the source of most coal and iron ore in the north-east, had been devastated, and in the final days of the war, mines had been flooded and railways, bridges and factories destroyed.[41]Clemenceau intended to ensure the security of France, by weakening Germany economically, militarily, territorially and by supplanting Germany as the leading producer of steel in Europe.[41][42][43]British economist and Versailles negotiatorJohn Maynard Keynes summarized this position as attempting to "set the clock back and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished."[44]
Clemenceau told Wilson: "America is far away, protected by the ocean. Not evenNapoleon himself could touch England. You are both sheltered; we are not".[45]The French wanted a frontier on theRhine, to protect France from a German invasion and compensate for French demographic and economic inferiority.[46][47]American and British representatives refused the French claim and after two months of negotiations, the French accepted a British pledge to provide an immediate alliance with France if Germany attacked again, and Wilson agreed to put a similar proposal to theSenate. Clemenceau had told theChamber of Deputies, in December 1918, that his goal was to maintain an alliance with both countries. Clemenceau accepted the offer, in return for an occupation of the Rhineland for fifteen years and that Germany would alsodemilitarise the Rhineland.[48]
French negotiators required reparations, to make Germany pay for the destruction induced throughout the war and to decrease German strength.[41] The French also wanted the iron ore and coal of theSaar Valley, by annexation to France.[49]The French were willing to accept a smaller amount ofWorld War I reparations than the Americans would concede and Clemenceau was willing to discuss German capacity to pay with the German delegation, before the final settlement was drafted. In April and May 1919, the French and Germans held separate talks, on mutually acceptable arrangements on issues like reparation, reconstruction and industrial collaboration. France, along with the British Dominions and Belgium, opposedLeague of Nations mandates and favored annexation of formerGerman colonies.[50]
The French, who had suffered significantly in the areas occupied by Germany during the war, were in favour of trying German war criminals, including the Kaiser. In the face of American objections that there was no applicable existing law under which the Kaiser could be tried, Clemenceau took the view that the "law of responsibility" overruled all other laws and that putting the Kaiser on trial offered the opportunity to establish this as an international precedent.[51]
Britain had suffered heavy financial costs but suffered little physical devastation during the war.[52] British public opinion wanted to make Germany pay for the War.[53]Public opinion favoured a "just peace", which would force Germany to pay reparations and be unable to repeat the aggression of 1914, although those of a "liberal and advanced opinion" shared Wilson's ideal of a peace of reconciliation.[14]
In private Lloyd George opposed revenge and attempted to compromise between Clemenceau's demands and the Fourteen Points, because Europe would eventually have to reconcile with Germany.[54]Lloyd George wanted terms of reparation that would not cripple the German economy, so that Germany would remain a viable economic power and trading partner.[55][54][52] By arguing that British war pensions and widows' allowances should be included in the German reparation sum, Lloyd George ensured that a large amount would go to the British Empire.[56]
Lloyd George also intended to maintain aEuropean balance of power to thwart a French attempt to establish itself as the dominant European power. A revived Germany would be a counterweight to France and a deterrent to Bolshevik Russia. Lloyd George also wanted to neutralize the German navy to keep theRoyal Navy as the greatest naval power in the world; dismantle the German colonial empire with several of its territorial possessions ceded to Britain and others being established asLeague of Nations mandates, a position opposed by theDominions.[54]
Together with the French, the British favoured putting German war criminals on trial, and included the Kaiser in this. Already in 1916Herbert Asquith had declared the intention "to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they be and whatever their station", and a resolution of the war cabinet in 1918 reaffirmed this intent.[57] Lloyd George declared that the British people would not accept a treaty that did not include terms on this, though he wished to limit the charges solely to violation of the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.[58] The British were also well aware that the Kaiser having sought refuge in the Netherlands meant that any trial was unlikely to take place and therefore any Article demanding it was likely to be a dead letter.[59]
American aims
Before the American entry into the war, Wilson had talked of a "peace without victory".[60] This position fluctuated following the US entry into the war. Wilson spoke of the German aggressors, with whom there could be no compromised peace.[61]On 8 January 1918, however, Wilson delivered a speech (known as theFourteen Points) that declared the American peace objectives: the rebuilding of theEuropean economy, self-determination of European and Middle Eastern ethnic groups, the promotion of free trade, the creation of appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, the creation of a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace.[62] The aim of the latter was to provide a forum to revise the peace treaties as needed, and deal with problems that arose as a result of the peace and the rise of new states.[63][54]
Wilson brought along top intellectuals as advisors to the American peace delegation, and the overall American position echoed the Fourteen Points. Wilson firmly opposed harsh treatment on Germany.[62] While the British and French wanted to largely annex the German colonial empire, Wilson saw that as a violation of the fundamental principles of justice and human rights of the native populations, and favored them having the right of self-determination via the creation of mandates. The promoted idea called for the major powers to act as disinterested trustees over a region, aiding the native populations until they could govern themselves.[64]In spite of this position and in order to ensure that Japan did not refuse to join the League of Nations, Wilson favored turning over the former German colony ofShandong, inEastern China, to theJapanese Empire rather than return the area to theRepublic of China's control.[65]Further confounding the Americans, was US internal partisan politics. In November 1918, theRepublican Party won theSenate election by a slim margin. Wilson, aDemocrat, refused to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation making his efforts seem partisan, and contributed to a risk of political defeat at home.[62]
On the subject of war crimes, the Americans differed to the British and French in that Wilson's proposal was that any trial of the Kaiser should be solely a political and moral affair, and not one of criminal responsibility, meaning that the death penalty would be precluded.[66] This was based on the American view, particularly those ofRobert Lansing,[57] that there was no applicable law under which the Kaiser could be tried.[51] Additionally, the Americans favoured trying other German war criminals before military tribunals rather than an international court, with prosecutions being limited to "violation[s] of the laws and customs of war", and opposed any trials based on violations against what was called "laws of humanity".[66]
Italian aims
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and his foreign ministerSidney Sonnino, anAnglican of British origins, worked primarily to secure the partition of theHabsburg Empire and their attitude towards Germany was not as hostile. Generally speaking, Sonnino was in line with the British position while Orlando favored a compromise between Clemenceau and Wilson. Within the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, Orlando obtained certain results such as the permanent membership of Italy in the security council of theLeague of Nations and a promised transfer of BritishJubaland and FrenchAozou strip to theItalian colonies of Somalia andLibya respectively.Italian nationalists, however, saw the War as a "mutilated victory" for what they considered to be little territorial gains achieved in the other treaties directly impacting Italy's borders. Orlando was ultimately forced to abandon the conference and resign. Orlando refused to seeWorld War I as a mutilated victory, replying at nationalists calling for a greater expansion that "Italy today is a great state....on par with the great historic and contemporary states. This is, for me, our main and principal expansion."Francesco Saverio Nitti took Orlando's place in signing the treaty of Versailles.[67][incomplete short citation]
The Italian leadership were divided on whether to try the Kaiser. Sonnino considered that putting the Kaiser on trial could result in him becoming a "patriotic martyr". Orlando, in contrast, stated that "the ex-Kaiser ought to pay like other criminals", but was less sure about whether the Kaiser should betried as a criminal or merely have a political verdict cast against him. Orlando also considered that "[t]he question of the constitution of the Court presents almost insurmountable difficulties".[68]
Treaty content and signing
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German delegateJohannes Bell signing the Treaty of Versailles in theHall of Mirrors, with various Allied delegations sitting and standing in front of him
