The two main antagonists in the war,Britain andFrance, openedpeace talks in the Dutch city ofBreda in 1746. Agreement was delayed by British hopes of improving their position; when this failed to occur, a draft treaty was agreed on 30 April 1748. A final version was signed on 18 October 1748 by Britain, France, and theDutch Republic.
The terms were then presented to the otherbelligerents, who could either accept them or continue the war on their own.Austria,Spain, andSardinia had little choice but to comply, though the terms were favorable for Spain who took land from Austria, and signed separately.Modena andGenoa joined on 21 January 1749.
The treaty largely failed to resolve the issues that caused the war, while most of the signatories were unhappy with the terms.Maria Theresa resented Austria's exclusion from the talks, and blamed Britain for forcing her to accept concessions, while British politicians felt they had received little benefit for the financial subsidies paid to her. These issues, combined with other factors, led to the strategic realignment known as theDiplomatic Revolution, and the outbreak of theSeven Years' War in 1756.
TheDuke of Newcastle, who delayed negotiations, hoping to improve the British position
Franco-British negotiations began atBreda in August 1746 but were deliberately delayed by theDuke of Newcastle, who controlled British foreign policy. The death ofPhilip V of Spain in July 1746 seemed an opportunity to break theBourbon alliance, while Newcastle hoped theOrangist revolution would revitalise theDutch war effort, and allow the Allies to recover theAustrian Netherlands.[1] Both assumptions proved incorrect; Spanish policy remained largely unchanged, theDutch States Army collapsed, and Newcastle later berated himself for his "ignorance, obstinacy, and credulity".[2]
Map of Europe, year 1750.
However, despite French victories inFlanders, the impact of the British naval blockade was such that throughout 1746, Finance MinisterMachault repeatedly warnedLouis XV of the impending collapse of their financial system.[3] The position became critical after theSecond Battle of Cape Finisterre in October 1747, as theFrench Navy was no longer strong enough to protect their merchant convoys.[4]
Maria Theresa made peace withBavaria inApril 1745, then withPrussia inDecember; only British financial subsidies kept Austria in the war thereafter. At a conference in December 1747, Austrian ministers agreed 'the worse peace is preferable to starting another campaign', and drew up proposals for ending the stalemate in Italy. They agreed to withdraw Austrian troops from theDuchy of Modena andRepublic of Genoa, confirmSpanish control ofNaples, and provide territorial concessions that would provideInfantePhilip of Spain with an Italian state.[5]
In November, Britain signed a convention withRussia for the supply of troops and in February 1748, a Russian corps of 37,000 arrived in the Rhineland.[6] Lack of progress in Flanders and domestic opposition to the cost of subsidising its allies meant Britain was also ready to end the war. Both France and Britain were prepared to impose terms on their allies if needed, but preferred to avoid dropping them by making a separate peace treaty.[7]
On 30 April 1748, France, Britain, and the Dutch Republic signed a preliminary treaty which included the return of the Austrian Netherlands, the DutchBarrier forts,Maastricht andBergen op Zoom. They also guaranteed the Austrian cession ofSilesia to Prussia, as well as the Duchies ofParma, andGuastalla to Philip of Spain. Faced with this, Austria, Sardinia, Spain, Modena and Genoa acceded to the treaty in two separate documents finalised on 4 December 1748 and 21 January 1749 respectively.[8]
The terms of the peace largely failed to resolve the issues that caused the war in the first place, while most of the signatories either resented the concessions they made, or felt they had failed to obtain what they were due. These factors led to the diplomatic re-alignment known as the 1756Diplomatic Revolution, and the subsequentSeven Years' War.[12]
Prussia, which doubled in size and wealth with the acquisition of Silesia, was the most obvious beneficiary, Austria arguably the biggest loser. Maria Theresa did not see acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction as any kind of concession, while she deeply resented Britain's insistence that Austria cede Silesia and the concessions made in Italy.[13] On the other hand, the Habsburgs survived a potentially disastrous crisis, regained the Austrian Netherlands and largely retained their position in Italy.[14] Administrative and financial reforms made it stronger in 1750 than 1740, while its strategic position was strengthened by installing Habsburgs as rulers of key territories in Northwest Germany, theRhineland and Northern Italy.[15]
The Spanish considered their territorial gains in Italy inadequate, failed to recoverMenorca orGibraltar, and viewed the reassertion of British commercial rights in theAmericas as an insult.Charles Emmanuel III of Sardinia felt he had been promised theDuchy of Parma, but had to content himself with minor cessions from Austria. The war confirmed the decline of the Dutch Republic as agreat power, and exposed the weakness of theirBarrier forts, which proved unable to stand up to modern artillery.[2]
Few Frenchmen understood the desperate financial state that required the return of their gains in the Austrian Netherlands; combined with the lack of tangible benefits for helping Prussia, it led to the phrase "as stupid as the Peace".[16] This view was widely shared; many French statesmen felt Louis XV had panicked, while English writer and politician,Horace Walpole, wrote "wonderful it is...why the French have lost so much blood and treasure to so little purpose".[17] As a result of the TreatyCharles Edward Stuart, the Jacobite Pretender to the thrones of Britain was arrested and exiled from France.[10][11]
The decline of the Dutch Republic as a military power exposed the vulnerability ofHanover,George II's German possession. In exchange for restoring the Barrier forts, France insisted on the return ofLouisbourg, the capture of which in 1745 was one of the few clear British successes of the war. This caused fury in both Britain and America, where it was seen as benefitting the Dutch and Hanover at the expense of the American colonies.[18]
John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich, the lead British negotiator, failed to include theUtrecht terms in the list of Anglo-Spanish agreements renewed in the Preliminaries to the treaty. When he tried to amend the final version, the Spanish refused to approve it, threatening the lucrative import and export trade between the two countries. Since it was equally valuable to the Spanish, they later agreed terms in the October 1750Treaty of Madrid, but it was another source of popular dissatisfaction with the treaty.[19]
Austrian resentment of British 'disloyalty' was mirrored inLondon; many questioned the value of the financial subsidies paid toVienna, and suggested Prussia as a more suitable ally. In the 1752Treaty of Aranjuez, Austria, Spain and Sardinia agreed to respect each other's boundaries in Italy, ending conflict in this region for nearly fifty years, and allowing Maria Theresa to focus on Germany.[17] Her determination to regain Silesia, combined with a feeling the Treaty had left many issues unresolved, meant that it was seen as an armistice, not a peace.[20]
The treaty would mark the end of the Anglo-French India-basedFirst Carnatic War.
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