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Tom Phillips (Royal Navy officer)

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Royal Navy Admiral (1888–1941)


Sir Tom Phillips

Vice Admiral Tom Phillips in March 1940
Birth nameTom Spencer Vaughan Phillips
NicknameTom Thumb
Born(1888-02-19)19 February 1888
Died10 December 1941(1941-12-10) (aged 53)
AllegianceUnited Kingdom
BranchRoyal Navy
Service years1903–1941
RankAdmiral
CommandsForce Z (1941)
Eastern Fleet (1941)
China Station (1941)
Home Fleet Destroyer Flotillas (1938–39)
HMS Hawkins (1932–35)
6th Destroyer Flotilla (1928–29)
HMS Campbell (1928–29)
HMS Verbena (1924–25)
Conflicts
AwardsKnight Commander of the Order of the Bath

AdmiralSir Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips,KCB (19 February 1888 – 10 December 1941) was aRoyal Navy officer who served during theFirst andSecond World Wars. He was nicknamed "Tom Thumb", due to his short stature. He is best known for his command ofForce Z during the Japaneseinvasion of Malaya, where he went down with hisflagship, thebattleshipHMS Prince of Wales. Phillips was one of the highest ranking Allied officers killed in battle during the Second World War.[A]

Early and private life

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Phillips was the son ofColonel Thomas Vaughan Wynn Phillips,Royal Artillery and Louisa Mary Adeline de Horsey Phillips, daughter of AdmiralAlgernon de Horsey. Phillips was married to Lady Phillips, ofBude,Cornwall.[1]

Phillips was 5 ft 4 in (163 cm) tall. At the time of his death at the age of 53, he was one of the youngest admirals in the Royal Navy and one of the youngest commanders-in-chief.[2]

Navy career

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Phillips joined theRoyal Navy in 1903 as anaval cadet following education atStubbington House School. He became amidshipman in 1904 and trained aboardHMS Britannia. He was promoted tosub-lieutenant on 9 April 1908, and tolieutenant on 20 July 1909.[3]

In theFirst World War, Phillips served ondestroyers in theMediterranean and in the Far East. He was promoted tolieutenant commander on 15 July 1916.[3]

Phillips attended theRoyal Navy Staff College from June 1919 to May 1920. He was a military adviser on the Permanent Advisory Commission for Naval, Military, and Air Questions Board at theLeague of Nations from 1920 to 1922.[3]

Phillips was promoted tocommander in June 1921, and tocaptain in June 1927. On 4 September 1928, he assumed command of the destroyerHMS Campbell, a position he held until August 1929.[3]

Between 24 April 1930 and September 1932, Phillips served as assistant director of the Plans Division in theAdmiralty. He then served for three years in the Far East as theflag captain of a cruiser. In 1935, he returned to the Admiralty to head the Plans Division.[3]

In 1938, Phillips was promoted tocommodore, commanding the destroyer flotillas of theHome Fleet.[3]

On 10 January 1939, Phillips became arear admiral after serving as anaide-de-camp toKing George VI. From 1 June 1939 until 21 October 1941, Phillips wasDeputy Chief of the Naval Staff and thenVice Chief of the Naval Staff.[3]

Phillips gained the confidence ofWinston Churchill, who had him appointed actingvice admiral in February 1940.[3]

Force Z

[edit]
See also:Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips (right), commander of Force Z, and his deputy, Rear AdmiralArthur Palliser,[4] on the quayside atSingapore Naval Base, 2 December 1941.

Phillips was appointed Commander-in-Chief of theChina Station in late 1941, an action which raised some controversy in the higher echelons of the Royal Navy, where he was considered a "desk admiral". He was appointed actingadmiral, and he took to sea on 25 October 1941 en route to his headquarters inSingapore. He travelled with a naval detachment then designated as Force G, consisting of his flagship, the newbattleshipHMS Prince of Wales, together with the veteranGreat War-erabattlecruiserHMS Repulse, and the fourdestroyersHMS Electra,HMS Express,HMS Encounter, andHMS Jupiter.

Prince of Wales (left, front) andHMS Repulse (left, behind) under Japanese air attack on 10 December 1941. A destroyer, eitherHMS Electra orExpress, is manoeuvring in the foreground.