In June 1919, the Allies declared that war would resume if the German government did not sign the treaty they had agreed to among themselves. Thegovernment headed byPhilipp Scheidemann was unable to agree on a common position, and Scheidemann himself resigned rather than agree to sign the treaty.Gustav Bauer, the head of the new government, sent a telegram stating his intention to sign the treaty if certain articles were withdrawn, including Articles 227 to 231 (i.e., the Articles related to the extradition of the Kaiser for trial, the extradition of German war criminals for trial before Allied tribunals, the handing over of documents relevant for war crimes trials, and accepting liability for war reparations).[69][iv] In response, the Allies issued an ultimatum stating that Germany would have to accept the treaty or face an invasion of Allied forces across theRhine within24 hours. On 23 June, Bauer capitulated and sent a second telegram with a confirmation that a German delegation would arrive shortly to sign the treaty.[70]On 28 June 1919, the fifth anniversary of theassassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the immediate impetus for the war), the peace treaty was signed.[1] The treaty had clauses ranging from war crimes, the prohibition on the merging of theRepublic of German Austria with Germany without the consent of the League of Nations,freedom of navigation on majorEuropean rivers, to the returning of aQuran to the king ofHedjaz.[n. 4][n. 5][n. 6][n. 7]
The treaty stripped Germany of 65,000 km2 (25,000 sq mi) of territory and 7 million people. It also required Germany to give up the gains made via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and grant independence to the protectorates that had been established.[71]InWestern Europe, Germany was required to recognize Belgian sovereignty overMoresnet and cede control of theEupen-Malmedy area. Within six months of the transfer, Belgium was required to conduct aplebiscite on whether the citizens of the region wanted to remain under Belgian sovereignty or return to German control, communicate the results to the League of Nations and abide by the League's decision.[n. 8] The Belgian transitional administration, under High Commissioner GeneralHerman Baltia, was responsible for the organisation and control of this process, held between January and June 1920. The plebiscite itself was held without asecret ballot, and organized as a consultation in which all citizens who opposed the annexation had to formally register their protest. Ultimately, only 271 of 33,726 voters signed the protest list, of which 202 were German state servants. After the Belgian government reported this result, the League of Nations confirmed the change of status on 20 September 1920, with the line of the German-Belgian border finally fixed by a League of Nations commission in 1922.[72] To compensate for the destruction of French coal mines, Germany was to cede the output of theSaar coalmines to France andcontrol of the Saar to the League of Nations for 15 years; a plebiscite would then be held to decide sovereignty.[n. 9]The treaty restored the provinces ofAlsace-Lorraine to France by rescinding the treaties ofVersailles andFrankfurt of 1871 as they pertained to this issue.[n. 10]France was able to make the claim that the provinces ofAlsace-Lorraine were indeed part of France and not part of Germany by disclosing a letter sent from the Prussian King to theEmpress Eugénie that Eugénie provided, in whichWilliam I wrote that the territories of Alsace-Lorraine were requested by Germany for the sole purpose of national defense and not to expand the German territory.[73] The sovereignty ofSchleswig-Holstein was to be resolved by a plebiscite to be held at a future time (seeSchleswig Plebiscites).[74]
InCentral Europe Germany was to recognize the independence ofCzechoslovakia and cede parts of the province ofUpper Silesia to them.[n. 11]Germany had to recognize the independence ofPoland, which hadregained its independence following a national revolution against the occupying Central Powers, and renounce "all rights and title" over Polish territory. Portions of Upper Silesia were to be ceded to Poland, with the future of the rest of the province to be decided by plebiscite. The border would be fixed with regard to the vote and to the geographical and economic conditions of each locality.[n. 12]TheProvince of Posen (nowPoznań), which had come under Polish control during theGreater Poland Uprising, was also to be ceded to Poland.[75][76]Pomerelia (Eastern Pomerania), on historical and ethnic grounds, was transferred to Poland so that the new state could have access to the sea and became known as thePolish Corridor.[77]The sovereignty of part of southernEast Prussia was to be decided viaplebiscite while the East PrussianSoldau area, which was astride the rail line betweenWarsaw andDanzig, was transferred to Poland outright without plebiscite.[n. 13][78]An area of 51,800 square kilometres (20,000 square miles) was transferred to Poland under the agreement.[79]Memel was to be ceded to the Allied and Associated powers, for disposal according to their wishes.[n. 14]Germany was to cede the city of Danzig and its hinterland, including the delta of theVistula River on theBaltic Sea, for the League of Nations to establish theFree City of Danzig.[n. 15]
Article 119 of the treaty required Germany to renounce sovereignty over former colonies and Article 22 converted the territories intoLeague of Nations mandates under the control of Allied states.[n. 16]Togoland andGerman Kamerun (Cameroon) were transferred to France, aside from portions given to Britain,British Togoland andBritish Cameroon.Ruanda and Urundi were allocated to Belgium, whereasGerman South-West Africa went to South Africa and Britain obtainedGerman East Africa.[80][81][82] As compensation for the German invasion of Portuguese Africa, Portugal was granted theKionga Triangle, a sliver of German East Africa in northernMozambique.[83]Article 156 of the treaty transferred German concessions inShandong, China, to Japan, not to China. Japan was granted all German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator and those south of the equator went to Australia, except forGerman Samoa, which was taken byNew Zealand.[81][n. 17]
Military restrictions
The treaty was comprehensive and complex in the restrictions imposed upon the post-war German armed forces (theReichswehr). The provisions were intended to make theReichswehr incapable of offensive action and to encourage international disarmament.[84][n. 18]Germany was to demobilize sufficient soldiers by 31 March 1920 to leave an army of no more than100,000 men in a maximum of seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. The treaty laid down the organisation of the divisions and support units, and theGerman General Staff was to be dissolved.[n. 19]Military schools for officer training were limited to three, one school per arm, and conscription was abolished. Private soldiers andnon-commissioned officers were to be retained for at least twelve years andofficers for a minimum of25 years, with former officers being forbidden to attend military exercises. To prevent Germany from building up a large cadre of trained men, the number of men allowed to leave early was limited.[n. 20]
The number of civilian staff supporting the army was reduced and the police force was reduced to its pre-war size, with increases limited to population increases;paramilitary forces were forbidden.[n. 21]The Rhineland was to be demilitarized, all fortifications in the Rhineland and 50 kilometres (31 miles) east of the river were to be demolished and new construction was forbidden.[n. 22]Military structures and fortifications on the islands ofHeligoland andDüne were to be destroyed.[n. 23]Germany was prohibited fromthe arms trade, limits were imposed on the type and quantity of weapons and prohibited from the manufacture or stockpile ofchemical weapons,armoured cars,tanks and military aircraft.[n. 24]TheGerman navy was allowed sixpre-dreadnought battleships and was limited to a maximum of sixlight cruisers (not exceeding 6,000 long tons (6,100 t)), twelvedestroyers (not exceeding 800 long tons (810 t)) and twelvetorpedo boats (not exceeding 200 long tons (200 t)) and was forbiddensubmarines.[n. 25]The manpower of the navy was not to exceed15,000 men, including manning for the fleet, coast defences, signal stations, administration, other land services, officers and men of all grades and corps. The number of officers and warrant officers was not allowed to exceed1,500 men.[n. 5]Germany surrendered eightbattleships, eight light cruisers, forty-two destroyers, and fifty torpedo boats for decommissioning. Thirty-twoauxiliary ships were to be disarmed and converted to merchant use.[n. 26]Article 198 prohibited Germany from having an air force, including naval air forces, and required Germany to hand over all aerial related materials. In conjunction, Germany was forbidden to manufacture or import aircraft or related material for a period of six months following the signing of the treaty.[n. 27]
InArticle 231 Germany accepted responsibility for the losses and damages caused by the war "as a consequence of the ... aggression of Germany and her allies."[n. 28][v] The treaty required Germany to compensate the Allied powers, and it also established an Allied "Reparation Commission" to determine the exact amount which Germany would pay and the form that such payment would take. The commission was required to "give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard", and to submit its conclusions by1 May 1921. In the interim, the treaty required Germany to pay an equivalent of 20 billion gold marks ($5 billion) in gold, commodities, ships, securities or other forms. The money would help to pay for Allied occupation costs and buy food and raw materials for Germany.[85][n. 33]
To ensure compliance, the Rhineland andbridgeheads east of the Rhine were to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years.[n. 34]If Germany had not committed aggression, a staged withdrawal would take place; after five years, theCologne bridgehead and the territory north of a line along the Ruhr would be evacuated. After ten years, the bridgehead atCoblenz and the territories to the north would be evacuated and after fifteen years remaining Allied forces would be withdrawn.[n. 35]If Germany reneged on the treaty obligations, the bridgeheads would be reoccupied immediately.[n. 36]
Part I of the treaty, in common with all the treaties signed during theParis Peace Conference,[vi] was theCovenant of the League of Nations, which provided for the creation of the League, an organization for the arbitration of international disputes.[n. 37]Part XIII organized the establishment of theInternational Labour Office, to regulate hours of work, including a maximum working day and week; the regulation of the labour supply; the prevention ofunemployment; the provision of a living wage; the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment; the protection of children, young persons and women; provision for old age and injury; protection of the interests of workers when employed abroad; recognition of the principle offreedom of association; the organization of vocational and technical education and other measures.[n. 38]The treaty also called for the signatories to sign or ratify theFirst International Opium Convention.[n. 39]
War Crimes
Article 227 of the Versailles treaty required the handing over of Kaiser Wilhelm for trial "for supreme offence against international treaties and the sanctity of treaties" before a bench of five allied judges – one British, one American, one French, one Italian, and one Japanese. If found guilty the judges were to "fix such punishment which it considers should be imposed".[86] The death penalty was therefore not precluded.[66] Article 228 allowed the Allies to demand the extradition of German war criminals, who could be tried before military tribunals for crimes against "the laws and customs of war" under Article 229. To provide an evidentiary basis for such trials, Article 230 required the German government to transfer information and documents relevant to such trials.[87]
Reactions
Britain
A British news placard announcing the signing of the peace treaty
The delegates of the Commonwealth and British Government had mixed thoughts on the treaty, with some seeing the French policy as being greedy and vindictive.[88][89] Lloyd George and his private secretaryPhilip Kerr believed in the treaty, although they also felt that the French would keep Europe in a constant state of turmoil by attempting to enforce the treaty.[88] DelegateHarold Nicolson wrote "are we making a good peace?", while GeneralJan Smuts (a member of theSouth African delegation) wrote to Lloyd-George, before the signing, that the treaty was unstable and declared "Are we in our sober senses or suffering from shellshock? What has become of Wilson's 14 points?" He wanted the Germans not be made to sign at the "point of the bayonet".[90][91]Smuts issued a statement condemning the treaty and regretting that the promises of "a new international order and a fairer, better world are not written in this treaty". LordRobert Cecil said that many within theForeign Office were disappointed by the treaty.[90] The treaty received widespread approval from the general public.Bernadotte Schmitt wrote that the "average Englishman ... thought Germany got only what it deserved" as a result of the treaty,[92] but public opinion changed as German complaints mounted.[93]
Prime MinisterRamsay MacDonald, following the Germanre-militarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, stated that he was "pleased" that the treaty was "vanishing", expressing his hope that the French had been taught a "severe lesson".[89]
Status of British Dominions
The Treaty of Versailles was an important step in the status of theBritish Dominions underinternational law. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa had each made significant contributions to the British war effort, but as separate countries, rather than as British colonies. India also made a substantial troop contribution, although under direct British control, unlike the Dominions. The four Dominions and India all signed the Treaty separately from Britain,[n. 2] a clear recognition by the international community that the Dominions were no longer British colonies. "Their status defied exact analysis by both international and constitutional lawyers, but it was clear that they were no longer regarded simply as colonies of Britain."[95] By signing the Treaty individually, the four Dominions and India also werefounding members of the League of Nations in their own right, rather than simply as part of the British Empire.
France
The signing of the treaty was met with roars of approval, singing, and dancing from a crowd outside the Palace of Versailles. In Paris proper, people rejoiced at the official end of the war,[96] the return ofAlsace andLorraine to France, and that Germany had agreed to pay reparations.[97]
While France ratified the treaty and was active in the League, the jubilant mood soon gave way to a political backlash for Clemenceau. TheFrench Right saw the treaty as being too lenient and saw it as failing to achieve all of France's demands.Left-wing politicians attacked the treaty and Clemenceau for being too harsh (the latter turning into a ritual condemnation of the treaty, for politicians remarking on French foreign affairs, as late as August 1939).MarshalFerdinand Foch stated "this (treaty) is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years."; a criticism over the failure to annex the Rhineland and for compromising French security for the benefit of the United States and Britain.[98][92][93][97][99][100][101] When Clemenceau stood for election asPresident of France in January 1920, he was defeated.[101]
Italy
Reaction in theKingdom of Italy to the treaty was extremely negative. The country had suffered high casualties, yet failed to achieve most of its major war goals, notably gaining control of theDalmatian coast andFiume. President Wilson rejected Italy's claims on the basis of "national self-determination." For their part, Britain and France—who had been forced in the war's latter stages to divert their own troops to the Italian front to stave off collapse—were disinclined to support Italy's position at the peace conference. Differences in negotiating strategy between PremierVittorio Orlando and Foreign MinisterSidney Sonnino further undermined Italy's position at the conference. A furious Vittorio Orlando suffered a nervous collapse and at one point walked out of the conference (though he later returned). He lost his position as prime minister just a week before the treaty was scheduled to be signed, effectively ending his active political career. Anger and dismay over the treaty's provisions helped pave the way for the establishment ofBenito Mussolini'sFascist dictatorship three years later.
Portugal
Portugal entered the war on the Allied side in 1916 primarily to ensure the security of itsAfrican colonies, which were threatened with seizure by both Britain and Germany. To this extent, she succeeded in her war aims. The treaty recognized Portuguese sovereignty over these areas and awarded her small portions of Germany's bordering overseas colonies, including theKionga Triangle. Otherwise, Portugal gained little at the peace conference. Her promised share of German reparations never materialized, and a seat she coveted on the executive council of the newLeague of Nations went instead toSpain—which had remained neutral in the war. In the end, Portugal ratified the treaty, but got little out of the war, which cost more than 8,000Portuguese Armed Forces troops and as many as 100,000 of her African colonial subjects their lives.[102]
United States
SenatorsBorah,Lodge andJohnson refuse Lady Peace a seat, referring to efforts by Republican isolationists to block ratification of the Treaty of Versailles establishing theLeague of Nations.
After the Versailles conference, Democratic President Woodrow Wilson claimed that "at last the world knows America as the savior of the world!"[vii] However, Wilson had refused to bring any leading members of the Republican party, led byHenry Cabot Lodge, into the talks. The Republicans controlled theUnited States Senate after the election of 1918, and were outraged by Wilson's refusal to discuss the war with them. The senators were divided into multiple positions on the Versailles question. It proved possible to build a majority coalition, but impossible to build a two-thirds coalition that was needed to pass a treaty.[103]
A discontent bloc of 12–18 "Irreconcilables", mostly Republicans but also representatives of the Irish and German Democrats, fiercely opposed the treaty. One bloc of Democrats strongly supported the Versailles Treaty, even with reservations added by Lodge. A second group of Democrats supported the treaty but followed Wilson in opposing any amendments or reservations. The largest bloc, led by Senator Lodge,[104] comprised a majority of the Republicans. They wanted a treaty with "reservations", especially on Article 10, so that the League of Nations could not draw the US into war without the consent of the US Congress.[105] All of the Irreconcilables were bitter enemies of President Wilson, and he launched a nationwide speaking tour in the summer of 1919 to refute them. But Wilson collapsed midway with a serious stroke that effectively ruined his leadership skills.[106]
The closest the treaty came to passage was on 19 November 1919, as Lodge and his Republicans formed a coalition with the pro-treaty Democrats, and were close to a two-thirds majority for a Treaty with reservations, but Wilson rejected this compromise and enough Democrats followed his lead to end the chances of ratification permanently. Among the American public as a whole, the Irish Catholics and theGerman Americans were intensely opposed to the treaty, saying it favored the British.[107]
After Wilson's presidency, his successor Republican PresidentWarren G. Harding continued American opposition to the formation of the League of Nations. Congress subsequently passed theKnox–Porter Resolution bringing a formal end to hostilities between the United States and theCentral Powers. It was signed into law by President Harding on 2 July 1921.[108][109] Soon after, theUS–German Peace Treaty of 1921 was signed in Berlin on 25 August 1921. Article 1 of this treaty obliged the German government to grant to the U.S. government all rights and privileges that were enjoyed by the other Allies that had ratified the Versailles treaty. Two similar treaties were signed withAustria andHungary on 24 and 29 August 1921, in Vienna and Budapest respectively.