The deployment of the ships was a decision made byWinston Churchill. He was firmly warned against it by theFirst Sea Lord,Admiral of the FleetSir Dudley Pound,[5] and later by his friend,Field MarshalJan Smuts,Prime Minister of South Africa, who prophesied the fate of the capital ships, when he addressed the crew of HMSRepulse just before she left Durban forSingapore.

No. 453 Squadron RAAF, which was assigned to Force Z, was not scrambled until after the Japanese air attack began.

It was intended that the newaircraft carrierHMS Indomitable would also travel out to Singapore, but she ran aground on her maiden voyage in the West Indies, and was not ready to sail from England with the other ships. Phillips and the vessels arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941, where they were re-designatedForce Z. Without a formaldeclaration of war, theJapanese landed inMalaya on 8 December 1941, on the same day as theattack on Pearl Harbor (on the other side of theInternational Date Line). The Japanese, by striking at three points almost simultaneously, hoped to attract all available land-based fighters of the Royal Air Force and leave Phillips without air cover when they were ready for him; and he steamed right into this trap.[6]

The earlier grounding of the carrierHMS Indomitable left the capital ships without naval air cover. Phillips had long held the opinion that aircraft were no threat to surface ships, and so he took Force Z, consisting of HMSPrince of Wales, HMSRepulse, and four destroyers (HMSElectra, HMSExpress,HMAS Vampire andHMS Tenedos) to intercept the Japanese without air cover. That decision has been discussed ever since. Force Z sailed from Singapore at 17:35 on 8 December. Admiral Phillips left his chief of staff, Rear AdmiralArthur Palliser, at the command post ashore. Phillips used HMSPrince of Wales as his flagship.[6]

Phillips hoped to intercept any further Japanese convoys to prevent the landing of more troops. He signalled his fleet upon departure, "We are out looking for trouble, and no doubt we shall find it. We hope to surprise the enemy transports tomorrow and we expect to meet the Japanese battleship Kongō."[7]

Shortly after midnight, Phillips's chief of staff radioed that the Royal Air Force was so pressed by giving ground support to land operations that the Admiral could expect no air cover offSingora.[citation needed] Japanese heavy bombers were already in southernIndochina, and GeneralDouglas MacArthur had been asked to send GeneralLewis H. Brereton'sB-17Flying Fortresses to attack their bases. By this time, the Japanese invasion force was already well established in the peninsular section ofThailand, which had already surrendered. AtKota Bharu within British Malaya, there was bitter fighting in a series of rear guard actions fought desperately by British and native troops. But by the time the British warships arrived, their opportunity had passed; the vulnerable transports were already returning to base. Admiral Phillips did not realize this.[6]

Force Z steamed north, leaving theAnambas Islands to port. At 06:29 on 9 December, Phillips received word that destroyerVampire had sighted an enemy plane.[6] He was entering the Japanese air radius without air cover, but he still hoped to surprise a Japanese convoy at Singora. The task force sailed on to a position 150 miles (240 km) south of Indochina and 250 miles (400 km) east of the Malay Peninsula.[6]

At 14:15, the Japanese submarineI-65 under command of Lieutenant CommanderHarada Hakue reported sighting "two enemy battleships, course 240, speed 14 knots."I-65 surfaced and started a tail chase, but a sudden squall cloaked the British ships. While Harada continued the chase, aKawanishi E7K "Alf" from the Japanese cruiser Kinu buzzed theI-65, mistaking it for an enemy submarine. Harada ordered a crash-dive. When theI-65 surfaced 30 minutes later, the contact with Phillips's force had been lost.[8]

At 18:30, when the weather cleared and three Japanese naval reconnaissance planes were sighted from the flagship, Phillips realized that his position was precarious and untenable. Reluctantly, he reversed course to return to Singapore at high speed. As Phillips steamed south, dispatches from Singapore portrayed impending doom on the shores of Malaya. The British Army was falling back fast. Shortly before midnight on 9 December, word came through of an enemy landing atKuantan, halfway betweenKota Bharu andSingapore. Phillips, in view of the imminent danger to Singapore, decided to strike at Kuantan.[6]