Edward House's views
Wilson's former friendEdward Mandell House, present at the negotiations, wrote in his diary on 29 June 1919:
I am leaving Paris, after eight fateful months, with conflicting emotions. Looking at the conference in retrospect, there is much to approve and yet much to regret. It is easy to say what should have been done, but more difficult to have found a way of doing it. To those who are saying that the treaty is bad and should never have been made and that it will involve Europe in infinite difficulties in its enforcement, I feel like admitting it. But I would also say in reply that empires cannot be shattered, and new states raised upon their ruins without disturbance. To create new boundaries is to create new troubles. The one follows the other. While I should have preferred a different peace, I doubt very much whether it could have been made, for the ingredients required for such a peace as I would have were lacking at Paris.[110]
China
Many in China felt betrayed as the Germanterritory in China was handed to Japan.Wellington Koo refused to sign the treaty and the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was the only nation that did not sign the Treaty of Versailles at the signing ceremony. The sense of betrayal led to great demonstrations in China such as theMay 4th movement. There was immense dissatisfaction withDuan Qirui's government, which had secretly negotiated with the Japanese in order to secure loans to fund their military campaigns against the south. On 12 June 1919, the Chinese cabinet was forced to resign and the government instructed its delegation at Versailles not to sign the treaty.[111][112] As a result, relations with theWestern world deteriorated.[113]
On 29 April, the German delegation under the leadership of the Foreign MinisterUlrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived in Versailles. On 7 May, when faced with the conditions dictated by the victors, including the so-called "War Guilt Clause", von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George: "We can sense the full force of hatred that confronts us here. ... You demand from us to confess we were the only guilty party of war; such a confession in my mouth would be a lie."[viii]Because Germany was not allowed to take part in the negotiations, the German government issued a protest against what it considered to be unfair demands, and a "violation of honour", soon afterwards withdrawing from the proceedings of the peace conference.[114]
Germans of all political shades denounced the treaty. The so-called "War Guilt Clause" that they saw as blaming Germany for starting the war was seen as an insult to the nation's honour. The clauses calling on the Germans to hand over alleged war criminals also caused deep offence, as many of those accused were seen as heroes, and also because the Allies were seen as applying one-sided justice.[115][116] They referred to the treaty as "theDiktat" since its terms were presented to Germany on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.[117] Germany's first democratically elected head of government,Philipp Scheidemann, resigned rather than sign the treaty. In an emotional and polemical address to theWeimar National Assembly on 12 May 1919, he called the treaty a "horrific and murderous witch's hammer",[118] and exclaimed:
Which hand would not shrivel, that shackled itself and us in such a way?[119][118]
At the end of his speech, Scheidemann stated that, in the government's opinion, the treaty was unacceptable.[119]
Demonstration against the treaty in front of theReichstag
After Scheidemann's resignation, a new coalition government was formed underGustav Bauer.PresidentFriedrich Ebert knew that Germany was in an impossible situation. Although he shared his countrymen's disgust with the treaty, he was sober enough to consider the possibility that the government would not be in a position to reject it. He believed that if Germany refused to sign the treaty, the Allies would invade Germany from the west—and there was no guarantee that the army would be able to make a stand in the event of an invasion. With this in mind, he askedField MarshalPaul von Hindenburg if the army was capable of any meaningful resistance in the event the Allies resumed the war. If there was even the slightest chance that the army could hold out, Ebert intended to recommend against ratifying the treaty. Hindenburg—after prodding from his chief of staff,Wilhelm Groener—concluded the army could not resume the war even on a limited scale. But rather than inform Ebert himself, he had Groener inform the government that the army would be in an untenable position in the event of renewed hostilities.[120]
Upon receiving Hindenburg's answer, the Bauer government recommended signing the treaty with the proviso that the "war-guilt" clause and the articles that required the extradition of war criminals and of the former Emperor be excluded. After the Allies refused anything other than full acceptance of the treaty, the National Assembly voted in favour of signing it by 237 to 138, with five abstentions (there were 421 delegates in total). The result was wired to Clemenceau just hours before the deadline. The Bauer government included the following statement with the acceptance:[121]
The honour of the German people will not be affected by an act of violence. After the appalling suffering of the last four years, the German people lack any means to defend it externally. Therefore, yielding to overwhelming force and without abandoning its view of the outrageous injustice of the peace terms, the Government of the German Republic declares that it is prepared to accept and sign the peace terms imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.
Foreign ministerHermann Müller and colonial ministerJohannes Bell travelled to Versailles to sign the treaty on behalf of Germany. The treaty was signed on 28 June 1919 and ratified by the National Assembly on 9 July by a vote of 209 to 116.[120]
Japan
Medal issued by the Japanese authorities in 1919, commemorating the Treaty of Versailles.Obv: Flags of the five allies of World War I.Rev: Peace standing in Oriental attire with thePalace of Versailles in the background
The disenfranchised and often colonized "non-white" world held high expectations that a new order would open up an unheralded opportunity to have a principle of racial equality recognized by the leading global powers.[122]Japanese diplomacy had bitter memories of the rhetoric of theYellow Peril, and the arrogance, underwritten by the assumptions about aWhite Man's Burden, memories aggravated by the rise ofracial discrimination against their business men, severe immigration restrictions on Asiatics, and court judgments hostile to Japanese interests, which characterized Western states' treatment of their nationals.[122] Japan's delegation, among whose plenipotentiaries figuredBaron Makino and AmbassadorChinda Sutemi, was led by itselder statesmanSaionji Kinmochi.
Versailles represented a chance to overturn this imposed inferiority, whose tensions were strengthened particularly inJapan's relationship with the United States during WW1.[122] Confidence in their growing industrial strength, and conquest ofGermany's Far East possessions, together with their proven fidelity to theEntente would, it was thought, allow them finally to take their rightful place among the victorious Great Powers.[122] They solicited support especially from the American delegation to obtain recognition for the principle ofracial equality at the League of Nations Commission. Their proposals to this end were consistently rebuffed by British, French, American and Australian diplomats, who were all sensitive to their respective countries' internal pressures. Wilson himself was an enactor ofsegregationist policies in the United States, Clemenceau openly ridiculed them,Arthur Balfour considered Africans inferior to Europeans – equality was only true of people within particular nations – whileWilliam Hughes, adopting a "slap the Jap" attitude, was a vocal defender of aWhite Australia policy.[122]
Japan's attempt, buttressed by the Chinese emissaryWellington Koo among others, to incorporate aRacial Equality Proposal in the treaty, had broad support, but was effectively declined when it was rejected by the United States, Great Britain and Australia,[122] despite a powerfully persuasive speech delivered by Makino.[ix]
Japan itself both prior to and during WW1 had embarked on a vigorous expansion of continental colonialism, whose aims were justified in terms of unitingAsians, such asKoreans andChinese, who were seen as belonging to the same race and culture as the Japanese (dōbun dōshǖ:同文同種), though it was geared to subordinating them to Japan's interests in apaternalistic manner. Aspiring to be accepted as a world actor with similar status to the traditional Western powers, Japan envisaged an AsianMonroe Doctrine, where Japan's proper sphere of geostrategic interests in Asia would be recognized. Some years earlier, Japan secured both British and French support for its claims to inherit rights that Germany had exercised both in China and in thePacific Ocean north of theEquator. American policy experts, unaware of these secret agreements, nonetheless suggested that Japan had adopted aPrussian model that would imperil China's own search for autonomy, and these considerations influenced Wilson.[123]
On 5 May 1921, the reparation Commission established the London Schedule of Payments and a final reparation sum of 132 billion gold marks to be demanded of all the Central Powers. This was the public assessment of what the Central Powers combined could pay, and was also a compromise among Belgian, British, and French demands and assessments. Furthermore, the Commission recognized that the Central Powers could pay little and that the burden would fall upon Germany. As a result, the sum was split into different categories, of which Germany was only required to pay 50 billion gold marks (US$12.5 billion); this being the genuine assessment of the commission on what Germany could pay, and allowed the Allied powers to save face with the public by presenting a higher figure. Furthermore, payments made between 1919 and 1921 of roughly 8 billion marks, most of it credit for state assets (e.g., German state railways in the Danzig corridor) transferred to Allied countries were taken into account reducing the sum to 41 billion gold marks.[124][125]
In order to meet this sum, Germany could pay in cash or kind: coal, timber, chemical dyes, pharmaceuticals, livestock, agricultural machines, construction materials, and factory machinery. Germany's assistance with the restoration of the university library ofLeuven, which was destroyed by the Germans on 25 August 1914, was also credited towards the sum. Territorial changes imposed by the treaty were also factored in.[126][127] The payment schedule requiredUS$250 million within twenty-five days and thenUS$500 million annually, plus 26 per cent of the value of German exports. The German Government was to issue bonds at five per cent interest and set up asinking fund of one per cent to support the payment of reparations.[85]
Territorial changes
A crowd awaits the plebiscite results in Oppeln
In February and March 1920, theSchleswig Plebiscites were held. The people of Schleswig were presented with only two choices: Danish or German sovereignty. The northernDanish-speaking area voted for Denmark while the southernGerman-speaking area voted for Germany, resulting in the province being partitioned.[74] TheEast Prussia plebiscite was held on 11 July 1920. There was a90% turn out with99.3% of the population wishing to remain with Germany. Further plebiscites were held inEupen-Malmedy andNeutral Moresnet. On 20 September 1920, the League of Nations allotted these territories to Belgium. These latter plebiscites were followed by a boundary commission in 1922, followed by the newBelgian-German border being recognized by the German Government on 15 December 1923.[128]The transfer of theHultschin area, of Silesia, to Czechoslovakia was completed on 3 February 1921.[129]
Following the implementation of the treaty, Upper Silesia was initially governed by Britain, France, and Italy.[130] Between 1919 and 1921,three major outbreaks of violence took place between German and Polish civilians, resulting in German and Polish military forces also becoming involved.[130][131]In March 1921, the Inter-Allied Commission held theUpper Silesia plebiscite, which was peaceful despite the previous violence. The plebiscite resulted inc. 60 per cent of the population voting for the province to remain part of Germany.[132]Following the vote, the League of Nations debated the future of the province.[133]In 1922, Upper Silesia was partitioned:Oppeln, in the north-west, remained with Germany whileSilesia Province, in the south-east, was transferred to Poland.[130]
Memel remained under the authority of the League of Nations, with aFrench Armed Forces garrison, until January 1923.[134]On 9 January 1923, theLithuanian Army invaded the territory during theKlaipėda Revolt.[135]The French garrison withdrew, and in February the Allies agreed to attach Memel as an "autonomous territory" to Lithuania.[134] On 8 May 1924, after negotiations between the Lithuanian Government and theConference of Ambassadors and action by the League of Nations, the annexation of Memel was ratified.[135] Lithuania accepted theMemel Statute, a power-sharing arrangement to protect non-Lithuanians in the territory and its autonomous status while responsibility for the territory remained with the great powers. The League of Nations mediated between the Germans and Lithuanians on a local level, helping the power-sharing arrangement lastuntil 1939.[134]
On 13 January 1935, 15 years after the Saar Basin had been placed under the protection of the League of Nations, a plebiscite was held to determine the future of the area.528,105 votes were cast, with477,119 votes (90 per cent of the ballot) in favour of union with Germany;46,613 votes were cast for the status quo, and2,124 votes for union with France. The region returned to German sovereignty on 1 March 1935. When the result was announced4,100 people, including800 refugees from Germany fled to France.[n. 9][136]
French soldiers in the Ruhr, which resulted in the American withdrawal from the Rhineland
In late 1918, American, Belgian, British, and French troops entered the Rhineland to enforce the armistice.[19] Before the treaty, the occupation force stood at roughly 740,000 men.[137][138][139][140] Following the signing of the peace treaty, the numbers drastically decreased and by 1926 the occupation force numbered only 76,000 men.[141]As part of the 1929 negotiations that would become theYoung Plan,Gustav Stresemann, andAristide Briand negotiated the early withdrawal of Allied forces from the Rhineland.[142]On 30 June 1930, after speeches and the lowering of flags, the last troops of the Anglo-French-Belgian occupation force withdrew from Germany.[143]
Belgium maintained an occupation force of roughly 10,000 troops throughout the initial years.[138]This figure fell to 7,102 by 1926, and continued to fall as a result of diplomatic developments.[141][144]
The BritishSecond Army, with some 275,000 veteran soldiers, entered Germany in late 1918.[139] In March 1919, this force became theBritish Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The total number of troops committed to the occupation rapidly dwindled as veteran soldiers were demobilized, and were replaced by inexperienced men who had finished basic training following the cessation of hostilities.[145]By 1920, the BAOR consisted of only 40,594 men and the following year had been further reduced to 12,421. The size of the BAOR fluctuated over the following years, but never rose above 9,000 men.[146] The British did not adhere to all obligated territorial withdrawals as dictated by Versailles, on account of Germany not meeting her own treaty obligations.[147]A complete withdrawal was considered, but rejected in order to maintain a presence to continue acting as a check on French ambitions and prevent the establishment of an autonomousRhineland Republic.[148]
The French Army of the Rhine was initially 250,000 men strong, including at a peak 40,000 African colonial troops (Troupes coloniales). By 1923, the French occupation force had decreased to roughly 130,000 men, including 27,126 African troops.[140]The troop numbers peaked again at 250,000 during the occupation of the Ruhr, before decreasing to 60,000 men by 1926.[141][149] Germans viewed the use of French colonial troops as a deliberate act of humiliation, and used their presence to create a propaganda campaign dubbed theBlack Shame. This campaign lasted throughout the 1920s and 30s, although peaked in 1920 and 1921. For example, a 1921 German Government memo detailed 300 acts of violence from colonial troops, which included 65 murders and 170 sexual offenses. Historical consensus is that the charges were exaggerated for political and propaganda purposes, and that the colonial troops behaved far better than their white counterparts.[140] An estimated 500–800Rhineland Bastards were born as a result of fraternization between colonial troops and German women, and who would later be persecuted.[150]
TheUnited States Third Army entered Germany with200,000 men. In June 1919, the Third Army demobilized and by 1920 the US occupation force had been reduced to15,000 men.[151][137] Wilson further reduced the garrison to6,500 men, beforeWarren G. Harding's inauguration in 1921.[137] On 7 January 1923, after the Franco–Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, theUS Senate legislated the withdrawal of the remaining force.[152][153]On 24 January, the American garrison started their withdrawal from the Rhineland, with the final troops leaving in early February.[154]
In June 1921 Germany made the first cash payment of 1 billion gold marks due under the London Schedule of Payments. However, this was the only full payment of cash made under the unamended schedule, and from then until the Dawes plan began operation in late 1924 only small cash payments were made. Whilst in-kind payments of goods such as coal and timber were made throughout 1922, these were never paid in full, and in December 1922 Germany was declared in default of timber deliveries by a 3-to-1 vote of the Reparations Commission, the British representative casting the sole opposing vote. On 9 January of the following year, after Germany had defaulted either partially or wholly on coal deliveries for the thirty-fourth time in thirty-six months, the Reparations Commission also declared Germany in default of coal reparations and authorised the occupation ofthe Ruhr coalfields in order to secure the deliveries, again with the British representative casting the sole opposing vote and all other votes being in favour.[155]