At dawn on 10 December, an unidentified plane was sighted about 60 miles (97 km) off Kuantan. Phillips continued on his course while launching a reconnaissance plane fromPrince of Wales. The reconnaissance plane found no evidence of the enemy. The destroyerExpress steamed ahead to reconnoitre the harbour of Kuantan, found it deserted, and closed with the flagship again at 08:35. Phillips had not yet realized that his intelligence from Singapore was faulty, and he continued to search for a nonexistent surface enemy, first to the northward and then to the eastward.[6]

TenBrewster Buffalo fighters ofNo. 453 Squadron RAAF atRAF Sembawang were allocated to Force Z.[9] They were designated the Fleet Defence Squadron for this task, with Flight LieutenantTim Vigors given the radio procedures used by Force Z.[10] After the war, Vigors remained bitter towards Admiral Phillips for his failure to call for air support.[10] Phillips decided not to ask theRoyal Australian Air Force for an air screen because he considered it more important to maintainradio silence.[7] At about 1020 on 10 December, a Japanese plane was sighted shadowingPrince of Wales. The crews immediately assumed anti-aircraft stations.[6]

At 11:00, by which time the sea was brilliantly sunlit, nine Japanese planes were sighted at an altitude 10,000 feet. They flew in single file along the length of the 32,000-ton battle cruiserRepulse. A bomb hit the catapult deck and exploded in the hangar, setting a fire below decks.[7]

At 11:15, CaptainWilliam Tennant ofRepulse radioed the RAAF for help. At 11:40, thePrince of Wales was attacked by torpedo bombers. She was hit astern, knocking out her propellers and rudder. Several waves of torpedo bombers swooped in on theRepulse. ThePrince of Wales signalled, asking whether she had been hit. TheRepulse replied, "We have avoided 19 torpedoes till now, thanks to Providence." Australian air protection was still not on hand at 12:20 p.m.CBS reporterCecil Brown, who was on board theRepulse, described the battle:[7]

"Stand by for barrage," comes over the ship's communication system. One plane is circling around. It's now at 300 or 400 yards, approaching us from the port side. It's coming closer head-on, and I see a torpedo drop. A watcher shouts, "Stand by for torpedo", and the tin fish is streaking directly for us.

Some one says: "This one's got us."

The torpedo struck the side on which I was standing, about twenty yards astern of my position. It felt like the ship had crashed into a well-rooted dock. It threw me four feet across the deck, but I did not fall, and I did not feel any explosion—just this very great jar.

Almost immediately, it seemed, we began to list, and less than a minute later there was another jar of the same kind and same force, except that it was almost precisely the same spot on the starboard.

After the first torpedo, the communications system coolly announced: 'Blow up your lifebelts.' I was in this process when the second torpedo struck, and the settling ship and crazy angle were so apparent that I didn't continue blowing the belt.

The communications system announced: "Prepare to abandon ship. May God be with you."

Prince of Wales andRepulse weresunk by Japanese air attack on 10 December 1941 by 86 Japanese bombers and torpedo bombers from the22nd Air Flotilla based atSaigon. The destroyers saved 2,081 of the 2,921 crew on the stricken capital ships, but 840 sailors were lost.Prince of Wales CaptainJohn Leach and Phillips went down with their ship. As both the British warships sank, the RAAF planes finally appeared.[2]

Aftermath of the sinking ofPrince of Wales andRepulse

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After the destruction of the British fleet, the Japanese continued to advance in Malaya. BritishLieutenant GeneralArthur Percival ordered a retreat from Malaya to Singapore on 27 January 1942.[11] On 15 February, Percivalsurrendered his remaining army of 85,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops to the Japanese, the largest capitulation in British history.[12]

Regarding Phillips's decision to proceed without air cover, Naval historianSamuel Eliot Morison wrote:

Those who make the decisions in war are constantly weighing certain risks against possible gains. At the outset of hostilities [U.S.]Admiral Hart thought of sending his small striking force north of Luzon to challenge Japanese communications, but decided that the risk to his ships outweighed the possible gain because the enemy had won control of the air. Admiral Phillips had precisely the same problem in Malaya. Should he steam into the Gulf of Siam and expose his ships to air attack from Indochina in the hope of breaking enemy communications with their landing force? He decided to take the chance. With the Royal Air Force and the British Army fighting for their lives, the Royal Navy could not be true to its tradition by remaining idly at anchor.[6]