In a move that was condemned by the British, French, Belgian, and Italian engineers supported by French and Belgian forces occupied theRuhr area on 11 January 1923. The German government answered with "passive resistance", which meant that coal miners and railway workers refused to obey any instructions by the occupation forces. Production and transportation came to a standstill, but the financial consequences, including the payment in paper currency of striking workers by the German government, contributed toGerman hyperinflation in the period from late 1921 to 1924. Consequently, passive resistance was called off in late 1923. The end of passive resistance in the Ruhr allowed Germany to undertake a currency reform and to negotiate theDawes Plan, which led to the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr Area in 1925. The agreement of the Dawes plan in late 1924 also led to a resumption of reparations payments in hard cash and gold. Total receipts from the Ruhr occupation summed to 900 million gold marks.[156][155]
From the agreement of the Dawes Plan in late 1924 until July 1931 when payment was suspended under a proposal byHerbert Hoover as a result of theGreat Depression, reparations payments were made regularly and on time both in cash and in-kind, though always slightly less than was required under the plan. The one year suspension of payments under theHoover Moratorium was to be converted into a permanent moratorium according to a proposal created at theLausanne Conference of 1932, however the agreement was never ratified.[155] The government of Adolf Hitler declared all further payments cancelled in 1933, and no further reparations payments were made until after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. Germany finally paid off its debts under the Versailles treaty, which had been reduced by 50% at the 1953 London Debt Conference, in 2010.[157]
Military
In 1920, the head of theReichswehrHans von Seeckt clandestinely re-established the General Staff, by expanding theTruppenamt (Troop Office); purportedly a human resources section of the army.[158][159] In March,18,000 German troops entered the Rhineland under the guise of attempting to quell possible unrest by theCommunist Party of Germany and in doing so violated the demilitarized zone. In response, French troops advanced farther into Germany until the German troops withdrew.[160]
German officials conspired systematically to evade the clauses of the treaty, by failing to meet disarmament deadlines, refusing Allied officials access to military facilities, and maintaining and hiding weapon production.[160] As the treaty did not ban German companies from producing war material outside of Germany, companies moved to theNetherlands,Switzerland, andSweden.Bofors was bought byKrupp, and in 1921 German troops were sent to Sweden to test weapons.[161]The establishment of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, via theGenoa Conference andTreaty of Rapallo, was also used to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles. Publicly, these diplomatic exchanges were largely in regards to trade and future economic cooperation. But secret military clauses were included that allowed for Germany to develop weapons inside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it allowed for Germany to establish three training areas for aviation, chemical and tank warfare.[162][163] In 1923, the British newspaperThe Times made several claims about the state of the German Armed Forces: that it had equipment for800,000 men, was transferring army staff to civilian positions in order to obscure their real duties, and warned of the militarization of the German police force by the exploitation of theKrümper system.[164][x]
The Weimar Government also funded domestic rearmament programs, which were covertly funded with the money camouflaged in "X-budgets", worth up to an additional10% of the disclosed military budget.[165]By 1925, German companies had begun to design tanks and modern artillery. During the year, over half of Chinese arms imports were German and worth 13 millionReichsmarks. In January 1927, following the withdrawal of the Allieddisarmament committee, Krupps ramped up production of armor plate and artillery.[166][167][xi] Production increased so that by 1937, military exports had increased to82,788,604Reichsmarks.[166][167] Production was not the only violation: "Volunteers" were rapidly passed through the army to make a pool of trained reserves, and paramilitary organizations were encouraged with the illegally militarized police. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were not limited by the treaty, thus this loophole was exploited and as such the number of NCOs were vastly in excess to the number needed by theReichswehr.[168]
In December 1931, theReichswehr finalized a second rearmament plan that called for 480 millionReichsmarks to be spent over the following five years: this program sought to provide Germany the capability of creating and supplying a defensive force of 21 divisions supported by aircraft, artillery, and tanks. This coincided with a 1 billionReichsmark programme that planned for additional industrial infrastructure that would be able to permanently maintain this force. As these programs did not require an expansion of the military, they were nominally legal.[169]On 7 November 1932, theReich Minister of DefenseKurt von Schleicher authorized the illegalUmbau Plan for a standing army of 21 divisions based on147,000 professional soldiers and a large militia.[169] Later in the year at theWorld Disarmament Conference, Germany withdrew to force France and Britain to accept German equality of status.[169] London attempted to get Germany to return with the promise of all nations maintaining an equality in armaments and security. The British later proposed and agreed to an increase in theReichswehr to200,000 men, and for Germany to have an air force half the size of the French. It was also negotiated for the French Army to be reduced.[170]
In October 1933, following therise of Adolf Hitler and the founding of theNazi regime, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and the World Disarmament Conference. In March 1935, Germany reintroduced conscription followed by an openrearmament programme and the official unveiling of theLuftwaffe (air force), and signed theAnglo-German Naval Agreement that allowed a surface fleet35% of the size of the Royal Navy.[171][172][173] The resulting rearmament programmes were allotted 35 billionReichsmarks over an eight-year period.[174]
Territorial
On 7 March 1936, German troops entered and remilitarized the Rhineland.[175]On 12 March 1938, following German pressure to the collapse of the Austrian Government, German troops crossed into Austria and the following day Hitler announced theAnschluss: the annexation of Austria by Germany.[176]The following year, on 23 March 1939, Germany annexed Memel from Lithuania.[177]
Front cover of a book of sheet music entitled "We're Going To Hang The Kaiser Under The Linden Tree"
Despite "hang the Kaiser" being a popular slogan of the time, particularly in Britain, the proposed trial of the Kaiser under Article 227 of the Versailles treaty never took place. Defying popular British anger at the Kaiser, and the fact that putting the Kaiser on trial was originally a British proposal,[178] Lloyd George refused to support French calls for the Kaiser to be extradited from the Netherlands where he was living in exile. The Dutch authorities refused extradition, and the former Kaiser died there in 1941.[86]
Article 228 allowed for the extradition of German war criminals to stand trial before Allied tribunals. Originally a list of as many of 20,000 alleged criminals was prepared by the Allies, however this was later reduced. Following the ratification of the treaty in January 1920, the Allies submitted a request that 890 (or 895) alleged war criminals be extradited for trial. France and Belgium each requested the extradition of 334 individuals includingvon Hindenburg andLudendorff for the damages they had inflicted on Belgium and the mass deportations they had overseen from both France and Belgium. Britain submitted a list of 94 names, includingvon Tirpitz for the sinkings of civilian shipping by German U-boats. Italy's request included 29 names divided between those accused of mistreating prisoners of war and those responsible for U-Boat sinkings. Romania requested the extradition of 41 individuals includingvon Mackensen. Poland requested 51 people be extradited, and Yugoslavia (successor to wartime Serbia) four. Germany refused extradition, however, claiming that carrying out such a request to extradite people widely regarded as heroes in Germany would likely result in the fall of the government, but made a counter-offer of holding trials at Leipzig, an offer that was ultimately accepted by the Allies.[179][180][181]
After subsequent negotiation, the list of alleged war criminals submitted by the Allies for trial at Leipzig was reduced to 45, however, this ultimately also ended up being too many for the German authorities, and in the end only 12 officers were put on trial – six from the British list, five from the French one, and one from the Belgian list. The British list included only low-level officers and enlisted men, including a prison-guard accused of beating prisoners of war and two U-Boat commanders who sank hospital ships (theDover Castle and theLlandovery Castle). In contrast the French list were all high-ranking officials, including Lieutenant-General Karl Stenger, who was accused of massacring French prisoners of war. The Belgian case involved a man accused of mistreating and imprisoning Belgian children. However, when the Germans announced that the trial would be under German law, with the German prosecutor being able to exerciseprosecutorial discretion, the French and Belgians withdrew from the process in protest. Only half of the cases led to conviction, withsuperior orders being allowed as a defence in the Dover Castle case, and in mitigation in the Llandovery Castle case where the officer responsible had massacred seamen in lifeboats. All but one of the people put forward by the French were acquitted, including Karl Stenger, who was showered with flowers by German spectators. The Belgian case was also acquitted.[182]
The Commission of Allied Jurists responded to these proceedings on 22 January 1922 by declaring that the Leipzig court had failed to carry out its mandate by failing to convict accused who should have been convicted, and by showing excessive leniency even where people had been convicted. The Allied Jurists recommended that extradition of war criminals be requested under Article 228. However, no further extradition request was made, though trials were held in France and Belgium of German war criminalsin absentia.[183]
Historians are split on the impact of the treaty. Some saw it as a good solution in a difficult time, others saw it as a disastrous measure that would anger the Germans to seek revenge. The actual impact of the treaty is also disputed.[184]
In his bookThe Economic Consequences of the Peace (published 1919), John Maynard Keynes referred to the Treaty of Versailles as a "Carthaginian peace", a misguided attempt to destroy Germany on behalf of Frenchrevanchism, rather than to follow the fairer principles for a lasting peace set out in Wilson's Fourteen Points, which Germany had accepted at the armistice. He stated: "I believe that the campaign for securing out of Germany the general costs of the war was one of the most serious acts of political unwisdom for which our statesmen have ever been responsible."[185]Keynes had been the principal representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, and used in his passionate book arguments that he and others (including some US officials) had used at Paris.[186] He believed the sums being asked of Germany in reparations were many times more than it was possible for Germany to pay, and that these would produce drastic instability.[xii]
Commemorative medal issued in 1929 in Germany on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles. The obverse depictsGeorges Clemenceau presenting a bound treaty, decorated with skull and crossbones toUlrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau. Other members of the Conference are standing behind Clemenceau, including Lloyd-George, Wilson and Orlando.
French economistÉtienne Mantoux disputed that analysis. During the 1940s, Mantoux wrote a posthumously published book titledThe Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes in an attempt to rebut Keynes' claims. More recently economists have argued that the restriction of Germany to a small army saved it so much money it could afford the reparations payments.[187]
It has been argued—for instance by historianGerhard Weinberg in his bookA World at Arms[188] (1994)—that the treaty was in fact quite advantageous to Germany. The Bismarckian Reich was maintained as a political unit instead of being broken up, and Germany largely escaped post-war military occupation (in contrast to the situation following World War II). In a 1995 essay, Weinberg noted that with the disappearance ofAustria-Hungary and with Russia withdrawn from Europe, that Germany was now the dominant power inEastern Europe.[189]
The British military historianCorrelli Barnett argued that the Treaty of Versailles was "extremely lenient in comparison with thepeace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies". Furthermore, he said, it was "hardly a slap on the wrist" when contrasted with theTreaty of Brest-Litovsk that Germany had imposed on a defeatedRussian SFSR in March 1918, which had taken away a third of Russia's population (albeit mostly of non-Russian ethnicity), one-half of Russia's industrial undertakings and nine-tenths of Russia's coal mines, coupled with anindemnity of six billionmarks.[190] Eventually, even under the "cruel" terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's economy had been restored to its pre-war status.
Barnett also argues that, in strategic terms, Germany was in fact in a superior position following the Treaty than she had been in 1914. Germany's eastern frontiers faced Russia and Austria, who had both in the past balanced German power. Barnett asserts that its post-war eastern borders were safer, because the formerAustrian Empire fractured after the war into smaller, weaker states, Russia was wracked byrevolution andcivil war, and the newly restored Poland was no match for even a defeated Germany. In the West, Germany was balanced only by France andBelgium, both of which were smaller in population and less economically vibrant than Germany. Barnett concludes by saying that instead of weakening Germany, the treaty "much enhanced" German power.[191]Britain and France should have (according to Barnett) "divided and permanently weakened" Germany by undoing Bismarck's work and partitioning Germany into smaller, weaker states so it could never have disrupted the peace of Europe again.[192]By failing to do this and therefore not solving the problem of German power and restoring the equilibrium of Europe, Britain "had failed in her main purpose in taking part in the Great War".[193]
American political cartoon depicting the contemporary view of German reparations, 1921
The British historian of modern GermanyRichard J. Evans wrote that during the war theGerman right was committed to an annexationist program which aimed at Germany annexing most of Europe and Africa. Consequently, any peace treaty that did not leave Germany as the conqueror would be unacceptable to them.[194] Short of allowing Germany to keep all the conquests of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Evans argued that there was nothing that could have been done to persuade the German right to accept Versailles.[194] Evans further noted that the parties of theWeimar Coalition, namely theSocial Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), thesocial liberalGerman Democratic Party (DDP) and theChristian democraticCentre Party, were all equally opposed to Versailles, and it is false to say as some historians have that opposition to Versailles also equalled opposition to theWeimar Republic.[194] Finally, Evans argued that it is untrue that Versailles caused the premature end of the Republic, instead contending that it was theGreat Depression of the early 1930s that put an end to German democracy. He also argued that Versailles was not the "main cause" ofNational Socialism and the German economy was "only marginally influenced by the impact of reparations".[194]
Ewa Thompson points out that the treaty allowed numerous nations in Central and Eastern Europe to liberate themselves from oppressive German rule, a fact that is often neglected by Western historiography, more interested in understanding the German point of view. In nations that found themselves free as the result of the treaty—such asPoles orCzechs—it is seen as a symbol of recognition of wrongs committed against small nations by their much larger aggressive neighbours.[195]
Resentment caused by the treaty sowed fertile psychological ground for the eventual rise of theNazi Party,[196] but the German-born Australian historian Jürgen Tampke argued that it was "a perfidious distortion of history" to argue that the terms prevented the growth of democracy in Germany and aided the growth of the Nazi Party; saying that its terms were not as punitive as often held and that German hyper-inflation in the 1920s was partly a deliberate policy to minimise the cost of reparations. As an example of the arguments against theVersaillerdiktat he quotes Elizabeth Wiskemann who heard two officer's widows in Wiesbaden complaining that "with their stocks of linen depleted they had to have their linen washed once a fortnight (every two weeks) instead of once a month!"[197]
The German historianDetlev Peukert wrote that Versailles was far from the impossible peace that most Germans claimed it was during theinterwar period, and though not without flaws was actually quite reasonable to Germany.[198] Rather, Peukert argued that it was widely believed in Germany that Versailles was a totally unreasonable treaty, and it was this "perception" rather than the "reality" of the Versailles treaty that mattered.[198] Peukert noted that because of the "millenarian hopes" created in Germany during World War I when for a time it appeared that Germany was on the verge of conquering all of Europe, any peace treaty the Allies of World War I imposed on the defeatedGerman Reich were bound to create a nationalist backlash, and there was nothing the Allies could have done to avoid that backlash.[198] Having noted that much, Peukert commented that the policy ofrapprochement with the Western powers that Gustav Stresemann carried out between 1923 and 1929 were constructive policies that might have allowed Germany to play a more positive role in Europe, and that it was not true that German democracy was doomed to die in 1919 because of Versailles.[198] Finally, Peukert argued that it was the Great Depression and the turn to a nationalist policy ofautarky within Germany at the same time that finished off the Weimar Republic, not the Treaty of Versailles.[198]
French historian Raymond Cartier states that millions of ethnic Germans in theSudetenland and inPosen-West Prussia were placed under foreign rule in a hostile environment, where harassment and violation of rights by authorities are documented.[xiii]Cartier asserts that, out of 1,058,000 Germans in Posen-West Prussia in 1921, 758,867 fled their homelands within five years due to Polish harassment.[xiii] These sharpening ethnic conflicts would lead to public demands to reattach the annexed territory in 1938 and become a pretext for Hitler's annexations ofCzechoslovakia and parts ofPoland.[xiii]
According toDavid Stevenson, since the opening of French archives, most commentators have remarked on French restraint and reasonableness at the conference, though Stevenson notes that "[t]he jury is still out", and that "there have been signs that the pendulum of judgement is swinging back the other way."[199]
Territorial changes
Map of territorial changes in Europe after World War I (as of 1923)
The Treaty of Versailles resulted in the creation of several thousand miles of new boundaries, with maps playing a central role in the negotiations at Paris.[200][201] The plebiscites initiated due to the treaty have drawn much comment. Historian Robert Peckham wrote that the issue of Schleswig "was premised on a gross simplification of the region's history. ... Versailles ignored any possibility of there being a third way: the kind of compact represented by the Swiss Federation; a bilingual or even trilingual Schleswig-Holsteinian state" or other options such as "a Schleswigian state in a loose confederation with Denmark or Germany, or an autonomous region under the protection of the League of Nations."[202]In regard to the East Prussia plebiscite, historian Richard Blanke wrote that "no other contested ethnic group has ever, under un-coerced conditions, issued so one-sided a statement of its national preference".[202] Richard Debo wrote "both Berlin and Warsaw believed theSoviet invasion of Poland had influenced the East Prussian plebiscites. Poland appeared so close to collapse that even Polish voters had cast their ballots for Germany".[203]