Morison wrote, that as a result of the sinking ofPrince of Wales andRepulse:

...[T]he half-truth "Capital ships cannot withstand land-based air power" became elevated to the dignity of a tactical principle that none dared take the risk to disprove. And the Japanese had disposed of the only Allied battleship and battle cruiser in the Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii. The Allies lost face throughout the Orient and began to lose confidence in themselves.[6]

U.S. AdmiralThomas Hart, Phillips's American counterpart, was critical of the air support to Force Z. He was unaware of Phillips's change of plan and preference for radio silence at the time. Hart toldTime magazine in 1942:

The only thing that would have saved Singapore would have been the success of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips's attempt to place his heavy ships where they could sink the Japanese transports at sea. We have never heard why the R.A.F. fighters, which were half an hour away, gave Admiral Phillips no help whatever.[13]

Phillips's name is inscribed at thePlymouth Naval Memorial inPlymouth, England.[1]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^
    The others were SovietRed Army GeneralsIvan Chernyakhovsky andNikolai Vatutin, ChineseNational Army Lieutenant-GeneralZhang Zizhong (at the time of his death holding acting full general rank), and ItalianRegia Marina Ammiraglio di SquadraCarlo Bergamini.U.S. Army Lieutenant GeneralsLesley J. McNair andSimon Bolivar Buckner Jr. were posthumously promoted to the rank of General decades after being killed.

Citations

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  1. ^ab"Admiral Sir TOM SPENCER VAUGHAN PHILLIPS, KCB".Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Retrieved5 May 2010.
  2. ^ab"World Battlefronts: Wales, Repulse: A Lesson".Time Magazine. 22 December 1941. Archived fromthe original on 5 November 2012. Retrieved5 May 2010.
  3. ^abcdefghC. Peter Chen."Thomas Phillips".World War II Database. Retrieved6 May 2010.
  4. ^L, Klemen (1999–2000)."Rear-Admiral Sir Arthur Francis Eric Palliser".Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941–1942.
  5. ^Captain Stephen Roskill: The war at sea, 1939–1945 Three volumes (1954–61; 1994)
  6. ^abcdefghijSamuel Eliot Morison (September 1948).""The Rising Sun in the Pacific" pages 188–90".History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War Two, Volume III.Little, Brown & Company. Retrieved4 May 2010.
  7. ^abcd"World Battlefronts: Wales, Repulse: A Lesson".Time Magazine. 22 December 1941. Archived fromthe original on 9 June 2008. Retrieved5 May 2010.
  8. ^Bob Hackett & Sander Kingsepp."IJN Submarine I-165: Tabular Record of Movement".Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved31 August 2023.
  9. ^Stephen, p. 108.
  10. ^ab"Tim Vigors – Telegraph".The Telegraph. 19 November 2003. Retrieved12 June 2011.
  11. ^Colin Smith (2006).Singapore Burning: Heroism and Surrender in World War II. Penguin Books Limited.ISBN 978-0-14-190662-1.
  12. ^"Down but Not Out".Time Magazine. 2 December 1991. Archived fromthe original on 2 September 2010. Retrieved6 May 2010.
  13. ^"Tommy Hart Speaks Out".Time Magazine. 12 October 1942. Archived fromthe original on 14 October 2010. Retrieved5 May 2010.

References

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  • Mark M. Boatner:The Biographical Dictionary of World War II. – Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1996. –ISBN 0-89141-548-3
  • H. G. Thursfield:Phillips, Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan (1888–1941). In: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. – Oxford und New York, 1959
  • Stephen, Martin.Sea Battles in Close-up, p. 99–114. Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan, 1988.
  • Part of this article are based on a translation of theequivalent article of theGerman Wikipedia, dated 28 September 2006

External links

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Wikimedia Commons has media related toTom Phillips.
Military offices
Preceded byDeputy Chief of the Naval Staff
1939 – 1940
Vacant
Title next held by
Robert Oliver
Preceded by
Himself
asDeputy Chief of the Naval Staff
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff
1940 – 1941
Succeeded by
Preceded byasCommander-in-Chief, China StationCommander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet
1941
Succeeded by
Sir Geoffrey Layton
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