In regard to the Silesian plebiscite, Blanke observed "given that the electorate was at least 60% Polish-speaking, this means that about one 'Pole' in three voted for Germany" and "most Polish observers and historians" have concluded that the outcome of the plebiscite was due to "unfair German advantages of incumbency and socio-economic position". Blanke alleged "coercion of various kinds even in the face of an allied occupation regime" occurred, and that Germany granted votes to those "who had been born in Upper Silesia but no longer resided there". Blanke concluded that despite these protests "there is plenty of other evidence, including Reichstag election results both before and after 1921 and the large-scale emigration of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians to Germany after 1945, that their identification with Germany in 1921 was neither exceptional nor temporary" and "here was a large population of Germans and Poles—not coincidentally, of the same Catholic religion—that not only shared the same living space but also came in many cases to see themselves as members of the same national community".[132] PrinceEustachy Sapieha, the PolishMinister of Foreign Affairs, alleged that Soviet Russia "appeared to be intentionally delaying negotiations" to end the Polish-Soviet War "with the object of influencing the Upper Silesian plebiscite".[203] Once the region was partitioned, both "Germany and Poland attempted to 'cleanse' their shares of Upper Silesia" via oppression resulting in Germans migrating to Germany and Poles migrating to Poland. Despite the oppression and migration, Opole Silesia "remained ethnically mixed."[130]
Frank Russell wrote that, in regard to the Saar plebiscite, the inhabitants "were not terrorized at the polls" and the "totalitarian [Nazi] German regime was not distasteful to most of the Saar inhabitants and that they preferred it even to an efficient, economical, and benevolent international rule." When the outcome of the vote became known, 4,100 (including 800 refugees who had previously fled Germany) residents fled over the border into France.[136]
Military terms and violations
During the formulation of the treaty, the British wanted Germany to abolish conscription but be allowed to maintain a volunteer Army. The French wanted Germany to maintain a conscript army of up to 200,000 men in order to justify their own maintenance of a similar force. Thus the treaty's allowance of 100,000 volunteers was a compromise between the British and French positions. Germany, on the other hand, saw the terms as leaving them defenseless against any potential enemy.[204]Bernadotte Everly Schmitt wrote that "there is no reason to believe that the Allied governments were insincere when they stated at the beginning of Part V of the Treaty ... that in order to facilitate a general reduction of the armament of all nations, Germany was to be required to disarm first." A lack of American ratification of the treaty or joining the League of Nations left France unwilling to disarm, which resulted in a German desire to rearm.[92] Schmitt argued "had the four Allies remained united, they could have forced Germany really to disarm, and the German will and capacity to resist other provisions of the treaty would have correspondingly diminished."[205]
Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer wrote "military and economic historians [have] found that the German military only insignificantly exceeded the limits" of the treaty before 1933.[165]Adam Tooze concurred, and wrote "To put this in perspective, annual military spending by the Weimar Republic was counted not in the billions but in the hundreds of millions ofReichsmarks"; for example, the Weimar Republic's 1931 program of 480 millionReichsmarks over five years compared to the Nazi Government's 1933 plan to spend 4.4 billionReichsmarks per year.[206]P. M. H. Bell argued that the British Government was aware of later Weimar rearming, and lent public respectability to the German efforts by not opposing them,[170] an opinion shared by Churchill.[citation needed]Norman Davies wrote that "a curious oversight" of the military restrictions were that they "did not include rockets in its list of prohibited weapons", which providedWernher von Braun an area to research within eventually resulting in "his break [that] came in 1943" leading to the development of theV-2 rocket.[207]
Rise of the Nazis
The Treaty created much resentment in Germany, which was exploited byAdolf Hitler in his rise to power at the helm of Nazi Germany. Central to this was belief in thestab-in-the-back myth, which held that the German army had not lost the war and had been betrayed by the Weimar Republic, who negotiated an unnecessary surrender. The Great Depression exacerbated the issue and led to a collapse of the German economy. Though the treaty may not have caused the crash, it was a convenient scapegoat. Germans viewed the treaty as a humiliation and eagerly listened to Hitler's oratory which blamed the treaty for Germany's ills. Hitler promised to reverse the depredations of the Allied powers and recover Germany's lost territory and pride, which has led to the treaty being cited as acause of World War II.[208][200][failed verification]
Hermann Göring first met Adolf Hitler at a speech which Hitler gave at a rally against French demands for the extradition of alleged German war criminals under the Versailles treaty.[178]
^Similar wording was used in the treaties signed by the other defeated nations of the Central Powers: Article 177 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye with Austria; Article 161 of the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary; Article 121 of the Treaty Areas of Neuilly-sur-Seine with Bulgaria; and Article 231 of the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey.[n. 29][n. 30][n. 31][n. 32]
^President Woodrow Wilson speaking on the League of Nations to a luncheon audience in Portland OR. 66th Cong., 1st sess. Senate Documents: Addresses of President Wilson (May–November 1919), vol. 11, no. 120, p. 206.
^"wir kennen die Wucht des Hasses, die uns hier entgegentritt ... Es wird von uns verlangt, daß wir uns als die allein Schuldigen am Kriege bekennen; ein solches Bekenntnis wäre in meinem Munde eine Lüge." (Weimarer Republik n.d.)
^"The whole purpose of the league", began Makino, was "to regulate the conduct of nations and peoples toward one another, according to a higher moral standard than has reigned in the past, and to administer justice throughout the world." In this regard, the wrongs of racial discrimination have been, and continue to be, the source of "profound resentment on the part of large numbers of the human race", directly affecting their rights and their pride. Many nations fought in the recent war to create a new international order, he said, and the hopes of their nationals now have risen to new heights with victory. Given the objectives of the league, the wrongs of the past, and the aspirations of the future, stated Makino, the leaders of the world gathered in Paris should openly declare their support for at least "the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals" (Lauren 1978, p. 270).
^On 8 March 1936,22,700 armed policemen were incorporated into the army in 21 infantry battalions (Bell 1997, p. 234).
^Gustav Krupp later claimed he had duped the Allies throughout the 1920s and prepared the German military for the future (Shuster 2006, p. 116).
^"The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbours, nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old World and the New. The Council of Four paid no attention to these issues, being preoccupied with others—Clemenceau to crush the economic life of his enemy, Lloyd George to do a deal and bring home something which would pass muster for a week, the President to do nothing that was not just and right. It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental economic problems of a Europe starving and disintegrating before their eyes, was the one question in which it was impossible to arouse the interest of the Four. Reparation was their main excursion into the economic field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of polities, of electoral chicane, from every point of view except that of the economic future of the States whose destiny they were handling." (Keynes 1919)
^abcRaymond Cartier,La Seconde Guerre mondiale, Paris, Larousse Paris Match, 1965, quoted inGroppe 2004.
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